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Summary
Program evaluation is an important tool to inform policy makers about the eﬀectiveness of
programs and the eﬃcient allocation of resources. Several studies have examined the impact
of school feeding and deworming programs on educational outcomes in developing countries.
However, conﬂicting evidence still exists regarding the eﬀectiveness of these programs on school
performance. Also, there are little evidences on the cost eﬀectiveness of these programs.
Although nutritional and health experiences have been developed in recent years in Senegal,
there is no empirical study gearing towards assessing the impacts of meal and deworming pro-
grams on educational outcomes, that also addresses issues related to the complementarity or
substitutability of the two programs.
This thesis aims at ﬁlling this gap. We use experimental and observational data and rely on
both program evaluation and structural approaches. The thesis is organized in 5 chapters. After
introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 uses observational data to assess the impacts of meal and
deworming programs taken on isolation. We study the impact of these programs on school per-
formances measured by test scores, while elaborating on the determinants of test scores. This
explains that the meal and the deworming programs can increase pupils’ scores. The impact
of each program is more important for pupils who are in school with association of mothers.
Deworming in school has a positive eﬀect on pupils’ performance, while the deworming at home
has a negative impact on pupils’ scores. In addition, the deworming program increases signiﬁ-
cantly the scores of pupils who are in school with association of their mothers or school project.
Among the determinants of test scores, education expenditure, household size, Koranic school,
early childhood institution and existence of a college in the village have a positive eﬀect on pupil’s
performance, while controls such as disturbed courses, temporary shelters, gender of teacher and
absenteeism of teacher have negative impact on scores. In terms of policy analysis, the Local
Average Treatment Eﬀect (LATE), reveals that if the objective is to increase scores, the most
cost-eﬀective way is to combine the canteen and the association of parents compared to other
options including management committee, school project, school cooperative and reduction of
teacher absence.
Chapter 3 uses the observational data to assess the school feeding and deworming programs as
a package on school performances (aggregate score, French score, math score, enrollment, repe-
tition and dropout rates), while elaborating on the determinants of these performances. In this
chapter we develop a model for two treatments, which makes it possible to estimate a variety
of treatment eﬀects, while also addressing issues related to complementarity or substitutability
of programs. We found out that both meal and deworming programs increase scores, but the
combination of the two programs is more beneﬁcial in terms of increasing pupils’ achievements.
The sequence of implementation does matter. The two programs are complementary in the goal
of increasing scores and promotion rates. However, they are substitutes with the aim at reducing
dropouts. The cost-eﬀectiveness analysis shows that deworming is by far cheaper than school
meals. However, the implementation of meals program before deworming is more cost-eﬀective
than the reverse. In terms of the determinants of scores, the results found in this chapter are
consistent with those in Chapter 2. In addition, deworming at home impact scores negatively,
while existence of latrine and existence of hand washing device in school impact scores posi-
tively.
An interesting and intuitive result is that having a literate household head increases the en-
rollment rate. In contrast, the enrollment rate declines with school expenses. This result is
important for education policy in terms of reducing the illiteracy rate in rural areas where the
living standard is very low. Indeed, if policy makers seek to encourage families to send their
children to school, it would be interesting to ensure that the cost of schooling is not too high.
Two other results are worth noting: having a male teacher and holding arable land have negative
eﬀect on enrollment.
As a whole, our ﬁndings in terms of determinants of school performances presented in Chapters
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2 and 3 suggest that despite the fact that temporary shelters reduce dropout rates with hav-
ing positive eﬀects on enrollment and promotion rates, it also contributes to reducing pupils’
achievement (scores). In addition, even if school manual can improve on the competence of
pupils, when the number of pupils per manual become higher (more than 4 pupils per man-
ual), the eﬀect seems to be negative on scores. Implementing a policy gearing towards reducing
teachers’ absenteeism and disturbances will improve educational quality. It also seems impor-
tant to promote more experienced teachers (from 33 years old) and female teachers. Finally,
encouraging them to have professional qualiﬁcation CAP and CEAP, supporting teachers with
High school diploma and more as an academic qualiﬁcation, while increasing the duration of
continuing training for teachers are some of the measure towards improving pupil achievement.
Chapter 4 uses an experimental data to assess the impact of the meal program on school per-
formances in the presence of attrition and partial adherence. Estimation results show that the
school feeding program signiﬁcantly increases pupils’ performances and enrollment rate, while
reducing dropout rate. However, the program increases the repetition rate and decreases pro-
motion rate, which is unexpected. This may follow from the measures taken by the Government
of Senegal consisting in removing repetition during the ﬁrst year of each step in the primary
cycle and capped at 5% maximum rate of repetition at the end of each step.
We also found out that, the meal program has greater eﬀect for girls compared to boys in math
score, while boys outperform the girls in French score.
The cost-beneﬁt analysis conducted in this chapter shows that the meal program is justiﬁed
in terms of economic gains, while the result of the cost-eﬀectiveness analysis is consistent with
ﬁndings in Chapter 3.
Chapter 5 summarizes the key ﬁndings of all chapters, with some policy implications. It also
discusses the limitations of the thesis and justiﬁes the need for some future research projects.
Overall, this thesis provides empirical evidence on the impact of meal and deworming programs
on school performances using both experimental and non-experimental studies. To our knowl-
edge, this is the ﬁrst study to show that the combination of meal and deworming programs as
package would be more eﬀective in terms of increasing school performances while giving the
eﬀect of each intervention and several other eﬀects to inform policy makers.
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CHAPTER 1
General Introduction
In developing countries, hundreds of millions of children suﬀers from poverty, health problems,
morbidity and malnutrition. This situation results to fewer years of schooling for these children
as compared to those in developed countries. Recent studies have shown that impairment of
health and child malnutrition reduced learning time, attendance, concentration in class and
therefore academic performances.
The United Nations estimate shows that more than one third of children aged under 5 have
growth problems whereas hundreds of millions more suﬀer from tropical diseases, malaria and
intestinal parasites (OMS, 2000). Intestinal worms are endemic in tropical and subtropical re-
gions and mostly resulting to symptoms such as abdominal pain, diarrhea and exhaustion. The
consequences are particularly devastating for children. This is because it leads to malnutrition,
increased susceptibility to other infections and slower growth during a critical period of child-
hood. Infected and non-dewormed children generally become ill, which results in slower cognitive
development, increased absenteeism at school and adversely aﬀects school performance.
Moreover, the reduction or elimination of malnutrition is often sought for its intrinsic beneﬁts.
However, there is evidence showing that better nutrition of children has signiﬁcant physical
and mental beneﬁts. Severe malnutrition can cause delays or even deﬁciencies in cognitive
development. Malnourished children enter school late, mostly exposed to repetition and dropout
rates, and they are also likely to have weak scores on assessments in learning. Owing to its
negative impacts on health and education, malnutrition weakens human capital formation. Thus,
malnutrition issues and lack of child health are considered as important issues in developing
countries.
As the lack of health and malnutrition of children have a negative impact on education,
policies that improve health of children and their nutrition will also improve their academic
performance (Glewwe and Miguel, 2008). Given the importance of keeping children in school
and enhancing their performance, any policy designed to improve health and nutrition is an
important mechanism in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
Since the implementation of school feeding and deworming aims at eradicating malnutrition
and improving child health, the assumption is that these programs can improve school perfor-
mance. However, until recently empirical evidence of policies implemented in that respect in
Sub-Saharan Africa are scarce and have not been conclusive.
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1.1 Motivation and objectives of the thesis
Education is seen as a driving factor of development. The MDGs call for reducing hunger and
improvement of universal primary education by 2015. However, until recently, there has not
been any rigorous assessment on how best to achieve these goals. As it is diﬃcult to attract
and keep children in school in developing countries because of poverty, improvements in school
quality and modest incentives, like providing meals at school or rations to take home, could be
eﬀective means to attract children to school, maintain them, and improve pupils’ performance.
School feeding has been of great public interest in recent years. It is considered as a strategy
to achieve the objectives of Education for All; goals set by the international community in 2000 in
Dakar. To meet these objectives, the ‘Global Initiative Food for Education’ was launched by the
USA in 2001 and was replaced in 2002 by the ‘Food for Education’ (FFE) program. These pro-
grams are often accompanied by medical treatment aiming at eliminating intestinal helminths.
The interventions usually target speciﬁc beneﬁciaries, i.e. geographical areas, schools, and in
some cases students or families. However, the implementation of these programs is more expen-
sive than some other programs (rations for home, health or school inputs for example), which
also aim to improve school performance. Therefore, school feeding is not considered to be the
only lever to improving school performance. Among others, deworming, directly linked to health
is also another important tool. The impacts of these programs on school performance and their
comparison in terms of cost eﬀectiveness are considered important issues for NGOs, governments
and donors. But until recently, related empirical work has been inconclusive. Participation in
school (enrollment and attendance), academic performance (test score), cognitive development,
dropout and repetition rates are the main outcomes most often used by economists. There is a
lack of evidence on the impact of FFE programs on repetition and dropout rates.
Depending on the type of meals provided, the size of food rations and the duration of the
program, there is conﬂicting evidence on how school meals improve cognitive development and
test performance in mathematics and in literature (Adelman et al. (2008)). There is also con-
ﬂicting evidence regarding the eﬀect of these programs on school performance measured through
scores, repetition and dropout rates. While some authors ﬁnd positive eﬀects (Vermeerrch and
Kremer, 2004; Cueto and Chinen, 2007; Ahmed, 2004; Simeon and Grantham-McGregor, 1989,
etc.), others ﬁnd negative eﬀects (Ahmed and del Ninno, 2002; Ahmed, 2004), while others
did not ﬁnd any eﬀects (Ahmed, 2004, Kazianga et al., 2009, Tan et al., 1999, Simeon and
Grantham-McGregor, 1989).
Generally, it has been shown that lunch programs have more impact in areas of low schooling
and on children suﬀering from severe malnutrition. Program impacts may be higher when com-
bined with complementary programs which improve the characteristics of schools and children’s
health. Lugaz (2006) pointed out that issues related to the implementation of school meals in-
cluding targeting errors, poor quality food or poor hygiene can aﬀect the impact of programs.
Therefore, more information is needed on how to improve the impact of these programs on school
performance through more eﬀective targeting, changing the size and food composition, or the
provision of complementary inputs (such as health-related or school inputs).
Unlike empirical studies on the eﬀects of the meal program, evidence on the impact of intesti-
nal deworming on school performance (test score) is spotty in Africa and empirical evaluations
suﬀer from several methodological drawbacks. To our knowledge, the main study was con-
ducted by Miguel and Kremer (2004) who assess the impact of randomized intestinal deworming
on school participation, health, nutrition and the scores of students in schools in Kenyan schools.
The results show that despite reduction in absenteeism, there is no evidence that deworming
increases the scores of students. The authors also concluded that the deworming program is less
expensive than other alternatives in increasing school participation. Nokes et al. (1992) eval-
uated a treatment of whipworm in Jamaica and concluded that the treatment improves some
cognitive functions. However, other outcomes, including those related to academic performance,
do not seem to have changed signiﬁcantly. A study conducted in South Africa, Kvalsig et al.
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(1991) did not ﬁnd any relationship between drug treatment, cognitive development and school
performance. Miguel and Kremer (2004) emphasize that deworming could improve test scores
by increasing the time spent at school or through the improvement of learning, but it could also
potentially reduce the test results because of congestion or negative side eﬀects. In the literature,
we ﬁnd no empirical studies that estimate the impact of a joint program of school meals and
deworming programs on educational outcomes (test scores, repetition, promotion, enrollment
and dropout rates).
In Senegal, under the leadership of ‘Programme De´cennal de l’Education et de la Formation
(PDEF)’, signiﬁcant progress has been made in providing access to primary education during
the 2000s. The gross primary school enrollments increased from 71.6 % in 2002 to 92.5 % in
2009. However, the education system of the country is still marked by a weak ability to advance
a signiﬁcant proportion of pupils from the beginning to the end of an education cycle, with a
high dropouts and repeaters. Eﬀorts made in favor of primary education since 2000 have led
to a rapid increase in the gross enrollment rate and signiﬁcantly reduced the repetition rate.
Indeed, to ﬁght repetition, the government has taken a number of administrative actions such
as removing repetition during the ﬁrst year of each step in the primary cycle and capped at 5
% the maximum rate of repetition in the late stage of each cycle. However, decisions on the ad-
ministrative nature will not succeed by themselves in solving the problem of keeping children at
school. This is much more an issue of demand for education. Primary education in the country
is still characterized by high dropout rates. Therefore, keeping children in school and improving
their academic performances are among the main challenges facing the education system towards
achieving universal education in 2015. With poverty and vulnerability in rural areas, there is
evidence of the most pronounced delay in enrollment, school dropout and repetition rates. The
food insecure households have low incomes and a high proportion of their expenditure concerns
food. However, their diets are poor, and the weakness in the nutritional quality is compounded
by the presence of children having intestinal worms. PAM (2006) observed 31 % of the cases
related to nutritional deﬁciency in school age and adolescence, and a predominance of nutritional
anemia among children 4-14 years old, with 62 % for boys against 38 % for girls. In addition,
for some children, the distances to schools are long, and they are not always able to bring food
to school. Thus, fatigue, hunger and poor health can reduce pupils’ performance and increase
repetition and dropout. That is why, ﬁghting malnutrition has emerged as an important dimen-
sion of educational policy in Senegal, especially in areas experiencing poverty and vulnerability.
For over 10 years, the government of Senegal with the support from international organizations
introduced nutritional and health programs in some rural areas. The National Agency for Med-
ical School Control (‘Division Nationale du Controˆle Me´dical Scolaire, DCMS’) of the Ministry
of Education leads a program focused exclusively on deworming and medical monitoring in rural
public schools.
Currently, a policy of generalization of meal and deworming programs is in sight. That is
why, it is important to conduct rigorous analysis to assess the impacts of these programs on
school performances and also to compare them in terms of cost and eﬃciency. The reports
of the Ministry of Education, the World Food Programme (WFP) and NGOs only provide a
statement of positive impacts of school canteens (meal) on educational outcomes. However,
these assessments suﬀer not only from several methodological drawbacks, but also, none of
them has investigated whether combined meal and deworming programs has positive impact
on educational outcomes, and whether the two programs are complementary or substitutable.
Even less, none of these studies endeavour to ﬁnd out whether the impact of programs on school
performances varies according to the sequence of implementation of interventions. Our thesis
seeks to ﬁll these gaps by evaluating the eﬀects of meal and deworming programs on academic
performances of pupils and internal eﬃciency of schools in rural Senegal.
The main objective of this thesis is to provide empirical evidence on the impact of meal
and deworming programs on school performances in rural Senegal, while elaborating on the
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determinants of these performances. The speciﬁc objectives are as follows: i) analyze the impact
of the meal and deworming programs on school performances separately while elaborating on
the determinants of scores using observational data; ii) develop a model for multiple treatments,
which makes possible to estimate a range of treatment eﬀects, while addressing issues related to
the complementarity or substitutability of the meal and deworming programs using observational
data; iii) use experimental data to assess the impact of meal program on school performance.
1.2 History of meal and deworming programs in Senegal
School feeding is not a recent practice. Historically, countries implement school feeding programs
in order to increase enrollment and attendance, as well as provide food to the poorest pupils.
In developed countries, given the high level of enrollment rates, the main objective of school
feeding is to adapt to the pace of work of parents by giving pupils the opportunity to enjoy
a healthy meal at school. In developing countries, school feeding programs are implemented
to improve educational (enrollment, attendance, dropout, repetition, academic performance)
and nutritional (Height for age, weight for height, dietary intake) outcomes. Most of them are
initiated by the World Food Program (WFP).
In Senegal, the government has always emphasized school canteens in the development of ba-
sic education. Indeed, school meals or school canteens have existed since 1963 and represent the
activity through which WFP and other NGO like Countepart International or Caritas support
the education sector in Senegal.1 School canteens are designed to provide students with a regu-
lar food supply in vulnerable areas and to promote children’s access to quality basic education,
especially for girls. These interventions support the government in achieving universal educa-
tion for all children by the year 2015 which is one of the goals of the ‘Programme De´cennal de
l’Education et de la Formation (PDEF)’ and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Since
the 1970s, WFP is supporting the Government in achieving universal enrollment of children by
the year 2015 which is one of the objectives of the PDEF and the MDGs. In addition, the school
canteens are also speciﬁc interventions of WFP to strengthen social cohesion. The programs
help displaced children or those returning in conﬂict areas to feed normally. The WFP also im-
plements canteens to respond to the rising food prices. The action of WFP exclusively targets
pupils attending public elementary schools, children supported in pre-schools and kindergartens
which are supervised by the ‘Agence Nationale de la Case des Tout-Petits (ANCTP)’. To be
assisted by WFP, the school must meet the following conditions: i) be located in an area of in-
secure food supply or particularly aﬀected by higher prices, ii) be located in rural or peri-urban
areas, iii) preferably have a minimum size of 50 pupils and maximum of 600 (management con-
cerns requirement), iv) have an operational management committee including active women’s
among members, v) show a commitment of the local community to develop infrastructure such
as storage, even cooking based on local materials, vi) have an acceptable standard of hygiene.
Initially, WFP’s school feeding covered the following regions: Fatick, Kaolack, Tambacounda
and Matam (under the ‘Programme Pays’ 2007-2011) and the regions Ziguinchor, Kolda and
Se´dhiou (under the ‘Intervention Prolonge´e de Secours et de Redressement (IPSR)’ carried
out since 2003 in Casamance Natural). Under the action plan, WFP has strengthened the
school feeding program in its initial intervention areas: Fatick, Kaolack, Kaﬀrine, Tambacounda,
Kedougou, Matam, Ziguinchor, Kolda and Se´dhiou were considered as priority areas. Later on,
the action plan has been extended to other regions: Diourbel, Louga and Thies. The program
involves a total of 12 regions out of 14 in Senegal.
WFP activities are implemented within the framework of two programs, namely the ‘Pro-
gramme Pays (PP)’ which extends from 2007 to 2011 and the IPSR program for the 2008-2010
and following. Both programs are developed in accordance with United Nations Development
Assistance (Plan-cadre des Nations Unies pour l’Aide au De´veloppement, UNDAF), based on
1See DCaS (2011) for details on the history of school meals in Senegal.
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the new draft Poverty Reduction Strategy (2006-2010) of the Government of Senegal and the
MDGs. Speciﬁc interventions (IPSR) consisting of two components operating for the ‘post-
conﬂict rehabilitation in the ‘Casamance Naturelle’ to assist vulnerable populations aﬀected by
poor harvests and ﬁghting against the impacts of price increases in Senegal. Although the ac-
tion plan of WFP covers the entire national territory, the school feeding program gives priority
to areas located in regions already identiﬁed as most vulnerable to food insecurity,2 meaning
regions whose gross enrollment ratio (GER) is below the national average (86.0 %) and regions
with proven rates of global acute malnutrition (‘Malnutrition Aigue Globale, MAG’) above 10
%.3
The setting-up of the activity is carried out in coordination with the Ministry of National
E´ducation through its national agency of school feeding (Division des Cantines Scolaires, DCaS)
established in 2009, with the ﬁnancial and technical support from WFP and other partners such
as Caritas and Kinkeliba NGOs.
The supplies consist of cereals, pulses, oil fortiﬁed with vitamin A and iodized salt. Pupils
receive a hot meal at midday Monday to Friday throughout the school year. This meal should
include help to improve concentration and learning. The delivery of food in schools is provided
on a quarterly basis.4
The management committee of each school is responsible for managing school canteens (food
preparation, food storage etc.). Parents are also involved in management through the composi-
tion of these committees, participation in ﬁnancial contributions for the provision of ingredients
not provided by WFP such as vegetables, ﬁsh etc. The follow-up of schools which have beneﬁtted
from feeding is done by a person designated within each academic inspection in collaboration
with DCaS and WFP.
The few empirical studies undertaken and the assessments of teachers report positive eﬀects
of school feeding on schooling. The qualitative observations made are also positive but no quan-
titative study was conducted to evaluate the eﬀect of food assistance to schools in Senegal until
2004. In a WFP/UNESCO report, Akakpo (2004) examined the impact of WFP’s school feeding
on schooling and pupils’ achievement in the certiﬁcate of elementary end studies (Certiﬁcat de
Fin d’E´tudes E´le´mentaire, CFEE) in rural primary schools in three regions of Senegal (Fatick,
Kaolack and Tambacounda). The author concludes that schooling is much better in beneﬁcia-
ries schools and that the presence of feeding increases the chances of success in the CFEE. In
addition to some methodological limitations, the author did not use test scores, repetition rate,
and dropout rate as outcome.
In schools receiving meals, usually deworming is conducted in collaboration with the ‘Division
du Controˆle Me´dical Scolaire (DCMS)’ of the Ministry of education and the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Deworming aims at improving the health and nutritional status
of pupils and their academic performance. Deworming includes providing each pupil with a
500mg tablet of mebendazole or albendazole 400mg every 6 months. A pupil absent the day
of deworming will receive his/her tablet once return to school. A report by the Ministry of
education through the DCMS concluded that regular deworming of children improves their health
and nutritional status. However, it has no eﬀect on their scores in French and in mathematics
(DCMS, 2003). In this report, the methodological approach consisted of simple comparison of
the outcome variables before and after deworming without further considerations of sampling
issues. This reveals some methodological weaknesses in the estimation of treatments eﬀects.
The methods used for program evaluations are subject to a lively debate in the econometric
literature. Over the past two decades, several methods were developed for assessing the impact
2The survey of ‘Se´curite´ Alimentaire en Situation d’Urgence (ESASU)’ conducted by WFP has identiﬁed areas
considered as vulnerable to food insecurity.
3These rates were collected in September 2008 in the survey ‘Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief
and Transitions (SMART)’. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) supported the Ministry of Health in
collaboration with WFP and the World Health Organization (WHO) for this survey.
4See DCaS (2011) for further details.
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of development programs. This theoretical and empirical literature is built upon a combination
of statistical and econometric approaches.
Traditional (structural) economic models were used in assessments of policy or program. How-
ever, after 60 years of their application, economists have realized the diﬃculties in identifying
and estimating the parameters of interest that could allow them to answer issues that were ﬁrst
mentioned by the Cowles Commission. The apparent limitations of these methods in the 1970s
and 1980s led to the development of two other methodological approaches. The ﬁrst is what
is termed by Heckman (2010) as approach to program evaluation, referring to RCTs (Random-
ized Controlled Trial) and quasi-experimental methods (matching, propensity score matching,
LATE, regression discontinuity, etc.). The second represents the nonparametric version of the
structural approach.5
The literature on methods for evaluating program has reached a level of maturity that earned
it to be an important tool in many areas of empirical research in economics. However, consid-
erable controversy exists about the approaches used for the identiﬁcation and estimation of
program eﬀects. Recently, a lively debate between the program evaluation approach and struc-
tural approaches was raised by Deaton (2009, 2010), Heckman and Urzua (2009), Heckman
(2010) and Imbens (2010).6 Relying on Marschak (1953), Heckman (2010) built a bridge be-
tween the two approaches by leveraging the strengths of each. In what follows we summarized
the essence of the debate before dealing brieﬂy with the conciliation oﬀered by Heckman (2010).
1.3 Program evaluation v.s. structural approaches
An experimental evaluation consists of randomly sampling of an eligible population into two
groups before the introduction of the program. Randomization is a procedure that assigns
individuals to either a treatment group or a control group. In the literature on program eval-
uation, randomization is the term often used for randomized controlled trials (experiments)
because it is the procedure commonly used to construct homogeneous groups of treatment and
control, thereby eliminating the selection bias. The quasi-experimental approach (or quasi-
randomization) consists of sampling randomly ex-post the population into two groups and con-
ditionally on their characteristics. As it is possible to consider that the quasi-randomization is a
conditional randomization, in what follows, analyzing program evaluation versus structural ap-
proaches comes sometimes to contrast randomization (quasi randomization and randomization)
versus non-randomization (structural approaches).
The recent literature on program evaluation in economics is based on the counterfactual
model of causality of Rubin. This model deﬁnes causality using an experimental framework. As
a matter of fact, it provides practitioners false sense that random assignment or randomization is
the most convincing way to identify causal eﬀects (Heckman, 2010). Proponents of this approach
considered randomization as an ideal and considered instrumental variables or matching or
regression discontinuity as a substitute for randomization while noting that these alternatives
are all available (Imbens, 2010).
However, Heckman and Urzua (2009) and Deaton (2009) argue that, even perfectly executed,
randomization does not meet all the important economic issues. There are examples of issues for
which structural models perform better than controlled experiments (Heckman, 1992, Heckman
and Vytlacil 2007a,b). Randomized experiments have become very popular in the evaluation
of development programs. Duﬂo (2004) claims that the randomized controlled trials of projects
should generate knowledge that could be used everywhere as an ‘international public good’.
5The program evaluation approach draws some of its terminology from medical science where the ‘intervention’
is often synonymous with the adoption of a treatment. In this thesis, the use of the terms such as treatment,
interventions, program or policy means the same thing. They call for public intervention, a subsidy policy, program
development or alternative actions that could be undertaken.
6The LATE in particular and the structural approaches are subject to intense debates. The controversy focuses
on the identiﬁcation and estimation of causal eﬀects (Deaton, 2010; Heckman, 2010; Imbens, 2010).
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Freedman (2006) says that the experiments provide more reliable data than the causal studies
using observational data. Imbens (2010) note that if the experiments are feasible, they are clearly
preferable in the identiﬁcation of causal eﬀects because no approach has as much credibility as
a randomized experiment. However, this does not prevent from implementing observational
studies even in the case where randomized experiments are feasible.
Despite the popularity of randomized controlled trials, some authors argue that random-
ization has no special ability to produce more credible knowledge than other methods. Actual
experiences (randomization), and quasi-experiments (quasi-randomization) are often subjected
to practical problems that question any statistical or epistemic superiority of these methods.
Deaton (2009) and Heckman and Urzua (2009) criticized the program evaluation approach with
a particular emphasis on the increased use of instrumental variables and natural experiments in
labor economics and randomized controlled trials in development economics. They direct their
harshest critics to the Local Average Treatment Eﬀect (LATE) parameter.7 The technique of in-
strumental variables has evolved as a mechanism to disentangle the causal inﬂuences. When the
instrument is the result of ‘natural experiments’, true exogeneity is claimed. The purity of result
has fueled the enthusiasm of ‘experimentalists’. While Heckman and Urzua (2009) argue that
it is diﬃcult to use instrumental variables estimator to meet an interesting economic question,
Deaton (2010) writes that he is struggling to make sense of the LATE. Imbens (2010) argues
that the methodological approach in the case of randomized experiments and quasi-randomized
is unassailable. For Imbens, none of the arguments put forward by Deaton (2010) or Heckman
and Urzua (2009) could weaken the fact that randomization is widely recognized. However,
Imbens stated that in reality, randomized experiments are generally not perfect and that their
implementation can be improved. In addition, Imbens (2010) considers that the quality of ex-
perimental data and the design of the studies must be distinguished from choice of models and
estimation methods. Based on such distinction, several empirical studies have attempted to re-
produce the results from randomized evaluations using both experimental and non experimental
methods. The results are mixed because some conclude that non-experimental methods cannot
fully replicate the experimental results, while others ﬁnd that they can reproduce experimental
results.8
According to Imbens, the main concern with the current trend on the credibility of random-
ized experiments is that researchers may try to avoid major issues for which randomization is
diﬃcult or conceptually impossible and for which natural experiments are not available. How-
ever, in response to issues for which randomized experiments are possible, randomization is
superior to any other approach in terms of credibility. Moreover, much of the debate between
structural and program evaluation approaches focuses on issues of internal and external validity
of a study. The problem is that in general the randomized experiments may be successful in
terms of internal validity but less in terms of external validity compared to structural models.
However Duﬂo et al. (2008) emphasize that problems of selection, imperfect compliance, and at-
trition to externalities are potential drawbacks to the internal validity of randomized evaluations.
They discuss ways to eliminate these problems either in ex-ante or ex-post analysis.
In many disciplines, internal validity is emphasized. However, when the objective is to
generalize a program on a given population, external validity is as important as the internal
validity. In biomedical science, if one can easily extend a vaccine to prevent infection to other
populations, in economics, the question of external validity is more diﬃcult to solve. Imbens
(2010) proposed to use structural models in order to solve this problem.
Despite the diﬀerences between program evaluation and structural approaches, conciliation
7The parameter LATE is introduced by Imdens and Angrist (1994). It represents the average impact of
treatment on individuals who move from the status of a non participant to that of participants when we move
from an instrument to another.
8See Lalonde (1986) in the case of the labor market, Todd and Wolpin (2006) and Attanasio, et al. (2009) for
other experiments in an attempt to replicate experimental results using non-experimental approaches including
structural models.
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is possible by assuming that for many economic policy issues, it is not necessary to achieve a
complete identiﬁcation of the models. In this line, Heckman (2010) proposes to make the bal-
ance thanks to Marschak’s principle. Indeed, during the ﬁrst generations of structural models
in econometrics, Marschak (1953) stated that many problems of policy analysis do not require
to identify or to fully estimate the structural parameters in contrast to what the pioneers of
the structural analysis (Cowles Commission) and generations of structural economists who suc-
ceeded them did. Marshak suggests the principle of making combinations of invariant structural
parameters that are often easier to identify than the individual parameters themselves. The
combination of invariant structural parameters does not require knowledge of individual param-
eters. This approach has the advantage of drawing attention to how to respond clearly economic
policy issues. The proposed approach often requires less complex calculation because it focuses
on a more limited range of policy issues compared to issues targeted by the pioneers of structural
analysis. Heckman (2010) built upon this idea and suggested an approach termed Marschak’s
principle as a middle way between the structural and the program evaluation (especially the
LATE) approaches. Marschak’s principle makes it easier to determine the structural parameters
and improves upon program evaluation by producing estimates which are relevant to economic
policy.9 Heckman (2010) links Roy (1951)’s model to that of Imbens and Angrist (1994). The
approach he proposes makes the interpretation of the LATE easier and broadens the number of
questions that the LATE could answer. It addresses the interpretation of estimates and their
political relevance. It explores how to make the most of the data using the economic content to
deﬁne issues of concern and the statistics that are useful to answer these questions.
The summary made above of the debate published in Journal of Economic Literature high-
lights that unanimity on the superiority of the randomization or quasi-randomization compared
with the structural approach is far from being reached. This can be understood easily if we no-
tice that some authors even oﬀer to take the middle ground of the two. Both program evaluation
and structural approaches have important features. Program evaluation models are generally
simpler than structural models. Identifying the eﬀects of a program is often more transparent
than the identiﬁcation of structural parameters. At the same time, economic issues and the rele-
vance of treatment eﬀects in program evaluation are often not very clear. Structural approaches
produce more interpretable parameters which are best suited to conduct counterfactual policy
analysis (Heckman, 2010). Currently, the distinction between these two literatures is strong
enough. However, Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a, p. 4851) outline that it could disappear in the
future, “As the treatment eﬀect literature is extended to address the more general set of policy
forecasting problems entertained in the explicitly economic literature, the distinction between the
two approaches will vanish although it is currently very sharp”.
In this thesis, we use two approaches emphasizing the structural approach because it better
suited to meet the economic policy issues raised in the work. We seek to simultaneously esti-
mate the determinants of school performance indicators in the presence of endogenous treatment
indicators that represent selection processes. We are interested in calculating the average treat-
ment eﬀect (ATE), the average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATET), the average treatment
eﬀect on the untreated (ATNT), the local average treatment eﬀect (LATE) and several relative
eﬀects.10
1.4 Contributions and organization of the thesis
In terms of contribution, this thesis contributes to the literature in several aspects. From a
methodological point of view, the thesis proposes models of selection for the case of two treat-
ments when data are non experimental. Empirically, the application of this framework allows
us to draw important conclusions for policy makers and NGOs. A cost-eﬀectiveness analysis of
9See Heckman (2010) for a further details.
10See Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a) for details on these eﬀects; also see Chapters 2 and 3.
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a school feeding program compared to deworming is implemented. In addition, the variability
of the impact of two programs on improving school performances is studied. Thus this thesis
contributes to the growing literature on the impact of school feeding programs and deworming
in developing countries. In terms of policy analysis, this thesis provides new perspectives to the
empirical literature on the evaluation of development programs in Africa, in particular, those
relating to meal and deworming programs. The thesis can also inform policy makers (govern-
ment and NGOs) on the eﬀectiveness of programs implemented these years and guide them in
choosing between several options depending on the objectives.
The thesis uses unpublished data (observational and experimental) from deworming and
school meals programs conducted in rural Senegal. The observational data used in Chapter 2
and Chapter 3 are novel in the sense that both programs have been implemented at the same
time since 2007-2008 by the World Food Programme (WFP) and supported by the Senegalese
government to contribute to the objectives of the MDGs. Therefore, it is not experimental data
and the beneﬁciary population (about 5000 pupils) is signiﬁcantly higher than in the experimen-
tal data. In addition, the design of the sampling in the observational data is unique and rich
in terms of program implementation as it involves mutually non-exclusive treatments. To date,
these observational data have never been used and no evaluation of these programs had been
undertaken.
In 2009, an experimental school lunch program supported by the Policy Impact Evaluation
Research Initiative (PIERI) was launched with the coordination of the Consortium pour la
Recherche E´conomique et Sociale (CRES) in collaboration with the Senegalese Ministry of Ed-
ucation and the World food programme (WFP). The experimental data used in Chapter 4
consists on two primary data sets collected before (baseline data) and after (follow-up data)
the implementation of the school feeding program. During the collection of baseline data for
the experiment (RCT), the evaluators discovered the existence of programs package that had
been implemented by the WFP and the Senegalese Ministry of Education. The baseline data
for the RCT were contaminated with pupils treated with deworming, school meal program and
both (package programs). Thereafter, the RCT has been corrected taking account of the con-
tamination. Fortunately, data opportunity arose for us to take advantage of the existence of
such unique package program and the richness of information to conduct a study on impact
assessment.
The outcome variables are aggregate score, French score, mathematics score, enrollment, repeti-
tion, promotion and dropout rates. Pupils’ characteristics (age, gender, etc.), the characteristics
of their families as well as those of schools and teachers are documented. The description of the
observational data and variables used is discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, while the description of
the experimental data is presented in Chapter 4. The thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 uses observational data to measure the eﬀect of deworming and school meal pro-
grams on pupils’ performance, while elaborating on the determinants of these performances.
In this chapter, we used both program evaluation (propensity score matching) and structural
models. The structural framework has the advantage of allowing for the joint estimation of a
performance equation and a selection mechanism, while estimating the eﬀect of the program.
To our knowledge, there is no study that sought to measure both the impact of a meal and a
deworming program, while estimating the determinants of school performance in a joint frame-
work.
Chapter 3 seeks to assess the impact of school feeding and deworming programs as a pack-
age on academic performance (test scores), retention (drop-out rates) and repetition rates while
elaborating on the determinants of school performance. Governments or NGOs are generally
implementing packages of programs for their eﬀectiveness and because the implementation of
a unique program is more expensive as compared to a package. However, researchers usually
analyze package program separately (Chapter 2), or present a combined eﬀect of the package
because of the unavailability of appropriate tools that enable them to estimate the eﬀects of
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exclusive programs , while providing the eﬀect of the package in a uniﬁed framework. In Chap-
ter 3, we propose to ﬁll this gap by developing a model for multiple treatments, which allows
estimating a variety of treatment eﬀects while also addressing issues related to the complemen-
tarity or substitutability of programs. Evaluating multiple programs requires the identiﬁcation
and estimation of many diﬀerent treatment eﬀects which makes the analysis complex but more
interesting.
Chapter 4 uses experimental data to estimate the eﬀect of a meal program on school per-
formances. In recent years, experimental studies are increasingly used to assess the impact of
development projects because randomized controlled trials should generate knowledge that could
be used everywhere as an ‘international public good’, see Duﬂo (2004). However, despite their
advantages over observational studies, randomized experiments are often faced with diﬃculties.
In fact, in controlled social science experiments, researchers usually often do not have perfect
control of their target population because participants may choose not to follow instructions on
the random assignment to the treatment (partial adhesion problem) or not to respond (attrition
problem), Horiuchi et al. (2007) and Esterling et al. (2011). In this regard, some authors in-
cluding Horiuchi et al. (2007) and Esterling et al. (2011) argued that a good analysis must take
problems related to attrition and partial adhesion into account simultaneously. Unfortunately,
in the literature, the majority of existing studies does not address one of the two problems,
although this invalidates causal inference.
In this chapter, we measures the impact of an experimental school feeding program on school per-
formance in the presence of attrition and partial adherence in rural Senegal. We use a statistical
method that can overcome the problems of partial adherence and attrition simultaneously.
Chapter 5 summarizes the key ﬁndings from all chapters and their policy implications, dis-
cusses the limitations of the thesis and presents some future research projects.
CHAPTER 2
Non-experimental Assessment of Meal and Deworming Programs
2.1 Introduction
In developing countries, several empirical studies have attempted to assess the impact of meal
and deworming programs on school performance. However, scholarly contributions on Africa are
spotty, despite the fact that program evaluation is an important tool to inform policy makers
about the impact of programs and the eﬃcient allocation of resources for new or existing policies.1
From a methodological point of view, several academic contributions have developed statis-
tical and econometric tools to assess the eﬀects of programs or policies. Two main families of
methods are widely used in impact evaluation: program evaluation approaches (in particular
the so-called Local Average Treatment Eﬀect, hereafter LATE) and structural approaches based
on the Roy (1951) or Tobit 5 type model.2 Approaches for evaluating programs are based on
randomization and quasi-randomization. These approaches consider among others instrumental
variables methods, Propensity Score Matching or regression discontinuity as substitutes for ran-
domization (Imbens, 2010). However, Heckman and Urzua (2009) and Deaton (2010) pointed
out that even perfectly executed, randomization does not answer all the relevant economic is-
sues raised by policy programs. Structural models generally produce more information about
preferences than programs evaluation approaches (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007a, 2007b). How-
ever, approaches for evaluating programs are successful in making within sample inference while
structural approaches prove robust for both within sample and out of sample inferences. As
previously discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.3), both inferences are important because it is only
when both are used that assessment of a policy becomes more informative for decision makers.
From an empirical point of view, Adelman et al. (2008) provided a review of assessment of
the eﬀect of Food for Education (FFE) programs on education outcomes. The authors showed
conﬂicting evidence on the ability of school meals to improve pupils’ cognitive development
test performance in mathematics and language. Some studies found that school meal programs
lead to a signiﬁcant increase in academic performance as measured by test scores, while other
studies found a negative eﬀect or no impact. Vermeersch and Kremer (2004) used data from a
randomized breakfast program in Kenyan kindergartens. The authors showed that the program
improved student learning, but only for those whose teachers were more experienced at the
beginning of the program. Cueto and Chinen (2007) examined the impact of an experimental
program of school breakfasts in primary schools in Peru. The results showed that children in the
treatment group, who are in ‘multigrade’ schools and ‘simple ﬂow’ performed better in coding
1Policy makers are seen here as governments, aid donors and the development community at large.
2See Heckman and Taber (2008) for a presentation of the Roy model; Maddala, 1983 for Tobit models.
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tests, arithmetic and reading.
Studies of the impact of deworming on school achievement are even rarer. Kvalsvig et
al. (1991) examined the impact of deworming in South Africa and concluded that the drug
treatments had some eﬀects on school performance, but some eﬀects were not signiﬁcant. Miguel
and Kremer (2004) studied the impact of an experimental deworming program (supported by
the World Bank) on (among other outcomes) scores of pupils in Kenyan primary schools. The
authors showed that there is no evidence that deworming increases the scores of students. The
study also indicates that not taking into account deworming externalities may underestimate
the eﬀects of deworming programs.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study that sought to measure both the impact of a
lunch program and a deworming program, while estimating the determinants of school perfor-
mance in a joint framework. This study uses a unique and recent data set from a school lunch
and deworming program in rural Senegal to assess their eﬀects on pupils’ achievement measured
by test scores while elaborating on the determinants of test scores. To this end, we use obser-
vational data on 159 schools from an experimental program called PIERI.3 This program was
lead by the ‘Consortium pour la Recherche Economique et Sociale’ (CRES) and the Senegalese
Ministry of Education. The sample contains data on school and teacher characteristics, pupils’
achievements (score in French, Maths, aggregate score), pupils’ and household characteristics,
community characteristics, shocks variables, geographical location and treatment indicators.
In this chapter we use both approaches (program evaluation vs. structural models) for two
reasons. Firstly, for comparison purpose, we wanted to have the most robust results. The
propensity score used here allows us to estimate the Average Treatment eﬀect on the Treated
(ATET), while the structural speciﬁcation informs about the average treatment eﬀect on the
entire sample. Secondly, we are not only interested in assessing the eﬀectiveness of canteen and
deworming on pupils’ school performance — both approaches can do this job but we are also
interested in the joint estimation of the determinants of school performance and the participation
model (selection equation or the probability to beneﬁt from the programs). In that context, the
structural model better suits our purpose. With such a framework in mind, we can specify a
two system equations: one equation for the outcome (performance equation) and another for the
treatment (selection equation). It is clear that the program evaluation approach (in particular
the propensity score matching) cannot do that as it is only designed for the purpose of evaluation.
In addition, this chapter distinguishes between deworming at home and deworming in school.
We have one indicator for meal program (33.73% of pupils beneﬁting from the meal program) and
three indicators for deworming. For the school or home deworming (25.88% of pupils dewormed
in school or at home) we refer to as deworming program throughout the text. We refer to the
school deworming (11.80% of pupils dewormed in school) as deworming in school, and the house
deworming (16.08% of pupils dewormed at home) as deworming at home. It is important to
emphasize that the deworming program is not the sum of the deworming in school and at home.
Furthermore, we do not take the combination of deworming in school and deworming at home
into account. Also, in terms of policy analysis, this study uses the local average treatment eﬀect
(LATE) as an instrument to analyze economic policy.
The results show that deworming in school has a positive eﬀect on pupils’ performance
while deworming at home has a negative impact on pupils’ scores. In addition, the deworming
program increases the scores of pupils who are in school with association of pupils’ mothers or
school project.
In terms of policy analysis, results using the LATE show that in increasing scores the most
cost-eﬀective way is to combine the canteen and the association of parents.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2 we provide a summary of the
state-of-the-art literature on school feeding and deworming programs. Section 2.3 describes the
data used. In Section 2.4 we present the econometric speciﬁcations. Section 2.5 summarizes
3PIERI (Policy Impact Evaluation Research Initiative).
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estimation results. Section 2.6 presents a policy analysis before the conclusion in the Section
2.7.
2.2 Taking stock of the literature
In this section, we ﬁrst provide a summary of literature review on the determinants of school
performance before presenting an empirical review on the impact of deworming and school
feeding programs on educational outcomes.
2.2.1 Determinants of school achievement
Among the determinants of school performance, school factors and those related to the fam-
ily environment were the most commonly used by researchers in recent years. In developed
countries, some studies have concluded that family environment is the most important factor in
explaining school performance. In contrast, other studies have found signiﬁcant eﬀects of school
factors and weak eﬀects of family environment on educational outcomes for students in the case
of developing countries (Coleman et al. 1966; Fuller and Clarke 1994). It is important to note
that outside of school, individual and family factors, other elements such as socioeconomic and
health shocks can have consequences on student outcomes.
School and teacher characteristics. There is a common perception that school inputs have a
positive impact on school performance. Indicators such as class size, expenditure per pupil,
pupil/teacher ratio, salary, age, experience and academic level of the teacher, have been used
in some studies as school inputs. In addition to these factors, teaching practices and school
composition may help to explain why some schools are more eﬀective than others with identical
levels of resources.
In fact, research on the eﬀects of reducing class size on student performance has not pro-
duced consistent ﬁndings. Glass and Smith (1979) showed, ﬁrstly, that the relationship between
class size and student achievement exists. Secondly, they found out that the eﬀect of reducing
classes is not linear. Hoxby (2000), in the case of the United States fails to ﬁnd the eﬀect of
class size on student performance. It shows that smaller class sizes may not be cost-eﬀective.
While some studies show that students in small classes have higher student achievement (Piketty
2004), others show that the reduction of the class size still leave uncertainties (Davies, 2003).
On the other hand, while some research in developed countries tends to conclude that expen-
diture per pupil and the quality of school resources have little impact on pupil learning, studies
on developing countries show that physical inputs such as textbooks , libraries and good training
of teachers determine student’s performance (Lockheed et al. 1986). The most expensive inputs
such as science laboratories, higher teacher salaries and reducing class sizes appear to have little
eﬀect (Cohen and Rossmiller, 1987). In summary, the physical inputs are more important in a
context where school resources are inadequate and unevenly distributed, notably in developing
countries. The impact is however less in a context where a minimum level of core resources has
been reached (developed countries).
For teacher characteristics, Bressoux (1996) analyzed the impact of the experience and train-
ing of teachers on students’ achievement. He found out that experience and training have positive
eﬀects on pupil achievement, especially in mathematics. In contrast, the quadratic eﬀect of ex-
perience of teachers is not signiﬁcant. However, neither training nor experience can reduce the
initial gap between the best and worst students. More recent studies have found a weak positive
impact of teacher experience on student achievement (Clotfelter et al. 2006). Krueger (1999) ob-
tained a low explanatory power of teacher characteristics. Qualiﬁcations of the teachers have no
signiﬁcant eﬀect, while the experience has a small positive eﬀect. The latter eﬀect is quadratic:
it is maximum at about 20 years of experience. Regarding the age of the teacher, if one assumes
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that the operation of classroom instruction is positively aﬀected by maturity of teacher, one can
expect a positive correlation between age of teacher and performance. In a study conducted in
the “Republique Centreafricaine”, Diambomba (1997) observed a positive relationship between
teacher’s age and performance in French. It is important to note that in the literature some
authors have found no correlation between the age of the teacher and pupils’ scores.
The impact of the professional training of teachers has also been less studied. Angrist and
Lavy (2001) showed that the improvement of educational performance resulting from professional
training seems important in religious schools. In addition, a cost-eﬀectiveness analysis shows
that teacher training is a less costly strategy to increase academic achievement compared to
decreasing of class size or increasing the number of course hours. More recent studies (Kane et
al. 2008) have found a small eﬀect of professional training on performance. The research leads
to mixed results regarding the impact of the academic level of teachers (academic qualiﬁcation)
on student achievement (Clotfelter et al. 2006).
Pupils characteristics. Among individual factors considered as having the most inﬂuence on
student achievement, the literature mention the gender of pupil, the ability of pupils, their per-
ception of themselves, their physical and mental health. Our data refer only to gender and
physical health status of children (whether the child was ill in the last 3 months or no). In addi-
tion to these two variables, we included other variables: pupils’ age, attendance early childhood
institution and attendance in Koranic school. The literature shows that school performance
varies by gender. Although some studies indicate that boys are better than girls in maths and
science, others show that gender diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant and others show
mixed results. The health status of children may aﬀect their academic success by addressing
cognitive abilities and their academic learning skills. Regarding health indicators, nutritional
indicators and indicators directly related to health such as experience of a period of prolonged
illness, the presence of parasites in the body or physical inﬁrmity have been used.
Many studies linking nutritional deﬁciencies with educational outcomes have shown the im-
portance of nutrition as a determinant of academic progress. The evidence of the impact of
severe malnutrition on cognitive abilities is particularly convincing for children under 5 years
(Grantham-McGregor et al., 2000). Malnutrition during this period of life can lead to cognitive
disabilities which remain throughout school age. Even short-term nutritional deﬁciencies such
as not taking breakfast, can cause cognitive dysfunction at school age (Simeon and Grantham
McGregor, 1989). Many researchers argue that there is a link between the eating habits of pupils
such as taking lunch, and school performance, Taras (2005). The eﬀect of parasitic infections
was also studied by Grigorenko et al. (2002). These authors found that these infections are
common in children between 5 and 15 years. They cause anemia and have some eﬀects on cogni-
tive ability and school participation. However, mixed results are noted concerning the direction
of the relationship between the health of the child and his school performance (El Hioui et al.
2008). This view is consistent with results found by other authors such as Fu et al. (2007) who
noted that there is no signiﬁcant relationship between the academic achievement of children and
their nutritional status.
Household characteristics. To explain the unequal achievement of pupils, studies have focused
on the role of socioeconomic status, family structure (gender of household head), family size
and parenting practices. Numerous studies indicate that marked disparities in schooling and
the acquisition of knowledge are associated with the socioeconomic status of parents (Ryan and
Adams 1998). Lockheed et al. (1989), found signiﬁcant eﬀects of social class on student perfor-
mance in mathematics and languages. In Africa, studies have found the parents’ socioeconomic
status as a determinant of academic failure (Lawson-Body, 1993). In contrast, Curtis and Phipps
(2000), found that there is a weak link that is statistically insigniﬁcant between the situation
of poverty or the household income and educational outcomes for students. Family structure
is often controlled by the variable gender of household head in the literature. In fact, in some
African contexts, “female head of household” seems to be associated with signiﬁcant educational
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opportunities for children (Fuller and Liang 1999, Lloyd and Blanc 1996).
In addition, studies on the impact of family size on student achievement have resulted in very
controversial results. In the United States an inverse relationship between number of siblings
and school performance was found (Blake, 1989). However, Anh et al. (1998) point out that the
negative relationship between number of siblings and schooling disappears when socioeconomic
status is added as control. Chernichovsky (1985) in Botswana showed that the number of
children aged 7-14 years in the household is positively correlated with the performance of pupils.
In Kenya, Buchmann (2000) found no relationship.
Community characteristics. Studies that examined the eﬀects of community characteristics on
school’s performance remain limited compared to those that examine the eﬀects of individual
variables and school.
Shocks variables. There are some shocks related to schooling that can lower student achievement.
These shocks are for example the delay in starting the courses or the temporary closure of classes.
They reduce the time of student learning and, therefore, the results. In primary education,
teachers’ strikes and high absenteeism rates constitute to the main source of temporary closure
of classes.
2.2.2 Deworming and school feeding programs: some facts
Several studies have evaluated school feeding and deworming programs in underdeveloped coun-
tries. However contributions on Africa are very spotty. Some studies conclude that school meal
programs have a positive eﬀect on scores while others conclude on a negative eﬀect or no eﬀect.
So we can say that empirical studies do not draw the same conclusions (Ahmed (2004), Ver-
meersch and Kremer (2004), Kazianga et al. (2009), Powell et al. (1998), Jacoby et al. (1996),
Akakpo (2004), Ahmed and del Ninno (2002)). Studies do not always seek to measure the same
relation between programs and the associated outcomes. Moreover, the nature of interventions
may diﬀer depending on the goal of the study. Studies can be diﬀerentiated from a number
of criteria. We focus here on outcome variables and the nature of the intervention as criterion
of diﬀerentiation. For the nature of intervention, we limit ourselves only to deworming and
school feeding (including take-home rations) programs and for outcome variables we will focus
on academic achievement and cognitive development.
The impact of deworming programs on educational outcomes is less documented than the
impact of school feeding programs. To our knowledge, there are few studies on the impact of
deworming on test scores. One signiﬁcant study was conducted by Miguel and Kremer (2004)
in the case of schools in Kenya. They studied the impact of a randomized deworming program
on test scores among others. The results show no evidence that deworming increases test scores
of students. In using the Kenya Life Panel Survey (KLPS) to document the long-term impact
of deworming program on school achievement, the authors found that the program has no eﬀect
on tests score even in the long-term. Miguel and Kremer (2004) outlined that deworming could
improve test scores both by increasing time spent in school and by improving learning, but it
could also potentially reduce test scores through congestion or negative peer eﬀects. In the case
of Jamaica, Nokes et al. (1992) evaluated a treatment of whipworms and found that the academic
performance did not change signiﬁcantly. For South Africa, Kvalsvig et al. (1991) examined the
impact of a deworming program and concluded that the treatment had some eﬀect on school
performance (tests of sustained attention), while for memory function tests the eﬀects were not
signiﬁcant.
Soewondo et al. (1989) and Seshadri and Gopaldas (1989) have worked on Indian and Indone-
sian data. They found a signiﬁcant impact of iron supplementation on cognitive development
and school performance of anemic children. Pollitt et al. (1989) didn’t ﬁnd such an impact in
Thailand. For an extensive literature on iron supplementation, see Nokes et al. (1998).
Several studies have examined the impact of school feeding programs on the performance
measured as test scores. Despite the popularity of such programs, evidence on their impact on
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educational outcomes is mixed. While some authors found a positive impact (Vermeersch and
Kremer 2004, Cueto and Chinen 2007, Ahmed 2004, Simeon and Grantham-McGregor 1989),
others found a negative impact (Ahmed and del Ninno 2002, Ahmed 2004, Kazianga et al. 2009)
or simply found no evidence (McEwan 2013, Kazianga et al. 2009, Ahmed 2004, Vermeersch
and Kremer 2004, Simeon and Grantham-McGregor 1989, Tan et al. 1999). Ahmed (2004)
in the case of Bangladesh studied the impact of a school lunch program on student outcomes
(aggregate, math and language scores). Using data on test scores for 1648 students in ﬁfth
grade elementary school, he found that the aggregate scores of students who are in schools that
received the program are 15.7% higher than students in schools that were in the control group.
However, from a breakdown of scores, the author found that the improvement is mainly due to
an increase in math score. Also, by controlling characteristics (such as children, households and
schools) in particular the number of pupils in a class, the author found that the program has a
signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect on scores in English. However, the size of the impact is still quite
low. Also for Bangladesh, Ahmed and del Ninno (2002) concluded that school meal programs
had a negative and signiﬁcant impact on test scores of pupils who beneﬁt from the program
in fourth-year primary schools. Investigating whether this result was due to the increase in
class size in treated schools, the authors found that students in the control group performed
the same way as students in schools receiving the program. The authors also indicated that
the diﬀerences between the two groups follow a decrease in scores of pupils who beneﬁt from
the program. They concluded that this result stems from the low level of socio-economic sta-
tus of beneﬁciaries. Vermeersch and Kremer (2004) in western Kenya, quantiﬁed the eﬀects of
subsidized school meals on student outcomes using randomized data obtained from a breakfast
program in kindergarten. The authors found an improvement in student learning, but only
for children in schools where teachers were more experienced at the beginning of the program.
Kazianga et al. (2009) in northern rural Burkina Faso used a randomized trial to assess the im-
pact of school meal and take-home ration on health and education outcomes for poor children.
The experience lasted one school year and the authors concluded that there was no signiﬁcant
impact on raw scores in mathematics. McEwan (2013) in the case of Chile evaluates the impact
of higher-calorie meals on the education outcomes of public, rural schools and their students.
Using a regression-discontinuity design and administrative data, the author found no evidence
that additional calorie aﬀect the outcome variables including school enrollment and attendance,
ﬁrst-grade enrollment age and grade repetition, and fourth grade test scores. Cueto and Chinen
(2007) in three departments of Peru studied the impact of an experimental program of school
breakfasts in primary schools. The outcome variables were, among others, test scores on stan-
dardized coding, arithmetic and reading. The results showed that children in the treatment
group who are enrolled in multigrade schools and uni-grade performed better in coding test,
arithmetic and reading. Tan et al., (1999) in the case of Philippines evaluated the impact of
a school feeding program on the academic performance of students in the ﬁrst year of primary
school. They found that school feeding either alone or with parent-teacher partnerships, had
a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on tests scores in English. In addition, school feeding where
parents and teachers are involved had a signiﬁcant positive impact on math scores. One can
see then that some studies conclude that the lunch program at school has a positive impact on
student achievement, others ﬁnd the opposite, or simply that these programs have no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on student scores.
On the aspect of cognitive development, several studies have sought to measure the impact
of feeding programs on children. Among them, we can cite the eﬀect of breakfast programs on
cognitive performance of children (Pollitt, 1995). In general, the impacts are higher for children
with low nutritional status (Adelman et al., 2008). Simeon and Grantham-McGregor (1989)
in the case of Jamaica concluded that breakfast had no eﬀect on the cognitive performance of
children with a normal weight and height for their age, while breakfast increases the performance
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of children at risk. Vermeersch and Kremer (2004) in Kenya also concluded that the breakfast
program for children has no impact on their cognitive abilities. The intervention has beneﬁted
the boys in terms of weight, but there was no impact on girls (weight or height) and on the
height of boys. Whaley et al. (2003) in rural Kenya using a randomized program of school
feeding studied the impact of animal foods, meat and milk on the cognitive development of
children at primary school. Their result shows that food of animal origin as well as energy has
a positive eﬀect on the results of children in cognitive tests such as arithmetic and perceptions.
One limitation in their study was that there were only three schools in each group. So, it is
possible that the results are due to diﬀerences in quality between the groups. We can note
that school feeding programs may have an impact on cognitive development, although the size
and nature of the eﬀect varies considerably depending on the program. The eﬀect varies also
depending on the micronutrient contained in the food served, or the initial nutritional status of
children or the used measure of cognitive development.
To summarize, from this literature review, we can see that empirical studies on the impact
of deworming and school feeding programs on school performance in Senegal are almost nonex-
istent.4 It is important to also note that there are few studies that identify the diﬀerent impacts
of these programs on children by gender. The impact of school feeding programs on student
achievement has not been carefully analyzed in relation to the inputs of schooling and class
size. Finally, in the literature we found no work that tries to measure in the same study the
impact of deworming and meal programs on student achievement (test scores) while evaluating
the determinants of school performance.
2.3 Description of the data
The school feeding or Food For Education (FFE) is the activity through which the World
Food Programme (WFP) has supported the education sector in Senegal since the 1960s. This
intervention aims at providing pupils with a regular diet and to promote children’s access to
basic education quality, especially girls. This intervention supports the government in achieving
universal education for all children by the year 2015 which is one of the goals of the Ten-Year
Education and Training (PDEF) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Ministry
of Education, through the ‘Direction de l’administration ge´ne´rale et de l’e´quipement (DAGE)’
also funds a school feeding program. Its ‘Division du Controˆle Me´dical Scolaire (DCMS)’ also
leads another program which focuses exclusively on deworming and medical monitoring in rural
public schools.
In this study, we use primary data collected by the ‘Consortium pour la Recherche Economique
et Sociale (CRES)’ and the Ministry of Education as part of an experimental program on school
canteens and deworming in four rural areas in Senegal namely: Diourbel, Fatick, Kolda and
Se´dhiou.5 The sampling strategy involved ﬁrst selecting a number of areas for experimentation
based on the following criteria: i) poor areas, ii) existence of a standardized assessment, iii)
location of intervention must be priority areas for partners (such as WFP) that support the
experiment.6 Then, schools eligible for the program were randomly selected based on the follow-
ing criteria: i) never had a school canteen, ii) never had access to a package of health services
(deworming and supplementation iron), iii) have an enrollment of at least 50 pupils and at most
600, iv) have at least second and fourth year classes of primary school, v) have a functioning
management committee, vi) be located in rural areas. Finally, a random selection of 20 pupils
in each class was conducted in each selected school. Because of imperfect information on schools
4There is one study of Akakpo, 2004 on eﬀect of school feeding program, however the author did not use as
outcome variables, the scores of students.
5See the map of Senegal in the appendix A.2 for geographical areas covered by meal and deworming programs
in this thesis.
6The Senegalese education system implements, for nearly a decade, a major innovation in assessing the per-
formance of elementary school pupils. This approach is called ‘standardized assessment’.
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meeting the selection criteria, it was found that some schools in the sample have already had a
deworming and/or canteens program for years.
Therefore, we have observational data of 159 randomly selected schools from which we were
able to form the following groups: a group of pupils that beneﬁt from a meal program, a group of
pupils that are dewormed (at school or at home), a group of pupils that are dewormed at home,
a group of pupils that are dewormed at school and the control group that receives nothing.
2.3.1 Variables
The data available concern schools and teachers’ characteristics; pupils and households’ char-
acteristics; communities’ characteristics and geographical location. The variables used in the
estimation are: i) the outcome or school performance variables (aggregate score, French and
math scores), ii) the determinants of performance or control variables that can be grouped as
follows: those related to schools and teacher characteristics (temporary shelters, school manual,
class size, distance to school, water point, playground, meals near school, gender of teacher,
age of teacher, continuing training, professional and academic diploma of teacher), pupils char-
acteristics (gender, age, number of hours, grade, Koranic school, early childhood institution,
snack and pupil eat ﬁll), household characteristics (food and education expenditures, household
size, livestock, gender of household head, literacy of household head, marital status and land),
community characteristics (college and parents school) and shocks variables (disturbed courses,
absenteeism, number of pregnancies, number of marriages, ill last three months preceding the
survey, and health expenditures of household). We also have the treatment dummies and re-
gion dummies. The deﬁnition of variables is documented in Table A.1 in the appendix. The
control variables in the performance equation were chosen based on both their availability in
the database and their relevance in terms of the literature on the determinants of academic
performance. Some control variables are speciﬁc to the context of the study and are therefore
particularly interesting. We will mention then during the description of variables.
Schools’ characteristics.
Generally, it is assumed that schools with better infrastructure will perform better. School
and teacher characteristics taken into account are: the number of classes in temporary shelters,
the number of students per manual ‘school manual’, the class size, the distance between the
school and the pupil’s home, existence of a water point in school ‘water point’, existence of a
playground ‘playground’, the possibility for students to eat near their school ‘meal near school’,
gender of teacher, teacher’s age, continuing training received by the teacher, professional and
academic diploma of teacher. Among these variables, those that contextualize our study are
temporary shelters and the opportunity for students to eat near their school. For variable
temporary shelters, we expect a negative eﬀect on scores. In Senegal, to overcome the lack of
classrooms in some areas, temporary shelters were set up to receive pupils. These are usually
precarious straw constructions which become unusable during the rainy season. For ‘meal near
school’, we expect a positive eﬀect on pupil achievement. For the variable school manual which
represents the number of pupils per textbook, we expect a negative eﬀect on the scores. It is
generally accepted that schools having suﬃcient school manual often perform better than those
not having. However, if the number of pupils sharing a manual is high, this will impact negatively
on performances. About the variable class size, research and experiments on the eﬀects of a
reduction classes on pupils’ achievement have not led to consistent conclusions. While some
studies show that pupils in small classes have better academic results (Piketty, 2004), others
show that the reduction of class size still leaves uncertainty (Davies, 2003). Glass and Smith
(1979) showed that the relation between class size and pupils’ performance is not linear. We
expect a positive relationship between distance to school and pupils’ achievement. Distance to
school is equal to one if the pupil’s house is located less than 1 km from the school and zero if
the distance is higher than one km. We expect a positive eﬀect of variables ‘water point’ and
‘playground’ on pupil achievement. In addition, to take into account a possible non-linearity
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that may exist between some variables (school manual and class size) and pupils’ performance,
we introduced their square.
For the teacher characteristics, in the Senegalese context, we expect that a female teacher
will have a positive inﬂuence on students particularly girls who identify themselves more easily
to a female teacher.
Regarding the age of the teacher, we assume a positive eﬀect. We introduced the square of the
teacher’s age to take into account possible non-linearity that may exist between this variable
and scores. Indeed, if we assume that the operation of classroom instruction is positively af-
fected by the maturity of the teachers, we can expect a positive correlation between teacher’s
age and school performance, Schwille et al. (1991). It is important to remember that in the
literature, there is no consensus on the relationship between the age of the teacher and school
performance. Undoubtedly, the teacher’s age can interact with both experience and education
level of the teacher. This means that some teachers having the same age but with diﬀerent
levels of education and diﬀerent experience do not necessarily have the same eﬀects on student
achievement.
Concerning academic qualiﬁcation of teachers, we made a distinction between those who have
the National certiﬁcate (Brevet) and those who have the High school diploma and more. Re-
garding the impact of academic diploma of teacher on student performance, studies led to mixed
results (Clotfelter et al. 2006). For continuing training of teacher, we expect a positive eﬀect on
scores because training improves teaching skills of teachers.
Also, in the literature, there is no consensus on the eﬀect of teacher’s professional diploma on
scores. In fact, according to CONFEMEN (1999), the teachers trained for a year in Burkina
Faso and Cameroon are less satisfactory results in 5th year than those who had no professional
training. In Senegal, the same phenomenon is reﬂected for teachers who received two years of
training as compared to those who received only one year. It seems that the initial training is
the basis of this result (CONFEMEN, 1999).
Regarding the variable continuing training, we expect a positive eﬀect on pupils’ performance
because continuing training should improve teaching methods of teachers. However, it is im-
portant to note that the impact of continuing training on the performance of pupils brings a
positive eﬀect if the training covers several periods, otherwise you can even record a negative
eﬀect (UNESCO, 2000).
Pupils’ characteristics. Pupils’ characteristics taken into account are gender, age, number
of hours that the child spends on household work per day, attending at the koranic school,
attending a early childhood institution, bring a snack to school and eat his/her ﬁll.
For the gender of pupils, some studies indicate that boys are better than girls in mathematics
and science (Felouzis, 1997). Others studies show that gender diﬀerences are not statistically
signiﬁcant and sometimes mixed (Ma, 2007). We anticipate that boys perform better than girls
because girls in rural areas are more prone to domestic work. In addition, some families always
doubt the interest of the education of girls.
We also introduced the pupil’s age and its square to highlight the non-linearity that may exist
between the age of the pupils and their performance. The literature mentions a positive eﬀect
of pupils’s age on scores (Schwille et al. 1991) or a negative eﬀect, depending on whether pupils
enroll late to school or have had a lot of repetitions.
Regarding the variable ‘number of hour’, we expect a negative eﬀect on school performance. In
fact, children who are forced to spend a high number of hours on domestic activities are exposed
to poor school performance because it reduces their learning time.
Attending an early childhood institution and or a koranic school are speciﬁc to the context
of our study. The Koranic schools, usually found in Muslim countries, is an informal private
educational structure that provides religious education based on memorization. In Senegal,
95.9% of the population are muslim. We now understand that this structure, albeit informal,
is highly developed in the Senegalese society. This school is known for developing the capacity
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of learning and memory of students because children learn to memorize at an early age. It is
expected that these two variables positively aﬀect student achievement.
Two other control variables are the fact to eat ﬁll at home and the fact to bring a snack to school.
These two variables are not frequently used in the literature. Recall that the study focuses on a
population in rural areas and these indicators tell us about the nutritional well-being of students.
We anticipate that these two variables have a positive eﬀect on pupils’ performance.
Households’ characteristics. Among the households’ characteristics of pupils, we have in-
cluded: food and education expenditures, household size per adult equivalent, literacy of the
household head, gender of household head, marital status, possession of an arable land and
livestock owned by the household.
The variable food expenditure is an indicator of standard of living of the household. We expect
a positive correlation with performance. The variable education expenditure, we also expect a
positive relationship with performance because more parents invest in the education of children,
more they will follow the children at home.
Household size per adult equivalent has also been used as a control variable. Studies on
the impact of family size on schooling in developing countries have led to highly controversial
results that do not allow generalizable conclusions. We expect a positive relationship between
family size and pupils’ performance. We believe that in large size households, it is likely to have
seniors persons who are already in college or high school and who should be willing to guide the
youngest.
Literacy of household head is another important variable in the explanation of the performance
of the student. In fact, a literate environment has a positive inﬂuence on the child’s ability to
learn read, write and do arithmetic if however, the child is well supported at home.
Household characteristics also consist of their marital status. Since more than 95% of house-
hold heads are married, we have grouped the terms of this variable to married and unmarried
(unmarried included singles, divorced, concubine and widowed). We expect that children living
with parents married will have better performance, although individual experiences suggest that
children living with a single mother divorced or widowed are generally more successful compared
to children living with both parents in a large polygamous household.
Two others important variables not mentioned in the literature are the household ownership
of arable land and the number of livestock owned by the household. Despite the fact that
these two variables are indicators of richness, we expect that they will have a negative eﬀect
on children’s performance. In terms of arable land, especially in the context of Senegal, rural
households still continue to use their children for domestic and farm work. It is therefore likely
that children living in households with farmland are asked to work in the ﬁelds, which will result
in reducing the learning time of pupil. The same reasoning applies to the variable livestock
owned by the household. The probability is that the higher the size of livestock, the more
children in the household are exposed to work.
Community characteristic. Studies examining the eﬀects of community characteristics on
pupils’ performance are still limited compared to those examining the eﬀects of individual,
family and school variables. However, factors associated with neighborhood can have both,
positive and negative inﬂuences on school performance. In this research, the characteristics of
the environment taken into account are: the existence of a college in the village of the student,
the fact for students to live in a community where some children do not go to school because
parents are not interested in school.
Regarding the existence of a college, we expect a positive eﬀect on performance. Indeed, parents
who have not the possibility to help their children to pursue studies in a remote village after
obtaining the primary certiﬁcate will invest little in their child’s education, because they are
convinced that he will leave school prematurely. In addition, living in a village where there is a
college implies that there are seniors who are in college and can help the younger ones with their
studies. Regarding variable ‘Parents school’, we expect a negative eﬀect on performance. Living
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in a community where some children do not go to school because parents are not interested
could negatively impact on the scores. In such communities, a lot of children are generally used
to work to help their families. We believe that living in this context is likely to have an adverse
eﬀect on the performance of children who go to school because there possibility of ripple eﬀect.
Shocks variables. Among shocks, we have those directly aﬀecting the child, those aﬀecting
his school, his household and those acting on the environment in which he lives. Shock variable
directly aﬀecting pupils which is available is: being sick during the last three months preceding
the survey (‘sick last 3 month’). The health of students is a major element for the explanation of
the performance. Being sick the last three months preceding the survey can reduce the time of
school attendance and learning ability therefore the performance of pupil. We expect a negative
eﬀect of this variable on student performance.
Shocks variable aﬀecting school of pupils are: the number of pregnancies ‘Pregnancies’ and mar-
riages registered during the school year, teacher absenteeism and the existence of disturbances
which entrained delays in starting courses.
For variable number of pregnancy and number of marriage, we expect negative eﬀect on perfor-
mance. Girls in rural areas are generally exposed to early marriage and pregnancy. If marriage
or pregnancy does not result automatically by a pure and simple dropout of the pupil, it becomes
extremely diﬃcult to focus on her studies due to family responsibilities.
Regarding the variable absenteeism, we expect a negative eﬀect of this variable on performance,
because if the teacher is often absent, the learning time will reduced, as well as the performance.
The existence of disturbances having driven delays in the start of the courses also reduces the
learning time of pupils. We hypothesized a negative eﬀect of this variable on pupils’ perfor-
mance.
Shock variable aﬀecting the household of the pupil is: health expenditure. We expect a negative
eﬀect of this variable on performance of pupil. In fact, a high health expenditure shows that
there have been cases of illness in the household. The illness of the pupil has a negative eﬀect
on the learning time. In addition, illness of a family member (parent, etc.) can aﬀect the pupil
psychologically. It is important to note that low health expenditure does not necessarily signify
that there are no illness cases in the household concerned. It may be that the household is
unable to provide medical needs for their members.
In addition, having regarded some speciﬁc characteristic area of intervention for which in-
formation is not available, we introduced the indicator regions among control variables. It is
dummies variables for Diourbel Fatick, Kolda and Sedhiou. The reference region is Fatick which
has the largest number of pupils.
Having also consider the choice of control variables in the selection equation of the meal
program at school, we used the criteria set by WFP and the division of school canteens. Among
the criteria, there is a lack of information in the database on some variables such as being
located in an area food insecure or particularly aﬀected by rising prices. The variables are the
total number of students in the school, the distance between the school and pupils’ homes, the
existence of a management committee in the school, an association of parents, a cooperative
school, a grant from the Rural Council, a water point, a disturbances that delays starting
courses, a storage, and the gender of pupil. We assume that the distance to school has a negative
inﬂuence on the probability to beneﬁt from the program, while the forms of associations and
infrastructure that exist within the school will act positively on the probability of having the
program. Similarly, we anticipate disturbances in courses and having more boys in the school
act negatively on the probability to beneﬁt from the meal program. For the choice of control
variables in the selection equation of deworming program, we based this on the criteria listed
by the Ministry in the meal program and our intuition. The variables are: The total number
of students, the existence of a management committee of the school, an parents’ association,
a cooperative school, a water point, a medicine box, gender of the pupil and literacy of the
household head.
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2.3.2 Descriptive statistics
We summarize the statistics of variables in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix, respectively
for meal and deworming programs. The statistics are provided by group (treatment and control
group). Additionally, the last column of each block reports the test whether variables are
statistically diﬀerent across treatment and control groups.
For the meal program (Table A.2 in the appendix), the summary statistics show that on
average the treatment group perform better than the treatment group in terms of the scores
(aggregate, French and math). The mean of aggregate, French and math scores for the treatment
group are 42.445, 41.877 and 42.890 respectively, whereas they are 37.587, 38.228 and 36.949
for the control group. There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two groups as showed by
the t-test. We also note that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two groups for the
following variables: total pupils, number of hours, food expenditure, household size, cooperative
school, meal near school, professional qualiﬁcation CAP, other professional qualiﬁcation, aca-
demic qualiﬁcation (high school diploma), academic qualiﬁcation (national certiﬁcate), gender
of pupil, grade, Koranic school, sick last 3 months, pupils eat ﬁll, literacy of household head,
marital status, land and parents school. On average, there are about 187 pupils per school in
each group. Pupils spends on average 3 hours per day to do household work, also, The house-
hold size is about 11 persons on average and we note the same food expenditure in each group.
In each group, about 56% of teachers have ‘brevet’ as academic qualiﬁcation, while only 44%
have a ‘high school diploma’ as academic qualiﬁcation. In the treatment group, about 48% of
the pupils are boys, while in the control group, there are about 50% of boys. But there is no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two averages. In the treatment group, approximately 27% of
pupils became sick during the last three months preceding the survey while it is 24.4% in the
control group, but there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two averages. Also, on average,
in each group, 16% of household heads are literate, 95% are married and 95% have their own
arable land. In each group, 49% of children live in a community where some children do not go
to school because their parents are not interested in sending them to school.
For some variables such as temporary shelters, school manual, pregnancies, teacher’s age,
education expenditure, health expenditure, distance to school, playground, management com-
mittee, association of parents, association of mothers, rural council grant, water point, disturbed
courses, storage, professional qualiﬁcation CEAP, gender of household head, Fatick and Se´dhiou,
the treatment group shows the highest average with a signiﬁcant diﬀerence. However, if we take
the variables, class size, marriages, pupil’s age, livestock, school project, medicine box, gender of
teacher, no professional diploma, continuing training, absenteeism, early childhood institution,
snack, college, Diourbel and Kolda, the control group displays the highest average with a signif-
icant diﬀerence. So far, around 92% of schools in the treatment group have a playground while
it is around 75% for schools in the control group. Also, about 90% of schools in the treatment
group have had a delay in starting the courses because of disturbances. This ﬁgure is about
74.5% for schools in the control group. Also, one can note that 20% of teachers in the treatment
group have no professional diploma compared to about 32% in the control group. We noted that
35% of teachers in the treatment group had a CEAP as professional qualiﬁcation, while there
were 19% in the control group. For continuing training, about 65% of teachers had beneﬁted in
the control group compared to 45% in the treatment group. It is important to note that 8% of
the teacher in the control group are often absent, while only around 4% in the treatment group
is not often present. Likewise, about 4% of pupils in the treatment group have attended an early
childhood institution. This ﬁgure is about 7% for pupils in the control group. Also, about 5%
of pupils in the treatment group bring snack at school. This ﬁgure is about 10% for pupils in
the control group. About 24% of schools in the control group are located in a village having
a college, while this ﬁgure is only about 13% for schools in the treatment group. Majority of
treated schools are located in Fatick while the majority of schools in the control group are in
Kolda. To summarize, the treatment group performs better in terms of scores.
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Regarding the deworming program, the statistical summary (Table A.3 in the appendix)
shows that on average, for scores, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the treatment and
control groups as documented by the t-test. In fact, in the treatment group one note 37.495,
37.680 and 37.161 for aggregate, French and Math scores. In the control group, one note 37.587,
38.228 and 36.949 for aggregate, French and Math scores respectively. Also, for a number of
control variables such as health class size, marriages, food expenditure, household size, meal
near school, medicine box, gender of teacher, professional qualiﬁcation CEAP, other professional
qualiﬁcation, gender of pupil, grade, koranic school, gender of household head, marital status,
land and the area of Se´dhiou, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two groups. In
each group, the average class size is about 36% pupils, the household size is about 11 persons
and 12% of schools have medicine box. Also, around 49% of pupils are boys in the treatment
group whereas 51% in the control group, 27.6% of pupils did a Koranic school in the treated
group and 29.6% in the control group. We observe that around 95% of households are married.
Likewise in each group, about 94% of household have an arable land. However, for temporary
shelters, total pupils, pregnancies, teacher’s age, education expenditure, distance to school,
playground, management committee, cooperative school, association of parents, association of
mothers, rural council grant, water point, storage, professional qualiﬁcation CAP, High school
diploma, absenteeism, early childhood institution, snack, sick last 3 months, pupils eat ﬁll,
literacy of household head parents school and Fatick, the control group displays the lowest
average with a signiﬁcant diﬀerence, whereas the treatment group displays the lowest average
with a signiﬁcant diﬀerence for all remaining variables. For example, about 85.6% of schools
are in less than 1 km from pupil’s home for the treatment group, while only 78% of schools in
the control report the same. Also about 52.6% of schools in the treatment group have a water
point, while only about 39.5% of schools in the control group have.
2.4 Estimation strategy
Observational studies typically use non random samples. In these situations, where the sample
is either fully or partly based on values taken by the outcome response variable, parameter
estimates are likely to be inconsistent unless corrective measures are applied. Such samples are
broadly deﬁned as selected samples. Two types of speciﬁcations are suited for this purpose: i)
the dummy endogenous selection model originally developed by Heckman (1979), which is fully
integrated into the evaluation literature, ii) the Roy model which dates from Roy (1951). In
what follows, we apply these two speciﬁcations to our study.
As previously outlined, we are interested not only in assessing the eﬀectiveness of meal pro-
gram, but also in the study of determinants of outcomes. In this regard, we found the structural
model most appropriate for our purpose. With such a framework we can specify a two equations
system: one equation for the outcome (performance equation) and another for the treatment
(selection equation). The system can be estimated using Full Information Maximum Likeli-
hood (FIML) or the Control Function (CF) approach. Moreover, as the structural speciﬁcation
imbeds a treatment (selection) equation which is the basic material of the Propensity Score
Matching (PSM), we only present the structural model (see Maddala, 1983 and Greene, 2011).7
The generic model combines a Probit selection equation (treatment equation) which is assumed
to stem from an unobserved latent variable, and a regression equation (performance equation).
2.4.1 The Heckman selection framework
This speciﬁcation relies on an exclusion restriction, meaning that a variable determines partic-
ipation in the program but not the outcome of the program itself. Unlike to ‘matching’ which
7For a presentation of the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method see Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009;
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008.
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is viewed as ‘selection on observable’, the Heckman approach enables ‘selection on [observables
and] unobservables’. As outlines by Blundell and Costa Dias (2008), a comparison of both ap-
proaches turns to be very informative in understanding the advantages and limitations of these
methods.
i) Firstly, we assume a latent Probit selection mechanism (selection equation):
z∗i = w
′
iα + μi with μi ∼ N[0, 1] (1-1)
zi = 1[z∗i >0]
where w stands for the selection controls, and zi = 1 if treated, μi is the disturbance.
ii) Secondly, we assume a linear regression with sample selection (performance equation):
yi = x′iβ + δzi + εi (1-2)
We assume that equations (1-1) and (1-2) are linked by a bivariate normal distribution
conditionally on (wi,xi) : (
εi
μi
)
∼ N
[(
0
0
)
,
(
σ ρ
ρ 1
)]
(1-3)
Next, we will implement two estimation strategies to estimate the eﬀect of interventions on
the entire population, that is to say the Average Treatment Eﬀect (ATE): the Full Informa-
tion Maximum Likelihood (FIML) and the Control Function (CF) which relies on the Heckman
(1976, 1979) two-step procedure.
Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML)
We assume that μi|εi ∼ N( ρσεi, 1 − ρ2). The probabilities for zi = 1 (treated) and zi = 0
(untreated) are then deﬁned as:
• Treated:
P(zi = 1 | ,wi, εi) = Φ
(
w′iα + ρεi/σ√
1− ρ2
)
(1-4)
where Φ(·) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution, and ρ is the correlation
coeﬃcient between εi and ui.
• Untreated:
P(zi = 0 |wi, εi) = Φ
(
−(w′iα + ρεi)√
1− ρ2
)
(1-5)
Let θ = (β,α, σ, ρ) denotes the set of parameters and the functions f2(·), f1(·) respectively
bivariate and univariate normal density functions. The log-likelihood function for the full model
is the joint density for the observed data. The FIML estimator θˆFIML is obtained as:
θˆFIML = arg max
θ∈Θ
lnL
where
L =
N∏
i=1
[∫ −w′α
−∞
f2(μi, yi) dμi
]1−zi[∫ ∞
−w′α
f2(μi, yi) dμi
]zi
(1-6)
=
N∏
i=1
[
f1(yi)
∫ −w′α
−∞
f1(μi|yi) dμi
]1−zi[
f1(yi)
∫ ∞
−w′α
f1(μi|yi) dμi
]zi
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and
lnL =
n∑
i=1
lnΦ
[
(2zi − 1)
(
w′iα + (yi − x′iβ − δzi)(ρ/σ)√
1− ρ2
)]
− 1
2
ln
[
exp(yi − x′iβ − δzi)2
σ2
√
2π
]
for zi = (0, 1) (1-7)
Two-step or Control Function
The rationale of the Control Function approach is in controlling for the part of the disturbance
in the outcome relation that is correlated with the treatment dummy indicator. This method
involves a two-step procedure. The ﬁrst step relies on a Probit estimation of the selection
equation to obtain P(zi = 1 |wi) = Φ(w′iα). Then, the conditional outcome expectation in (1-2)
is modiﬁed as
E(yi|zi) = x′iβ + δzi + λhi (1-8)
where λ = ρσ and hi is the Control Function:
hi =
⎧⎨⎩
φ(w′iαˆ)
Φ(w′iαˆ)
if zi = 1
−φ(w′iαˆ)
1−Φ(w′iαˆ) if zi = 0
(1-9)
where φ denotes the standard normal density function. The second step consists in an OLS
estimation of β, δ and λ in the regression (1-8) augmented with the Control Function hi. This
modiﬁed regression allows us to handle the part of the disturbance that is correlated with the
selection mechanism. By including hi in the outcome relation, we are able to disentangle the
true impact of treatment from the selection mechanism. accounts for the diﬀerence between
treated and untreated.
The estimation of the parameters σ2 and ρ are obtained as σˆ2 = (ε′ε + λˆ2
∑N
i=1 ϕi)/N and
ρˆ = λˆ/σˆ with ϕi = hi(hi +w′iαˆ).
Treatment eﬀects
The estimated eﬀect of a program is obtained by computing the diﬀerence in expected school
performance between participants and nonparticipants: E(yi|zi = 1)− E(yi|zi = 0). We have
E(yi|zi = 1) = x′iβ + δ + E(εi|zi = 1)
and
E(yi|zi = 0) = x′iβ + E(εi|zi = 0)
Taking the diﬀerence of the above terms leads to
E(yi|zi = 1)− E(yi|zi = 0) = δ + E(εi|zi = 1)− E(εi|zi = 0)
= δ + E(εi|ui > −w′iα)− E(εi|ui < −w′iα)
= δ + λ
[
φ(−w′iα)
1− Φ(−w′iα)
]
+ λ
[
φ(−w′iα)
Φ(−w′iα)
]
= δ + λ
[
φ(w′iα)
Φ(w′iα){1− Φ(w′iα)}
]
(1-10)
where λ = ρσ, the standard error of which is approximated by Var(λ) ≈ D{atanh(ρ) lnσ}D′,
where D is the Jacobian of λ with respect to atanh(ρ) and lnσ. If the correlation coeﬃcient ρ is
zero then the estimation procedure is reduced to an OLS. As a result, the diﬀerence in expected
outcome between treated and untreated is simply δ.
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2.4.2 The Roy model
The Roy model has the advantage of considering selection on both observables and unobserv-
ables while relaxing the assumption of homogeneity of treatment by introducing heterogenous
treatment eﬀects. Thereby, we are able to identify and estimate not only the average treatment
eﬀect, but also treatment eﬀect on the treated and on the untreated. The model with endogenous
treatment and diﬀerent outcome equations is
T ∗i = γ
′wi + μi, Ti = 1[T ∗i > 0], i = 1, · · · , N (1-11)
yi1 = β′1xi + εi1, (1-12)
yi0 = β′0xi + εi0, (1-13)
where T ∗i in equation (1-11) is a latent variable, the observed counterpart of which is Ti, and
1[ ] denotes the indicator function which takes on the value 1 if the corresponding latent variable
is positive, and 0 otherwise. Relations (1-12) and (1-13) are respectively the outcome equations
for participants and non-participants, γ and β’s denote vectors of parameters to be estimated,
and μi, ε1 and ε0 the denote error terms in the corresponding equations. Our estimation strate-
gies are the maximum likelihood estimation and the two-step control function approaches.
Maximum Likelihood (ML)
We assume joint normality for the three disturbances conditionally on (wi,xi);⎛⎝μiεi1
εi0
⎞⎠ ∼ N
⎡⎣⎛⎝00
0
⎞⎠ ,
⎛⎝ 1ρμε1σε1 σ2ε1
ρμε0σε0 0 σ
2
ε0
⎞⎠⎤⎦
Observe here that the null correlation term corresponds to Cov(ε0, ε1) = ρε0ε1σε0σε1 as the
outcome equations are assumed not to be related. The likelihood function is then given by
L =
N∏
i=1
[∫ −γ′wi
−∞
f2(μi, yi0) dμi
]1−Ti[∫ ∞
−γ′wi
f2(μi, yi1) dμi
]Ti
(1-14)
=
N∏
i=1
[
f1(yi0)
∫ −γ′wi
−∞
f1(μi|yi0) dμi
]1−Ti[
f1(yi1)
∫ ∞
−γ′wi
f1(μi|yi1) dμi
]Ti
where the functions f2(·) and f1(·) stand respectively for bivariate and univariate normal density
functions. By replacing these functions by the population analogues, the likelihood function
becomes
L =
N∏
i=1
⎡⎣ 1
σε0
φ (ζ0)Φ
⎛⎝−γ ′wi − ρμiεi0ζ0√
1− ρ2μiεi0
⎞⎠⎤⎦1−Ti⎡⎣ 1
σε1
φ (ζ1)Φ
⎛⎝γ ′wi + ρμiεi1ζ1√
1− ρ2μiεi1
⎞⎠⎤⎦Ti (1-15)
where ζk =
yik−β′
k
xi
σεk
, with k = (0, 1), and φ(·) and Φ(·) denote respectively the standard normal
probability density and the normal cumulative distribution functions. The parameters vector
estimates are obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood lnL using standard numerical proce-
dures (e.g. Newton-Raphson). Standard error estimates are obtained using the inverse Hessian
or outer product of gradient.
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Two-step (2-step)
In order to estimate the Roy model using the Heckman’s two-step method applied to the
truncated means, we write the regression function for each subpopulation as
E(yi1|T = 1,x,w) = β′1xi + Cov(εi1, μi)λ1(γ ′wi) (1-16)
E(yi0|T = 0,x,w) = β′0xi + Cov(εi0, μi)λ0(γ ′wi), (1-17)
where λ1(γ ′wi) =
φ(γ′wi)
Φ(γ′wi) and λ0(γ
′wi) = − φ(γ
′wi)
1−Φ(γ′wi) are the inverse Mills ratios. In terms of
parameters to be estimated, these regressions can be rewritten as:
yi1 = β′1xi + ρμε1σε1λ1(γ
′wi) + ηi1 (1-18)
yi0 = β′0xi + ρμε0σε0λ0(γ
′wi) + ηi0, (1-19)
where E(ηi1|xi, λ1) = E(ηi0|xi, λ0) = 0. In relations (1-18) and (1-19), λ1(γ ′wi) and λ0(γ ′wi)
do enter as additional controls, the parameters of which ρμε1σε1 and ρμε0σε0 have to be estimated
in addition to parameters vector β1 and β0. Thereby, the estimation proceeds as follows:
1. Obtain consistent and eﬃcient (under normality) estimates for γ by estimating a probit
using maximum likelihood. Compute λ1(γ ′wi) and λ0(γ′wi) given the predictions.
2. Use λ1(γ ′wi) and λ0(γ ′wi) as additional controls along side xi and apply OLS to equations
(1-18) and (1-19). Since we use the estimates of the λ’s, the conventional standard errors
are not valid and need to be corrected by using simulation techniques or bootstrap.
Treatment eﬀects
The computations of the treatment eﬀects are summarized in Table 2.1, where the covari-
ance term is given by Cov(εi1− εi0, μi) = ρμiεi1σεi1 − ρμiεi0σεi0 . For the LATE(x), we apply the
formulæ for double truncation to obtain the term λ01 =
φ(γ′wi)−φ(γ′w˜i)
Φ(γ′w˜i)−Φ(γ′w˜i) , where w˜i stands for
a ‘policy instrument’. For these eﬀects, the associated parameters ATE, ATET, ATENT and
LATE can be retrieved by simply integrating out or averaging over the sample.
Table 2.1: Treatment parameters (single treatment Roy model)
Parameter Deﬁnition Assumptions (model)
ATE(x)a E(yi1 − yi0|x) xi(β′1 − β′0) =: ϑ(x)
ATET(x,w)b E(yi1 − yi0|T = 1,x) ϑ(x) + Cov(εi1 − εi0, μi)λ1
ATENT(x,w)c E(yi1 − yi0|T = 0,x) ϑ(x)− Cov(εi1 − εi0, μi)λ0
LATE(x, w˜,w)d E(yi1 − yi0|T (w) = 0, T (w˜) = 1,x) ϑ(x) + Cov(εi1 − εi0, μi)λ01
E(yi1 − yi0| − γ′w˜i ≤ μi < −γ′wi,x)
(a) Average treatment eﬀect
(b) Average treatment eﬀect on the treated
(c) Average treatment eﬀect on the untreated
(d) Local average treatment eﬀect
2.5 Findings
As we have previously indicated, we used both the propensity score matching framework (here-
after PSM) which can be viewed as given by relation (1-1), and the structural model presented
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in the previous section to assess the impact of meal and deworming programs. As we have also
mentioned, the structural model has the advantage of allowing to jointly estimate a performance
equation (1-2) and a selection equation (1-1) while estimating the eﬀect of the program. One
important aspect of the structural model is whether both equations are related via the corre-
lation term ρ between errors. If the correlation is zero, both equations are unrelated and the
problem reduced to one estimable by OLS and the eﬀect of the program is δ.
In our framework, the PSM yields the ATET and the structural approach allows to have a
greater number of eﬀects (ATE, ATET, ATENT and LATE).
2.5.1 Determinants of school achievement: a summary of ﬁndings
For the determinants of performance, we conducted estimations. For example, taking the meal
program, we have made estimates with the Heckman selection framework (FIML and two step)
and estimates with the Roy model (FIML and two step). With the deworming program, we
did also estimations with the Heckman selection framework (FIML and two step) and the Roy
model (FIML and two step). For reasons of space, we present only estimates on meal program
(FIML) and deworming program (FIML). The other estimates are reported in the appendix.
If there is no diﬀerence between the results presented and those in the appendix, we will not
mention the later. Otherwise, we will highlight the diﬀerences.
The results for the determinants of school performance are given in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 . The
LR test in the two tables shows that ρ is signiﬁcant for the aggregate and math scores, and not
signiﬁcant for the score in French in Table 2.2 and signiﬁcant for all scores in Table 2.3 meaning
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two error terms are unrelated.
Table 2.2: Determinants of scores: Meal, HSFa regression (FIML)
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Performance Eq.
Temporary shelters -0.766∗∗ 0.345 -0.434 0.369 -1.166∗∗∗ 0.386
School manual 6.731∗∗∗ 1.107 6.784∗∗∗ 1.185 6.668∗∗∗ 1.240
School manual squared -0.619∗∗∗ 0.195 -0.940∗∗∗ 0.209 -0.295 0.219
Class size -0.241∗∗ 0.114 -0.077 0.122 -0.3948∗∗∗ 0.128
Class size squared 0.002 0.001 -0.0002 0.001 0.004∗∗ 0.001
Number of pregnancies -3.544∗∗∗ 1.035 -3.749∗∗∗ 1.108 -3.259∗∗∗ 1.158
Number of marriages -0.544 0.734 -1.251 0.786 0.068 0.822
Teacher’s age -1.385∗∗ 0.656 -1.127 0.703 -1.547∗∗ 0.734
Teacher’s age square 0.023∗∗ 0.009 0.016 0.010 0.028∗∗ 0.011
Pupil’s age 7.088∗∗∗ 2.108 8.436∗∗∗ 2.257 5.845∗∗ 2.361
Pupil’s age square -0.283∗∗∗ 0.097 -0.347∗∗∗ 0.104 -0.225∗∗ 0.109
Number of hours -0.019 0.534 -0.113 0.572 0.073 0.596
Food expenditureb -0.782 0.768 -1.090 0.822 -0.584 0.859
Education expenditureb 0.937∗∗∗ 0.296 1.149∗∗∗ 0.317 0.754∗∗ 0.332
Health expenditureb -0.268 0.186 -0.188 0.199 -0.362 0.208
Household size c 0.210∗∗∗ 0.065 0.215∗∗∗ 0.070 0.205∗∗∗ 0.073
Livestock 0.007 0.019 -0.004 0.020 0.020 0.021
Distance to school 1.377 0.940 1.424 0.997 1.320 1.061
Playground 0.373 1.056 0.090 1.132 0.696 1.179
Water point 2.447∗∗∗ 0.885 1.583∗ 0.939 3.267∗∗∗ 0.997
Disturbed courses -6.318∗∗∗ 1.161 -5.087∗∗∗ 1.239 -7.663∗∗∗ 1.301
Meals near school -0.118 0.911 -1.276 0.975 1.071 1.021
Gender of teacher -4.731∗∗∗ 1.145 -3.913∗∗∗ 1.225 -5.608∗∗∗ 1.282
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 2.2 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
No professional qualif.d 6.267∗∗∗ 1.041 5.063∗∗∗ 1.116 7.469∗∗∗ 1.165
Professional qualif. CAP 2.801∗∗ 1.412 3.081∗∗ 1.511 2.707∗ 1.583
Professional qualif. CEAP 4.474∗∗∗ 1.097 2.021∗ 1.175 6.796∗∗∗ 1.228
High school diploma & more 0.222 0.888 -1.233 0.952 1.658∗ 0.994
Continuing training -0.191 0.789 -0.371 0.845 -0.174 0.883
Absenteeism -1.131 1.583 -0.423 1.706 -2.030 1.762
Gender of pupil 1.409∗ 0.723 0.704 0.766 1.922∗∗ 0.817
Garde -12.622∗∗∗ 1.032 -19.553∗∗∗ 1.105 -5.646∗∗∗ 1.155
Koranic school 2.663∗∗∗ 0.813 2.625∗∗∗ 0.870 2.781∗∗∗ 0.910
Early childhood inst. 4.930∗∗∗ 1.563 5.810∗∗∗ 1.673 3.967∗∗ 1.751
Snack 1.499 1.315 1.477 1.408 1.736 1.472
Sick last 3 months 0.075 0.824 0.723 0.883 -0.490 0.922
Pupils eat ﬁll 2.929∗∗ 1.165 2.618∗∗ 1.248 3.198∗∗ 1.303
Gender of household head -1.142 1.365 -2.288 1.462 0.067 1.528
Lit. of household head -1.659∗ 1.006 -1.175 1.077 -2.377∗∗ 1.127
Marital status 1.130 1.872 2.368 2.006 -0.079 2.095
Land -2.325 1.670 -1.011 1.787 -3.384∗ 1.870
Parents school -2.997∗∗∗ 0.827 -3.938∗∗∗ 0.882 -1.962∗∗ 0.926
College 7.284∗∗∗ 1.109 6.675∗∗∗ 1.186 7.942∗∗∗ 1.244
Diourbel 6.877∗∗∗ 1.811 4.950∗∗ 1.932 8.788∗∗∗ 2.028
Kolda -0.656 1.298 -0.087 1.388 -1.096 1.454
Sedhiou -0.826 1.904 -3.694 2.042 1.805 2.130
Meal 2.814 2.010 4.932∗∗ 2.205 1.182 2.164
Intercept 27.078 17.813 21.637 19.071 31.385 19.948
Selection Eq.
Total pupils 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005∗ 0.0003 0.0004∗ 0.0003
Distance to school 0.132∗ 0.075 0.129∗ 0.075 0.136 0.075
Management committee 0.095 0.069 0.092 0.070 0.096 0.068
Association of mothers 0.686∗∗∗ 0.072 0.696∗∗∗ 0.073 0.700∗∗∗ 0.071
Cooperative school -0.006 0.067 -0.013 0.068 0.008 0.066
Rural council grant 0.859∗∗∗ 0.088 0.816∗∗∗ 0.088 0.879∗∗∗ 0.086
Water point -0.030 0.075 -0.035 0.076 -0.027 0.075
Disturbed courses 0.967∗∗∗ 0.095 0.983∗∗∗ 0.096 0.955∗∗∗ 0.095
Storage 0.821∗∗∗ 0.074 0.842∗∗∗ 0.074 0.795∗∗∗ 0.074
Gender of pupil -0.087 0.062 -0.087 0.062 -0.087 0.062
Intercept -2.709∗∗∗ 0.160 -2.702∗∗∗ 0.161 -2.717∗∗∗ 0.159
atanh ρ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.075 0.088 0.076 0.334∗∗∗ 0.072
lnσ 2.850∗∗∗ 0.016 2.907∗∗∗ 0.014 2.973∗∗∗ 0.017
ρ 0.241 0.071 0.088 0.076 0.322 0.065
σ 17.289 0.280 18.312 0.270 19.552 0.335
λ 4.172 1.266 1.612 1.401 6.307 1.336
LR test (H0 : ρ = 0)
χ2 (1) 9.16 1.28 18.95
P > χ2 0.0020 0.257 0.000
Log likelihood -11140.128 -11302.72 -11406.014
# Observations 2369 2369 2369
Wald χ2(46) 604.12 775.16 505.38
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes a: Heckman selection framework; b: In log; c: Household size per adult equivalent; d: qualiﬁcation.
Signiﬁcance levels (bootstrap): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
This supports our modeling strategy that both equations should be estimated jointly. The
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sign of the coeﬃcients in the selection equation are the same for the three scores. The same holds
for signiﬁcance apart from the variables ‘total pupils’ which is not signiﬁcant for the aggregate
score and ‘distance to school’ which is not signiﬁcant for the math score. For example, total
pupils, association of mothers, rural council grant, disturbed courses, storage, distance to school
impact positively the probability for a pupil to beneﬁt from a meal program. Similar results
are found when using the two step estimation. These results are expected, as these controls
are speciﬁc indicators used by the World Food Program (WFP) and the Senegalese Ministry of
education to select the schools that will participate in the program. However, in the same line,
one would expect that having an operational management committee and a water point will be
among the determinants of selection, which surprisingly is not the case. When we compare these
ﬁndings to those obtained from the PSM estimation (see Table A.4 in the appendix), we have
quite similar results except for the variable water point which is positive and signiﬁcant now.
Table 2.3: Determinants of scores: Deworming, HSFa regression
(FIML)
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Performance Eq.
Temporary shelters 0.537 0.393 0.572 0.419 0.793∗ 0.442
School manual 1.096 1.087 2.560∗∗ 1.150 0.307 1.224
School manual squared 0.110 0.190 -0.331∗ 0.200 0.460∗∗ 0.214
Class size -0.162 0.119 0.056 0.126 -0.488∗∗∗ 0.134
Class size squared 0.0008 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001
Number of pregnancies -6.453∗∗∗ 1.116 -8.082∗∗∗ 1.150 -4.428∗∗∗ 1.256
Number of marriages -0.200 0.680 0.203 0.709 -0.399 0.764
Teacher’s age -2.527∗∗∗ 0.624 -3.540∗∗∗ 0.656 -2.201∗∗∗ 0.702
Teacher’s age square 0.035∗∗∗ 0.009 0.047∗∗∗ 0.009 0.033∗∗∗ 0.010
Pupil’s age 6.974 ∗∗∗ 1.950 7.698∗∗∗ 2.040 6.366∗∗∗ 2.193
Pupil’s age square -0.277∗∗∗ 0.091 -0.315∗∗∗ 0.096 -0.247∗∗ 0.103
Number of hours -0.180 0.626 -0.432 0.667 -0.174 0.703
Food expenditureb 0.706 0.738 -0.045 0.773 1.367∗ 0.830
Education expenditureb 0.252 0.275 0.264 0.283 0.223 0.309
Health expenditureb 0.083 0.166 0.129 0.173 0.038 0.187
Household size c 0.265∗∗∗ 0.063 0.234∗∗∗ 0.066 0.283∗∗∗ 0.071
Livestock -0.001 0.020 -0.023 0.021 0.019 0.023
Distance to school 1.001 0.908 1.456 0.950 0.598 1.022
Playground 1.573∗ 0.954 2.671∗∗∗ 1.008 1.995∗ 1.073
Water point -0.009 0.965 -3.954∗∗∗ 1.063 1.200 1.084
Disturbed courses -4.220∗∗∗ 0.990 -2.132∗∗ 1.028 -5.899∗∗∗ 1.112
Meals near school -0.537 0.908 -2.157∗∗ 0.955 0.486 1.024
Gender of teacher -3.913∗∗∗ 1.127 -1.416 1.182 -5.151∗∗∗ 1.267
No professional qualif.d 0.115 1.034 -0.889 1.085 1.778 1.163
Professional qualif. CAP -0.670 1.246 -1.593 1.301 -0.233 1.401
Professional qualif. CEAP 4.483∗∗∗ 1.169 3.107∗∗ 1.244 5.546∗∗∗ 1.318
High school diploma & more 1.811∗∗ 0.882 0.848 0.922 2.368∗∗ 0.993
Continuing training -0.518 0.797 -0.570 0.833 -0.596 0.899
Absenteeism -4.528∗∗∗ 1.285 -4.322∗∗∗ 1.352 -6.771∗∗∗ 1.449
Gender of pupil 0.579 0.725 0.646 0.847 1.266 0.831
Garde -14.211∗∗∗ 0.983 -20.854∗∗∗ 1.028 -7.389∗∗∗ 1.106
Koranic school 3.499∗∗∗ 0.798 4.028∗∗∗ 0.832 3.136∗∗∗ 0.898
Early childhood inst. 2.027 1.313 2.744∗∗ 1.370 1.213 1.473
Snack -0.290 1.148 -0.483 1.197 -0.661 1.289
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 2.3 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Sick last 3 months -0.263 0.770 0.273 0.800 -0.792 0.865
Pupils eat ﬁll 0.256 1.195 1.332 1.259 -0.396 1.349
Gender of household head -0.649 1.263 -1.319 1.317 -0.184 1.421
Lit. of household head 0.466 1.015 -0.918 1.159 -0.079 1.155
Marital status 2.847 1.789 2.121 1.870 3.161 2.011
Land -2.404 1.590 -2.348 1.643 -2.385 1.789
Parents school -3.143∗∗∗ 0.798 -2.219∗∗∗ 0.848 -3.463∗∗∗ 0.899
College 1.801∗ 1.029 1.269 1.085 2.994∗∗ 1.161
Diourbel 0.865 1.703 0.289 1.786 1.283 1.913
Kolda -9.844∗∗∗ 1.241 -9.737∗∗∗ 1.304 -9.794∗∗∗ 1.399
Sedhiou -9.116∗∗∗ 2.276 -9.503∗∗∗ 2.407 -10.967∗∗∗ 2.554
Dworming -13.046∗∗∗ 3.529 22.635∗∗∗ 2.390 -16.443∗∗∗ 3.431
Intercept 47.868∗∗∗ 16.778 60.688∗∗∗ 17.505 37.559∗∗ 18.884
Selection Eq.
Total pupils 0.0004∗ 0.0002 0.0003∗ 0.0002 0.0005∗∗ 0.0002
Management committee 0.175∗∗∗ 0.063 0.325∗∗∗ 0.051 0.170∗∗∗ 0.059
Association of mothers 0.222∗∗∗ 0.067 0.095 0.064 0.240∗∗∗ 0.066
Cooperative school 0.1717∗∗∗ 0.060 -0.040 0.052 0.187∗∗∗ 0.058
Water point 0.179∗∗∗ 0.064 0.169∗∗∗ 0.062 0.172∗∗∗ 0.064
Medicine box -0.328∗∗∗ 0.088 0.126∗ 0.073 -0.333∗∗∗ 0.082
Gender of pupil -0.050 0.053 -0.089∗ 0.052 -0.050 0.053
Lit. of household head 0.157∗∗ 0.069 0.164∗∗ 0.068 0.149∗∗ 0.069
Intercept -0.944∗∗∗ 0.071 -0.869∗∗∗ 0.066 -0.962∗∗∗ 0.070
atanh ρ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.128 -0.882∗∗∗ 0.093 0.541∗∗∗ 0.112
lnσ 2.877∗∗∗ 0.031 3.039∗∗∗ 0.030 3.015∗∗∗ 0.030
ρ 0.425 0.425 -0.707 0.046 0.494 0.084
σ 17.771 0.452 20.885 0.643 20.398 0.631
λ 7.557 2.082 -14.776 1.395 10.086 2.011
LR test (H0 : ρ = 0)
χ2 (1) 4.80 22.46 11.04
P > χ2 0.028 0.000 0.000
Log likelihood -12011.633 -12134.14 -12302.472
# Observations 2487 2487 2487
Wald χ2(46) 730.52 1119.30 546.79
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes a: Heckman selection framework; b: In log; c: Household size per adult equivalent; d: qualiﬁcation.
Signiﬁcance levels (bootstrap): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Regarding the determinants of performance as measured by test scores, as mentioned in
the description of variables, we distinguished four categories of controls: those related to schools
(temporary shelters, school manual, class size, teacher’s age, pupil’s age, distance to school, play-
ground, water point, meals near school, gender of teacher, professional and academic qualiﬁcation
of teacher, continuing training), pupils (gender, grade, age, Koranic school, early childhood in-
stitution, snack, pupils eat at ﬁll) household characteristics (food and education expenditures,
household size, livestock, literacy of household head, gender of household head, marital status
and land), community (parents school and existence of college in the village) and shocks vari-
ables (number of pregnancies, number of marriages, absenteeism, disturbed courses, sick last 3
months and health expenditures). Most of the control variables are of the expected sign when
signiﬁcant. Some others are not conformed on intuition. However, put in the speciﬁc context of
rural Africa experience, they become rather highly interesting. This is the case of the relation
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between class size and math score as we will see later. For controls related to school character-
istics, as expected, increasing temporary shelters has a negative eﬀect on pupils’ performance
(aggregate, French and math scores). However, the result is not signiﬁcant for French score. In
temporary shelters, there are no adapted benches tables, blackboard that meet the requirement
and sometimes no roof. That is why the quality of learning in temporary shelters are very bad.
For variables number of pupils per manual ‘School manual’, class size and teacher’s age as
mentioned above, we included the linear and the square terms to account for possible nonlin-
earities. In fact, for school manual which varies between 0.2 to 7 pupils per manual, Figures
2.1 and 2.2 show inverted U-shaped relations with scores, meaning that the number of pupils
per manual increase the scores until a point from which the variable has a negative eﬀect on
performance. The turning point is 5 pupils for the aggregate score and 4 pupils for the French
score. It is important to note that the nonlinear part of school manual is not signiﬁcant for
the math score. Our reading is that even if school manual has a capacity to ameliorate the
competence of pupils, when the number of pupils per manual become higher this has a negative
impact on scores because the learning time decreases with increasing of the number of pupils
per manual. CONFEMEN (1999) shows that French and mathematics manuals have a positive
eﬀect on learning with a larger impact for the French manuals.
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Figure 2.1: Meal: Relation between aggregate score and school manual.
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Figure 2.2: Meal: Relation between French score and school manual.
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Class size displays a U-shaped relation with math score. Note that this variable ranges
from 4 to 82 pupils. Firstly, the performance decreases with increasing class size which is
consistent with some ﬁndings in the literature on performance. However, starting from 47
pupils, the performance increases which is also consistent with other ﬁndings (see Figure 2.3).
It is important to note that neither class size nor its square are signiﬁcant for the French score.
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Figure 2.3: Meal: Relation between math score and class size.
As mentioned above, the eﬀects of a reduction of class size on pupil achievement have not
led to consistent conclusions in the literature (Davies, 2003). How to explain that large classes
can perform? In these speciﬁc rural areas, large classes may impact positively math score. This
result could be linked to the strategy of multigrade classes which is practiced in some rural
schools in Senegal. The strategy based on multigrade classes is to put together in a classroom,
pupils from several diﬀerent grades under the supervision of only one teacher. Generally, if the
practice of multigrade classes solves the problems of enrollment, it greatly reduces the learning
time of pupils and consequently their academic performance. We believe that some small class
sizes could be in multigrade classes, which would explain the negative correlation between small
class size and the math score that we found. With big class size, it is diﬃcult or not possible to
practice the multigrade system. We think that, in this rural area, the small class sizes could be
in multigrade class whereas the big class sizes could not.
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Figure 2.4: Meal: Relation between aggregate score and teacher age.
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Figure 2.5: Meal: Relation between math score and teacher age.
The teacher’s age also shows a similar U-shaped picture. This variable ranges from 20 to 53.
The linear term is negative while the square term is positive for scores. This means that the
teacher’s age aﬀect negatively the scores until a certain threshold at which additional age aﬀect
positively on the performances. We observe that the turning point is 36 and 33 respectively for
aggregate and math scores (See Figures 2.4 and 2.5).
Always for controls related to school characteristics, one can note that variables gender
of teacher (male=1) and teacher absenteeism have a negative eﬀect on scores, as expected,
while variables water point, professional qualiﬁcation and academic qualiﬁcation (High School
Diploma) have a positive eﬀect on pupils’ performance. In fact, for variable: gender of teacher,
the result shows that pupils with female teachers perform better than those with male teachers.
This result is consistent with the ﬁnding of Jarousse and Mingat (1989) who found similar results
relying on data from Togo. For control absenteeism, the results are not surprising because when
teachers are often absent, it reduces the learning time of pupils. For variable water point, the
result is intuitive because schools with better infrastructure will record the best performance.
Regarding professional qualiﬁcation, the results show that pupils supervised by a teacher with
the professional qualiﬁcation CAP and CEAP perform better than those taught by a teacher
with another professional qualiﬁcation which is the reference. This result is intuitive. In fact, in
Senegal, the two most important professional qualiﬁcations are the CAP (Certiﬁcat d’Aptitude
Pe´dagogique, meaning ‘Pedagogical Aptitude Certiﬁcate’) and CEAP (Certiﬁcat Ele´mentaire
d’Aptitude Pe´dagogique, which is ‘Basic Pedagogical Aptitude Certiﬁcate’). The surprising
result is that pupils taught by teacher with no professional diploma perform better than those
supervised by a teacher with other professional degree. This result is consistent with a ﬁnding
of CONFEMEN (2007) in Senegal. In rural areas, the result can be explained in two ways.
Firstly, it may be that those teachers without professional diploma are awaiting to be oﬃcially
graduated because most often they have already passed the written examination. Secondly,
their level of motivation is much more important than teachers with professional qualiﬁcation.
In fact, teachers without professional qualiﬁcation can be controlled at any time and this control
is crucial for their career. So the performance of pupils under their care is reﬂected in the state
of their job. As a result, it is likely that the motivation of those teachers is a push factor which
leads them to teach pupils very well. This may also explain why pupils supervised by teachers
without professional qualiﬁcation are more eﬀective.
For the academic qualiﬁcation of teachers, the results from the DESM model show that pupils
supervised by a teacher with the High School Diploma perform better in mathematics compared
to those supervised by a teacher with the national certiﬁcate. As pointed out by Rivers and
2.5. Findings 35
Sanders (2002), this result suggests that teachers with High School Diploma and more have a
higher level of knowledge in mathematics than those with national certiﬁcate.
When one takes the deworming estimations, we always have the same result as in the meal
regressions. If one takes the Roy’s model into account, one has the same results for the untreated.
However, if one takes the treated, one observes a negative relation between the scores and the
proportion of pupils who are supervised by a teachers with High School Diploma. This result is
consistent with the ﬁndings of CONFEMEN(1999).
Regarding controls related to pupils’ characteristics, variable pupil’s age shows an inverted
U-shaped relation. Broadly, getting older has a negative eﬀect on performance. In the sample,
the variable varies between 6 to 15 years old. In fact, the results show that the age of pupil has
a positive eﬀect on scores until a certain threshold at which the age has a negative impact on
the scores. The thresholds are 13, 12 and 13 years old respectively for aggregate, French and
math scores (see ﬁgures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8). This ﬁnding is consistent with observations and can be
related to several factors which can explain the presence of pupils having age that is higher than
the normal in primary school. These factors are for example temporary dropout of the pupil,
repetition of the pupil or adverse family conditions for the pupil, etc. This result is observed for
all estimations methods.
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Figure 2.6: Meal: Relation between aggregate score and pupil age.
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Figure 2.7: Meal: Relation between French score and pupil age.
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Figure 2.8: Meal: Relation between math score and pupil age.
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Other control variables related to pupils’ characteristic, gender, Koranic school, early child-
hood institution, eat at ﬁll have a positive eﬀect on performance. One observes that boys perform
better than girls in scores and the results are signiﬁcant for math and aggregate scores. This
results is consistent with the ﬁndings of Felouzis (1997). In the Roy estimations, one observes
that girls perform better in French scores in the group of pupils who beneﬁt from the meal or
the deworming program. The presence of meal programs or deworming improves the nutritional
status of pupils. In addition, the presence of canteen allows girls to stay in school all day. So
they do not have domestic chores before going to school in the afternoon. Therefore they can
concentrate better in the afternoon in the presence of a school meal.
For control variables Koranic school which is an informal school and early childhood insti-
tution which is a modern pre-school, the results show a positive impact on scores. This result is
intuitive and well known in the literature. Both types of schools are known to develop children’s
ability to learn at an early age. Particularly, Koranic school is known for developing learning
ability and memory because children learn by heart very early. For control pupils eat at ﬁll, as
anticipated, one observe a positive eﬀect on scores. In fact the study focused on a population
in rural areas and eating at ﬁll at home is an indicator of nutritional well-being. So one can
understand that this pupil performs better than pupils who do not eat at ﬁll.
Regarding household characteristics, the results show that education expenditure and house-
hold size have a positive eﬀect on performances. For education expenditure, one knows that the
more parents invest in the education of their children the more they will supervise kids at home.
For household size per adult equivalent as expected, one observes a positive eﬀect on scores. As
mentioned in the description of variables, we believe that large households are likely to have
seniors students who are already in college or high school and are willing to coach the youngest.
It is important to also remember that studies on the eﬀect of family size on education outcomes
in developing countries have led to highly controversial results.
Another important variable is the literacy of household head. Contrary to our expectation, re-
sults show a negative impact of this variable on aggregate and math scores. In fact, as mentioned
in the description of the variables, the only fact of having a literate parent is not enough to ob-
tain good results. This requires monitoring at home. Therefore, one can think that children
with literate parents are possibly not well monitored by their parents at home. For variable
land, as expected, the result shows a negative impact on scores. The result is only signiﬁcant
for math score. In Senegal, rural households still continue to use their children for domestic and
farm work. So children living in households with farmland probably have to work in the ﬁelds,
which will result in reducing their learning time and therefore their performances.
Regarding community characteristics, control “parents school” shows a negative eﬀect on
scores while ‘college’ shows a positive one. These two results are expected. For the control
“parents school”, living in a community where some children do not go to school because their
parents are not interested is likely to have adverse eﬀects on the performance of children who
go to school because there is a big chance that it has a spill-over eﬀect.
For the control college, the result can be viewed as an indirect eﬀect. As mentioned in the
description of variables, the result can be explained from two angles. Firstly, living in a com-
munity where there is a college implies that parents are encouraged to invest in their children’s
education because they know that children can continue studying in the village after obtaining
the primary certiﬁcate. Secondly, living in a village having a college implies that there are more
advanced seniors (brother or sister) who are in college and who can guide the youngest with
their studies. However, we have no information on the fact that a pupil would have a brother
or sister in a college.
Regarding shocks variables, controls number of pregnancies registered in school, absenteeism
of teacher, disturbed courses and health expenditure have negative eﬀects on scores. These
results are expected, for example the presence of absenteeism and disturbed courses will reduce
the learning time of pupils as well as their performances.
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Regarding regions, the results show that pupils living in Diourbel perform better than those
living in Fatick which is the reference.
Finally the coeﬃcient of the meal program is positive and signiﬁcant for French outcomes
meaning that having a meal program aﬀects positively on pupils’ performance. Also, coeﬃcient
of the deworming program is negative for aggregate and math scores, but positive for French
score. However, it is worth stressing that these estimations do not reveal causalities but rather
correlations. We now turn to the causal relation as given by the treatment eﬀects from the PSM
and the structural models.
2.5.2 Eﬀects of meal and deworming programs on scores
As outlined earlier, our framework allows identifying and estimating the average treatment ef-
fects on the population (ATE); the average treatment eﬀects on the treated (ATET); and the
average treatment eﬀects on the non-treated (ATENT) depending on the model used. In the
endogenous selection model (Heckman selection framework), we can identify only the ATE. In
the PSM we can identify the ATET and in the Roy model in addition to identifying the ATE
and ATET, we can also calculate the ATENT. Regarding the ATENT, i.e, the average eﬀect on
the group of pupils who do not receive the meal program, the purpose is to inform policy makers
on the rationale for extending the programs to this subpopulation of pupils.
The combination of the average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATET) and the average treat-
ment eﬀect on the non-treated (ATENT) provides a more comprehensive view of the eﬀectiveness
of a given program and allows to choose a result from a wide alternatives of options.
School feeding program
From the foregoing, we computed the ATE of the meal program using the relation (1-10)
for the Heckman selection framework. For the Roy model, we used relations in Table 2.1 to
compute ATE, ATET and ATENT. See Table 2.4 for results on various eﬀects computed from
the Heckman selection framework and the Roy model. For the PSM speciﬁcation, the average
treatment eﬀects on the treated (see Tables 2.5, 2.8) is based on various matching methods
or algorithms in order to check the robustness of the estimates.8 Results based on structural
approaches (see Table 2.4) show a positive impact of meal program on scores. Likewise, from
the DESM (both FIML and two step), one notes a positive average treatment’s eﬀect (ATE) of
the meal program on all scores. One observes that the ATE on math score is higher than the
ATE on aggregate and French scores.
8In order to check the balancing between groups (treated vs. control), we also report the matching tests in
Tables A.11 to A.13 in the appendix.
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From the Roy model, the ATE computed goes in the same direction as the ATE obtained
from the DESM. However, it is important to note that the ATE from the Roy model is higher
than those from de DESM. As mentioned above, in addition to the ATE the Roy model allow us
to compute treatment eﬀect on treated and on non-treated. The results on average treatment’s
eﬀect on treated (ATET), show that the meal program has a positive impact on the pupils who
beneﬁt from the program. One can note that the ATE is higher than the ATET. This can be
explained by the fact that the ATENT is higher than the ATET. For the ATENT, results show
a positive eﬀect of the meal program on all scores. The ATENT on math score is higher than
the ATENT on aggregate and French score.
Results from the PSM speciﬁcation (see table 2.5) show a positive and signiﬁcant ATET for
aggregate and French scores using only the kernel matching and a positive and signiﬁcant ATET
using the Nearest Neighbors matching (K-NN), the Nearest Neighbors matching with 5 neighbors
(K-NN(5)) and the kernel procedure for the math score.
Table 2.5: Treatment eﬀects: Meal, Propensity score matching (ATET)
Meal
Score Coef. Std. Err. Boot.a
Aggregate
K-NNb 2.879 2.804 2.153
K-NN (5)b 2.928 1.425 1.832
Kernel 3.757 0.774∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗
French
K-NNb -1.241 2.884 2.954
K-NN (5)b 0.548 1.514 1.791
Kernel 2.683 0.859∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗
Math
K-NNb 6.965 3.232∗∗ 2.313∗∗∗
K-NN (5)b 5.266 1.584∗∗∗ 1.872∗∗∗
Kernel 5.062 0.841∗∗∗ 0.895∗∗∗
Note: aBootstraping standard errors;
bK-Nearest Neighbors; K-NN(5): 5 neighbors.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Deworming programs: school vs. home
For the deworming program, as mentioned earlier, we distinguished between deworming pro-
gram, school deworming program and home deworming program. It is important to remember
that the deworming program is not the sum total of the two programs. Furthermore, we do
not take into account the intersection of school deworming and home deworming. The eﬀects
of deworming on scores are reported in 2.7, for structural models and in table 2.8, for the PSM
method.
From the structural models, Table 2.7 given the eﬀect of the deworming in school, the
deworming at home and the deworming program (in school or at home) in the ﬁrst, second and
last column of the table respectively.
Due to a small number of observations regarding pupils dewormed at school or at home, we have
not been able to estimate the Roy model for these subgroups. That is why we do not have the
ATET and ATENT for school and home deworming. Regarding the school deworming, Table
2.7 shows a positive impact on all scores using either FIML or two step. This result means
that the deworming in school program has a positive eﬀect on the entire population (ATE). The
impact is more important for the math score. If we take the deworming at home, the table
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shows a negative impact on all scores (both with FIML and two step). This result could be
explained by the nature of the drug used by rural households to deworm children. They use
either traditional or modern deworming drugs, and one knows that several cases of side eﬀects
in terms of fatigue or diarrhea have been reported. In addition, the use of traditional drugs
is not without consequences because this could lead to the reduction of pupils’ performance.
Regarding the deworming program, Table 2.7 shows a negative impact on all scores for the
entire population, for the treated and for the non-treated.
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The ATET from the PSM (see Table 2.8) shows a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on both the
aggregate and math scores in the case of the Kernel matching methods. For the score in French,
we have a negative impact for all algorithms.9
Table 2.8: Treatment eﬀects: Deworming, Propensity score matching (ATET)
Deworming
Score Coef. Std. Err. Boot.a
Aggregate
K-NNb -3.404 2.206 2.113
K-NN (5)b -1.228 0.934 1.635
Kernel -1.927 0.766∗∗ 0.802∗∗
French
K-NNb -5.874 2.390∗∗ 2.183∗∗∗
K-NN (5)b -2.762 1.224∗∗ 1.277∗∗
Kernel -1.680 0.851∗∗ 0.854∗∗
Math
K-NNb 0.358 2.437 2.081
K-NN (5)b 1.092 1.256 1.445
Kernel -1.713 0.835∗∗ 0.789∗∗
Note: aBootstraping standard errors;
bK-Nearest Neighbors; K-NN(5): 5 neighbors.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
2.6 Policy analysis
2.6.1 Impact of programs on some subgroups
We have estimated the eﬀects of the meal program, but it is also interesting to study these
eﬀects on some subgroups. This exercise allows us to emphasize the variability of the eﬀects for
diﬀerent recipients. It is thought for example that the program’s impact is diﬀerent according
to gender or according to whether there is an association around the school as we know that
the operation of a school canteen requires a minimum of organization. In this subsection, using
the structural approach only, we present the impact heterogeneity of the meal and deworming
programs by gender, according to whether there is a school project in the school, an association
of pupil mothers, a school cooperative, and by grade or education level of the pupils followed.
In Table 2.10, one can see that the impact of the meal program on the scores is positive for
boys and girls. However, the impact on the math score of boys is higher than for girls, while the
the reverse applies for the French score. Thus one can say that the eﬀect of the meal program
is not uniform by gender.
In addition, an analysis according to the existence of an association of mothers of pupils is
conducted. We found that the meal program has a positive eﬀect on all scores for pupils who are
in schools with and without association of mothers. However, the impact of the meal program
is higher in schools with an association of mothers.
For the grade, Table 2.10 shows that the eﬀect of the meal program on the math score is higher
for pupils in CP, while the eﬀect on the French score is higher for pupils in CE2.
9The matching test reported in Table A.13 in the appendix indicates that on average, the treated and control
group show similar characteristics after matching in view of the variables used.
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Table 2.10: Impacts heterogeneity: Meal
Aggregate French Math
Gender of pupil
Male 11.018∗∗∗ 7.570∗∗∗ 14.107∗∗∗
Female 10.465∗∗∗ 8.905∗∗∗ 12.315∗∗∗
Association of mother
With 14.596∗∗∗ 17.640∗∗∗ 12.372∗∗∗
Without 8.904∗∗∗ 6.994∗∗∗ 10.780∗∗∗
Grade
CE2 10.333∗∗∗ 9.823∗∗∗ 10.701∗∗∗
CP 11.828∗∗∗ 8.104∗∗∗ 15.593∗∗∗
Signiﬁcance levels (bootstrap): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Regarding the deworming program, Table 2.11 shows that the impact on the scores of girls is
positive, while it is negative for the scores of boys. This means that the program has a positive
eﬀect on girls’ performance contrary to boys’ scores. In addition, the table shows that the
deworming program has a positive impact on the pupils’ performance in school with association
of mothers or school project.
Table 2.11: Impacts heterogeneity: Deworming
Aggregate French Math
Gender of pupil
Male -2.094∗∗∗ -3.693∗∗∗ -0.456∗∗∗
Female 0.734∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 1.143∗∗∗
School project
With 0.668∗∗∗ 1.091∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
Without -0.386∗∗∗ -1.508∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗
Association of mother
With 1.659∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗ 5.096∗∗∗
Without -0.175∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗
Grade
CE2 -0.253∗∗∗ -0.704∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
CP -0.593∗∗∗ -1.769∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗
Signiﬁcance levels (bootstrap): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
We can thus summarize by saying that having an association of mothers and a school project
would lead to positive eﬀect of both meal and deworming programs on pupils’ scores. This implies
that even if a meal or deworming program is implemented at school, if a number of conditions
are not met, the program cannot improve pupils’ achievement.
2.6.2 LATE as policy instrument
The local average treatment eﬀect (LATE), introduced by Imdens and Angrist (1994), is an
interesting parameter in terms of economic policies, Blundell and Costa Dias (2008). It represents
the average gain to participate in a program for individuals called to receive the program due to
a change in one variable that Imbens and Angrist (1994) called instrument. In the context of our
study, the LATE is the average impact to beneﬁt from the school canteen for a group of pupils
that is passed from the status of non-beneﬁciaries to the status of beneﬁciaries. At the same time
one provides to the group of pupils a school input called instrument. The instruments used are:
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management committee, school project, cooperative school, association of parents, association
of mothers, eliminating absenteeism of teachers and providing lot of textbook to pupils.
The management committee has three specialized committees responsible for food manage-
ment, community involvement and cooking in the school. So, one can easily understand that the
presence of a functional management committee in a school is important for the proper operation
of the school canteen. The school project is a management system tool that can improve the
quality of learning. The management of a school project is in the responsibility of a management
committee.
The cooperative school is also another association around the school. Ideally, it is a group
of adults and pupils who implement an educational project. Parents of pupils are grouped
around associations such as the pupils’ parents or mother. These associations ensure the smooth
operation of school canteens and respect for the ﬁnancial contribution of up to 200 FCFA per
pupil per month to purchase ingredients not provided by WFP. The parents also help to supply
ﬁrewood for cooking meals and support the construction of kitchens and warehouse for food
storage. Reduction of teacher absenteeism is important. For school manual, it is generally
accepted that pupils in schools with lots of textbooks perform better than pupils in schools with
few textbooks.
From the relationship contained in Table 2.1, the LATE was calculated for each instrument.
Table 2.12: Local Average Treatment Eﬀect (LATE)a: Meal
Aggregate score French score Math score
Policy instruments FIML 2-step FIML 2-step FIML 2-step
Management committee 33.371∗∗∗ 30.671∗∗∗ 24.146∗∗∗ 30.135∗∗∗ 44.668∗∗∗ 33.568∗∗∗
School project 30.311∗∗∗ 27.281∗∗∗ 21.502∗∗∗ 26.179∗∗∗ 42.585∗∗∗ 32.306∗∗∗
Cooperative School 40.349∗∗∗ 36.630∗∗∗ 34.825∗∗∗ 37.062∗∗∗ 53.155∗∗∗ 44.035∗∗∗
Association of mothers 23.382∗∗∗ 20.177∗∗∗ 14.542∗∗∗ 19.587∗∗∗ 34.359∗∗∗ 23.194∗∗∗
Association of parents 45.292∗∗∗ 43.828∗∗∗ 37.095∗∗∗ 41.081∗∗∗ 57.166∗∗∗ 50.639∗∗∗
Absence 22.515∗∗∗ 23.290∗∗∗ 13.083∗∗∗ 13.916∗∗∗ 37.830∗∗∗ 38.798∗∗∗
Textbooks 24.951∗∗∗ 22.451∗∗∗ 15.160∗∗∗ 21.061∗∗∗ 35.932∗∗∗ 25.349∗∗∗
Note a: Estimate from the Roy model.
Signiﬁcance levels (bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 2.12 shows results on various LATE depending on the instrument used. The association
of parents gives the greatest LATE for all scores. After the association of parents, we have the
cooperative school, management committee, then the school project, eliminating absenteeism of
teachers and ﬁnally the provision of textbooks in suﬃcient quantity. However, in order to identify
the best option it is important to link the cost of each input to the corresponding average eﬀect,
i.e the corresponding LATE. This analysis can be made through a cost-eﬀectiveness analysis
which is a form of economic analysis that compares the relative costs and outcomes (eﬀects) of
two or more courses of action. It is important to notice that the cost eﬀectiveness analysis made
here is not about comparing the canteen program with another option in the aim to increase
pupils’ performance. It is a question of comparing several options in the presence of the canteen
program in order to obtain the best result at a lower cost.
To conduct the analysis, we need the cost of the meal program and the cost related to each
input. For the cost of the canteen, based on information from the WFP, the annual cost of the
canteen per student is approximately 13100 CFA. For the school project, based on information
on the region of Matam from the Ministry of education, we estimated an approximate cost per
2.6. Policy analysis 46
pupil for the year 2010. The total cost for the school project for the year is 78,978,651 CFA and
the total number of pupils in the region was 87,971 in 2010. So the cost of a school project per
year is around 900 CFA. Although Matam is not part of regions covered in our study, we still felt
that the cost of a school project in Matam can be a rough average cost for other regions. Then,
the annual cost of a canteen combined with a school project per student is 14000 CFA. From
Diagne (2012, page 220), we have the cost of increasing the eﬀective learning time of pupils by
the establishment of an administrative system to monitor the attendance of teachers. This cost
is 111 CFA per year and per pupil. So the annual cost of a canteen combined with monitoring
the attendance of teachers is about 13211 CFA. Diagne (2012, page 220) also gives us the cost of
improving the staﬃng of pupils’ textbooks. He estimated that the cost of a textbook that can
be used for two years is 2305 CFA. In this study we divided this cost by 2 to get the annual cost
of a textbook. So, the cost of a book per year is 1151 CFA and the cost of a canteen combined
with improving the staﬃng of pupils’ textbooks is 14252. For management committee, school
cooperative, association of parents and mothers, we will only use the cost of the canteen (13100
CFA). For these forms of association, a local organization can allow to make them operating
without a budget from the government.
To assess the cost-eﬀectiveness, in Table 2.13 we used ﬁrst the cost of each option (cost of
the canteen plus the cost of the instrument) divided by the percentage of additional score which
is the corresponding LATE.
Table 2.13: Comparing options using LATE: Policy analysis
Aggregate French Math
Cost a
Management committee 13100 13100 13100
School project 14000 14000 14000
Cooperative school 13100 13100 13100
Association of mothers 13100 13100 13100
Association of parents 13100 13100 13100
Absence 13200 13200 13200
Textbook 14300 14300 14300
Percentage of additional scoreb
Management committee 33.4 24.1 44.7
School project 30.3 21.5 42.6
Cooperative school 40.3 34.8 53.2
Association of mothers 23.4 14.5 34.3
Association of parents 45.3 37.1 57.2
Absence 22.5 13.1 37.8
Textbook 25 15.2 36
Cost per percentage of additional score
Management committee 393 543 293
School project 462 651 329
Cooperative school 325 376 246
Association of mothers 560 901 381
Association of parents 289 353 229
Absence 587 1010 349
Textbook 571 940 397
Table 2.13 shows that the most cost eﬀective option is the combination of the canteen and
the association of parents. Having taken the aggregate and French scores, the results of the
analysis show that after association of parents, one observes cooperative school, the management
committee, the school project, the association of mothers, the textbook and the eliminating of
absenteeism of teachers. Meaning that, eliminating absenteeism of teacher is the least proﬁtable
option when one wants to increase the aggregate and French scores of pupils by 1 point. If one
takes the math score, the least proﬁtable option is improving the staﬃng of pupils’ textbooks.
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2.7 Conclusion
In this study, we have assessed the eﬀects of school feeding and deworming programs on school
performance measured through aggregate score, French score and mathematic score. We use
a observational database of 159 schools in four rural areas in Senegal: Diourbel, Fatick, Kolda
and Sedhiou. We use both program evaluation (Propensity Score Matching) and structural
approaches. The structural framework has the advantage of allowing for the joint estimation of
a performance equation and a selection mechanism while estimating the eﬀect of the program.
Our study distinguishes between deworming at home and deworming in school. It is important
to emphasize that the deworming program is not the sum total of the deworming in school and
at home. Furthermore, we do not take into account the intersection of deworming in school and
at home. Also, in terms of policy analysis, this study uses the local average treatment eﬀect
(LATE) as an instrument to analyze economic policy.
The main results that emerge from this study are the following: i) The results show that the
meal program can signiﬁcantly increase pupils performances. The impact is more important for
pupils who are in a school with an association of mothers. ii) The deworming in school has a
positive eﬀect on pupils’ performance while the deworming at home has a negative impact on
pupils’ scores. Our reading is that it is essential to assist rural households to deworm children
in households. This will avoid the use of traditional medicines (that have adverse consequences
on pupils’ performance). In addition, the deworming program signiﬁcantly increases the scores
of pupils who are in a school with an association of mothers or a school project. iii) Among the
determinants of test scores (schools and teacher, pupils’, household and community character-
istics, and shocks variables), school manual, class size, age of teacher and pupil’s age display a
non-linear relations with the scores. Particularly, class size displays a U-shaped relation meaning
that the performance (aggregate and math scores) decreases with increasing class size which is
consistent with the ﬁndings in the literature on performance. However, starting from a certain
threshold, the performance increases with respect to class size. In the context of rural Sene-
gal, large classes may have a positive impact on test scores. Among other controls, education,
expenditure, household size per equivalent adult, water point, Koranic school, early childhood
institution, existence of a college in the village have a positive eﬀect on pupils’ performance,
while controls such as disturbed courses, gender of teacher (male), absenteeism of teacher and
parents school have negative impact on scores. In terms of policy analysis, results show that the
impact of programs varies depending on the gender of the pupil, the existence of an association
around the school or the educational level of the pupil.
An extension of this study would be to introduce unobserved heterogeneity in an econo-
metric speciﬁcation designed for such purpose. Another extension would be to pay attention
to the variability (complementarity vs. substitutability) of the impact of the two programs on
educational outcomes. Finally, our data also raise a methodological challenge that would be to
elaborate on a structural model to estimate the impact of double or multi-program. However,
accounting for this is by no means trivial. This is the objective of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3
Packaging Meal and Deworming Programs1
3.1 Introduction
Policymakers are prone to comparing the relative beneﬁts of diﬀerent programs rather than
the impact of a single program. This leads to many relevant policy questions when multiple
programs are implemented. Some of such policy questions includes whether joint implementation
of a package be more eﬀective than each programs if performed separately? whether programs
are complementary or suplementary? What is the impact of a given treatment compared to the
impact of another treatment? Whether the cumulative impact of two programs is greater than
the sum of the impacts of each separately? This chapter provides some answers to these policy
questions.
Deworming and school meals programs have been widely implemented in developing countries
namely: Latin America, South America, Asia and Africa. They are considered as important
driving forces to improve enrollment, attendance and pupils’ academic performance in developing
countries. However, no consensus has emerged on the role and the eﬃciency of such interventions.
In this study, we focus on neglected aspects of these interventions by taking into account the
interdependence between both programs. To this end, we propose an econometric framework
that extends the basic endogenous selection methods a` la Heckman and the Roy model.
This chapter seeks to assess the impact of school feeding and deworming programs as a pack-
age on school performance (test scores), inscription (enrollment rate), progression (promotion
rate) and retention (dropout rate), while elaborating on the determinants of these performances.
To the best of our knowledge, previous contributions have been considered either as a single
program or a package of programs as a purpose of study. Package of programs are usually im-
plemented by policy makers because of their eﬃciency and also because implementing package
programs is less expensive than single programs. Banerjee and Duﬂo (2009) argued that the cost
of organizing an experiment may be high. Then it is worth implementing multiple experiments
or multiple treatments at the same time on the same population in order to assess alternative
variants of the program. However, due to the unavailability of appropriate tools that may enable
researchers to jointly estimate the eﬀect of package, and at the same time to disentangle the
eﬀects within a uniﬁed setting, most studies analyze these programs either separately or consider
the package as unique programs; or do not consider on the interactions between programs in
the package. Evaluating multiple programs requires the identiﬁcation and estimation of many
diﬀerent treatment eﬀects which makes the analysis more complex.
1Co-authors: The´ophile T. Azomahou (United Nations University, UNU-MERIT and Maastricht University)
and Wladimir Raymond (STATEC, Luxembourg)
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Some ‘multiple treatment experiments’ albeit in a very diﬀerent context and using diﬀerent
methodology include among others Banerjee et al. (2007), Duﬂo et al. (2006) and Olken (2007).
However, it is worthwhile to note that multiple treatments in these empirical papers diﬀer from
what we study here.A apart from the fact that these papers were not interested in canteen or
deworming programs, the authors did not jointly study their treatments and its interactions.
From a methodological perspective, Lechner (2001), Frolich (2004), Heckman and Vytlacil
(1998) and Wooldridge (2003) studied identiﬁcation and estimation strategies for the evaluation
of policies with multiple programs. Lechner (2001) extended the conventional two state frame-
work of the Rubin model to the case of multiple mutually exclusive treatment and discusses
various measures of the causal eﬀects. The author discussed the identiﬁcation of these eﬀects
under the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). The results explain that low dimen-
sional balancing scores, similar to the ones valid in the case of only two treatments exist and can
be used for identiﬁcation of various causal eﬀects. Lechner (2001) outlined a matching estimator
and showed that for speciﬁc parameters, like the treatment eﬀect on the treated, the multiple
program nature of the policy can be ignored, because individuals who are not in programs of
interest, are not needed for identiﬁcation. In Frolich (2004), diﬀerent nonparametric strategies
to solve the selection bias problem and to identify average treatment eﬀects have been inspected.
The study outlines that the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence and the instrumental variable approach often
identify only the treatment eﬀect using participation versus non-participation, and do not allow
a comparison between diﬀerent treatments. Lechner (2001) and Frolich (2004) are based on
propensity score matching.
Heckman and Vytlacil (1998) and Wooldridge (2003) used instrumental variables (IV). Heck-
man and Vytlacil (1998) developed models for counterfactuals and causality that build on Cowles
Commission econometrics. The authors generalized the IV approach to consider models with
multiple outcomes. They proposed both ordered and unordered choice models and deﬁned
treatment eﬀects for a general multiple treatment problem and presented conditions for the
application of IV for identifying a variety of new treatment parameters. Rather than relying
on IV to estimate the local average treatment eﬀect, Wooldridge (2003) imposed assumptions
that identify the average eﬀect for general kinds of treatment based on the correction function
approach. The author developed a correlated random coeﬃcient model with multiple treatments
which is more robust than the plug-in estimators of Heckman and Vytlacil (1998).
From the methodological viewpoint, the approach used in this chapter departs from the
previous studies on several aspects. First of all, the foregoing contribution is aiming at providing
framework for analyzing experimental data such as randomization. One need to recall that we
are dealing with observational data. More speciﬁcally, we do not require instrumental variables
like Wooldridge (2003). It is well known that Instrumental variables do correct the endogeneity
issue alongside ruling out the simultaneity aspect of the selection decision which is crucial to us.
Moreover, we are not in a pure propensity score matching paradigm as in the case of Lechner
(2001) and Frolich (2004) as we require the joint estimation of selection and outcome equations.
Propensity score matching for multiple treatments can easily be retrieved from the ﬁrst step
estimation of our procedure by elaborating on multiple selection. Lastly, our sampling process
generates mutually non-exclusive data as it will become clear in Section 3.3.
In this chapter, we propose a structural framework for double-index selection where treatment
variables are endogenous. Firstly, we use a double endogenous selection model, and secondly
we use a generalized Roy (1951) framework. For each speciﬁcation, we propose two estimation
procedures: The Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) and the Control Function (two-
step estimation) a` la Heckman (1978, 1979). One diﬃculty in the two-step procedure is that the
conditional expectations in the second step regression function involve the truncated trivariate
normal distribution. We compute these expectations relying on the moment-generating function
formula along the lines of Muthe´n (1990). As for the inference, it is well known that the
conventional standard errors of the parameters estimated in the second step are not valid and
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need to be corrected by generalizing the results of Heckman (1978, 1979), or by using simulation
or bootstrapping methods. Our framework has the advantage of allowing the identiﬁcation and
the estimation of a wide and rich range of treatment eﬀects: global eﬀects (eﬀects of programs
taken together), exclusive eﬀects (disentangled eﬀects), relative eﬀects (eﬀect of a program versus
the eﬀect of another program), additional eﬀects (eﬀect following from having another program
in addition), sequential and substitution eﬀects. We also tackle issues related to complementarity
versus substitutability of programs.
The implementation of the assessment uses a very rich and recent observational data for ap-
proximately 5,000 pupils in rural Senegal. The data relates to canteen and deworming programs,
pupils’ achievements (score in French, Maths, aggregate score, enrollment rates, promotion and
dropout rates), their characteristics (age, sex, etc.), their households’ and schools’ characteristics.
The use of these data is interesting not only for the underlying above mentioned development
issues, but also because it raises methodological challenges.
The results show that the package of meal and deworming is more beneﬁcial in terms of increas-
ing pupils’ achievements. The sequence of implementation does matter. The two programs are
complementary in increasing scores and promotion rates. Instead, they are substitutes with the
aim of reducing dropouts. The cost-eﬀectiveness analysis shows that deworming is by far cheaper
than the school meals. However, the implementation of meals program before deworming is more
cost-eﬀective than the reverse.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 takes stock of the literature on canteen and de-
worming program and their eﬀectiveness on school achievement in developing countries. Section
3.3 describes the data and variables. We propose two econometrics frameworks: the double-
index selection model and the generalized Roy’s model in section 3.4. Estimation results are
discussed in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 presents a treatment eﬀect heterogeneity and performs
a cost-eﬀectiveness analysis. The ﬁnal section summarizes and discusses implications of the
results, and elaborates its limitations.
3.2 Insights from the literature
In this section, we discuss salient features and evaluation studies from the literature, focusing
on issues related to the nature of interventions: school meals vs. deworming. Do these programs
achieve their ultimate objectives? We shall also highlight the main conclusions which they have
led. The list of references cited below is by no means exhaustive. School feeding (or other
nutrition) and deworming programs are the subject of great interest in recent years in many
developing countries. Some empirical studies found out that school meal and take-home ration
programs induce a signiﬁcant increase in pupil achievement as measured by test scores. However,
some other studies found no evidence or a negative eﬀect of the programs on test scores (Ahmed
and del Ninno (2002) and Kazianga et al. (2009)). Thereafter our literature survey is targeted
at the nature of the interventions.
3.2.1 School meal programs
Most empirical studies that evaluate school meals or feeding programs used participation in
school (which includes enrollment and attendance) as outcome. Some conclude that school meal
programs have a signiﬁcant positive impact on attendance and enrollment. On the other hand,
some other studies outlined that school feeding programs have a positive impact on learning
outcomes measured by test scores. As pointed out by Ahmed (2004), Vermeersch and Kremer
(2004), Powell et al. (1998), Jacoby et al. (1996) and Akakpo (2004) school feeding does not
have the same impact on all recipients. This raises the issue of causal heterogeneity we will
highlight later in this study.
Ahmed (2004) evaluated the impact of the school lunch program in Bangladesh on student
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outcomes using test scores for 1648 pupils in ﬁfth grade elementary school. The author revealed
that the aggregate scores of pupils who received the program are 15.7%, higher than pupils
in the control group. Relying on the disaggregated scores, the also author found out that the
improvement is mainly due to an increase in math score. By controlling the characteristics
of children, households and schools the number of pupils in particular, he observed that the
program has a signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect on scores in English. However, the impact is not
sizeable. Ahmed and del Ninno (2002) found that the FFE program in Bangladesh had a negative
and signiﬁcant impact on test scores for pupils who beneﬁted from the program in fourth-year
primary schools. The authors also indicated that the diﬀerence between the two groups came
from a decrease in scores of pupils who enjoyed the program. This ﬁnding stems from the low
socio-economic status of beneﬁciaries. Vermeersch and Kremer (2004) quantiﬁed the eﬀects of
subsidized school meals on student outcomes using randomized data from a breakfast program
in kindergarten in western Kenya. Results show that children in the treatment group attended
school 35.9% of the time, compared to 27.4% in the control group. The diﬀerence in attendance
is one third in the comparison group. The authors also showed that there is an improvement
in student learning, but only for children in schools where teachers were more experienced at
the beginning of the program. Kazianga et al. (2009) used a randomized trial to assess the
impact of school meal and take-home ration on health and education outcomes for poor children
in northern rural Burkina Faso. After one year academic experiment, the authors found that
both programs increased girls’ enrollment but there was no signiﬁcant impact on raw scores
in mathematics. Also, the interventions had caused an increase in absenteeism in households,
with low use of child labor while it decreased for household that had a relatively large use of
child labor. Powell et al. (1998) used data on 814 children in the ﬁfth year in primary schools
in rural Jamaica. The children were randomly divided into two groups. The treated group
received a breakfast containing 576 to 703 kcal and 27 g of protein. The control group received a
placebo consisting of a slice of orange with 18 kcal every day during eight months of school year.
School attendance rates records showed a slight increase for children in the treatment group.
This impact was greater for malnourished children than for well fed children. However, these
impacts are relatively small compared to the extent of the real impact because participation
rates were about 70% in both groups. Jacoby et al. (1996) found that a breakfast program
in Peru increases attendance rates of pupils in fourth and ﬁfth year of primary school. The
authors found that there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the rates of school attendance between
the two groups before the implementation of the program. During the implementation of the
program, they found out that attendance increased by 0.58% in schools for the treatment group
and decreased by 2.98% in the control group.
Akakpo (2004) examined the impact of school canteens on enrollment and attendance and on
student achievement with certiﬁcates of completion of elementary study (FEAC) in rural public
schools in three regions (Fatick, Kaolack and Tambacounda) of WFP intervention in Senegal.
The analysis includes the schools belonging to the WFP program for at least two years, those
who recently joined the program and those who participated in any of the WFP programs.
The results showed that school attendance is far better in schools where WFP operates, as
enrollment grew by 12% per year while the increase is only 8% in the group of schools where
WFP does not operate. The schooling of girls is particularly high in schools where WFP has
been operating and the number pupils grew by 15% per year against 10% in schools without
canteens. Cueto and Chinen (2007) examined the impact of an experimental program of school
breakfasts in primary schools in three departments in Peru. The outcome variables were test
scores on standardized coding, arithmetic and reading as well as attendance, enrollment and
dropout rates. The results showed that children in the program have high rates of attendance
and low dropout rate, compared to children not receiving the program. In addition, children in
the treatment group who are enrolled in multigrade schools and uni-grade have perform better
in coding test, arithmetic and reading.
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Several studies have sought to measure the impact of feeding programs at schools on the
cognitive development of children. Simeon and Grantham-McGregor (1989) used data on rural
Jamaica and found that breakfast had no eﬀect on the cognitive performance of children with
normal weight and height for their age while breakfast increases the performance of children
at risk. Whaley et al. (2003) studied the impact of animal foods (meat and milk) on the
cognitive development of children at primary school in rural Kenya using a randomized program.
The authors concluded that the quality and quantity of food can predict the performance in
arithmetic. The study shows that food of animal origin as well as energy have a positive eﬀect
on the results of children in cognitive tests such as arithmetic and perceptions.
3.2.2 Deworming programs
Compared to school feeding studies, evaluation research on the eﬀect of deworming programs
on educational outcome is less documented. Miguel and Kremer (2004) assessed the impact of
a randomized deworming program in Kenyan schools. The results showed that absenteeism in
the treatment group was 25% lower than in the control group. Moreover, deworming increases
school attendance by 0.14 percent per treated pupil on average. Miguel and Kremer (2004) also
studied the impact of deworming on test scores. The results showed that despite the reduction
in absenteeism, there is no evidence that deworming increased students scores. Additionally,
the authors use the Kenya Life Panel Survey (KLPS) to document the long-term impact of de-
worming program on school achievement, cognitive skills, labor market, fertility, marital choice,
health, physical strength and personal happiness. The authors found that children’s health and
participation in school are increasing not only for students in the treatment group but also
for students whose primary schools are located within 6km from treated schools. In particular
the impact was signiﬁcant on schools located within 3km. The impact on nearby schools seem
to be due to the reduction of transmission of the disease (positive externalities) thank to the
intervention. A key ﬁnding of the study is that the failure to take these externalities into ac-
count leads to a signiﬁcant underestimation of the beneﬁts of the intervention and the actual
cost of deworming. However, increased participation in schools is not reﬂected in the results
of tests score. In addition, the authors presented cost-eﬀectiveness analysis showing that the
intervention is cost eﬀective, but this intervention not does improve basic skills.
Bobonis et al. (2006) conducted a randomized trial in India as part of a health program
that provides iron supplementation and deworming to children aged from 2 to 6 years in 200
kindergartens in poor urban areas of Delhi. After ﬁve months of treatment, the authors found
signiﬁcant weight gains and a reduction of one ﬁfth of absenteeism. This ﬁnding is consistent
with the results of Miguel and Kremer (2004). Subsequently, Bobonis et al. (2006) have tried to
obtain estimates after 2 years of program implementation. However, the attrition of the sample
and the apparently non-random entry of new children in kindergartens make it diﬃcult to obtain
unbiased estimates of impacts in the long run. An important channel through which the gains
of preschool attendance in Bobonis et al. (2006) could aﬀect the long run entry of new children
in kindergartens is an improvement over time in academic performance in primary school. In
fact, 71% of parents in the ﬁeld study of India argued that the improved outcomes in primary
school has been a motivation for sending their children to preschool. In this study, children
received both iron supplementation and deworming. However, the study does not distinguish
between the eﬀects of both treatments meaning that iron supplementation and deworming were
considered together as one program.
Other studies focus on the impact of parasitic infection on cognitive development. Kvalsig et
al. (1991) examined the impact of whipworms and other parasites in South Africa and found no
association between drug treatment and educational attainment or memory function. Nokes et
al. (1992) evaluated a treatment of whipworms in Jamaica and concluded that cognitive functions
improved after undergoing the treatment, but other outcomes, particularly those related to
academic performance, does not seem to have changed signiﬁcantly.
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The main lesson from this brief literature review is that school meal and deworming in-
terventions as well as the potential policy implications have received substantial attention by
scholars. The debate has reached a state of maturity thanks to all the impact evaluation studies
that helped accumulate a rich and substantial knowledge of the success and failure of these
programs. However, no consensus has emerged yet as the conclusions are highly mixed and
controversy. This paper aims at contributing to this heated debate by exploring in depth an
important aspect of the problem which has so far been neglected: the package aspect of nutrition
and health interventions.
3.3 Programs package: variables and descriptive statistics
As we have outlined earlier, the design of the sampling of the two programs is unique and rich.
This richness follows from the fact that the two treatments in our analysis are mutually non-
exclusive. This means that having deworming does not prevent pupils from beneﬁting from
meals. As a result, some of pupils get only deworming, some only meals, some get both and
other received nothing. This section presents the variables and descriptive statistics. Before
that it is important to understand the data structure and the motivation of the econometric
speciﬁcation.
Data generation process and programs package
We have the case of two non-exclusive treatments T1 and T2. In this case, some individuals
receive only T1 whereas others receive only T2. Some others receive both T1 and T2. As a
result, the treatments here are typically mutually non-exclusive events. As we are in the case
of a package consisting of two treatments, we have four regimes, that are, T1T2, T1(1 − T2),
(1− T1)T2 and (1− T1)(1− T2).
In terms of impact analysis, this type of data sampling makes the study particularly rich
as compared to the case where all individuals in the treated group receive both treatments or
when the interventions are mutually exclusive, which means that deworming and meals cannot
be implemented at the same time.2 In other words, the occurrence of deworming does not
automatically rule out the occurrence of meals and vice versa. This kind of data arrangement
oﬀers the possibility to study not only the impact of each intervention as single, but also the
impact of the combination of the two programs and several relative eﬀects. Moreover, it helps
to design a speciﬁcation that aims at testing the complementarity vs. substitutability of the two
programs.
Programs package: Area covered and data sampling
In this study, we used a primary data (non-experimental) collected by the ‘Consortium for
Social and Economic Research (CRES)’ and the Ministry of Education as part of an interventions
of school canteens (meal) and deworming. For intervention areas, as mentioned earlier, four
regions (Fatick, Kolda, and Diourbel Se´dhiou) of Senegal were chosen. Central regions (Diourbel
and Fatick) are mainly composed of farmers and are closer to the capital (Dakar), while those
in the South (Kolda and Se´dhiou) are very isolated and are mainly ranchers as main economic
activity. The southern regions also suﬀer from poor living conditions and lack of access to
basic infrastructure, which prevent people getting out of poverty. In 2003, the regions of Kolda
and Se´dhiou are part of southern regions classiﬁed as a very low risk management capacity
whereas Fatick is part of regions with average management capacity of risk and Diourbel is
considered as a region with good capacity to manage risk (PAM, 2003).3 These four regions are
2See Brodaty et al. (2001) and Lechner (2001) for multiple mutually exclusive treatments analysis with non-
experimental data.
3In Senegal, rural ares, most risks that people are facing are natural hazards such as drought, land degradation,
animal diseases, pests and ﬂooding. The consequences of these risks are felt on agricultural production (production
loss, lower yields), livestock (cattle decreased, decreased production of animal products) and household incomes
because they will lose a portion of income from the sale of agricultural and animal products. In addition there are
other risks such as economic risks associated with rising prices of basic necessities, lower prices for agricultural
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characterized by weak school enrollment and high prevalence of poverty and vulnerability. As a
result of low harvests, food insecurity in these regions reduced not only household income, but
also impoverished their diet. Therefore, kids are exposed to acute malnutrition. It has been
recorded 31% of nutritional deﬁciency cases at school age and adolescence and a prevalence of
nutritional anemia for children at 4 to 14 years, with 62% of boys and 38% of girls (PAM, 2006).
The sample study is made up of pupils in the second and fourth year of primary school
(hereafter CP and CE2) in these four regions. Several reasons have guided the selection of these
two classes or grade. For reasons of costs of investigations, it was diﬃcult to include into the
interventions all pupils in each school. It should also be noted that all pupils within a school
beneﬁt from school lunch. On the other hand, if at the end of the second year the pupil cannot
read and write, the probability to fail before the end of the education cycle is very strong. In
addition, if after four years of primary education, skills in reading and writing are not acquired,
it is unlikely that the pupils cannot learn the basic skills that education is supposed to provide.
The interventions take about two years. We have a observational database of 159 schools with
about 5500 pupils of which 2800 are at second year (CP) and 2850 at fourth year (CE2) randomly
selected from a more large population. The pupils were oﬀered the two programs: deworming
(T1) and or meal (T2) as described above. Relying on that we formed the four groups: a group
of pupils that beneﬁt from the meal program only, a group of pupils that are dewormed only, a
group of pupils that received the two programs and a control group that receives nothing.
Since this data set has not been used previously, we conducted an important work of data
cleaning and cleansing in order to detect and correct corrupt or inaccurate records (typographical
errors, etc.), and to also make data valid, consistent, accurate and complete. Moreover, the
merging of the four survey questionnaires was challenging. Part of the merging identiﬁer for
households’ questionnaires was not accurate and has been restored, which took enormous time.
Score variables were imputed using the databases on scores from the ‘Institut National d’E´tude et
d’Action pour le De´veloppement de l’E´ducation (INEADE)’ who is responsible for administering
tests to pupils and to enter the data.
3.3.1 Variables
The variables used in this study are of two types: the outcome or performance variables (aggre-
gate score, French score, math score, enrollment rate, promotion rate and dropout rate) and the
determinants of performance or control variables. We have gathered the controls into four cate-
gories: pupils’ characteristics, households’ characteristics, schools and teachers’s characteristics,
the characteristics of the community where pupils live and the geographic location or regions
(Diourbel Fatick, Kolda and Se´dhiou). The treatment indicators are the response variables in
the selection mechanism. The deﬁnitions of all variables are summarized in Table A.1 in the
appendix. The control variables were chosen based on data availability from the survey sample
and their relevance for the analysis. Some controls are speciﬁc to the context of the study and
therefore are of particular interest. We mention them as such and also elaborate a bit on the
rationale of their use.
The characteristics of pupils. Pupils’ characteristics are: gender, age, class, having attended a
Koranic school, early childhood institution, being sick in the last three months preceding the
survey, eat his/her ﬁll, bring a snack to school and be dewormed at home. It is worth noticing
that deworming at home is not part of the deworming program studied. The latter consists only
of being dewormed at school.4
The gender of pupils can inﬂuence their academic performance. Although some studies
indicate that boys perform better than girls in mathematics and in science Felouzis (1997), and
products and livestock and cattle theft. Any region that doesn’t have ability to manage risk is highly vulnerable
to food insecurity. This has a negative impact on children’s education, nutrition and school performance.
4Remark: Deworming at home usually involves the use of traditional medecines or drugs by families without
any control of a practitioner.
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others have explained that gender diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant, and that sometimes
results are mixed (Ma, 2007). In the context of rural areas in Senegal, we anticipate that
boys perform better than girls because girls are more prone to domestic work. In addition,
some families still question the value of education of girls and are very reluctant to promote the
schooling of girls. The age of pupils may have a negative eﬀect on their achievement in case where
there is a delay in school progress due to the grade repetition. However, if one considers that
the delay follows from late entry to school, the literature mentions a positive relation between
age and academic achievement (Schwille et al., 1991). Health status is a major determinant of
performance. In the survey sample, it was asked whether a pupil has being sick the last three
months preceding the survey. Intuitively, being sick will reduce learning ability and the number
of school attendance.
Attending an early childhood institution and a Koranic school are speciﬁc to the context of
the study. Indeed, the development of structures like nursery that aims at supporting children
of young age are still underdeveloped.5 The Koranic school, usually found in Muslim countries,
is an informal private structure that provides religious education to kids. In Senegal, 95.9% of
the population practice Islam. Albeit informal, Koranic schools are very common in the society.
Children usually go to Koranic school between the ages of 5 and 6 years. These schools are very
popular and contribute to a tremendous development of kids capacity to learn and memorize
at young age. We can say that the learning mechanism in these schools is a memory based
learning. We hypothesis that these two variables (early childhood institution and a Koranic
school) will positively inﬂuence the academic performance of pupils. Two other variables that
are not frequently used in the literature are to eat at ﬁll at home and bringing a snack to
school. Remember that the study focused on rural population. These food indicators provide
information on the nutritional well-being of children. We also anticipate that these two variables
act positively on pupils’ performance.
The characteristics of schools and teachers. Schools’ characteristics taken into account are: the
number of classes in provisional shelters, the distance between school and the home of pupils,
the class size, the number of pupils per textbook, the existence of latrines, hand washing device,
association of pupils’ parents, water point, opportunity for pupils to eat near school, disruptions
that delay the kick-oﬀ of classes, absenteeism of teachers and schools stating that the tuition
fee or school cost is high. Among these variables, those that allow us to contextualize the
study are classes in provisional shelters, hand washing device, association of pupils’ parents, the
opportunity for pupils to eat near their school and disruptions that delay the start of classes.
For the variable temporary shelters, we expect a negative eﬀect on the scores but a positive
eﬀect on enrollment, dropout and repetition rate. In Senegal, temporary shelters have been
set up to overcome the lack of classrooms in some rural areas. They are usually precarious
straw constructions which become unusable during the rainy season. Through the oﬃce of the
association of parents, the community can control over the school, which could have a positive
eﬀect on the eﬀectiveness of schools. We give serious consideration to the quality of sanitation
in schools through the variables latrines and hand washing device. We expect a positive eﬀect
of these variables on pupils’ performance. The same goes to pupils having a meal near their
school. There are disturbances resulting to delays in the start of the course reduces the learning
time. We hypothesize a negative eﬀect of this variable on pupils’ achievement. In the Senegalese
context, there are often disruptions or strikes by teachers as well as ﬂood cases that often cause
delay in opening of classes. This situation reduces the learning time of pupils. The school cost
variable may impact negatively on the enrollment rate because if costs are too high households
may not be able to enroll their children.
Teachers’ characteristics are: gender, age, training received by teachers, professional and
academic qualiﬁcations and absenteeism. In the Senegalese context, we also expect that a
5In Senegal, enrollment in kindergarten is very low. In relation to the provision of education, institutions to
support early childhood are: community houses, houses for toddlers, nursery schools and kindergartens.
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female teacher has a positive inﬂuence on pupils’ achievement particularly girls who identify
themselves more easily to a teacher female. Regarding the age of teacher, we assume a positive
eﬀect. We introduced the square of the age of the teacher to take into account a possible
nonlinearity that may exist between the age and pupils’ performance. It is important to note
that in the literature, some authors have found no evidence between the age of the teacher and
pupils’ scores. Concerning the academic degree of teachers, we made the distinction between
the national certiﬁcate, which is a diploma certifying the acquisition of general knowledge at the
end of the secondary education and the ‘High School Diploma’ which is the national graduate
certifying the acquisition of high school.6 The literature reports mixed results regarding the eﬀect
of the academic level of teachers on pupils’ achievement (Clotfelter et al. 2006). Regarding the
variable continuing training, we expect a positive eﬀect on pupils’ achievement. Indeed, training
improves the teaching skills of teachers. There is no consensus in the literature as to the eﬀect of
the continuing training of the teacher. According to CONFEMEN (1999), the teacher’s trained
for a year in Burkina Faso and Cameroon have less satisfactory results than those trained for
ﬁve (5) years. In Senegal, the same phenomenon is reﬂected for teachers who received two years
of training compared to those who only received one year.
The characteristics of households. Here we have included some control variables usually found in
the literature such as education spending, health care spending, literacy of the household head,
gender of household head and marital status. Two other control variables which are important
in our context but not often mentioned in the literature are whether the household owns arable
land and cattle. Despite the fact that these two variables could be regarded as indicators of
wealth, we expect that they will have a negative eﬀect on pupils’ academic performance and also
on enrollment, promotion and dropout rates. As we previously outlined, in rural areas, it is likely
that pupils living in households with farmland are required by the families to work in the ﬁelds
or for domestic work.7 This will result in keeping them away from school. The same rationale
applies to the variable number of head of cattle owned by the household. The assumption is that
the higher the head of cattle the higher the probability that pupils are exposed to labor. This
variable is relevant in explaining the dropout because the communities who practice livestock
are generally nomadic and move permanently with their families.
With regard to marital status, more than 95% of household heads are married. We then
create two marital statuses consisting of married and unmarried people where unmarried includes
singles, unmarried, divorced and widowed. We expect that pupils living in married couple will
have a much better performance. Some facts suggest that children living with a single divorced
mother or widowed are generally more successful than children living in a large polygamous
household.
The community characteristics. Studies that have examined the eﬀects of neighborhood or
community factors on pupils’ performance are still scarce. These factors could have both positive
and negative eﬀect on pupils’ performance. In our study, we use the following indicators: the
existence of a college in the village, living in a community in which some children do not go
to school because parents are not interested in school, or some children do not attend school
because they only go to Koranic school and the number of primary schools in the village. These
variables are context-speciﬁc and can enrich our understanding of the determinants of pupils’
achievement.
Regarding the existence of a college, we expect a positive eﬀect on performance. Parents
who have no means to support their children to further their studies in a remote village after
their primary certiﬁcate will invest little in the education of their children. This could lead
to premature termination of schooling. In addition, living in a village where there is a college
6In the French system, the national certiﬁcate is denoted ‘Le diploˆme national du brevet (DNB)’ and the
High School Diploma is called ‘Baccalaure´at’. The latter doesn’t mean bachelor’s degree. It is equivalent to the
‘General Education Diploma’.
7Remind that agriculture and livestock are the main economic activities in the target rural regions of the
programs under study.
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implies that there are facilities for further study and possibly also that there are senior pupils in
these colleges who can help the younger ones in primary schools. Regarding the variable parents
who are not interested in school, we expect a negative eﬀect. The number of primary schools in a
community inform about educational opportunities. So it is expected that this variable will have
a positive eﬀect on enrollment. Lastly, to take into account certain unobserved characteristics
of the areas where the programs were implemented, we introduced region dummies. The region
of reference is Fatick because it has the largest number of schools and students.
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics
The distribution of the sample pupils according to the programs received is shown in the bottom
of Table B.1. About 4% of pupils receive both programs, 8% receive deworming but not meal,
23% receive meal but not deworming and 65% have not received any of the two programs. Table
B.1 also summarizes descriptive by treatment status. To check whether there is any diﬀerence
between groups, we provide mean diﬀerence tests. In what follows, we provide salient features
on outcome indicators: scores (aggregate, French and Math) and enrollment rate, promotion
and dropout rates).
We observe that, on average, pupils who received the package of two programs have the
highest academic results: 47.66, 45.24 and 50.08 respectively for the aggregate scores and the
scores in math and French. Those who have only deworming have the lowest aggregated average
score and score in French (36.69 and 35.36 respectively). The lowest average score in math is
36.96 and this occurs in the untreated group. As indicated in the test of mean diﬀerence, the
diﬀerences between groups are signiﬁcant except between untreated and deworming groups for
the aggregate score and score in math.
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The ﬁgure 3.1 displays the distribution of the three scores. These distributions are basically
uni-modal. Moreover, these distributions are fairly clustered around the sample averages. The
major information we draw from this distribution is that the academic performance of pupils is
quite low. It shows that most pupils have scores below the central value (50). It is therefore
clear that improving the academic performance of pupils became an objective of policy makers
because this improvement will contribute to human capital formation.
For the outcomes enrollment, promotion and dropout rates, statistics are reported in the
same Table. For a given outcome variable, the rate is calculated as given in the appendix B. We
observe negative average rate of enrollment for the deworming group, package and untreated.
This rate is positive for the meal group (7.6%). Negative values mean that the number of
students enrolled in school at date t− 1 is greater than the number of entries in t. In our data
collected, we observe that some schools that reported no registration at t, had registered in t−1,
thereby resulting in signiﬁcant negative rates as shown on the the distribution (see Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.1: Kernel density estimate. [Top]: Aggregate score [Bottom-left]: French score [Bottom-
right]: Math score
These enrollment statistics are particularly instructive in several respects. Several criticisms
and doubts persist as for the objectives assigned to the school feeding and deworming programs.
This is due to the fact that these programs can be diverted from their original objectives, which
would explain the high attractiveness of schools in areas where these programs are implemented.
This is also because they could allow families to meet the food needs of their children. With
a lot of caution, we may tentatively say that the observed positive average of enrollment rate
applies only for the meals group, while the average rates of other groups are negative.
The average promotion rate is highest in the group of pupils who received the package (81.89%),
followed by the untreated group (79.15%), meal group (78.76%) and deworming group (73.34%).
Regarding the dropout rate, it is lowest in the package group (10.2%) and highest in the untreated
group (16.6%). Note that the test of mean diﬀerence indicates that the average enrollment rate
between the deworming group (-32.28%) and the untreated group (-31.40%) is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent. The same goes for the average promotion rate between the untreated group (79.15%)
and the meal group (78.76%), and the average dropout rate between deworming group (15.18%)
and meal group (15.07%).
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Figure 3.2 provides additional picture about the distribution of the three rates. The en-
rollment rate has a bi-modal dominant distribution: with a mode around negative values and
another around zero. It is clear that the distribution of enrollment rate is dominated by nega-
tive values. Promotion and dropout rates have a dominant uni-modal distribution. A signiﬁcant
proportion of schools are located around 85% with regard to the promotion rate and another
smaller mode is shown around 65%. Overall, we observe that a signiﬁcant proportion of the
population experienced relatively high rates of promotion. The dropout rate meanwhile shows
a dominant mode around a value slightly lower at 15% and another smaller mode around 33%.
This indicates that most schools experienced a relatively low dropout rates.
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Figure 3.2: Kernel density estimate [Top]: Enrollment rate [Bottom-left]: Promotion rate
[Bottom-right]: Dropout rate
In conclusion, as indicated by the test of mean diﬀerences in Table B.1 in the appendix, we
observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the averages of several variables including outcomes and
controls. We can conclude that experimental methods based on randomization are not suited
to assess the impact of the package of programs that we study. In the following sections, we
develop and apply appropriate non-experimental methods to our data.
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3.4 Econometric speciﬁcations
3.4.1 The double-index selection model
Let T ∗1i and T
∗
2i denote two latent (unobserved) variables denoting the reasons for pupil i (i =
1, · · · , N) to receive treatment 1 (deworming) and treatment 2 (school meal) respectively. These
variables are assumed to be functions of observed characteristics of the pupil or the household
he/she belongs to, which we denote by wji (j = 1 or 2). Formally,
T ∗1i = γ
′
1w1i + μ1i, (1-1)
T ∗2i = γ
′
2w2i + μ2i, (1-2)
where γj denotes the vectors of parameters to be estimated, and μji denotes the error terms.
We assume that μji ⊥ wji. The observed counterparts to T ∗1i and T ∗2i, denoted by T1i and T2i,
are deﬁned as
T1i = 1[T ∗1i > 0], (1-3)
T2i = 1[T ∗2i > 0], (1-4)
where 1[.] denotes the indicator function which takes on the value 1 if the corresponding latent
variable is positive, and 0 otherwise. In other words, if the unobserved reasons for pupil i to
receive treatment j are suﬃciently valid, i.e. T ∗ji > 0, the pupil does receive the treatment, in
which case Tji = 1. If not, the pupil does not receive the treatment, i.e. Tji = 0. The outcome
for pupil i, yi, in terms of achievement (e.g. scores, repetition and dropout rates) is given by
yi = β′xi + δ1T1i + δ2T2i + θT1iT2i + εi, (1-5)
where xi denotes the control variables, β, δj and θ are parameter vectors to be estimated;8.
xi also contains an intercept whose coeﬃcient will be the eﬀect of the absence of treatment on
the outcome; εi denotes the error term capturing among other things the eﬀect of unobserved
factors on the outcome. Since T1i and T2i are endogenous, E(εi | T1i, T2i,xi) = 0. By including
the interaction term T1iT2i, as additional regressor in equation (1-5), we can isolate the exclusive
eﬀect of either treatment and their joint eﬀect. Moreover, depending on the sign, θ reﬂects the
complementarity (positive) or the substitutability between T1 and T2.
The model consisting of equations (1-1)-(1-5) is a generalization of the dummy endogenous
variable model of Heckman (1978) in that there are two endogenous dummy variables. To es-
timate the model, we consider a full information maximum likelihood (FIML) approach and a
generalized two-step Heckman method as described in what follow.
FIML Estimation
We make the following distributional assumption: conditionally on (wi,xi), (μ1i, μ2i, εi)′ is
normally distributed with vector mean 0 and covariance matrix Σ =
⎛⎝ 1ρμ1μ2 1
ρμ1εσε ρμ2εσε σ
2
ε
⎞⎠ .9
The likelihood function of the model consists of four parts due to the combination of the
two treatments. The contributions to the likelihood are as follows: those of pupils who beneﬁt
from deworming and canteen meals (T1i = 1, T2i = 1), from deworming only (T1i = 1, T2i = 0),
from canteen meals only (T1i = 0, T2i = 1), and from neither one (T1i = 0, T2i = 0). For all four
8The vectors and matrices are bold faced while scalars are typeset normally
9With ρ12 = 0, equations (1-1)-(1-4) form a bivariate probit where σμ1 and σμ2 are not identiﬁed. Thus,
σμ1 = σμ2 = 1.
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categories of pupils, the outcome is observed. Formally, the likelihood is written as
L =
N∏
i=1
[∫ ∞
−γ′1w1i
∫ ∞
−γ′2w2i
f3(μ1i, μ2i, yi)dμ1idμ2i
]T1iT2i
[∫ ∞
−γ′1w1i
∫ −γ′2w2i
−∞
f3(μ1i, μ2i, yi)dμ1idμ2i
]T1i(1−T2i)
(1-6)
[∫ −γ′1w1i
−∞
∫ ∞
−γ′2w2i
f3(μ1i, μ2i, yi)dμ1idμ2i
](1−T1i)T2i
[∫ −γ′1w1i
−∞
∫ −γ′2w2i
−∞
f3(μ1i, μ2i, yi)dμ1idμ2i
](1−T1i)(1−T2i)
,
where f3 = f1(yi|xi,wi)f2(μ1i, μ2i|yi) denotes the trivariate normal density function and where
f2 and f1 denote respectively the bivariate and the univariate normal density function. Substi-
tuting f1(· · · )f2(· · · ) for f3 into equation (1-6) yields
L =
N∏
i=1
[∫ ∞
−γ′1w1i
∫ ∞
−γ′2w2i
f1(yi|xi,wi)f2(μ1i, μ2i|yi)dμ1idμ2i
]T1iT2i
[∫ ∞
−γ′1w1i
∫ −γ′2w2i
−∞
f1(yi|xi,wi)f2(μ1i, μ2i|yi)dμ1idμ2i
]T1i(1−T2i)
(1-7)
[∫ −γ′1w1i
−∞
∫ ∞
−γ′2w2i
f1(yi|xi,wi)f2(μ1i, μ2i|yi)dμ1idμ2i
](1−T1i)T2i
[∫ −γ′1w1i
−∞
∫ −γ′2w2i
−∞
f1(yi|xi,wi)f2(μ1i, μ2i|yi)dμ1idμ2i
](1−T1i)(1−T2i)
,
where f1(yi|xi,wi) = 1σε φ1
(
yi−β′xi−Ai(T1i,T2i)
σε
)
, φ1 denotes the univariate standard normal den-
sity function and Ai(T1i, T2i) is given by
Ai(T1i, T2i) ≡ δ1T1i + δ2T2i + θT1iT2i. (1-8)
The diﬃculty consists in evaluating the double integrals of equation (1-7) which result in bi-
variate (standard) normal cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) conditional on a third random
variable, yi. It is known that
(μ1i, μ2i)′|yi ∼ N
[(ρμ1ε
σε
[yi − E (yi|xi,Tj)]
ρμ2ε
σε
[yi − E (yi|xi,Tj)]
)
;
(
1− ρ2μ1ε
ρμ1μ2.ε 1− ρ2μ2ε
)]
, (1-9)
with E (yi|T1i, T2i,xi) = β′xi + Ai(T1i, T2i) + E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi), where E(εi | T1i, T2i,xi) = 0 and
ρμ1μ2.ε denotes the partial correlation between μ1i and μ2i conditional on yi and is given by:
ρμ1μ2.ε =
ρμ1μ2 − ρμ1ερμ2ε√
(1− ρ2μ1ε)(1− ρ2μ2ε)
.10 (1-10)
Using the symmetry property of the normal distribution, we derive the ﬁnal expression of the
10See for instance Kotz et al. (2000).
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likelihood as
L =
N∏
i=1
[
f1(yi|xi,wi)Φ2 (ζ1, ζ2; ρμ1μ2.ε)
]T1iT2i[
f1(yi|xi,wi)Φ2 (ζ1,−ζ2;−ρμ1μ2.ε)
]T1i(1−T2i)
[
f1(yi|xi,wi)Φ2 (−ζ1, ζ2;−ρμ1μ2.ε)
](1−T1i)T2i[
f1(yi|xi,wi)Φ2 (−ζ1,−ζ2; ρμ1μ2.ε)
](1−T1i)(1−T2i)
(1-11)
where Φ2 denotes the bivariate standard normal cdf, and ζk is deﬁned as
ζk ≡
γ ′kwki +
ρμkε
σε
(
yi − β′xi −Ai(T1i, T2i)
)√
1− ρ2μkε
, k = 1, 2 (1-12)
To obtain FIML estimates of the model, we can maximize the log-likelihood lnL using
standard numerical techniques (e.g. Newton-Raphson). Standard errors of the estimates are
obtained using the inverse Hessian or the outer product of gradient.
Two-step estimation
The regression equation (eq.(1-5)) is the equation of interest. The population regression can
be written in the form of a conditional expectation, i.e.
E(yi|T1i, T2i,xi) = β′xi + δ1T1i + δ2T2i + θT1iT2i + E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi). (1-13)
Since T1i and T2i are endogenous, E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi) = 0 and the ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimator of β, δ1, δ2 and θ is inconsistent. The endogeneity of Tji (j = 1 or 2) comes from
the fact that Tji depends on μji and the latter is correlated with εi. Hence, the endogeneity is
accounted for by taking the correlations ρμ1ε and ρμ2ε into account. The conditional expectation
E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi) can be written as
E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi) = T1iT2iE(εi|T1i = 1, T2i = 1,xi)
+ T1i(1− T2i)E(εi|T1i = 1, T2i = 0,xi) (1-14)
+ (1− T1i)T2iE(εi|T1i = 0, T2i = 1)
+ (1− T1i)(1− T2i)E(εi|T1i = 0, T2i = 0,xi).
Note the similarity between the four types of likelihood contributions. Using the deﬁnition of
T1i and T2i (eqs. (1-3) and (1-4)) and the latent equations (eqs.(1-2), (1-14) can be written as
E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi) = T1iT2i E(εi|μ1i > −γ ′1w1i, μ2i > −γ ′2w2i,xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E(εi|>,>)
+ T1i(1− T2i)E(εi|μ1i > −γ ′1w1i, μ2i ≤ −γ ′2w2i,xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E(εi|>,≤)
(1-15)
+ (1− T1i)T2i E(εi|μ1i ≤ −γ ′1w1i, μ2i > −γ ′2w2i,xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E(εi|≤,>)
+ (1− T1i)(1− T2i)E(εi|μ1i ≤ −γ ′1w1i, μ2i ≤ −γ ′2w2i,xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
E(εi|≤,≤)
.
The conditional expectations in equation (1-15) involve the truncated trivariate normal distri-
bution. Using the moment-generating function formula along the lines of Muthe´n (1990), these
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expectations are shown to be (see Appendix B.2 for derivations):
E(εi| >,>) = σερμ1εφ1(γ
′
1w1i)
Φ2 (γ ′1w1i,γ′2w2i, ρμ1μ2)
Φ1
⎛⎝γ ′2w2i − ρμ1μ2γ ′1w1i√
1− ρ2μ1μ2
⎞⎠
+
σερμ2εφ1(γ
′
2w2i)
Φ2 (γ ′1w1i,γ′2w2i, ρμ1μ2)
Φ1
⎛⎝γ ′1w1i − ρμ1μ2γ ′2w2i√
1− ρ2μ1μ2
⎞⎠ , (1-16)
E(εi| >,≤) = σερμ1εφ1(γ
′
1w1i)
Φ2 (γ ′1w1i,−γ ′2w2i,−ρμ1μ2)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρμ1μ2γ ′1w1i − γ ′2w2i√
1− ρ2μ1μ2
⎞⎠
− σερμ2εφ1(γ
′
2w2i)
Φ2 (γ ′1w1i,−γ ′2w2i,−ρμ1μ2)
Φ1
⎛⎝γ ′1w1i − ρμ1μ2γ ′2w2i√
1− ρ2μ1μ2
⎞⎠ , (1-17)
E(εi| ≤, >) = − σερμ1εφ1(γ
′
1w1i)
Φ2 (−γ ′1w1i,γ′2w2i,−ρμ1μ2)
Φ1
⎛⎝γ ′2w2i − ρμ1μ2γ ′1w1i√
1− ρ2μ1μ2
⎞⎠
+
σερμ2εφ1(γ
′
2w2i)
Φ2 (−γ ′1w1i,γ ′2w2i,−ρμ1μ2)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρμ1μ2γ ′2w2i − γ ′1w1i√
1− ρ2μ1μ2
⎞⎠ (1-18)
and
E(εi| ≤,≤) =− σερμ1εφ1(γ
′
1w1i)
Φ2 (−γ ′1w1i,−γ ′2w2i, ρμ1μ2)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρμ1μ2γ ′1w1i − γ ′2w2i√
1− ρ2μ1μ2
⎞⎠
− σερμ2εφ1(γ
′
2w2i)
Φ2 (−γ ′1w1i,−γ ′2w2i, ρμ1μ2)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρμ1μ2γ ′2w2i − γ ′1w1i√
1− ρ2μ1μ2
⎞⎠ , (1-19)
where we use the symmetry property of the normal distribution (i.e., ∀ξ, φ1(−ξ) = φ1(ξ)) and
Φ1 and Φ2 denote respectively the univariate and bivariate standard normal cdf. For notational
convenience, let
λ++1 ≡
φ1(γ ′1w1i)
Φ2 (γ ′1w1i,γ′2w2i, ρμ1μ2)
Φ1
⎛⎝γ ′2w2i − ρμ1μ2γ ′1w1i√
1− ρ2μ1μ2
⎞⎠ , (1-20a)
λ++2 ≡
φ1(γ ′2w2i)
Φ2 (γ ′1w1i,γ′2w2i, ρμ1μ2)
Φ1
⎛⎝γ ′1w1i − ρμ1μ2γ ′2w2i√
1− ρ2μ1μ2
⎞⎠ , (1-20b)
for pupils who beneﬁt from both deworming and canteen meals,
λ+−1 ≡
φ1(γ ′1w1i)
Φ2 (γ ′1w1i,−γ ′2w2i,−ρμ1μ2)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρμ1μ2γ ′1w1i − γ ′2w2i√
1− ρ2μ1μ2
⎞⎠ , (1-20c)
λ+−2 ≡
φ1(γ ′2w2i)
Φ2 (γ ′1w1i,−γ ′2w2i,−ρμ1μ2)
Φ1
⎛⎝γ ′1w1i − ρμ1μ2γ ′2w2i√
1− ρ2μ1μ2
⎞⎠ , (1-20d)
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for those who beneﬁt from deworming but not from canteen meals,
λ−+1 ≡
φ1(γ ′1w1i)
Φ2 (−γ ′1w1i,γ′2w2i,−ρμ1μ2)
Φ1
⎛⎝γ ′2w2i − ρμ1μ2γ ′1w1i√
1− ρ2μ1μ2
⎞⎠ , (1-20e)
λ−+2 ≡
φ1(γ ′2w2i)
Φ2 (−γ ′1w1i,γ′2w2i,−ρμ1μ2)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρμ1μ2γ ′2w2i − γ ′1w1i√
1− ρ2μ1μ2
⎞⎠ , (1-20f)
for those who beneﬁt from canteen meals but not from deworming, and
λ−−1 ≡
φ1(γ ′1w1i)
Φ2 (−γ ′1w1i,−γ ′2w2i, ρμ1μ2)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρμ1μ2γ ′1w1i − γ ′2w2i√
1− ρ2μ1μ2
⎞⎠ , (1-20g)
λ−−2 ≡
φ1(γ ′2w2i)
Φ2 (−γ ′1w1i,−γ ′2w2i, ρμ1μ2)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρμ1μ2γ ′2w2i − γ ′1w1i√
1− ρ2μ1μ2
⎞⎠ , (1-20h)
for those who did not beneﬁt from deworming or meal program: untreated. The λ’s are gener-
alizations of the inverse Mill’s ratio. Replacing the expressions of (eqs.(1-20a)-1-20h) into the
conditional expectations of equation (1-15) yields
E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi) = T1iT2i(σερμ1ελ++1 + σερμ2ελ++2 ) + T1i(1− T2i)(σερμ1ελ+−1 − σερμ2ελ+−2 )
(1-21)
+ (1− T1i)T2i(−σερμ1ελ−+1 + σερμ2ελ−+2 ) + (1− T1i)(1− T2i)(−σερμ1ελ−−1 − σερμ2ελ−−2 ),
which after factorization yields
E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi) = σερμ1ε
[
λ++1 T1iT2i + λ
+−
1 T1i(1− T2i)− λ−+1 (1− T1i)T2i − λ−−1 (1− T1i)(1− T2i)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
h1(T1i,T2i)
+ σερμ2ε
[
λ++2 T1iT2i − λ+−2 T1i(1− T2i) + λ−+2 (1− T1i)T2i − λ−−2 (1− T1i)(1− T2i)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
h2(T1i,T2i)
.
(1-22)
Since E(εi|T1i, T2i,xi) = 0, one approach to estimate consistently the population regression
(eq. (1-13)) consists in using the control function approach (Heckman 1978, 1979). In other
words, we rewrite the regression equation as
yi = β′xi + δ1T1i + δ2T2i + θT1iT2i + σερμ1ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
η1
h1(T1i, T2i) + σερμ2ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
η2
h2(T1i, T2i) + νi, (1-23)
where E[νi|xi, h1(T1i, T2i), h2(T1i, T2i)] = 0 and η1 and η2 are additional parameters to be esti-
mated. In theory, the coeﬃcients of equation (1-23) can be consistently estimated using OLS.
In practice, one problem occurs in that h1(T1i, T2i) and h2(T1i, T2i) are unobserved as they are
functions of the unobserved parameters γ1, γ2 and ρμ1μ2 , hence the two-step approach:
1. Obtain consistent and eﬃcient (under normality) estimates for γ1, γ2 and ρμ1μ2 by esti-
mating a bivariate probit using maximum likelihood. Compute ĥ1(T1i, T2i) and ĥ2(T1i, T2i)
by estimating the diﬀerent λ’s given in equations (1-20a)-(1-20h) using γ̂1, γ̂2 and ρ̂μ1μ2 .
2. Use ĥ1(T1i, T2i) and ĥ2(T1i, T2i) as regressors in equation (1-23) alongside xi, T1i and T2i
and apply OLS to equation (1-23). Since we use their estimates in lieu of h1(T1i, T2i) and
h2(T1i, T2i), the conventional standard errors are not valid and need to be corrected by
generalizing the results of Heckman (1976, 1979), or by using techniques of simulation or
bootstrap.
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3.4.2 The generalized Roy’s model
Roy (1951) introduced a framework of self-selection that aims to analyze occupational choice
with heterogeneous skill. This framework is one of the most important in economics and has been
widely applied in many other contexts, including evaluation. The Roy (1951) model has been
extended in several directions and many generalizations have been proposed (see e.g. Heckman
and Taber, 2008 and Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007a, Chap.70). By generalized Roy’s model,
we mean here multiple selections in the Roy’s framework also known as endogenous switching
regression.
Based on our four regimes: (1, 1), the pupil receives both treatments; (1, 0), the pupil re-
ceives only treatment T1; (0, 1), the pupil only receives T2; and (0, 0), the pupil receives neither
treatment. The four corresponding outcomes are deﬁned as: yi11, yi10, yi01 and yi00 respectively.
The generalized model of Roy consists of equations (1-1)-(1-4) and the following equations:
yi11 = β′11xi + εi11, (1-24a)
yi10 = β′10xi + εi10, (1-24b)
yi01 = β′01xi + εi01, (1-24c)
yi00 = β′i00xi + εi00. (1-24d)
An individual unit cannot be present in two diﬀerent regimes at the same so that the correlations
between the error terms of equations (1-24a)-(1-24d) are not identiﬁed and hence set to zero.
Maximum likelihood estimation
In order to estimate the generalized Roy’s model, we maintain the normality assumption. In
this case, (μ1i, μ2i, εi11, εi10, εi01, ε00)′ is normally distributed with vector mean 0 and covariance
matrix Ω deﬁned as
Ω =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
ρμ1μ2 1
ρμ1ε11σε11 ρμ2ε11σε11 σ
2
ε11
ρμ1ε10σε10 ρμ2ε10σε10 0 σ
2
ε10
ρμ1ε01σε01 ρμ2ε01σε01 0 0 σ
2
ε01
ρμ1ε00σε00 ρμ2ε00σε00 0 0 0 σ
2
ε00
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
The likelihood function of the model is given by
L =
N∏
i=1
[∫ ∞
−γ′1w1i
∫ ∞
−γ′2w2i
f3(μ1i, μ2i, yi11)dμ1idμ2i
]T1iT2i
[∫ ∞
−γ′1w1i
∫ −γ′2w2i
−∞
f3(μ1i, μ2i, yi10)dμ1idμ2i
]T1i(1−T2i)
(1-25)
[∫ −γ′1w1i
−∞
∫ ∞
−γ′2w2i
f3(μ1i, μ2i, yi01)dμ1idμ2i
](1−T1i)T2i
[∫ −γ′1w1i
−∞
∫ −γ′2w2i
−∞
f3(μ1i, μ2i, yi00)dμ1idμ2i
](1−T1i)(1−T2i)
,
where f3 still denotes the trivariate normal density function. Using the results in subsection
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3.4.1, the likelihood function can be written as
L =
N∏
i=1
[
Φ2
(
ω11, ξ11; ρμ1μ2.ε11
)
ϕ11i
]T1iT2i[
Φ2
(
ω10,−ξ10;−ρμ1μ2.ε10
)
ϕ10i
]T1i(1−T2i)
(1-26)
[
Φ2
(
− ω01, ξ01;−ρμ1μ2.ε01
)
ϕ01i
](1−T1i)T2i[
Φ2
(
− ω00,−ξ00; ρμ1μ2.ε00
)
ϕ00i
](1−T1i)(1−T2i)
,
where ωjk, ξjk and ϕjk (j, k ∈ {0, 1}) are deﬁned as follows
ωjk ≡
γ ′1w1i +
ρμ1εjk
σεjk
(
yijk − β′jkxi
)
√
1− ρ2μ1εjk
(1-27a)
ξjk ≡
γ ′2w2i +
ρμ2εjk
σεjk
(
yijk − β′jkxi
)
√
1− ρ2μ2εjk
(1-27b)
ϕjk ≡ 1
σεjk
φ1
(
yijk − β′jkxi
σεjk
)
(1-27c)
In order to obtain ML estimates of the generalized Roy’s model, lnL can be maximized using
standard numerical methods.
Two-step estimation
In order to estimate the model using the two-step approach, we write the regression of the
subpopulation as
E(yi11|T1i = 1, T2i = 1,xi) = β′11xi + E(εi11|T1i = 1, T2i = 1,xi), (1-28)
E(yi10|T1i = 1, T2i = 0,xi) = β′10xi + E(εi10|T1i = 1, T2i = 0,xi), (1-29)
E(yi01|T1i = 0, T2i = 1,xi) = β′01xi + E(εi01|T1i = 0, T2i = 1,xi), (1-30)
E(yi00|T1i = 0, T2i = 0,xi) = β′00xi + E(εi00|T1i = 0, T2i = 0,xi), (1-31)
where each regression is estimated using data for the corresponding subsamples. Using the results
of the conditional expectations calculated in Subsection 3.4.1 in the double-index selection model
at the two-step estimation, we can write the regression equations (eqs. (1-24a)-(1-24d)) as
yi11 = β′11xi + σε11ρμ1ε11λ
++
1 + σε11ρμ2ε11λ
++
2 + νi11, (1-32a)
yi10 = β′10xi + σε10ρμ1ε10λ
+−
1 − σε10ρμ2ε10λ+−2 + νi10, (1-32b)
yi01 = β′01xi − σε01ρμ1ε01λ−+1 + σε01ρμ2ε01λ−+2 + νi01, (1-32c)
yi00 = β′00xi − σε00ρμ1ε00λ−−1 − σε00ρμ2ε00λ−−2 + νi00, (1-32d)
with E(νi11|xi, λ++1 , λ++2 ) = · · · = E(νi00|xi, λ−−1 , λ−−2 ) = 0, and where the expressions of the λ’s
are given in equations (1-20a)-(1-20h). Equations (1-32a)-(1-32d) can be estimated separately
by OLS using the two-step approach described in Subsection 3.4.1 at the two-step estimation,
i.e.
1. Obtain consistent and eﬃcient (under normality) estimates for γ1, γ2 and ρμ1μ2 by esti-
mating a bivariate probit using maximum likelihood. Compute the λ̂’s, given in equations
(1-20a)-(1-20h), by using γ̂1, γ̂2 and ρ̂μ1μ2 .
2. Use the λ̂’s as regressors in equations (1-32a)-(1-32d) alongside xi, and apply OLS to these
equations. Since we use the estimates of the λ’s, the standard errors of the estimates must
be corrected once again by generalizing the results of Heckman (1976, 1979), or by using
techniques of simulation or bootstrap.
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Several comments are in order about the rationale of the use of DISM versus Roy as well
as their economic performance. Both models complement each other. They are diﬀerent and
deliver diﬀerent estimations and treatment eﬀects. The DISM model uses the selection processes
alongside one outcome equation for the full sample. It allows to estimate the Average Treatment
Eﬀects (ATE). In addition, with the interaction term T1T2, the DISM model enables us to test
for complementarity versus substitutability within the programs. The generalized Roy model
is a switching regression framework with four regimes. It also uses the two selection equations
but allows for diﬀerent outcome equations (one for each regime). As a result, in addition to
the ATE, we can estimate the Average Treatment Eﬀects on the Treated (ATET), the Average
Treatment Eﬀects on the Non-Treated (ATET).
Treatment eﬀects
As outlined earlier, our framework allows us to identify and estimate a wide range of treat-
ment eﬀects depending on the model used. In the double-index selection model we identify a
class of average treatment eﬀects. For the generalized Roy model, in addition to the average
treatment eﬀects, we provide several heterogenous treatment eﬀects as well.
Treatment eﬀects in the double-index selection model
Relying on the ﬁrst model, we can identify several average treatment eﬀects as summarized
in Table (3.1). Let us consider them in turn.
i) Exclusive eﬀect. Assume the two programmes T1 and T2. The exclusive eﬀect of T1
respectively T2 is the marginal eﬀect of T1 resp. T2 conditional on the fact that agents are
not in the alternative programme. Such eﬀects allow to measure the impact T1 or T2 only
on the outcome y, given controls x. This leads to the exclusive eﬀects of T1 and T2.
ii) Global eﬀect. The global eﬀect is the eﬀect of both programmes taken together.
iii) Additional eﬀect. The additional eﬀect is the eﬀect following from having additionally
another program. It is given by the diﬀerence between the global eﬀect and the exclusive
eﬀects. This eﬀect should be distinguished by the global and the sequential eﬀects even if
they are closely related. It is diﬀerent from the global eﬀect because the implementation
starts only with one program, either meal or deworming, contrary to the global eﬀect
for which both programs are administered together starting from the beginning of the
implementation. It is also diﬀerent from the sequential eﬀect because the order doesn’t
matter.
iv) Relative eﬀect. Within our framework, we are able to assess the eﬀectiveness of imple-
menting (T1, T2) vs. T1 or T2. Thus, we have the eﬀect of package (T1, T2) vs. T1 and the
eﬀect of package (T1, T2) vs. T2. We can also stand for the eﬀect of a programme vs. the
eﬀect of the other programme. For example, in the case of exclusive eﬀects, taking the
diﬀerence yields also a relative eﬀect.
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Treatment eﬀects in the generalized Roy model
The Roy model allows to compute the average treatment eﬀects as in the case of the double-
index endogenous selection model, but also to derive several heterogenous average treatment
eﬀects: the eﬀects on the treated and on the untreated. For each, we also compute the associated
exclusive, global, additional and relative eﬀects. In addition, some new eﬀects can be identiﬁed
viz, sequential and substitution eﬀects. Both eﬀects are relevant for policy analysis.
i) Sequential eﬀect. This eﬀect is of particular interest. As part our assessment, deworming
and school feeding programs are complementary in nature. Depending on which treatment
is ﬁrstly implemented, the overall eﬀect will diﬀer. This means that we will not have the
same eﬀect if a pupil got school feeding treatment before deworming, and vice versa. Of
course the ideal case is to deworm ﬁrst, hence the rationale of the sequence. Let us denote
T1 the deworming treatment and T2 the canteen treatment. It is expected that the sequence
T1T2 be more eﬃcient than T2T1.
ii) Substitution eﬀect. By substitution eﬀect, we mean replacing one program with another.
For example, what would happen if after having started a program, it is stopped and
replaced by another. In this, substitution eﬀect is diﬀerent from the sequential eﬀect. The
substitution eﬀect is particularly interesting when the substitution is made with programs
targeting the same goal. In the case of the deworming and canteen programs the question
arises whether the substitution makes sense. The answer is yes. On one hand, the two
programs can have the same goal: improve pupils’ performance. On the other hand, if
during the implementation of programs, a program appears to be more expensive than
anticipated compared to the other, and in case of lack of resources, the organizers may
face such choices. In this case, it seems clear that the cheapest program will be substituted
for the more expensive one. Experience has shown that the deworming program is cheaper
than the canteen because the resources mobilized are cheaper. This fact is supported by
cost-eﬀectiveness analysis (see Miguel and Kremer, 2004).
In our data, although both treatments (deworming and canteen) have not been implemented
sequentially or not has been substituted, our sampling allows us to identify and estimate these
eﬀects. Thus we are able to provide decision makers with powerful policy analysis tools. These
eﬀects are summarized in Table (3.2).
3.4. Econometric speciﬁcations 70
T
ab
le
3.
2:
T
re
at
m
en
t
eﬀ
ec
ts
in
th
e
ge
ne
ra
liz
ed
R
oy
m
od
el
P
ar
am
et
er
D
eﬁ
ni
ti
on
A
ss
um
pt
io
ns
(m
od
el
)
A
ve
ra
ge
tr
ea
tm
en
t
eﬀ
ec
t
E
xc
lu
si
ve
eﬀ
ec
t
of
T
1
,
E
A
T
E
T
1
(x
)
E
(y
i1
0
−
y i
0
0
|x
)
x
i(
β
′ 10
−
β
′ 00
)
:=
ϑ
0
0
1
0
(x
)
E
xc
lu
si
ve
eﬀ
ec
t
of
T
1
,
E
A
T
E
T
2
(x
)
E
(y
i0
1
−
y i
0
0
|x
)
x
i(
β
′ 01
−
β
′ 00
)
:=
ϑ
0
0
0
1
(x
)
G
lo
ba
le
ﬀe
ct
of
(T
1
,T
2
),
G
A
T
E
(x
)
E
(y
i1
1
−
y i
0
0
|x
)
x
i(
β
′ 11
−
β
′ 00
)
:=
ϑ
0
0
1
1
(x
)
A
dd
it
io
na
le
ﬀe
ct
,A
A
T
E
(x
)
G
A
T
E
(x
)
-
E
A
T
E
T
1
(x
)
-
E
A
T
E
T
2
(x
)
x
i(
β
′ 11
−
β
′ 10
−
β
′ 01
+
β
′ 00
)
:=
ϑ
1
0
.0
1
1
1
.0
0
(x
)
R
el
at
iv
e
eﬀ
ec
t
of
(T
1
,T
2
)
vs
.
T
1
,
R
A
T
E
T
1
(x
)
E
(y
i1
1
−
y i
1
0
|x
)
x
i(
β
′ 11
−
β
′ 10
)
:=
ϑ
1
0
1
1
(x
)
R
el
at
iv
e
eﬀ
ec
t
of
(T
1
,T
2
)
vs
.
T
2
,
R
A
T
E
T
1
(x
)
E
(y
i1
1
−
y i
0
1
|x
)
x
i(
β
′ 11
−
β
′ 01
)
:=
ϑ
0
1
1
1
(x
)
R
el
at
iv
e
eﬀ
ec
t
of
T
1
vs
.
T
2
,
R
A
T
E
T
1
,T
2
(x
)
E
A
T
E
T
1
(x
)
-
E
A
T
E
T
2
(x
)
x
i(
β
′ 10
−
β
′ 01
)
:=
ϑ
0
1
1
0
(x
)
T
re
at
m
en
t
eﬀ
ec
t
on
th
e
tr
ea
te
d
E
xc
lu
si
ve
eﬀ
ec
t
of
T
1
,
E
A
T
E
T
T
1
(x
)
E
(y
i1
0
−
y i
0
0
|T 1
=
1,
T
2
=
0,
x
)
ϑ
0
0
1
0
(x
)
+
λ
+
−
1
(σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
0
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
0
)
+
λ
+
−
2
(σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
0
−
σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
0
)
E
xc
lu
si
ve
eﬀ
ec
t
of
T
2
,
E
A
T
E
T
T
2
(x
)
E
(y
i0
1
−
y i
0
0
|T 1
=
0,
T
2
=
1,
x
)
ϑ
0
0
0
1
(x
)
+
λ
−
+
1
(σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
0
−
σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
1
)
+
λ
−
+
2
(σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
1
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
0
)
G
lo
ba
le
ﬀe
ct
of
(T
1
,T
2
),
G
A
T
E
T
(x
)
E
(y
i1
1
−
y i
0
0
|T 1
=
1,
T
2
=
1,
x
)
ϑ
0
0
1
1
(x
)
+
λ
+
+
1
(σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
1
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
0
)
+
λ
+
+
2
(σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
1
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
0
)
A
dd
it
io
na
le
ﬀe
ct
,A
A
T
E
T
(x
)
G
A
T
E
T
(x
)
-
E
A
T
E
T
T
1
(x
)
-
E
A
T
E
T
T
2
(x
)
ϑ
1
0
.0
1
1
1
.0
0
(x
)
+
λ
+
+
1
(σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
1
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
0
)
+
λ
+
+
2
(σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
1
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
0
)
−λ
+
−
1
(σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
0
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
0
)
−λ
+
−
2
(σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
0
−
σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
0
)
−λ
−
+
1
(σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
0
−
σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
1
)
−λ
−
+
2
(σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
1
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
0
)
R
el
at
iv
e
eﬀ
ec
t
of
(T
1
,T
2
)
vs
.
T
1
,
R
A
T
E
T
T
1
(x
)
G
A
T
E
T
(x
)
-
E
A
T
E
T
T
1
(x
)
ϑ
1
0
1
1
(x
)
+
λ
+
+
1
(σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
1
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
0
)
+
λ
+
+
2
(σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
1
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
0
)
−λ
+
−
1
(σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
0
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
0
)
−λ
+
−
2
(σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
0
−
σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
0
)
R
el
at
iv
e
eﬀ
ec
t
of
(T
1
,T
2
)
vs
.
T
2
,
R
A
T
E
T
T
2
(x
)
G
A
T
E
T
(x
)
-
E
A
T
E
T
T
2
(x
)
ϑ
0
1
1
1
(x
)
+
λ
+
+
1
(σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
1
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
0
)
+
λ
+
+
2
(σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
1
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
0
)
−λ
−
+
1
(σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
0
−
σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
1
)
−λ
−
+
2
(σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
1
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
0
)
C
on
ti
nu
ed
on
ne
xt
pa
ge
..
.
3.4. Econometric speciﬁcations 71
T
ab
le
3.
2
–
co
nt
in
ue
d
P
ar
am
et
er
D
eﬁ
ni
ti
on
A
ss
um
pt
io
ns
(m
od
el
)
R
el
at
iv
e
eﬀ
ec
t
of
T
1
vs
.
T
2
,
R
A
T
E
T
T
1
,T
2
(x
)
E
A
T
E
T
T
1
(x
)
-
E
A
T
E
T
T
2
(x
)
ϑ
0
1
1
0
(x
)
+
λ
+
−
1
(σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
0
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
0
)
+
λ
+
−
2
(σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
0
−
σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
0
)
−λ
−
+
1
(σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
0
−
σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
1
)
−λ
−
+
2
(σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
1
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
0
)
Se
qu
en
ti
al
eﬀ
ec
t:
(T
1
,T
2
),
Se
qA
T
E
T
T
1
,T
2
(x
)
E
(y
i1
1
−
y i
1
0
|T 1
=
1,
T
2
=
1,
x
)
ϑ
1
0
1
1
(x
)
+
λ
+
+
1
(σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
1
−
σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
0
)
+
λ
+
+
2
(σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
1
−
σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
0
)
Se
qu
en
ti
al
eﬀ
ec
t:
(T
2
,T
1
),
Se
qA
T
E
T
T
2
,T
1
(x
)
E
(y
i1
1
−
y i
0
1
|T 2
=
1,
T
1
=
1,
x
)
ϑ
0
1
1
1
(x
)
+
λ
+
+
1
(σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
1
−
σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
1
)
+
λ
+
+
2
(σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
1
−
σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
1
)
Su
bs
ti
tu
ti
on
eﬀ
ec
t:
(T
1
,T
2
),
Su
bA
T
E
T
T
1
,T
2
(x
)
E
(y
i0
1
−
y i
1
0
|T 1
=
0,
T
2
=
1,
x
)
−ϑ
0
1
1
0
(x
)
+
λ
−
+
1
(σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
0
−
σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
1
)
+
λ
−
+
2
(σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
1
−
σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
0
)
Su
bs
ti
tu
ti
on
eﬀ
ec
t:
(T
2
,T
1
),
Su
bA
T
E
T
T
2
,T
1
(x
)
E
(y
i1
0
−
y i
0
1
|T 2
=
0,
T
1
=
1,
x
)
ϑ
0
1
1
0
(x
)
+
λ
+
−
1
(σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
0
−
σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
1
)
+
λ
+
−
2
(σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
1
−
σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
0
)
T
re
at
m
en
t
eﬀ
ec
t
on
th
e
u
n
tr
ea
te
d
E
xc
lu
si
ve
eﬀ
ec
t
of
T
1
,
E
A
T
E
N
T
T
1
(x
)
E
(y
i1
0
−
y i
0
0
|T 1
=
0,
T
2
=
0,
x
)
ϑ
0
0
1
0
(x
)
+
λ
−
−
1
(σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
0
−
σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
0
)
+
λ
−
−
2
(σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
0
−
σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
0
)
E
xc
lu
si
ve
eﬀ
ec
t
of
T
2
,
E
A
T
E
N
T
T
2
(x
)
E
(y
i0
1
−
y i
0
0
|T 1
=
0,
T
2
=
0,
x
)
ϑ
0
0
0
1
(x
)
+
λ
−
−
1
(σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
0
−
σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
1
)
+
λ
−
−
2
(σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
0
−
σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
1
)
G
lo
ba
le
ﬀe
ct
of
(T
1
,T
2
),
G
A
T
E
N
T
(x
)
E
(y
i1
1
−
y i
0
0
|T 1
=
0,
T
2
=
0,
x
)
ϑ
0
0
1
1
(x
)
+
λ
−
−
1
(σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
0
−
σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
1
)
+
λ
−
−
2
(σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
0
−
σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
1
)
A
dd
it
io
na
le
ﬀe
ct
,A
A
T
E
N
T
(x
)
G
A
T
E
N
T
(x
)
-
E
A
T
E
N
T
T
1
(x
)
-
E
A
T
E
N
T
T
2
(x
)
ϑ
1
0
.0
1
1
1
.0
0
(x
)
+
λ
−
−
1
(σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
0
+
σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
1
−
σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
1
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
0
)
+
λ
−
−
2
(σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
0
+
σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
1
−
σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
1
−
σ
ε
0
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
0
)
R
el
at
iv
e
eﬀ
ec
t
of
(T
1
,T
2
)
vs
.
T
1
,
R
A
T
E
N
T
T
1
(x
)
G
A
T
E
N
T
(x
)
-
E
A
T
E
N
T
T
1
(x
)
ϑ
1
0
1
1
(x
)
+
λ
−
−
1
(σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
0
−
σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
1
)
+
λ
−
−
2
(σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
0
−
σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
1
)
R
el
at
iv
e
eﬀ
ec
t
of
(T
1
,T
2
)
vs
.
T
2
,
R
A
T
E
N
T
T
2
(x
)
G
A
T
E
N
T
(x
)
-
E
A
T
E
N
T
T
2
(x
)
ϑ
0
1
1
1
(x
)
+
λ
−
−
1
(σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
1
−
σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
1
)
+
λ
−
−
2
(σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
1
−
σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
1
)
R
el
at
iv
e
eﬀ
ec
t
of
T
1
vs
.
T
2
,
R
A
T
E
N
T
T
1
,T
2
(x
)
E
A
T
E
N
T
T
1
(x
)
-
E
A
T
E
N
T
T
2
(x
)
ϑ
0
1
1
0
(x
)
+
λ
−
−
1
(σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
1
−
σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
0
)
+
λ
−
−
2
(σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
1
−
σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
0
)
Se
qu
en
ti
al
eﬀ
ec
t:
(T
1
,T
2
),
Se
qA
T
E
N
T
T
1
,T
2
(x
)
E
(y
i1
1
−
y i
1
0
|T 1
=
1,
T
2
=
0,
x
)
ϑ
1
0
1
1
(x
)
+
λ
+
−
1
(σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
1
−
σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
0
)
+
λ
+
−
2
(σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
0
−
σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
1
)
Se
qu
en
ti
al
eﬀ
ec
t:
(T
2
,T
1
),
Se
qA
T
E
N
T
T
2
,T
1
(x
)
E
(y
i1
1
−
y i
0
1
|T 2
=
1,
T
1
=
0,
x
)
ϑ
0
1
1
1
(x
)
+
λ
−
+
1
(σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
1
−
σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
1
)
C
on
ti
nu
ed
on
ne
xt
pa
ge
..
.
3.4. Econometric speciﬁcations 72
T
ab
le
3.
2
–
co
nt
in
ue
d
P
ar
am
et
er
D
eﬁ
ni
ti
on
A
ss
um
pt
io
ns
(m
od
el
)
+
λ
−
+
2
(σ
ε
1
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
1
−
σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
1
)
Su
bs
ti
tu
ti
on
eﬀ
ec
t:
(T
1
,T
2
),
Su
bA
T
E
N
T
T
1
,T
2
(x
)
E
(y
i0
1
−
y i
1
0
|T 1
=
0,
T
2
=
0,
x
)
−ϑ
0
1
1
0
(x
)
+
λ
−
−
1
(σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
0
−
σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
1
)
+
λ
−
−
2
(σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
0
−
σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
1
)
Su
bs
ti
tu
ti
on
eﬀ
ec
t:
(T
2
,T
1
),
Su
bA
T
E
N
T
T
2
,T
1
(x
)
E
(y
i1
0
−
y i
0
1
|T 2
=
0,
T
1
=
0,
x
)
ϑ
0
1
1
0
(x
)
+
λ
−
−
1
(σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
1
ε
0
1
−
σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
1
ε
1
0
)
+
λ
−
−
2
(σ
ε
0
1
ρ
μ
2
ε
0
1
−
σ
ε
1
0
ρ
μ
2
ε
1
0
)
3.5. Findings 73
3.5 Findings
Remember that from the estimation perspective, this study focuses on two things: the study
of the treatment eﬀects from the package of deworming and school meal program alongside
the determinants of the academic performance of pupils. Both objectives have motivated our
modeling strategy in the previous section. We have estimated the two models presented in the
previous section: DISM (Eqs. (1-1), (1-2) and (1-5)) and the generalized Roy (Eqs. (1-1)), (1-4
and 1-24a-1-24d).11 Recall that these two speciﬁcations are diﬀerent and they also delivered
diﬀerent treatment eﬀects. The DISM model used the selection processes alongside an outcome
equation for the full sample. It can be used to estimate the Average Treatment Eﬀects (ATE),
meaning the eﬀect of treatment on the population. The generalized Roy’s model is a switching
regression framework with four regimes. It also uses the two selection equations but allows for
diﬀerent outcome equations (one for each regime). As a result, we can estimate not only the
ATE, but also the Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Treated (ATET) and the treatment eﬀect on
the untreated (ATENT). In both cases (DISM and Roy), the double selection given by relations
(1-1) and (1-1) is endogenous. The estimation results are provided in Tables B.2, B.3 and B.4 for
the score outcomes (aggregate, French and math) and Tables B.6 and B.5 for the rate outcomes
(enrollment, promotion and dropout) in the appendix.
3.5.1 Determinants of school performances: Selections and outcomes
The bivariate selection equations (1-1 and 1-2 describe the participation mechanisms in the two
programs (deworming and school meal). We used the criteria (see Chapter 2 Section 2.3 for
criteria) set by World Food Program and the Ministry of National Education of Senegal to mo-
tivate the choice of the control variables for the selection equations. Among these criteria, some
were recorded by the survey such as be located in an area with food insecurity, or be particularly
aﬀected by rising prices. The variables that we use are the existence of a management committee
in the school, warehouse, school cooperative, association of pupils’ mothers, grant from the Rural
Council, distance to home, the total number of pupils in the school, disturbances that delayed
the starting of the courses, the gender of pupils and medical box. These factors of selection are
the same regardless of the outcome. This implies that we have the same selection equations for
each outcome (aggregate score, French score, math score, enrollment rate, promotion rate and
dropout rate).
For deworming program, the results show that the total number of pupils, the existence
of a management committee of the school, association of pupils’ mothers, school cooperative,
existence of water point in the school and the gender of pupils have a positive eﬀect on the
probability of beneﬁting from the program. Furthermore, the existence of school infrastructure
and various associations in schools promote the supply of food and health programs. The
existence of a medicine box in the school reduced the likelihood of beneﬁting from the deworming
program. This suggests that pupils in schools with ﬁrst aid box are less aﬀected by parasitic
worms so that the concerned schools are less likely to get into the deworming program. This
may be because schools with medicine box are likely to have already an established medical
facility. Such schools would be less need for medical care including deworming.
On the school meals program, the results show that the total number of pupils, the distance
between pupils’ home and school, the existence association of pupils’ mothers, a grant from the
rural council, a warehouse, disturbances that have caused delays in starting the academic year
act positively on the probability of receiving a meal program at school. On the contrary, the
existence of school cooperative reduces the probability of receiving school meal program. Indeed,
the school cooperative plays several roles (cleanliness of the school, gardening activities, etc.).
In reality, in some schools, the school cooperative is not operational. In other schools, the school
11All the computations are performed with STATA. Despite the complexity of the procedures, the codes are
optimized to run fast.
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cooperative plays its role fully and even goes further to organize activities to enable children to
enjoy their lunch.
The variable distance to school (distance between school and the pupils’ home) is also one
of the selection criteria listed by the government for establishing canteens. In our sample, most
schools have beneﬁted from the so-called canteens ‘price increase’. These were established to
respond to the rising prices of food staples. This could explain the fact that we found a positive
eﬀect of the distance control on the probability of beneﬁtting from the meal program.
Outcomes
Scores
It is usually accepted that pupils in schools that are well equipped with ‘appropriate’ text-
books are likely to perform better.12 Our results show a nonlinear relationship between the
number of pupils per manual and test scores. The coeﬃcient of the linear term of the control
‘Manual’ is positive and signiﬁcant (for all score outcomes) while its square is negative (for the
aggregate and French scores). In other words, scores increase with the number of pupils who
share a textbook up to a certain threshold from which the scores drop. This threshold is 4 pupils
per textbook for the French score. For the aggregate score, the square term is negative but not
signiﬁcant and the turning point is 7, which corresponds to the maximum of pupils per textbook.
Observe that the decreasing part of the curve is out of sample. This result could be explained
by the fact that the learning time decreases when the number of pupils by textbook increases.
This result corroborates the ﬁndings of Michaelowa (2006). According to CONFEMEN (1999),
French and mathematics textbooks have a positive impact on learning, with a larger eﬀect for
the French textbooks.
Another interesting control variable is class size. Previous studies and experiments that
have evaluated the eﬀects of reducing class size on pupils’ achievement do not reach a consensus.
While some studies show that pupils in reduced size classes have better academic results (Piketty,
2004), others show that the reduction of class size does not necessarily lead pupils to perform
better (Davies, 2003). Our results show a negative but not signiﬁcant eﬀect of class size on
scores (see Tables B.2, B.3 in the appendix). Estimates based on the Roy’s model (see Table B.4
in the appendix) sometimes show a positive relation, sometimes a negative one depending on
the regime. For pupils who beneﬁt from deworming, we ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant relation
between class size and the aggregate and French scores. For those who beneﬁted from the
meal program or the package (deworming and meal), the results show a positive and signiﬁcant
relation between class size and test scores. For the untreated group, the eﬀect of class size on
French score is negative and signiﬁcant. Along the lines of Altinok (2006), we could argue that
class size does not aﬀect pupils’ outcomes in schools with canteens or for those in schools where
both program are implemented. However, in schools without meal program or with only the
deworming program, we ﬁnd that class size does impact negatively the score in French. This is
consistent with Brossard (2003). It is worthwhile to notice that in the Senegalese context, there
is a decline of the French language compared to national languages in particular the ‘Wolof’
language (ANSD, 2006).13
We obtain a nonlinear relationship between the age of teacher and scores. The linear term
is negative while the square is positive drawing a U shaped relation. As a result, the age of the
teacher has a negative eﬀect on pupils’ performance up to a threshold from which the relation
becomes positive. This threshold is 32 years for the aggregate score, 34 years for the French
12A well known result in the literature is that of Glewwe et al. (2009). This study evaluates a program of
textbook delivered to pupils in Kenya. The authors found that a textbook program has a negative impact on
pupils’ achievement. The problem was that the textbooks were in English. However, English was not the language
commonly used by Kenyan pupils at this level of education.
13Wolof is the most widely spoken language in Senegal (by the Wolof ethnic group which is about 45% of the
total population, as well as non-Wolof people). This language, which is also spoken in Gambia and Mauritania,
is experiencing a cultural expansion.
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score and 31 years for math score. In our sample, the age of the teachers varied between 20
and 53 years with an average age of 31 for the whole sample. Thus the age of teacher impacts
positively on scores when it reaches the average age of 31 years. This ﬁnding regarding the
age of the teacher probably reﬂects an experience eﬀect. Indeed, if we assume that mastering a
classroom is positively related to teachers’ experience, we can expect a positive eﬀect of the age
of the teacher on pupil’s performance (Schwille et al. 1991). It is important to remember that
in the literature, there is no consensus on the relation between the age of the teacher and pupils’
achievement. Indeed, the age of the teacher can interact with both experience and education.
This means that teachers of the same age but with diﬀerent levels of education and diﬀerent
experience will not necessarily have the same eﬀects on pupil’s achievement.
The age of pupils is another potential determinant of their performance. The results obtained
from the DISM model (see Tables B.2, B.3 in the appendix) show a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect
of pupil’s age on scores. As documented by Schwille et al. (1991), this relation may be explained
by the maturity of older pupils compared to younger pupils. According to UNESCO (1987), the
normal age of pupils in primary school is between 6 and 11 years. In our sample, the age of
pupils varies between 6 and 15 years. Therefore, there is a gap between the normal age group
and the current age of pupils. This may mean that either pupils entered school late, or they
have failed several times. As mentioned in the description of variables, if we consider the case
of late entry, a positive relation can be observed (Schwille et al. 1991). In the case of repeated
repetition, one generally expects a negative relation between age and pupils’ performance. High
rate of repetition thus indicative a low academic performance of pupils. The estimates provided
by the model of Roy (see Table B.4 in the appendix) show a negative relation between the age
of pupils and the aggregate and French scores for the group of pupils who beneﬁt from the
package. This ﬁnding could follow from the fact that this group of students is the youngest on
average, meaning the less mature compared to pupils in other groups (see descriptive statistics
in Table B.1: the average age is about 9.3 against 9.5, 9.7 and 9.9 respectively for pupils in the
deworming, canteen and untreated groups).
Another interesting evidence is the positive relation between education spending and the
aggregate and French scores. This result is not surprising because the more parents invest in the
education of their kids the higher achievement we could expect. The estimates also show that the
‘disturbed courses’ control, gender of the teacher, level of study or class of student, absenteeism
of teachers, deworming at home and living in a community where parents are not interested in
school have a negative eﬀect on pupil scores. Undoubtedly, disturbance and teacher absenteeism
decreased the learning time of pupils. According to UNESCO (2005), teacher absenteeism aﬀects
much of the time devoted to learning and hence learning outcomes. The result regarding the
gender of teacher is consistent with the ﬁnding of Jarousse and Mingat (1989). The authors
found similar results relying on data from Togo, meaning that pupils with female teachers
perform better than those with male teachers. For deworming at home, the relation found could
be explained by the nature of the drug used for deworming children. Rural households use either
traditional or modern deworming drugs. As mentioned in section 3.2, several cases of side eﬀects
in terms of fatigue or trigger diarrhea have been reported. Also, the use of traditional drugs is
not without consequences. This could lead to a decline in pupils’ performance.
The control variables like Koranic school, early childhood institution, existence of latrine,
existence of hand washing device, existence of a college in the village where the school of pupils
is located have a positive eﬀect on the scores. These results are expected. For example, the
eﬀect of college in the village where the school of pupils is operating can be viewed as indirect
eﬀect of more advanced sisters or brothers of pupils in these villages. They could act as mentor
to younger ones who are in primary school. Unfortunately, we have no direct information on the
fact that a pupil would have a brother or sister in a college. One can also argue that having a
college in the village will motivate pupils. The results concerning modern preschool (also known
as early childhood institution) and informal school (here Koranic school) are fairly well known
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in the literature. The Koranic school usually found in Muslim countries, is an informal private
educational structure that provides religious education based on memorization. The Koranic
school is known for developing the capacity of learning and memory because children learn by
heart very early.
On the qualiﬁcation of teachers, the results show that pupils taught by a teacher with
the professional qualiﬁcation CEAP perform better than those supervised by a teacher with
another professional qualiﬁcation (the reference).14 A surprising result is that pupils taught
by teachers without professional qualiﬁcation perform better than those supervised by teachers
with professional degree. In the case of Senegal, CONFEMEN (2007) has reported no evidence
or negative correlation between continuing training and pupils’ achievement. Especially in rural
areas, this can be explained by two factors. Firstly, in practice, it may be that those teachers in
the category without professional degree are awaiting graduation because most often they have
already passed the written examination. Secondly, they are teachers whose motivation is higher
than those with professional degrees. They can be inspected at any time. This control is crucial
for their career. The performance of pupils under their care is reﬂected in the state of their job.
As a result, it is likely that this motivation is a push factor which leads them to supervise pupils
very well. This may also explain why pupils supervised by these teachers are more eﬀective.
Regarding the academic degree of teachers, the results from the DISM model show that
pupils supervised by a teacher with the High School Diploma perform better in mathematics
than those supervised by a teacher with the national certiﬁcate. As pointed out by Rivers and
Sanders (2002), this result suggests that teachers with High School Diploma and more have a
higher level of knowledge in mathematics than those with the certiﬁcate. When we use the Roy’s
model, we get a positive relation between the scores and the proportion of teachers with High
School Diploma for the group of pupils who got the deworming program. On the contrary, the
eﬀect is negative for pupils who received the meal program only or the package. This ﬁnding
is consistent with the results of CONFEMEN (1999). The results also show that pupils taught
by teachers who have received continuing training are less successful in mathematics than those
taught by teachers who have not received such training. This result is surprising but could
be explained by the length of the continuing training: as pointed out by UNESCO (2000), the
impact of the training on pupils’ achievement becomes positive only if the training covers several
periods, otherwise one can observe a negative eﬀect.
On the geographical area, the results show that pupils living in Diourbel perform better than
Fatick (reference) unlike those living in Kolda and Se´dhiou that record weak performance. As
we have already stated in the data section, Kolda and Se´dhiou are isolated southern regions with
very weak risk management capacity and who practice mainly livestock. Fatick and Diourbel are
located in the center with a good ability to manage risk. These two regions are predominantly
involved in agriculture.15 In the southern regions, the livestock system is traditional and exten-
sive. The combination of heavy rainfall, dense water system and the availability of crop residues
(e.g. rice straw, stalks of millet and corn, peanut vines, etc.) after the rainy season promote the
development of a rich and varied pasture capable of maintaining the herd throughout the year
(ANSD, 2010). However, the frequency of bushﬁres at the end of the dry season (by end of May,
June and July) leads to food deﬁcits. It is worth noticing that this period also corresponds to the
exams period for pupils. This means that at the end of the school year, farmers are concerned
by the search of food for livestock. As some pupils are requested by their family to help with the
economic activities, which increases their absenteeism and impact their performances negatively.
The coeﬃcient of the treatment dummy T1 for the deworming program is negative and sig-
14It is worth to remember that the most two important professional degrees in Senegal are the CAP (Cer-
tiﬁcat d’Aptitude Pe´dagogique, meaning ‘Pedagogical Aptitude Certiﬁcate’) and CEAP (Certiﬁcat Ele´mentaire
d’Aptitude Pe´dagogique, which is ‘Basic Pedagogical Aptitude Certiﬁcate’).
15In our sample, the number of head of cattle by household varied between 0 and 500 in the region of Kolda, 0
to 502 in Se´dhiou, 0 to 111 in Fatick and 0 to 48 in Diourbel. As for agriculture, we have the following proportions
of arable land hold in each region: 97% in Diourbel, 92% in Fatick, 96% in Kolda and 87% in Se´dhiou.
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niﬁcant where as the dummy of the meal program is of the opposite sign for all scores except
for scores in math for which T2 is not signiﬁcant. Note that these eﬀects are not the treatment
eﬀects of the programs as the estimated partial correlation coeﬃcients are also signiﬁcant. Con-
sequently, the treatment eﬀects will be computed as derived in section 3.4.2. As outlined earlier,
an interesting aspect of our speciﬁcation (DISM) is that it oﬀers the opportunity to investigate
whether deworming and meal programs are complementary or substitutes. This is given by the
sign of the interaction term T1T2. The coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant for the aggregate
and French scores meaning that in the perspective of improving pupils’ academic achievement,
the two programs are complementary.
Enrollment, promotion and dropout
The estimation results for enrollment, promotion and dropout rates are reported in Tables
B.6 and B.5 in the appendix.
Enrollment. The control variables temporary shelters, association of pupils’ parents, age of
teacher, Koranic school, snack, pupils who eat their ﬁll and literacy of the household head have
a positive eﬀect. Particularly we ﬁnd a nonlinear U shape relation between the age of teacher
and the enrollment rate with a threshold at 32 years from which the age of teacher has a positive
eﬀect. On the contrary, determinants like class size, health expenditure, distance between pupils’
home and their school, disturbances that delays the starting of courses, gender of the teacher,
holding a farmland and school expenses have negative eﬀects. The coeﬃcients of these variables
are expected sign except for the variable distance from pupils’ home to their school for which
we do not anticipate a particular sign: the result shows that living less than one kilometer from
the school has a negative eﬀect.
Another interesting and intuitive result is that having a literate household head increases
the enrollment rate. However, the enrollment rate declines with school expenses. This result is
important for education policy in terms of reducing the illiteracy rate in rural areas where the
living standard is low. Ideally, if policy makers want to encourage families to send their children
to school, they must ensure that the cost of schooling is not too high. Two other results are
worth noting: having a teacher male and holding arable land have negative eﬀects. In the ﬁrst
case, in rural areas, the enrollment of girls is not always well received. The promotion of female
teachers may be desirable and may help in that respect. In the second case, arable land increases
the practice of child labor, which would in turn reduce enrollment. The geographical location
or regions also inﬂuences the rate of enrollment. Contrary to Kolda and Se´dhiou that have a
negative eﬀect on the enrollment rate compared to Fatick (reference), Diourbel has a positive
eﬀect. The meal program T2 has a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect.
Relying on the Roy’s model, for pupils who participate in the deworming program and
those receiving the package, we obtain that the number of classes in temporary shelters have a
negative eﬀect. Instead, for the group of pupils in the meal program and those in the untreated
group, the eﬀect is positive. For the group receiving the meal program, we have a negative
relation between enrollment and the proportion of pupils who have experienced early childhood
institution and those who bring a snack at school. Indeed, as the pupils in our sample are at
second and fourth year class, if there are no children of school age in the family and even if the
pupils had experienced an early childhood institution or bring food to school, it is possible to
ﬁnd a negative relation between these variables and the enrollment rate.
Promotion. The variables temporary shelters, age of teacher, age of pupil, distance to school,
association of pupils’ parents, gender of the teacher, continuing training, Koranic school, early
childhood institution, pupils who eat their ﬁll and ownership of arable land have a positive eﬀect.
As in the case of enrollment rate, there is a U shape nonlinear relation between the age of the
teacher and the promotion rate with a turning point at 38 years. However, health expenditure,
number of head of livestock owned, disturbance that have caused delay in courses and absen-
teeism have a negative eﬀect. Note that holding an arable land has a positive eﬀect, while the
number of head of livestock aﬀects promotion negatively. As we have already mentioned, this
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result may be related to the economic characteristics of the study areas. On the one hand, Kolda
and Se´dhiou have low capacity to manage risk and these two regions are those where households
have the greatest number of heads of cattle. On the other hand, Diourbel and Fatick are more
agriculture oriented. In addition, the practice of livestock based on a system of transhumance in
which farmers often move with their families is not beneﬁcial to children who go to school. On
the geographical locations, the results show a positive eﬀect of Diourbel and Se´dhiou compared
to the Fatick region. This eﬀect is negative for Kolda region.
The deworming program has a positive eﬀect while the meal program has a negative and
signiﬁcant eﬀect. The sign of the coeﬃcient of the interaction term T1T2 reveals that the two
programs are complementary. The estimates derived from the Roy’s model support the previous
ﬁndings except for the control variable eat at ﬁll in the group of meal program.
Dropout. The variable temporary shelters, class size, age of pupil, distance to school, associa-
tion of pupils’ parents, gender of teacher, continuing training, Koranic school, early childhood
institution, pupils who eat their ﬁll, ownership of arable land and the existence of a college in
the village have a negative eﬀect. Remember that (in the case of the dropout rate), a negative
sign on a coeﬃcient is a positive result as we seek to reduce the dropout rate. Instead, the
controls health spending, number of head of cattle, disturbances that caused delay in starting
the courses, the gender and the literacy of household head have a positive eﬀect on the dropout
rate. The coeﬃcient of the variable arable land is negative while the number of head of cattle
is positive. This means that children in households that keep livestock are more likely to drop,
while the possession of arable land reduces the dropout rate. This result is very interesting in
two respects. On the one hand, as we have already widely documented, farmers are mainly
located in the regions of Kolda and Se´dhiou which are landlocked with low risk management
capacity. These farmers often faced problems of feeding livestock at the end of each school
year. On the other hand, we can link this result with that obtained from the scores outcome so
that the two results complement each other. Indeed, we obtain a negative eﬀect of the variable
number of head of cattle on the scores while the eﬀect on the dropout rate is positive. As for
regions, the results show that there is a negative relation between the dropout rate and Diourbel
and Se´dhiou compared to Fatick, unlike the Kolda region where the eﬀect on the dropout rate
is positive. Deworming and meal programs have a negative and a positive eﬀect on the dropout
rate respectively. The coeﬃcient on the interaction term T1T2 shows that both programs are
substitutes with the aim of reducing dropouts.
The estimates obtained from the Roy’s speciﬁcation pointed to the same direction as those
observed from the DISM model except for temporary shelters, class size and the age of pupils
for the deworming regime. With regard to the gender of pupil, the estimation results for the
deworming and package regimes show a negative eﬀect of male pupils on dropout rate.
3.5.2 Eﬀects of meal and deworming on school performances
As we have described in Section 3.4.2 and summarized in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 the package of
deworming and meal programs and the data sampling allow us to estimate a wide range of
treatment eﬀects. Depending on the speciﬁcation, we have computed these eﬀects for the entire
population: Average Treatment Eﬀect (ATE) and for subpopulations of treated (ATET) and
untreated (ATENT). For each, we distinguish the exclusive, global, additional and relative eﬀects
in the case of the DISM model. In addition, we include sequential and substitution eﬀects in
the case of the Roy model. The results are presented in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 for the score
outcomes, and in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 for the enrollment, promotion and dropout rates.
Scores
Exclusive eﬀects. Remember that the exclusive eﬀects are the eﬀects of each program separately.
These eﬀects are positive and signiﬁcant. Thus, having only the deworming program has a pos-
itive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on pupils’ achievement (aggregate, French and math). The exclusive
eﬀect of meal is also positive and signiﬁcant. In other words, each program taken separately has
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Table 3.3: Average Treatment Eﬀects for scores: DISMa
FIMLb Two step
Aggregate French Math Aggregate French Math
Excusif: deworming 3.434∗∗∗ 0.055∗ 6.264∗∗∗ 3.700∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 6.866∗∗∗
Excusif: meal 7.197∗∗∗ 4.103∗∗∗ 10.158∗∗∗ 6.560∗∗∗ 3.779∗∗∗ 9.329∗∗∗
Global 15.097∗∗∗ 10.674∗∗∗ 19.578∗∗∗ 14.099∗∗∗ 9.997∗∗∗ 18.353∗∗∗
Additionnal 4.465∗∗∗ 6.515∗∗∗ 3.155∗∗∗ 3.838∗∗∗ 5.915∗∗∗ 2.157∗∗∗
Relative: package vs. deworming 11.663∗∗∗ 10.618∗∗∗ 13.313∗∗∗ 10.399∗∗∗ 9.694∗∗∗ 11.486∗∗∗
Relative: package vs. meal 7.900∗∗∗ 6.571∗∗∗ 9.420∗∗∗ 7.538∗∗∗ 6.218∗∗∗ 8.023∗∗∗
Relative: deworming vs. meal -3.763∗∗∗ -4.047∗∗∗ -3.893∗∗∗ -2.860∗∗∗ -3.476∗∗∗ -2.462∗∗∗
Notes a: Double-Index Selection Model; b: Full Information Maximum Likelihood.
Signiﬁcance levels (Bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on pupils’ achievement. It is important to note that the eﬀect of
the meal program is more pronounced than the deworming. The generalized Roy model provides
exclusive eﬀects that point to the same direction as those obtained from the DISM speciﬁcation.
Global eﬀects. The global or overall eﬀect is the eﬀect of the package, i.e, the combination of
deworming and meal. The global eﬀects are positive and signiﬁcant for all scores. We observe
that the global eﬀects are larger than the exclusive ones. This implies that pupils who get both
deworming and meal experienced greater improvement in their academic performance compared
to pupils who receive only one of the two programs. This result is very interesting and is
consistent with our expectations. As we have mentioned earlier from the estimation results, the
two programs are complementary. This means that the global eﬀect is expected to be higher
than the sum of exclusive eﬀects. The global eﬀects computed from the generalized Roy model
tell the same story as those obtained with the DISM.
Additional eﬀects. This eﬀect is the additional eﬀect of having a program in addition to an
other. These eﬀects are positive and signiﬁcant both from the DISM and the Roy framework.
This means that if pupils have already enjoyed the meal (or deworming), then taking deworming
(or meal) in addition improves their scores. The sign of this eﬀect can be seen as a corollary of
the complementarity of the two programs. However, the additional eﬀects are lower than the
global eﬀects. Remember that the additional eﬀect is diﬀerent from the global and the sequential
eﬀects as we have already documented in Section 3.4.2.
Relative eﬀects. Relative eﬀects seek to compare pairwise programs, including the fact of having
the package vs. a single program. We observe that the relative eﬀect of the package vs. de-
worming is positive and signiﬁcant. The same holds for package vs. meal. It is worth to note
that the relative eﬀect of the package vs. deworming is larger than package vs. meal. This is
not surprising as the exclusive eﬀect of the meal is higher than that of deworming. We also
observe that the relative eﬀect of deworming vs. meal is negative and signiﬁcant for all scores.
This result makes sense because the exclusive eﬀect of meal is larger than the exclusive eﬀect of
deworming. The relative eﬀects calculated from the generalized Roy model tell the same story.
3.5. Findings 80
T
ab
le
3.
4:
T
re
at
m
en
t
E
ﬀe
ct
s
fo
r
sc
or
es
:
G
en
er
al
iz
ed
R
oy
’s
m
od
el
a
P
op
ul
at
io
n
(A
T
E
)
T
re
at
ed
(A
T
E
T
)
U
nt
re
at
ed
(A
T
E
N
T
)
A
gg
re
ga
te
Fr
en
ch
M
at
h
A
gg
re
ga
te
Fr
en
ch
M
at
h
A
gg
re
ga
te
Fr
en
ch
M
at
h
E
xc
lu
si
f:
de
w
or
m
in
g
5.
35
7∗
∗∗
3.
75
20
∗∗
∗
8.
83
2∗
∗∗
17
.2
95
∗∗
∗
2.
00
2∗
∗∗
48
.1
24
∗∗
∗
-2
.1
92
∗∗
∗
-3
.4
26
∗∗
∗
-2
.8
38
∗∗
∗
E
xc
lu
si
f:
m
ea
l
7.
47
0∗
∗∗
5.
65
9∗
∗∗
9.
34
7∗
∗∗
20
.1
24
∗∗
∗
17
.2
09
∗∗
∗
23
.5
15
∗∗
∗
1.
25
9∗
∗∗
0.
06
4
2.
58
7∗
∗∗
G
lo
ba
l
18
.1
76
∗∗
∗
11
.7
93
∗∗
∗
24
.5
52
∗∗
∗
89
.2
31
∗∗
∗
55
.5
48
∗∗
∗
12
2.
77
3∗
∗∗
27
.8
17
∗∗
∗
25
.7
18
∗∗
∗
29
.9
38
∗∗
∗
A
dd
it
io
nn
al
5.
34
8∗
∗∗
2.
38
2∗
∗∗
6.
37
1∗
∗∗
51
.8
11
∗∗
∗
36
.3
36
∗∗
∗
51
.1
33
∗∗
∗
28
.7
50
∗∗
∗
29
.0
80
∗∗
∗
30
.1
89
∗∗
∗
R
el
at
iv
e:
pa
ck
ag
e
vs
.
de
w
or
m
in
g
12
.8
19
∗∗
∗
8.
04
1∗
∗∗
15
.7
19
∗∗
∗
71
.9
36
∗∗
∗
53
.5
45
∗∗
∗
74
.6
49
∗∗
∗
30
.0
10
∗∗
∗
29
.1
44
∗∗
∗
32
.7
77
∗∗
∗
R
el
at
iv
e:
pa
ck
ag
e
vs
.
m
ea
l
10
.7
05
∗∗
∗
6.
13
4∗
∗∗
15
.2
04
∗∗
∗
69
.1
07
∗∗
∗
38
.3
39
∗∗
∗
99
.2
58
∗∗
∗
26
.5
57
∗∗
∗
25
.6
54
∗∗
∗
27
.3
50
∗∗
∗
R
el
at
iv
e:
de
w
or
m
in
g
vs
.
m
ea
l
-2
.1
13
∗∗
∗
-1
.9
07
∗∗
∗
-0
.5
14
-2
.8
29
∗∗
∗
-1
5.
20
6∗
∗∗
24
.6
09
∗∗
∗
-3
.4
52
∗∗
∗
-3
.4
90
∗∗
∗
-5
.4
26
∗∗
∗
N
o
te
s
a
:
T
w
o
st
ep
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
.
S
ig
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
le
v
el
s
(B
o
o
ts
tr
a
p
-1
0
0
re
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
s-
):
∗:
1
0
%
∗∗
:
5
%
∗∗
∗:
1
%
3.5. Findings 81
In addition to the average treatment eﬀects (ATE) discussed above, the generalized Roy
model allows us to estimate the eﬀects on the treated (ATET) and on the untreated (ATET).
As in the case of ATE, here we also have exclusive, global, and additional eﬀects.
Average treatment eﬀects on the treated (ATET). Except for the French score, we observe that
the exclusive eﬀects on the treated are larger than their analogue ATE. The global eﬀects of
both programs are greater than the exclusive eﬀects and greater than the sum of the exclusive
eﬀects. Observe that for the math score, the exclusive eﬀects of deworming are larger than the
eﬀects of the meal program. This explains why we have a positive and signiﬁcant relative eﬀect
of deworming vs. meal.
Average treatment eﬀect on the untreated (ATENT). Regarding the eﬀect on the untreated, i.e,
the group of pupils who received neither deworming nor meal, the purpose is to inform policy
makers on the rationale for extending the programs to a wider population. Such extension
could result in signiﬁcant costs of implementation. The results show that the exclusive eﬀects
of deworming are negative while those of the meal program are positive. It is important to note
that the combination of the two programs greatly improves pupils’ achievement. We also obtain
positive additional eﬀects. The relative eﬀects of deworming vs. meal are negative because
the exclusive eﬀects of meal are larger than those of deworming. So for untreated pupils, it is
recommended to combine the two programs to increase scores.
Table 3.5: Substitution and Sequential Eﬀects for scores: Generalized Roy’s modela
Treated (ATET) Untreated (ATENT)
Aggregate French Math Aggregate French Math
Sequential: (T1, T2) 54.999∗∗∗ 33.247∗∗∗ 55.144∗∗∗ 144.436∗∗∗ 130.512∗∗∗ 142.742∗∗∗
Sequential: (T2, T1) 68.244∗∗∗ 38.043∗∗∗ 99.576∗∗∗ -63.891∗∗∗ -67.825∗∗∗ -60.469∗∗∗
Substitution: (T1, T2) 5.104∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 6.254∗∗∗ 3.452∗∗∗ 3.490∗∗∗ 5.426∗∗∗
Substitution: (T2, T1) 15.066∗∗∗ 1.550∗∗∗ 45.748∗∗∗ -3.452∗∗∗ -3.490∗∗∗ -5.426∗∗∗
Notes a: Two step estimation.
Signiﬁcance levels (Bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Sequential eﬀects. The sequential eﬀect is of particular interest as it accounts for the order
in which the programs are implemented. We expect the eﬀect to diﬀer depending on whether
pupils got school feeding ﬁrst and deworming next or vice versa. From a nutritional perspective
for example, the ideal order would be to deworm ﬁrst, hence the rationale of the sequence.
Unfortunately, we do not have a nutritional outcome indicator for which it may be expected
that the sequence T1T2 might be more eﬃcient than T2T1. For the group of treated pupils,
there are positive sequential eﬀects. However, the sequence T2T1 proves to be more eﬀective.
Thus, it seems more advantageous to introduce the meal program before deworming. As we
have discussed in Section 3.2, this result could be related to the negative perception that some
families have towards deworming as consequences of the sides eﬀects of drug used. However, for
pupils in the untreated group, it is better to deworming ﬁrst. For this group, introducing meal
program before deworming signiﬁcantly lowers pupils’ achievement.
Substitution eﬀects. For pupils in the treated group, we observe a very interesting result. Indeed,
introducing the canteen until a time and replacing it with a deworming program is more beneﬁcial
in terms of improving pupils’ academic achievement than the reverse. This is important for policy
analysis in particular for policy makers and NGOs who fund these sort of programs. Indeed,
we know that deworming program is far less expensive than the meal program. We will come
back to this aspect in the next section for further details through the cost-eﬀectiveness analysis.
What this result says is that, if for one reason or another, we have to substitute a program
for another (for example funding limitations), then it is more interesting to replace the meal
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program by the deworming if we seek to improve pupils’ academic achievement. This result is
consistent with the sequential eﬀect.
For the untreated group, deworming pupils ﬁrst before replacing the program by meal would
positively act on scores. However, unlike pupils in the treated group, it is not beneﬁcial to
introduce meal program, and then replace it with deworming. Again, this is consistent with
the sequential eﬀect results. Overall, the combination of the two programs is more beneﬁcial in
terms of increasing pupils’ academic achievement.
Enrollment, promotion and dropout
Enrollment. We expect positive eﬀects of programs on enrollment rate. The estimates give us
expected eﬀect for the meal program and unexpected eﬀects for the deworming. The exclusive
eﬀect of meal and deworming is respectively positive and negative. Even if the additional eﬀect
is positive, it is not high enough to oﬀset the negative impact of deworming. We also obtain
that the global eﬀect is negative which means that putting the two programs together decreases
the enrollment rate.
The relative eﬀect of the package vs. deworming is positive. This is not surprising because
we have an exclusive eﬀect of deworming which is negative and an additional eﬀect which is
positive. So the relative eﬀect of the package vs. deworming simply means that when you set as
goal to increase enrollment, among deworming alone and the combination of the two programs,
it is better to choose a combination of both. The relative eﬀect of the package vs. the meal is
negative. This implies that when we set the target of increasing enrollment, the implementation
of the meal program alone is better than the package. The relative eﬀect of the meal program
compared to deworming is positive. This is normal because the exclusive eﬀect of meal is positive
while that of deworming is negative. This means that the meal program would better help to
increase enrollment compared to the deworming program.
Table 3.6: Average Treatment Eﬀects for rates
DISMa Royb
Enrollment Promotion Dropout Enrollment Promotion Dropout
Exclusif: deworming -25.619∗∗∗ -5.198∗∗∗ -1.443∗∗∗ -19.642∗∗∗ -8.290∗∗∗ -1.263∗∗∗
Exclusif: meal 11.177∗∗∗ 2.727∗∗∗ -4.797∗∗∗ 19.644∗∗∗ 5.021∗∗∗ -5.430∗∗∗
Global -12.400∗∗∗ 7.040∗∗∗ -9.029∗∗∗ -14.415∗∗∗ 2.547∗∗∗ -8.100∗∗∗
Additionnal 2.041∗∗∗ 9.511∗∗∗ -2.788∗∗∗ 2.735∗∗∗ 5.815∗∗∗ -3.680∗∗∗
Relative: package vs. deworming 13.219∗∗∗ 12.239∗∗∗ -7.585∗∗∗ 17.675∗∗∗ 10.837∗∗∗ -9.436∗∗∗
Relative: package vs. meal -23.578∗∗∗ 4.313∗∗∗ -4.231∗∗∗ -20.740∗∗∗ 1.768∗∗∗ -2.111∗∗∗
Relative: deworming vs. meal 36.797∗∗∗ 7.925∗∗∗ -3.353∗∗∗ 1.550∗∗∗ 2.381∗∗∗ -1.660∗∗∗
Notes a: Double-Index Selection Model, two step estimations; b: Roy model, two step estimations.
Signiﬁcance levels (Bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Promotion. Here positive eﬀects are expected. The exclusive eﬀect of deworming is negative
while other eﬀects are positive and signiﬁcant. The global eﬀect shows that combining the two
programs is the best option. For the DISM model the global eﬀect is computed as 7.040 which
is larger than the eﬀect of the meal (2.727) and deworming (-5.198). For the generalized Roy
model, the global eﬀect is computed as 2.547 which is lower than the meal (5.021) and higher
than the deworming (-8.290).
The relative eﬀects clearly reveal that the package perform better than the single programs.
The relative eﬀect of the meal program vs. deworming shows that if one has to choose between
the two alternatives, implementing the meal program better ﬁt the target of achieving a higher
rate of promotion. The exclusive eﬀects lead to the same conclusion.
Dropout. Here we expect negative eﬀects. Remember that negative treatment eﬀects here mean
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that the program has reduced the dropout rate. The exclusive eﬀect of deworming is negative
as the eﬀect of the meal program. The global eﬀect indicates that the combination of the two
managed to reduce signiﬁcantly the dropout rate compared to the single programs. The global
eﬀect is computed as -9.029 in the DISM and -8.100 in the generalized Roy model whereas the
ﬁgures for the exclusive eﬀects are -1.443 and -4.797 for the deworming and the meal in the
DISM and -1.263 and -5.430 in the generalized Roy model respectively.
Table 3.7: Treatment Eﬀects for rates: Generalized Roy’sa
Treated (ATET) Untreated (ATENT)
Enrollment Promotion Dropout Enrollment Promotion Dropout
Exclusif: deworming -251.724∗∗∗ -59.885∗∗∗ 89.095∗∗∗ 80.410∗∗∗ -11.976∗∗∗ -0.995∗∗∗
Exclusif: meal -37.906∗∗∗ 41.619∗∗∗ -38.952∗∗∗ 45.890∗∗∗ -17.996∗∗∗ 9.014∗∗∗
Global -381.663∗∗∗ -31.793∗∗∗ 14.529∗∗∗ 58.663∗∗∗ 14.644∗∗∗ -1.869∗∗∗
Additionnal -92.032∗∗∗ -13.527∗∗∗ -35.613∗∗∗ -67.636∗∗∗ 44.617∗∗∗ -9.889∗∗∗
Relative: package vs. deworming -129.938∗∗∗ 28.091∗∗∗ -74.565∗∗∗ -21.746∗∗∗ 26.621∗∗∗ -0.874∗∗∗
Relative: package vs. meal -343.757∗∗∗ -73.413∗∗∗ 53.482∗∗∗ 12.773∗∗∗ 32.641∗∗∗ -10.884∗∗∗
Relative: deworming vs. meal -213.818∗∗∗ -101.504∗∗∗ 128.048∗∗∗ 34.520∗∗∗ 6.020∗∗∗ -10.010∗∗∗
Notes a: Two step estimation.
Signiﬁcance levels (Bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
The relative eﬀect of the package vs. deworming shows that the package performs better in
terms of reducing dropouts. The relative eﬀect of the package vs. meal is slightly lower than
the exclusive eﬀect of the meal program. The relative eﬀect of meal compared with deworming
shows that the former performs better.
3.6 Policy analysis
In this section we will ﬁrst present a treatment eﬀect heterogeneity analysis and then perform
a cost-eﬀectiveness analysis. Both analyzes are relevant to the policymaker. Treatment eﬀect
heterogeneity analysis is relevant from a policy perspective as it enables to identify subgroups
of populations for which treatments are eﬀective. To understand whether all targeted pupils
beneﬁt positively from the intervention it is important to explore the eﬀects heterogeneity.
In a context of scarce resources, the eﬀectiveness of an educational policy to promote the quality
is determined by the eﬀects of the program on educational outcomes and also the cost to achieve
them, hence the need for cost-eﬀectiveness analysis.
3.6.1 Treatment eﬀect heterogeneity
In section 3.5, we have summarized the treatment eﬀects by taking the average either over the
entire sample (this is the case for the average treatment eﬀect) or over two sub-populations
leading to the average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATET) and the average treatment eﬀect
on the untreated (ATENT). All these eﬀects are based on a hypothesis of homogeneity though
the ATET and ATENT which can be viewed as heterogenous eﬀect. In other words, the average
eﬀects obtained are extrapolated to the population considered. In this section, we study the vari-
ation in treatment eﬀects across populations. Treatment eﬀect heterogeneity is an outstanding
issue in many impact evaluation studies. As pointed out by Imai and Strauss (2011), the study
of heterogeneous treatment eﬀects is relevant from a policy perspective as it enables to identify
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subgroups of populations for which treatments are eﬀective.16 Treatment eﬀect is heterogenous
if some pupils experience larger treatment eﬀects than others while the treatment is identical
for all. This may follow from the characteristics of pupils and likely some unobserved factors.
Scores
The distribution of the treatments eﬀects for the scores outcomes are plotted in Figures B.1,
B.2, B.3, B.4 and B.5 in the Appendix. Two salient pictures can be observed. On one hand, the
exclusive ATE eﬀect for meal program has a strong uni-modal distribution which is concentrated
around the average. At the same time, the distribution of the exclusive eﬀect of deworming is
more heterogeneous, less concentrated and slightly shifted to the right. In other words, the eﬀect
of the deworming is more heterogeneous while the eﬀect of the meals is more homogeneous. As
a result, the distribution of the exclusive eﬀect of deworming is more dispersed than the eﬀect of
meals. This implies that the second order moment of the exclusive deworming eﬀect is greater
than that of the meal eﬀect. On the other hand, the distributions of global and additional eﬀects
are closely related except for the Average treatment eﬀect on treated (ATET) of math score.
The distribution of the sequential and substitution eﬀects shows similar pictures with strong
uni-modality.
Enrollment, promotion and dropout
Figures B.6, B.7, B.8, B.9 and B.10 display the plots of the distributions of treatment eﬀects
for the enrollment, promotion and dropout rates. The outstanding ﬁndings concern the enroll-
ment rate and the distribution of sequential and substitution eﬀects. Regarding enrollment rate,
we observe a bi-modal distribution of the additional ATE with the largest mode having negative
values of the treatment eﬀects and a second less pronounced mode which displays positive values
of treatment eﬀects. This result indicates a double heterogeneity: one related to the sign of the
treatment eﬀects and the other to the multiple modality. Whereas a signiﬁcant proportion of
pupils experiment an additional negative eﬀect, another smaller proportion experiment an addi-
tional positive eﬀect. The other distributions on the Figure display uni-modal patterns. Figure
B.6 (left) that shows the eﬀects of treatment on the treated, the exclusive and additional eﬀects
of deworming have a bi-modal distribution with diﬀerent signs for each modality. We deduce
that the heterogeneity picture is more pronounced than in the previous case. An interesting
phenomenon appears in Figure B.9 (left). We observe a mirror-like distribution between the two
substitution eﬀects for the promotion rate. While the uni-modality T2T1 is displayed around
negative treatment eﬀect values, the substitution T1T2 reﬂects the same shape but with a reverse
tail and a main mode around positive values of treatment eﬀects.
The main conclusion we draw from the analysis of the distributions is that while some ef-
fects are homogeneous (e.g, exclusive ATE for meal and substitution eﬀects for treated and
untreated for the scores), other eﬀects are clearly heterogeneous (mainly some eﬀects on enroll-
ment rate, sequential and substitution eﬀects). In other words, pupils react diﬀerently to the
same intervention.
3.6.2 Cost-eﬀectiveness analysis
A major policy issue of impact analysis is whether other alternatives are more eﬀective than the
programs under study in terms of cost-eﬀectiveness. Cheung and Perrotta (2011) outlined that
there are very few papers that studied the cost per outcome for school meal programs. Relying
on an experiment in Cambodia, the authors found that the on-site (school) feeding is the most
cost-eﬀective program while distributing take home rations is relatively expensive. They also
found that adding the deworming intervention to both on-site feeding and take home ration
16It is worthwhile to notice that we are not conducting a statistical inference on causal heterogeneity. Readers
interested in this aspect can refer to the studies of Angrist (2004), Horiuchi et al. (2007), Imai and Strauss (2011)
and Imai and Ratkovic (2013).
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make the full package much more cost-eﬀective thanks to the fact that the complete package
attracts many more pupils and the deworming medications are extremely cheap. Miguel and
Kremer (2004) found that the cost per additional year of school participation for the deworming
is very cost-eﬀective compared to other programs. In this section we conduct a cost-eﬀectiveness
analysis for our package. We will compare various alternatives in terms of cost and eﬀectiveness
in improving pupils’ performance.
A ﬁrst step in this analysis consists in determining the operation cost of the programs. Tables
3.9 and 3.8 report the average cost per year of running deworming and meal programs. These
costs have been calculated using information obtained from the Division of School Canteens
(DCS) of the Ministry of Education of Senegal. The World Food Program has planned 16,900
tons of food for a total cost of 7,165,413,861 CFA in 2011. This is intended for 3,400 schools or
560,000 pupils, in elementary schools in few regions, including Fatick, Kolda, Sedhiou, Diourbel
and Matam. We used this information to compute cost the per child of the meal program in
2011. To these costs, we added costs related to strengthening capacities and resources of the
Division of School Canteens, personnel responsible for the canteens and school management
committees.
Table 3.8: Program cost per year: Meal
Quantity Currency (CFA) Number of pupils Cost per pupil (CFA)
Meal
Food 16,900 7,165,413,861 560,000
Other costsa 1 170,566,943 560,000
Total meal 7,335,980,804 560,000 14000
Note: a Strengthening capacities and resources of the DCS, responsible of canteens and
school management committees.
For cost related to deworming, we used information obtained through the school canteen
division (DCS) and the DCMS of the ministry of education. In fact, for 2011 it was planned for
some regions to receive 400,000 tablets of mebendazole for 200,000 pupils due to two tablets per
student per year. The estimated cost of a tablet is around 16 CFA, therefore the total cost for
the drug is 6,400,000 CFA. To these costs, we added costs of transportation, mission of advocacy
and supervision that are only estimated costs. To assess the cost-eﬀectiveness we used the cost
of a program divided by the percentage of additional outcome due to the program.
Table 3.9: Program cost per year: Deworming
Quantity Currency (CFA) Number of pupils Cost per pupil (in CFA)
Deworming
Drugs 400,000 6,400,000 200,000
Advocacy Mission 1 3,734,280
Transport 1 200,000
Supervision 1 4,496,000
Total deworming 14,830,280 200,000 74
Scores
The results for the cost eﬀectiveness analysis are reported in Tables 3.10 and 3.11. Our
ﬁndings are consistent with the results in the literature. The deworming program is by far the
most cost eﬀective in increasing pupils’ achievement compared to the meal program. With the
deworming program it takes about 37 CFA per year and per pupil to increase the French score
by one point, whereas this ﬁgure is about 761,227 for the meal program. AS a result, the meal
program is twenty times more expensive. The combination of both programs cost about 237,166
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CFA per pupil and per year to increase the score in French by one point. To increase the score in
math by one point, it will take about 2; 557,089 and 107,304 CFA per year per pupil respectively
for deworming, meal and the package. It is important to also note that deworming alone is more
cost eﬀective in terms of increasing scores than the combination of the two programs.
Table 3.10: Cost eﬀectiveness analysis for scores
DISMa Roy b
Aggregate French Math Aggregate French Math
Cost deworming only 74 74 74 74 74 74
Cost meal only 13100 13100 13100 13100 13100 13100
Cost deworming and meal 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174 13174
Percentage of additional score
ATE
Excusif: deworming 3.7 0.3 6.9 5.4 3.8 8.8
Excusif: meal 6.6 3.8 9.3 7.5 5.7 9.3
Global 14.1 10 18.4 18.2 11.8 24.6
ATET
Excusif: deworming 17.3 2 48.1
Excusif: meal 20.1 17.2 23.5
Global 89.2 55.6 122.8
Sequential: (T1,T2) 55 33.2 55.1
Sequential: (T2,T1) 68.2 38 99.6
Substitution: (T1,T2) 5.1 0.2 6.3
Substitution: (T2,T1) 15.1 1.6 45.8
Cost per percentage of additional score
ATE
Excusif: deworming 20 246 11 14 20 8
Excusif: meal 1997 3467 1404 1754 2315 1402
Global 934 1318 718 725 1117 537
ATET
Excusif: deworming 4 37 2
Excusif: meal 651 761 557
Global package 148 237 107
Sequential: (T1,T2) 240 396 239
Sequential: (T2,T1) 193 346 132
Substitution: (T1,T2) 2581 74012 2107
Substitution: (T2,T1) 874 8499 288
Notes a: Dummy Index-Selection Model, two step estimations; b: Roy general model, two step estimations.
This makes deworming program being the easiest and least expensive to implement, because
it does not require all the material required by the establishment of a canteen. However, at
the same time deworming is not the program that has the greatest impact for pupils (in terms
of academic results) and for the families given their attitude towards deworming. Also, most
families would prefer canteens as they contribute directly to the alleviate food poverty which is
a serious problem in rural areas.
The analysis also shows that the introduction of canteen before deworming is more cost ef-
fective than the introduction of deworming ﬁrst. For example, to increase the math score by one
point, the meal-deworming sequence cost about 132 CFA and the deworming-meal sequence cost
about 240 CFA. The substitution of the deworming program to the meal is more cost eﬀective
compared to the reverse. Overall, compared to the meal program alone, the combination of both
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programs, whatever the order of implementation or substitution, it should be noted that the
deworming alone single is much more cost eﬀective.
Enrollment, promotion and dropout
The results show that it takes about 1172 CFA to increase the enrollment rate by one percent
with the school feeding program. In terms of promotion rate, we ﬁnd that the package (with
1871 CFA) is more cost eﬀective than the meal program (4804 CFA). It is not surprising that
deworming only is not enough to increase promotions. Indeed, we know that deworming improves
the health of children and so it must be combined with another program (here meal) to be more
beneﬁcial.
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For the dropout rate, we ﬁnd evidence that deworming is more cost eﬀective that the meal
program only and the package. However, the package is more cost eﬀective than the meal
program. Indeed, to reduce the dropout rate of 1%, it takes about 51,386 CFA per year and
per pupil for the deworming program, 2731 CFA for meal program and 1459 for the package
program.
3.7 Conclusion
Thanks to a unique observational data set, we are able to assess the impact of deworming and
school meals as a true package on pupils’ achievement in rural Senegal. In that, our approach
is new and can be distinguished from previous contributions in which deworming and school
feeding are implemented and studied separately as single programs or a single joint program.
From our ﬁeld experience and in conducting this analysis, several comments come to our mind
as regard the role of such interventions.
The main results that emerged from this chapter are the following. i) An interesting aspect
of our speciﬁcation is that it enables to investigate whether deworming and school meals are
complementary or substitutable. We observe that the two programs are complementary in the
goal of increasing scores and promotion rates. Contrariwise, they are substitutes with the aim
of reducing dropouts. ii) We derive a very diverse range of treatment eﬀects. For the score
outcomes, we obtain positive and signiﬁcant additional exclusive and global average treatment
eﬀects (ATE). The impact of the meal program on the scores is greater than that the deworming
program. The combination of the two programs (package) has a greater impact. This result
reinforces the complementary ﬁnding. Moreover, the relative eﬀect of the package vs. the
deworming alone is greater than that compared to the canteen only. For the average treatment
eﬀects on the treated (ATET), the exclusive, global, and additional eﬀects are positive and
signiﬁcant. It should be noted that the eﬀects on the treated are larger than the ATE. For
the treatment eﬀects on the untreated (ATENT), the results show that the exclusive eﬀect
of deworming is negative while the eﬀect of canteen is positive. The combination of the two
programs greatly increases scores. The sequential eﬀects indicate that for the pupils in the
treated group, the impact of the package performs better if the school meal is introduced before
deworming. For pupils in the untreated group, the reverse sequence is preferable. Substitution
eﬀects show that for the treated group, implementing school meals until a time and replace it with
a deworming program is more beneﬁcial in terms of enhancing scores compared to the reverse.
Regarding enrollment, we obtain an exclusive negative ATE eﬀect for the deworming program, an
exclusive positive eﬀect of the meals program, a negative overall eﬀect and an additional positive
eﬀect. Moreover, when we set the target of increasing enrollment, the implementation of meals
program alone is preferable to deworming or the package. When the objective is to increase
the promotion rate or reduce dropout, the package is the best option. iii) The cost-eﬀectiveness
analysis indicates that, regarding scores, deworming is far cheaper than the meals program. It
also shows that introducing the meals before deworming is more cost-eﬀective than the reverse.
As for the promotion rate, the combination of the two programs is more cost-eﬀective than the
single meals program. For the dropout rate, deworming is more cost-eﬀective compared to the
canteen and the package. However, the package is more cost eﬀective compared to the canteen
only.
Finally, results in this chapter suggest several additional areas for future research. Empir-
ically, a multiple outcome framework seems promising. In this study, we have considered six
outcomes (aggregate, French and math scores; and enrollment, promotion and dropout rates)
separately. It would be interesting to consider the improvement of all these outcome jointly.
Evidently, these outcomes are related. For example, in order to record good scores, one needs to
be enrolled and not to dropout. Moreover, being successful in terms of academic achievements
(via score) may also imply a high probability to be promoted. Another challenge consists in
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extending the double-index selection process to the case of M-selections. This is not only a
methodological challenge, but represents a real empirical interest. Indeed, as outlined by Lech-
ner (2001) many evaluation problems (for example the diﬀerent types of labor market policies
in Europe) involve more than two treatments. However, this is not without methodological
diﬃculties. Yet in this study, the likelihood maximization procedure is complex. As for the Roy
model, the main diﬃculty is that the procedure is data consuming. Indeed, all the parameters
have to be estimated for each regime. As a result, the problem of parameter inﬂation is likely. In
this sense, the two-stage estimation provides a more manageable alternative. Another extension
of this study would also be also to study the impact of the meal and deworming programs on
the welfare of households of beneﬁciary pupils. At the time of writing, none of these issues have
been addressed. We speculate that these are promising empirical research avenue.
CHAPTER 4
Impact of Meal Program on School Performances: A Randomized Experiment
4.1 Introduction
Experimental studies are increasingly used to measure the impact of policies or development
projects. Horiuchi et al. (2007, p. 669) pointed out that “randomized experiments are more
likely to yield unbiased estimates of causal eﬀects than typical observational studies. This is
because, the randomization of treatment makes the treatment and control groups is equal on
average in terms of observed and unobserved characteristics”. However, despite their beneﬁts
on observational studies, randomized experiments are often faced with diﬃculties. Likewise, in
controlled social science experiments, researchers often do not have perfect control of their target
population because participants may choose not to follow instructions on the random assignment
treatment or not responding. Therefore, problems of partial adhesion (non-compliance) and
attrition (non-response) can coexist. In this regard, some authors, including Horiuchi et al.
(2007), Esterling et al. (2011) and Barnard et al. (2003), argued that a good analysis must take
problems related to attrition and partial adhesion into account simultaneously. Unfortunately,
most of the existing studies do not address one of the two problems, although this leads to
invalid causal inference.
In this study, some schools in the treatment group did not receive the school feeding while
other schools in the control group have beneﬁted from the program, hence the problem of
non-compliance. In addition, during the post-program survey, the academic performance of
some pupils has not been collected, hence the presence of attrition or non-response. Given
that problems of non-compliance and non response are not produced completely at random (as
discussed in descriptive statistics), ignoring them in the estimation of the impact of the program
can seriously distort causal inference.
Using experimental data, this study measures the impact of an experimental school feed-
ing program on school performance in the presence of attrition and partial adherence in rural
Senegal. It uses a statistical method that can overcome the problems of partial adherence and
attrition simultaneously. The study covers four regions of Senegal, two in the center (Diourbel
and Fatick) and two in the south of the country (Se´dhiou and Kolda). We have two types of
outcomes, namely those related to academic performance of pupils (aggregate score, French score
and math score) and those related to internal eﬃciency of schools (enrollment rate, repetition
rate, promotion and dropout rates). We use a model that take the two problems in a single
framework for estimating the impact of the school feeding program into account (Horiuchi et
al., 2007, Barnard et al., 2003). In the presence of partial adherence, a standard intention to-
treat (ITT) eﬀect which is informative for policy makers, gives a valid inference of the eﬀect of
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assignment on outcome, but usually the goal is to calculate the eﬀect of receiving the treatment
rather than the eﬀect of the assignment. That is why we calculate both the ITT eﬀect and the
eﬀect of receiving the treatment which is called in the literature by “complier average causal
eﬀect (CACE)”.
In this study, we also do a cost-eﬀectiveness analysis and cost-beneﬁt analysis. The cost-
beneﬁt analysis is performed to determine whether the economic gains from the school feeding
program exceed the costs involded. The cost-eﬀectiveness analysis is conducted to know if there
are other options to achieve the same objectives covered by the feeding at a lower cost. In a poor
country, without an evaluation in terms of cost-eﬀectiveness or cost-beneﬁt of diﬀerent options,
we cannot know which policy to prioritize. This is very important because in a context of scarce
resources, it is necessary to choose the most cost eﬀective program in improving educational
outcomes.
The results show that the school feeding program can increase pupils’ performances and
enrollment rate, while reducing the dropout rate. The eﬀect of the program is positive for
all scores and it is greater for the math score than for the French one. Cost-beneﬁt analysis
conducted in this chapter shows that the school feeding program is justiﬁed in terms of economic
gains while cost-eﬀectiveness analysis shows that the meal program is less eﬀective than the
deworming program.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the experimental design, the data
and variables. In Section 4.3 we present the validation of the experimental design with the de-
scriptive statistics before and after the program. Section 4.4 describes the analytical framework
and the model used to measure the program’s impact. In Section 4.5, we present a summary of
the ﬁndings before making a policy analysis in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 concluded the chapter.
4.2 Experimental design, data and variables
In this experiment, a system was set up to build the treatment and control groups before
the introduction of the program randomly. The intervention consisted of providing hot meals
through school canteens located in rural primary schools in Senegal. A monthly contribution of
200 FCFA per pupil is required to purchase other products not included in the food delivered by
the WFP, but related to the functioning of the school canteens such as fresh vegetables, ﬁsh or
meat or even cereals other than maize, because WFP provides only maize during this periode.
Four regions (Fatick, Kolda, Diourbel and Se´dhiou) of Senegal were chosen to conduct the
experiment. The central regions which are Diourbel and Fatick are mainly composed of farmers,
and are closer to the capital (Dakar), while those in the South (Kolda and Se´dhiou), with mainly
ranchers, are very isolated. These areas are characterized by the presence of very few meal
programs, by very marked delays in enrollment, and high prevalence of poverty and vulnerability.
Food insecurity in these areas, due to poor harvests, not only reduces household income but also
impoverishes the diet. Their children are, therefore mostly at risk of acute malnutrition.
The sample consists of pupils in the second and in fourth year of primary school (CP and CE2
in Senegal), among schools located in Fatick, Diourbel, Kolda and Se´dhiou. Several reasons have
guided the selection of CP and CE2 grades. On the one hand, for reasons of cost of investigation,
it was diﬃcult to involve all pupils in each school. However, it should be noted that all pupils
beneﬁt from school canteen. On the other hand, at the end of the second year of primary
school, if the child cannot read and write, the probability to leave school before completing the
cycle is very high. In addition, if after four years of primary education, skills in reading and
writing are not vested, it is unlikely that the child can acquire the basic skills that education is
supposed to give him. Regarding the duration of treatment exposure, it is about 13 months, so
the experiment lasted a little more than one school year.
Diﬀerent actors have been involved in the implementation of this experiment. The main ones
includes; the World Food Program (WFP), the Ministry of Education through its ‘Division des
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Cantines Scolaires (DCaS)’, the ‘Institut National d’E´tude et d’Action pour le De´veloppement de
l’E´ducation (INEADE)’, the ‘Inspections De´partementales de l’E´ducation Nationale (IDEN)’,
which became the ‘Inspections de l’E´ducation et Formation (IEF)’ not very long ago, school
directors, teachers and communities. WFP provides food during each quarter and transports
them to the beneﬁciary schools. The DCas provides monitoring and coordination of management
of the canteens. At the level of the IEF, the persons in charge of canteens have to monitor their
functioning and write quarterly reports which is sent to WFP and to the Division of school
canteens. In each school, the operation of the canteen is provided by a Management Committee
which includes the school director, other teachers, two representatives of the pupils (one boy
and one girl) and a representative of the notables of the village. The management committee
has three specialized committees responsible for food management, community participation to
the kitchen and meals. Teachers ﬁll tracking sheets of the canteen under the supervision of the
director who collects and transmits them to the person in charge of canteens at the IEF. The
INEADE was responsible for test designing, recruitment of evaluators and for the marking of
tests. Parents of pupils are grouped into associations such as the association of parents or the
associations of mothers of pupils. These associations are responsible for ensuring the smooth
operation of canteens and the payment ﬁnancial contribution of FCFA 200 per pupil and per
month for purchasing of ingredients which are not provided by the WFP. The parents also
supplies ﬁrewood for cooking meals and support the construction of kitchens and store rooms
for the food. Communities are in charge of providing kitchen utensils for preparing meals. The
description of the sampling strategy and the data, will be discussed in the following subsections.
4.2.1 Sampling strategy
The sampling strategy has been to ﬁrst identify the geographic areas (regions) for the project,
and to also establish a population of eligible schools based on some criteria which will be listed
below. Then, from the population of eligible schools constituted, random sampling was con-
ducted to select a sample of schools for participation in the project. Finally random drawing
was conducted at each school for pupils participating to the program. Eligible geographical
areas should meet the following criteria: i) be among the poorest regions of Senegal, ii) have
a system of standardized assessment in the area and iii) be in a priority area of partners in-
volved in implementation of the project. Primary schools eligible for the experiment came from
a set of schools provided by the Department of Education based on the following criteria: i)
non availability of meal program and health service package including deworming in schools, ii)
having a number of pupils between 50 and 600, iii) have a grade of CP and / or CE2 iv) having
a functional management committee and v) be located in a rural area. The selection criteria
for pupils are: i) to be in a class of CP or CE2 and ii) to be attending the class the day of the
random selection of 20 pupils.
Selection of eligible schools for the project
On the basis of eligibility criteria the regions of Kolda, Tambacounda and Matam were selected.
Schools potentially or partially eligible in these three regions were isolated according to eligibility
criteria by using the data base on schools provided by the Ministry of Education. The number of
these eligible schools was 241 in Kolda, 101 in Matam and 143 in Tambacounda, which came up
to a total of 485 eligible schools. In terms of regional proportion of potentially eligible schools, it
was 49.7% in Kolda, 20.8% in Matam and 29.5% in Tambacounda. This amounts to a number
of schools of 79 for Kolda, 32 for Matam and 48 for Tambacounda. As the target population
was initially set up for four groups, ﬁnally 80 schools were selected for Kolda and 34 for Matam.
After a ﬁrst random selection, it emerged from a monitoring mission that some selected schools
did not meet the eligibility requirements of schools because the ﬁle provided by the Department
of Education contained schools that did not meet the criteria. Indeed, some schools already had
a deworming program, whilst others were provided with school meals in recent years. For Matam
region in particular, the majority of schools already had canteens and all pupils were dewormed
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and supplemented with iron. Moreover, while some schools were in temporary shelters, others
were isolated and did not have water. This is a major drawback for the establishment of school
canteens. So schools in Matam region were removed from the sample in favor of those of Se´dhiou.
Similarly, schools in the region of Tambacounda had received a deworming program initiated
by the Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization (WHO). These schools were then
replaced by schools in Fatick and Foundiougne. The choice of these new regions was due to the
fact that they are areas of intervention of the experiment partners, in particular the WFP.
The sample was then drawn again on the basis of the same selection criteria, but this time
using lists provided directly by person in charge of canteens. Particularly those in the IEF
instead of the lists that were provided by the Ministry of Education.
Thus, 167 schools located in Diourbel, Fatick, Kolda and Se´dhiou were identiﬁed as eligible
schools. Each region is administratively divided into departments and schools were distributed
as shown in the Table 4.1 below. The distribution of the ﬁnal sample of schools across regions
was proportional to the number of eligible schools by region.
Table 4.1: Schools eligible and selected for the experiment, 2009
Regions Department Schools eligible Schools selected
Diourbel Diourbel 18 11
Fatick
Fatick 41 37
Foundioune 41 22
Kolda
Kolda 33 29
Velingara 20 14
Se´dhiou Se´dhiou 14 7
Total 167 120
The sample size for the experiment is 120 schools and these schools were randomized into
4 groups of 30 schools. There was a canteen group (schools that will only be equipped with a
canteen), a canteen and deworming group (schools that will receive canteens and deworming), a
deworming group (schools that will only receive deworming) and ﬁnally a control group (schools
that have no canteen and no deworming). Moreover, in the sampling frame used to form the
population of eligible schools, some schools were waiting to receive school meals from the WFP.
It emerged that these schools were newly equipped with canteens. These schools were then
withdrawn from of the sample and were replaced by schools without canteens drawn randomly
from a group of replacement schools that had been constituted beforehand. We also observed
that four schools randomly classiﬁed into the ‘canteen group’ had the canteens for a long time.
These four schools were replaced by four schools randomly chosen among the 19 schools newly
equipped with canteens by WFP. The remaining 15 schools were added to the list of replacement
schools which contained 47 schools in total. These schools will be used as replacement schools
when needed during investigations. Among these 47 schools, 28 had just been newly equipped
with a canteen by WFP and 19 had no canteens. Replacement schools without canteens were
randomly placed in “replacement” order, and will replace schools in the control group whenever
needed. The same procedure was applied to replacement schools with canteens that will replace
schools in the treatment group when needed.
Selection of pupils
Once the schools in the experiment sample have been stabilized, a random selection of pupils
within each school was made. In schools where there has been more than one CP or CE2 class,
a random drawing was conducted at the ﬁrst class to have the class in which pupils will be
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drawn randomly. In each given class, 20 pieces of paper were marked among a total number of
paper equal to the size of the class. Each pupil was then asked to choose a piece of paper. After
the draw, the 20 pupils who happened to take the marked papers were selected for testing. In
classes, where the number was less than 20 pupils, pupils who attended the class the day of the
draw were selected systematically.
Standardized tests and surveys
After the random selection of pupils, standardized tests were conducted. The selected subjects
were mathematics and French and the two disciplines were given at the same time. For tests,
the INEADE has conducted supervision, administration, correction and data entry. The IN-
EADE has developed tools in the form of assessment booklets which are submitted to pupils to
test their academic performance. The strategy involves the selection of resource persons from
the ‘Collectifs de Directeurs d’Ecoles (CODEC)’ of six administrative departments to run the
experiment. Persons selected from the CODEC in charge to conduct the tests were trained
before giving tests to pupils in CP and CE2. The completed assessment booklets were then sent
to CRES by the IEF. Treatment (correction coding and computerization) of notebooks from
standardized tests was conducted by INEADE.
Testing pupils in math and French for the ﬁrst survey took place before March 2009. After
implementation of the program, test administration for the second survey took place throughout
the month of June 2010. After the program, a diﬀerent test was given to pupils passing in higher
class and the old test was given to repeaters.
Despite the eﬀorts of coordination, after conducting the ﬁrst survey, an audit of the entire
sample conducted in December 2009 revealed that 20 schools in the control group were already
equipped with canteens few years ago. Therefore, these schools were replaced by new schools
and pupils who were already tested.
Problems
During the ﬁrst survey, in addition to sampling problems, the long distances between commu-
nities, diﬃculties in accessing some schools and a teachers’ strike have resulted to the extension
of the duration of investigations. This also resulted to delay in giving tests to pupils in some
schools. Numerous problems were also encountered during the second survey. Indeed, some
schools were already on vacation before the arrival of the persons in charge of the tests. To limit
the attrition rate, some children were searched in the ﬁelds and tests were given. Also, some
classes in temporary shelters were closed early because of the raining season. Consequently, tests
to some pupils were conducted under trees. All this justiﬁes another visit after the holidays to
test pupils that could not be evaluated at the end of the 2009-2010 school year. Still, some
pupils were not found for testing. Another problem is related to the delivery of completed books
and questionnaires to persons in charge of canteens and then to CRES. Unlike the baseline sur-
vey, this device had not worked well during the second survey, and this caused a delay in the
treatment of notebooks and questionnaires.
Furthermore, to implement canteens, the strategy has been to persuade the WFP and the
Ministry of Education to direct their annual resources to schools in the treatment group and
not to those in the control group. The establishment of school canteens has taken much longer
than expected. Canteens have actually started operation in January 2010 except for some which
started in December 2009.
About the deworming, drugs had been acquired but the establishment of the medical team
was delayed due to a lack of ﬁnancial support. This was reason for abandoning the deworming
in the experiment. That is why we are not able to assess the impact of the deworming program
in this chapter.
Thus the four groups formed randomly in advance have been reduced to two groups. The
deworming group was added to the control group, whilst the deworming and canteen was added
to the canteen group. Finally, we have a sample of 120 schools divided into two groups (treatment
and control).
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4.2.2 Data and variables
Data
In this research, we used two primary data sets collected by the CRES before and after the
implementation of the school feeding program. The information was collected from population of
4,110 students including 2,122 boys and 1,988 girls, enrolled in rural primary schools in Senegal,
particularly in CP and CE2 classes. Data collected are based on the characteristics of schools,
teachers and classes, the characteristics of pupils and their households as well as on the school
census of population located within four miles of the school.
A questionnaire on the school, the teachers and the classes were given by directors selected
from the group of the ‘Collectifs de Directeurs d’Ecoles (CODEC)’. The questionnaire includes
information on school infrastructure, characteristics of teachers and of pupils.
A household survey including the administration of a questionnaire to all households of selected
pupils, and the population census within ﬁve kilometers around each school was carried out by
CRES. For the ﬁrst survey, the investigation began in March, 2009 and spread until May, 2009.
As for the second one, the investigation began on June, 2010 and ended in mid-July, 2010. This
survey collected information on pupils’ household characteristics, on pupils themselves, on their
environment and the community in which they live.
Information sheets were also used to collect data on the operation of school canteens. They were
ﬁlled by teachers under the supervision of school directors. Unfortunately, these records were
not well ﬁlled.
In addition to the surveys, data on the academic performance of pupils were collected at the
beginning and the end of the 2009-2010 school year through standardized assessments earlier
described.
We also used secondary data obtained from the database of the Ministry of Education. These
are related to pupil enrollment, school infrastructure, the number of repeaters by level of study
and for the entire school, as well as the number of promotion by study level. This secondary
data do not contain information on the number of dropouts. So, information on the admission
to the college entrance examination from the Directorate of services and examinations were also
used to calculate the promotion rate and ﬁnally the dropout rate. The list and deﬁnition of
variables is given in Table A.1 in the appendix.
Measurement of outcome variables
The outcome variables used are grouped into two categories: variables related to pupils’
achievement (aggregate score, French score and math score) and those related to the internal
eﬃciency of schools (repetition rate, promotion rate, dropout and enrollment rates).
Variables related to pupils’ performances.
The scores were calculated in terms of items by taking the sum total of correct answers. Missing
responses were considered incorrect responses (wrong answer). Each correct answer equal one
(1), whilst each incorrect answer is zero (0). The score is the percentage of correct answers.
Each score was calculated as follows: for scores in French, it was the total of good responses
given by a pupil divided by the total number of items (questions) in French then multiplied by
100. Then this result represents the score of the pupil in French. The same procedure was used
to calculate scores for mathematics. The aggregate score is a weighted average of French and
math scores based on the number of items in each discipline. In other words, it is the sum total
of the items obtained in French and mathematics divided by the total number of questions in
mathematics and French, and the result is reported to 100 (multiplied by 100).
Variables related to the internal eﬃciency of schools
Data collected provide information about the total number of repetitions, dropouts and pupils
per school for each grade (CI, CP, CE1, CE2, CM1 and CM2) within each school, as well as
enrollment in the ﬁrst grade (CI) from 2007 to 2010. As there were many missing values for
these variables, secondary data from the Ministry of Education were used to impute missing
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data. In addition, the same data have allowed us to have the information on repetition of the
school year 2010 which is only reported in 2011. Remember that the experiment was conducted
in the 2009-2010 school year. Information on outcomes related to internal eﬃciency (repetition,
dropout, promotion and enrollment) in the data collected was limited to the years 2009-2010.
That is why we used secondary data from the ministry of education to calculate outcome vari-
ables repetition rate, dropout and promotion rates after program. For the calculation of the
repetition rate for the year 2009, we used the ratio of the sum of repeaters of 2009 reported in
2010 to the total number of pupils (Pupils) in the school for 2009 school year.
Repetitionrate09 =
∑
repeaters(CI,CP,CE1,CE2,CM1,CM2)10∑
Pupils(CI,CP,CE1,CE2,CM1,CM2)09
∗ 100
For the calculation of the repetition rate for the year 2010, we used the ratio of the sum of
repeaters of 2010 reported in 2011 to the total number of pupils at the school in 2010.
Repetitionrate10 =
∑
repeaters(CI,CP,CE1,CE2,CM1,CM2)11∑
Pupils(CI,CP,CE1,CE2,CM1,CM2)10
∗ 100
To calculate the promotion rate for the baseline year i.e. 2009, we made the connection
between the total number promoted in 2009, against the total number of pupils in the school
for the same year. For the calculation of the total promoted in 2009 within each school, we used
the following equation:
Promoted09 = Pupils10 − newenrollment10 − totalrepeaters10 + examadmitted09
where Pupils10 is the total number of pupils within each school in 2010, newenrollment10
refers to pupils who have enrolled for the introductory course -ﬁrst year of primary school- (CI)
in 2010, totalrepeaters10 is the total number of repeaters recorded in 2010, and examadmitted09
is the number of pupils admitted to the secondary school entrance examination in 2009. Note
that we do not have any information on transfers between schools, which is why they do not
appear in the calculation of the total promoted. Thus, the promotion rate for 2009 is obtained
from the following relation:
Promotionrate09 =
Promoted09
Pupils09
∗ 100
To calculate the promotion rate in 2010, that is to say, after the program, we used the same
approach.
To calculate the dropout rate by year (2009 and 2010), we used the following relation:
Dropoutrate = 100− (Repetitionrate + Promotionrate)
For enrollment rate before the program (2009), we took the diﬀerence between the new en-
rolled in the ﬁrst year of primary school (CI) of 2009 and that of 2008, which we divided by the
new enrolled in 2008 and multiplied by 100. The following relationship was used:
Enrollmentrate09 =
newenrollment09−newenrollment08
newenrollment08
∗ 100.
For enrollment rate after the program (2010), we used the same approach.
Choice of control variables
Control variables were selected based on both their availability in databases and their rel-
evance from the point of view of the literature. Based on the literature on randomized ex-
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periments, control variables explain the performance of pupils (scores), but are not related to
treatment. They can be grouped into four categories: the characteristics of schools and teach-
ers, the characteristics of pupils, characteristics of pupils’ households, and characteristics of the
environment or the community where pupils live.
Characteristics of schools and teachers
Characteristics of schools selected are the number of classes in temporary shelters, the number of
pupils per manual, the distance between the school and the home of the pupil and disturbances
that have resulted to delays in the start of classes. It is important to remember that in general,
schools with the best infrastructure produce the best performance.
Teacher characteristics considered are gender, age, training received by the teacher, academic
qualiﬁcations and teacher absenteeism.
Pupils characteristics
The variables on the characteristics of students who have been selected are gender, age, class
or level of education, Koranic school, institution of childhood and the number of hours of work
that the child spends doing housework per day.
Household characteristics
Variables related to household characteristics of those selected are the household size per adult
equivalent, literacy of the household head, gender of household head, number of head of livestock
that the household owns, possession of cultivable land owned by the household and marital
status.
Community characteristics
Characteristics related to the environment of the pupils chosen are the existence of a secondary
school (“college”) in the village of the pupil, the number of primary schools in the village, and
the variable “Koranic school com.” which equal to 1 if the pupil live in a community where
attending Koranic school prevent children from going to school.
4.3 Descriptive statistics
In this section, we are exploring the homogeneity of the treatment and control groups before
the implementation of the program, using the pre-program survey; and then present descriptive
statistics after implementation of program using the post program survey.
4.3.1 Descriptive statistics before program
The aim of the various tests performed in this subsection is to determine if there are any dif-
ferences in the mean or in the distribution of variables for the treatment group and the control
group before the implementation of the program. In other words, we are exploring whether the
two groups are homogeneous before introducing the program regarding variables chosen.
In the data, the unit of observation is the pupil while the random assignment to the treatment
was conducted at the school level. Therefore, we ﬁrst conducted, tests at the school level, then
at the pupils level.
Homogeneity of the two groups: comparison tests at the school level
Parametric tests (test of equal mean of Student) and nonparametric (test of equal distributions
of Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov) were performed for each variable. An analysis
of multiple variances (MANOVA) and a Hotelling test were performed on all variables taken
simultaneously.
A Levene test of equality of variance was conducted before the test of equal mean of Student.
Both tests were performed on both dichotomous and continuous variables (Table C.1 and C.2),
while the tests of equal distribution of Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov were performed
only on continuous variables (Tables 4.2; 4.3, 4.6 and 4.7).
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The Levene test of equality of variances performed at school level indicates that we can reject the
hypothesis of equal variances for the variables household size, primary schools, livestock, number
of hours, disturbance and marital status (Table C.1). Therefore, we performed a Student test
with unequal variances for these variables, and a Student test with equal variances for the
remaining variables.
Regarding the Student test, the last column of Table C.1 shows that, on average, there is
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between schools in the treatment group and those in the control group
for most of the variables. We did not observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two groups
for all outcomes related to scores and for a number of control variables including: temporary
shelters (1.718 temporary shelters for the treatment group against 1.576 for the control group);
distance between school and home (81.4% of schools in the treatment group against 80.9% of
schools in the control group are located between 0 and 1 km from the pupils’ homes); school
manual (1.114 manual for pupils in the treatment group against 1.089 manual for pupils in the
control group in average); and literacy of household head (18.0% for the treatment group and
16.6% for the control group). The results of the parametric test at the school level indicates that
the two groups are homogeneous regarding all outcomes related to internal eﬃciency of schools
except for the enrollment rate for which we observe a signiﬁcance at 10%. For control variables
number of hours (0.19 hours per day in the treatment group against 0.13 in the control group);
disturbance (84.5 of schools had disturbance in the treatment group against 61.4% of schools in
the control group); and Koranic school in the community (61.6% of pupils live in a community
where attending Koranic school prevents children from going to school in the treatment group
against 38.7 pupils in the control group); the treatment group displays, in average, the highest
percentage with a signiﬁcance diﬀerence. For the control livestock (8.9 head of cattle in the
treatment group against 14.8% in the control group); the control group has the highest average
with a signiﬁcant diﬀerence.
The results of the non-parametric tests performed only on continuous variables (Table 4.2 and
4.3) conﬁrm those of the parametric test for some variables. For example, we note that there is
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the treatment and control groups for all score outcomes and for
other variables including temporary shelters, school manual, teacher age, pupil age and primary
school.
However, before implementation of the program, with signiﬁcance levels of 10% and 5%,
there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two groups of schools for a number of variables
including enrollment rate, livestock, disturbance and Koranic school and variables. Regarding
pupils’ scores, on average, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two groups. However,
on average, the academic results of pupils in the treatment group are lower than those in the
comparison group. Likewise, aggregate score, French and math scores are 37.743, 37.602 and
37.871 percent points for the treatment group, whereas these scores are 41.357, 41.247 and 41.467
percent points for the control group respectively. The diﬀerences are about four (4) points in
favor of pupils in the control group.
In terms of the internal eﬃciency of schools, there are no diﬀerences between the two groups
for outcome variables except for the enrollment rate (-8.021% for the treatment group and
-26.197% for the control group). Indeed, schools in the treatment group show the lowest pro-
motion rate, but the highest dropout and repetition rates. In those schools, promotion rate,
dropout rate and enrollment rate are 80.617%, 14.706% and -8.021% respectively, while those
in the control group shows 83.200%, 12.564% and -26.197% respectively.
For control variables such as livestock, number of hours, disturbance, Koranic school and Ko-
ranic school in the community, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two groups.
Also, non-parametric tests show that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two groups
for some variables (Table 4.2 and 4.3). Table 4.2 on the Kolmogorov test reveals a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between schools in the treatment group and those in the control group for variables
French score, dropout rate, enrollment rate, and livestock.
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Table 4.2: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: School level, 2009
Treatment control Combined Corrected
Variable D p-value D p-value D p-value p-value
Aggregate score -0.163 0.233 0.030 0.941 0.163 0.461 0.382
French score -0.223 0.066∗ 0.043 0.903 0.223 0.132 0.093∗
Math score -0.140 0.343 0.016 0.985 0.140 0.659 0.582
Repetition rate -0.072 0.753 0.078 0.717 0.078 0.996 0.993
Dropout rate -0.024 0.969 0.302 0.007 0.302 0.014∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
Enrollment rate -0.003 0.999 0.262 0.024 0.262 0.049∗∗ 0.032∗∗
Promotion rate -0.147 0.310 0.020 0.978 0.147 0.602 0.522
Temporary shelters -0.023 0.971 0.083 0.685 0.083 0.991 0.985
School manual -0.120 0.456 0.080 0.705 0.120 0.827 0.770
Number of hours -0.026 0.962 0.203 0.105 0.203 0.209 0.156
Household sizea -0.126 0.417 0.063 0.803 0.126 0.774 0.709
Teacher age -0.070 0.765 0.066 0.785 0.070 0.999 0.999
Pupil age -0.180 0.171 0.093 0.622 0.180 0.340 0.269
Primary school -0.089 0.652 0.000 1.00 0.089 0.983 0.972
Livestock -0.236 0.047∗∗ 0.001 1.000 0.236 0.094 0.064∗
Note a: Household size per adult equivalent.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 4.3 on the Mann-Whitney test shows that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
two groups for variables dropout rate, promotion rate, enrollment rate, number of hours and
livestock.
Table 4.3: Mann-Whitney test: School level, 2009
Treatment Control rank. test
Variable # Obs. # Obs. z p > |z|
Aggregate score 60 50 1.375 0.169
French score 60 50 1.615 0.106
Math score 60 50 1.051 0.293
Repetition rate 60 49 -0.420 0.674
Dropout rate 60 49 -2.365 0.018∗∗
Promotion rate 60 49 1.297 0.194
Enrollment rate 60 49 -2.144 0.032∗∗
temporary shelters 60 50 -0.656 0.511
School manual 60 50 0.525 0.599
Number of hours 60 50 -1.981 0.047∗∗
Household sizea 60 50 0.600 0.548
Teacher age 60 50 0.213 0.831
Pupil age 60 50 0.702 0.482
Primary schools 60 49 0.557 0.577
Livestock 60 50 1.945 0.051∗
Note a: Household size per adult equivalent.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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The results from the parametric and non-parametric tests performed at school level indi-
cate that the two groups are homogeneous for most of the variables. The veriﬁcation of the
homogeneity of the two groups vis-a`-vis the variables taken simultaneously is needed before a
conclusion on whether or not the two groups are homogeneous at the baseline. Therefore, a
Hotelling test which is a generalization of the Fisher test and a MANOVA which is a multiple
variance analysis were performed.
Table 4.4 on the Hotelling test for equality of means shows that the two groups are identical
regarding all variables taken simultaneously.
Table 4.4: Hotelling test: School level, 2009
2-group Hotelling’s T-squared = 44.253132
F test statistic: ((110-25-1)/(110-2)(25)) x 44.253132 = 1.3767641
H0: Vectors of means are equal for the two groups
F(25,84) = 1.3768
Prob > F(25,84) = 0.1416
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
The four tests performed by the MANOVA are all no signiﬁcant (Table 4.5) and thus conﬁrm
the results of the Hotelling test (Table 4.4). This implies that the behavior of the group of
variables does not change from one group to another. Therefore, hypothesis on equal mean
vectors between the two groups is not rejected overall.
Table 4.5: MANOVA on quantitative variables: School level, 2009
Number of obs = 110
W = Wilks’ lambda L = Lawley-Hotelling trace
P = Pillai’s trace R = Roy’s largest root
Source Statistic df F(df1, df2) = F Prob>F
group W 0.7093 1 25.0 84.0 1.38 0.1416 e
P 0.2907 25.0 84.0 1.38 0.1416 e
L 0.4098 25.0 84.0 1.38 0.1416 e
R 0.4098 25.0 84.0 1.38 0.1416 e
Residual 108
Total 109
e = exact, a = approximate, u = upper bound on F
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
In conclusion, before implementing the program, the tests at school level show that there were
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two groups for the greatest number of variables; whereas
tests performed simultaneously using all variables show that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the two groups. However, it is possible to ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the treat-
ment group and the control group when tests are carried out on more disaggregated data i.e. at
the pupil level because the sample sizes of the two groups become larger.
In what follows, we verify the homogeneity of the two groups by performing tests at the pupils
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level.
Homogeneity of the two groups: comparison tests at the pupil level
From Table C.2 in the appendix, Levene’s test of equality of variances shows that we cannot
reject the hypothesis of equal variances for variables enrollment rate, school manual, household
size, teacher age, grade, absenteeism, gender of teacher, continuing training, High school diploma
and more, national certiﬁcate, gender of pupil, literacy of household head, and college. Therefore,
a Student test with equal variances was performed for these variables, while a Student test with
unequal variance was performed for the remaining variables for which the assumption of equal
variances was rejected.
Contrary to the results of the tests performed at the school level, for the majority of variables,
Table C.2 in the appendix shows that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the treatment
group and the control group before implementation of the program. This is not diﬃcult to
understand because when tests are performed on the more disaggregated data, that is to say,
the pupil level, the sample sizes of the two groups become larger.
In terms of pupils’ achievement, as mentioned in the case of tests at the school level, pupils’
performance in the treatment group were lower than those in the control group. The aggregate
score, French score and math score, are 37.158, 37.095 and 37.202 points percentage respectively
for the treatment group, while in the control group these scores are 41.872, 41.627 and 42.117
points percentage respectively for aggregate, French and math scores. The diﬀerences are around
ﬁve percent points in favor of pupils in the control group. Signiﬁcance tests indicate that these
diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at the 1% level as shown in the last column of Table C.2 in the
appendix.
For outcome variables related to the internal eﬃciency of schools, namely the dropout rate
(17.784% for the treatment group and 12.204% for the control group), the promotion rate
(80.624% for treatment group and 84.408% for the control group), the enrollment rate (-10.085%
for the treatment group against -35.226% for the control group), the results show signiﬁcant dif-
ferences between the two groups. For the repetition rate (5.781% for the treatment group and
5.492% for the control group), there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two groups.
For some control variables, schools in the treatment group display the most important means
with signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Among others, those variables are temporary shelters, distance to
school, number of hours, disturbance, continuing training, high school diploma and more, Ko-
ranic school and Koranic school in the community (Table C.2 in the appendix). On average,
we noted that in the treatment group, 1.7 classes are in temporary shelters (against 1.6 classes
in the control group), 82.5% of pupils have their house less than one km from school (against
78.1% of pupils in the control group), 98% have an association of parents (against 95% for the
control group), 32% have an association of mothers (against 18% for control group) and 61.7%
of teachers received a continuing training against 58.5% of teachers in the control group. Note
that 45.9% of the teachers in the treatment group have high school diploma and more, while
they are 40.1% in the control group. Pupils in the treatment group work around 0.2 hours per
day against 0.14 hours for pupils in the control group.
For variables household size, pupils’ age, primary schools, livestock, absenteeism, national cer-
tiﬁcate, gender of pupil, land and “college”, the control group displayed the highest average
compared to the treatment group, with signiﬁcant diﬀerences. The household size in control
group is 9.883 persons on average against 9.526 persons in the treatment group. About 53% of
pupils in the control group are boys against 50% of pupils in the treatment group. About 9%
of schools in the control group reported that their teachers are often absent from school against
5% of schools in the treatment group.
Taking the characteristics of schools and teachers into account, we observed that approximately
58.9% of teachers have an academic degree equal to national certiﬁcate in the control group, as
against 54.9% in the treatment group. Regarding community characteristics, 27% of schools in
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the control group are in villages with a “college”, while 24% of schools in the treatment group
are in a village with “college”.
However, for a number of variables, such as school manual, teacher age, gender of teacher, early
childhood institution, gender of household head, literacy of head of household and marital sta-
tus, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two groups. Table C.2 in appendix shows that
around 18% of household heads are literate in the treatment and control groups and around
91% of them are men. About the characteristics of pupils in each group, about 5% of them have
gone through an earlier childhood institution.
Table C.2 shows that, before the implementation of the program, the two groups are homoge-
neous only for a few variables, while there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two groups for
most variables including outcome variables, except the repetition rate. In addition, Kolmogorov
tests of equal distribution performed on continuous variables indicate that the two groups are
not equal in all variables (Tables 4.6 and 4.7).
Table 4.6: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: pupil level, 2009
Treatment Control Combined Corrected
Variable D p-value D p-value D p-value p-value
Aggregate score -0.092 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.092 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
French score -0.091 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.091 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
Math score -0.072 0.000 0.001 0.995 0.072 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
Repetition rate -0.084 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
Dropout rate 0.001 0.995 0.304 0.000 0.304 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
Promotion rate -0.145 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.145 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
Enrollment rate -0.004 0.960 0.306 0.000 0.306 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
Temporary shelters -0.054 0.006 0.098 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
School manual -0.130 0.000 0.064 0.001 0.130 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
Number of hours 0.000 1.000 0.029 0.222 0.029 0.440 0.423
Household sizea -0.041 0.047 0.011 0.795 0.041 0.095 0.088∗
Teacher age -0.053 0.006 0.078 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
Pupil age -0.033 0.138 0.021 0.454 0.033 0.076 0.261
Primary schools -0.114 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.114 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
Livestock -0.096 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.096 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
Note a: Household size per adult equivalent.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
The Mann-Whitney test in Table 4.7 shows that the two groups are not homogeneous for
continuous variables, except for the following variables: repetition rate, number of hours, teacher
age and pupil age.
Table 4.7: Mann-Whitney test: Pupil level, 2009
Treatment Control rank. test
Variable # Obs. # Obs. z p > |z|
Aggregate score 1886 1648 6.225 0.000∗∗∗
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 4.7 – continued
Treatment Control rank. test
Variable # Obs. # Obs. z p > |z|
French score 1886 1648 5.454 0.000∗∗∗
Math score 1886 1648 5.802 0.000∗∗∗
Repetition rate 1886 1532 -1.255 0.209
Dropout rate 1886 1532 -14.242 0.000∗∗∗
Promotion rate 1886 1532 8.256 0.000∗∗∗
Enrollment rate 1886 1532 -13.366 0.000∗∗∗
Temporary shelters 1886 1649 -3.724 0.000∗∗∗
Distance to school 1886 1649 -3.243 0.001∗∗∗
School Manual 1886 1649 3.508 0.000∗∗∗
Number of hours 1886 1649 -1.036 0.300
Household sizea 1886 1649 2.173 0.029∗∗
Teacher age 1886 1649 -0.781 0.435
Pupil age 1886 1649 1.279 0.200
Primary schools 1886 1532 5.851 0.000∗∗∗
Livestock 1886 1649 6.712 0.000∗∗∗
Note a: Household size per adult equivalent.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Considering the results of the parametric and non-parametric tests performed at the pupil
level, we can say that the two groups are not, on average, identical to the view of all the variables
taken individually. Veriﬁcation of the homogeneity of the two groups with regard to variables
taken simultaneously is needed. Thus, as in the case of the tests performed in the school level,
a Hotelling test and a MANOVA were performed.
Table 4.8: Hotelling test: Pupil level, 2009
2-group Hotelling’s T-squared = 487.64363
F test statistic: ((3534-25-1)/(3534-2)(25)) x 487.64363 = 19.373203
H0: Vectors of means are equal for the two groups
F(25,3508) = 19.3732
Prob > F(25,3508) = 0.0000∗∗∗
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
The Hottelling test and the MANOVA performed at the pupil level on all variables indicates
that the two groups are not homogeneous at the baseline (Tables 4.8 and 4.9).
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Table 4.9: MANOVA on quantitative variables: Pupil level, 2009
Number of obs = 3418
W = Wilks’ lambda L = Lawley-Hotelling trace
P = Pillai’s trace R = Roy’s largest root
Source Statistic df F(df1, df2) = F Prob>F
group W 0.8787 1 25.0 3508.0 19.37 0.000∗∗∗e
P 0.1213 25.0 3508.0 19.37 0.000∗∗∗e
L 0.1381 25.0 3508.0 19.37 0.000∗∗∗e
R 0.1381 25.0 3508.0 19.37 0.000∗∗∗e
Residual 3532
Total 3533
e = exact, a = approximate, u = upper bound on F
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
In view of the results of testing pupil level, we noted that the two groups are not homoge-
neous before program implementation unlike the results obtained with tests carried out at school
level.
Descriptive statistics on the status of non-response
In randomized experiments, it is common to encounter problems related to non-response or at-
trition. Non-response problems occur when we are unable to obtain information on the outcome
variable of some observations after program implementation.
As part of this research, despite eﬀorts deployed to prevent attrition problem, from 4110 pupils,
1150 pupils have not been tested in the second survey (after the program). We noted an attrition
rate of 27.98%. For the non-response, 518 pupils are part of the control group, while 632 pupils
are part of the treatment group. The attrition rate for treatment and control groups are 28.35%
and 26.53 %, respectively. In terms of geographic location, on 1150 pupils that have not been
tested, 97 (8.43 %) are in Diourbel, 266 (23.13 %) in Se´dhiou, 376 (32.7 %) in Fatick and 411
(35.74 %) in the Kolda region.
The non-response problem is mainly due to the fact that the team responsible for administering
the tests went to regions during the rainy season. During this season, some pupils help parents in
the ﬁelds. In addition, in some schools, classes in temporary shelters were not working because
of the rainy season and therefore the pupils were absent. So many pupils were absent on the
day of testing.
To reduce the non-response rate, some pupils had been sought in the villages or in the ﬁelds
with the help of the local administration. Irrespective of this eﬀorts, we noted non-response
problem. To understand whether non-response occurred randomly, it is important to compare
pupils for which we noted non-response, with those for which we do not have non-response
problem.
We distinguish two groups of pupils: the pupils on whom we did not have non-response problem,
are now label non-attritors and the pupils on whom we have the non-response problem are now
label attritors.
In what follows, we ﬁrst compare attritors and non-attritors. Then, we make a comparison of
the two groups of pupils within each group. Finally, we compare attritors in control group with
those in the treatment group (Tables C.3 and C.4).
Comparison between attritors and non-attritors
As suggested by Duﬂo et al. (2008) it is important to compare attritors and non-attritors
to see if non-response has occurred randomly or not. Table C.3 in the appendix allows making
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a comparison between attritors and non-attritors using the baseline survey.
Regarding the academic performances of pupils, we realized that non-attritors have the highest
scores, compared to attritors. Similarly, the aggregate score, French score and math score for
non-attritors, are 40.516, 40.370 and 40.663 respectively, while those for attritors are 36.082,
35.929 and 36.193. The diﬀerences are signiﬁcant and are about four points in favor of non-
attritors. For variables related to internal eﬃciency of schools, we observe that the repetition
rate of attritors that is 6.435% is signiﬁcantly higher than repetition rate for non-attritors which
is 5.373%. Likewise, the dropout rate of attritors which is 16.865%, is signiﬁcantly higher
than the dropout rate of non-attritors (14.721 %). The promotion rate of non-attritors which
is about 82.882% is signiﬁcantly higher than the promotion rate of attritors (80.739%). For
control variables literacy of household head, one can see that around 19% of household head
for the non-attritors are literate against 16% for attritors. Also, attritors work in average 0.20
hour per day against 0.16 hour for non-attritors. Regarding school characteristics, one observes
that for attritors, on average, we have 1.7 classes in temporary shelters against 1.6 classes for
non-attritors (see table C.3). In sum, statistics show that attritors have less literate household
heads, the largest number of classes in temporary shelters and mostly live at more than one mile
from school compared to non-attritors.
Furthermore, the last column of table C.3 shows that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
the two groups of pupils for variables household size and primary schools. But for other control
variables such school manual, pupil age, and Koranic school in the community attritors display
the highest value with signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
Table 4.10 on Hottelling test shows that for all outcomes and control variables taken simul-
taneously, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two group of pupils at 1%.
In summary, before the implementation of the program, attritors and non-attritors are not ho-
mogeneous.
Table 4.10: Hotelling test: attritors versus non-attritors, 2009
2-group Hotelling’s T-squared = 169.32652
F test statistic: ((3534-25-1)/(3534-2)(25)) x 169.32652 = 6.7270378
H0: Vectors of means are equal for the two groups
F(25,3508) = 6.7270
Prob > F(25,3508) = 0.0000∗∗∗
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Comparison between attritors and non-attritors within each group
Table C.3 in the appendix allows us to compare attritors and non-attritors within each group
for each variable taken individually using baseline survey.
For the treatment group, Table C.3 indicates that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between at-
tritors and non-attritors for all outcome variables. For some of the control variables, household
size, literacy of household head, number of hours and Koranic school in the community, signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerences between the two groups of pupils do occur. However, for other control variables,
there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two groups of pupils. These variables are among
others, temporary shelters (2.017 classes in temporary shelters for attritors against 1.665 for non-
attritors), school manual (1.321 pupils per manual for attritors against 1.066 for non-attritors),
pupil age (9.86 years for attritors against 9.49 for non-attritors), and land (89% of households
have farmland for attritors against 94% of households for non-attritors).
For the control group, Table C.3 in the appendix shows that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences
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between attritors and non-attritors for pupils’ achievement. Regarding outcome variables related
to the internal eﬃciency of schools, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two groups of
pupils for promotion and dropout rates. However, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
the two groups for repetition rate.
Unlike the treatment group, in the control group, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between at-
tritors and non-attritors for most of the control variables. However, for other control variables,
there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two groups of pupils. These variables are: tempo-
rary shelters, distance to school, number of hours and literacy of household head.
Tables 4.11 and 4.12 related to the hotelling test in the treatment and control groups show that
there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between attritors and non-attritors for all variables (outcomes
and controls) taken simultaneously.
Table 4.11: Hotelling test for treatment group: attritors vs. non-
attritors, 2009
2-group Hotelling’s T-squared = 160.62421
F test statistic: ((1886-25-1)/(1886-2)(25)) x 160.62421 = 6.3431219
H0: Vectors of means are equal for the two groups
F(25,1860) = 6.3431
Prob > F(25,1860) = 0.0000∗∗∗
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 4.11 shows that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between attritors and non-attritors in
the treatment group for all variables taken simultaneously.
Table 4.12: Hotelling test for control group: attritors vs. non-attritors,
2009
2-group Hotelling’s T-squared = 117.9328
F test statistic: ((1648-24-1)/(1648-2)(24)) x 117.9328 = 4.8452038
H0: Vectors of means are equal for the two groups
F(24,1623) = 4.8452
Prob > F(24,1623) = 0.0000∗∗∗
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table 4.12 indicates that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between attritors and those non-
attritors in the control group for all variables taken simultaneously.
Comparison of attritors in the treatment group with those in the control group
On pupils’ achievement, Table C.4 shows that, on average, attritors in the control group have
the highest scores (aggregate, French and math) with signiﬁcant diﬀerences. The aggregate score,
French score and math score for attritors in the control group are 39.762, 39.053 and 40.471,
while those in the treatment group are 33.172, 33.459 and 32.811 respectively.
Regarding outcome variables related to internal eﬃciency of schools, one observes that repeti-
tion rate and dropout rate in the treatment group (7.156% and 18.965%, respectively) are higher
than those in the control group (5.457% and 14.013%, respectively), with signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
4.3. Descriptive statistics 108
For variables, household size, livestock and land attritors in the control group have the highest
average with signiﬁcant diﬀerences. For variables temporary shelters, school manual, literacy of
household head and pupil age, attritors in the treatment group have the highest averages with
signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
Table 4.13: Hotelling test on attritors: treatment vs. control, 2009
2-group Hotelling’s T-squared = 159.46158
F test statistic: ((924-25-1)/(924-2)(25)) x 159.46158 = 6.2124295
H0: Vectors of means are equal for the two groups
F(25,898) = 6.2124
Prob > F(25,898) = 0.0000∗∗∗
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
The Hotelling test in Table 4.13 shows that, given all variables, there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between attritors in the treatment group and those in the control group.
In conclusion, non-response does not occur randomly. Therefore, it is important to correct the
attrition problem when measuring the impact of school canteens on school performances.
We now proceed to compare between the treatment and control group after implementation of
the food program.
4.3.2 Descriptive statistics after program
Table C.5 in the appendix provides descriptive statistics for treated and control groups after
implementation of the meals program, as well as the evolution of each group between the two
periods (see last two columns of the table).
Taking academic results into consideration, we observe that on average, the pupils’ scores in
the treatment group are higher than those in the control group in contrast to what we observed
before the implementation of the program. Therefore, the scores (aggregate, French and math)
of pupils in the treated group became, 59.851, 56.694 and 62.563. Scores of pupils in the
control group became, 54.308, 51.819 and 56.423 for aggregate score, French and math scores,
respectively. There is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in scores between the two groups.
It is important to note that we observe almost a doubling of educational outcomes in the
control group. This could be justiﬁed by two reasons. First, when the implemented program has
a positive eﬀect on academic achievement, the presence of a partial adhesion (non-compliance)
can contribute to increase in academic performance of pupils in the control group. Second, this
situation can be explained by the fact that the ﬁrst-pass tests were carried out just after the big
holidays that oﬃcially lasted for three months, while those in the second passage took place at
the end of the school year. The fact that the pupils remained a long time without learning may
explain the poor results of the ﬁrst test compared to second passage.
On the internal eﬃciency of schools, on average, repetition rate, promotion rate, dropout
rate and enrollment rate in the control group are, 1.596%, 85.113%, 11.323% and -22.705%,
respectively, while they are 3.830%, 80.580%, 11.845% and -7.439% for the treatment group.
There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two groups.
However, for some variables, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two groups after
the experiment. These variables are, among others, dropout rate, temporary shelters, household
size, teacher age, pupil age, absenteeism, continuing training, Koranic school, earlier childhood
institution, literacy of household head and gender of household head.
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For variables distance to school, number of hours, disturbance, gender of teacher, high school
diploma and more, marital status and Koranic school in community, pupils in the treatment
group have the highest average with signiﬁcant diﬀerences. For variables school manual, live-
stock, primary schools, gender of pupil, national certiﬁcate, land and college, pupils in the control
group have the highest average with signiﬁcant diﬀerences (Table C.5 in the appendix).
In terms of evolution of treated and control groups between the two periods, there are no
signiﬁcant changes in the control group for some variables including temporary shelters, dis-
tance to school, household size, livestock, number of hour, primary schools, gender of teacher,
continuing training, gender of pupil and college (see last column of Table C.5 in the appendix).
In the treated group, the last column of Table C.5 in the appendix shows that there is no signif-
icant change between the two periods given a number of variables including distance to school,
school manual, livestock, number of hours, land and continuing training.
For example, one observes that the number of classes under temporary shelters in the treatment
group decreased from 1.71 to 1.65 between the two periods. However this number remains al-
most the same for the control group (this number increased from 1.57 to 1.60 with no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence).
Partial adherence
Despite the simplicity oﬀered by randomized experiments compared to observational studies
in assessing the impact of social programs, they are not without diﬃculties. In addition to the
attrition problem mentioned above, Table 4.14 shows non-compliance or partial adherence. In
other words, all schools assigned to the treatment group did not receive the school feeding pro-
gram and some schools assigned to the control group received the program. In fact, 62 schools
(2160 pupils) are assigned to the treatment group, but only 54 schools (1887 pupils) have actu-
ally beneﬁted from the program (87% of compliance). Out of 58 schools (1950 pupils) assigned
to the control group, 46 (1510 pupils) have not beneﬁted from the program (79% of compli-
ance). So, 8 schools (273 pupils) in the treatment group have not beneﬁted from the program
(13% of non-compliance), while 12 schools (440 pupils) in the control group beneﬁted (21% of
non-compliance). Some schools in the control group were able to receive treatment during the
experiment because in addition to WFP which is one of the partners of this experiment, there
are other non-governmental organizations (NGO) that implement canteens in rural Senegal. So,
some schools in the control group have beneﬁted from the canteens implemented by NGOs. Some
schools in the treatment group did not receive treatment for administrative reasons we could
not clearly understand. When we called the directors of schools, they reported that they were
promised to be receiving food from time to time. They waited in vain without any explanations.
Table 4.14: Treatment planned versus treatment received
Treatment received Total
0 1
Planned Treatment 0 46(79%) 12(21%) 58
1 8(13%) 54(87%) 62
Total 54 66 120
Table 4.15 presents comparison between pupils assigned to the treatment group and those
who actually received the treatment, and pupils assigned to the treatment group that did not
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received, using the baseline survey.
Table 4.15: Comparison of adhesion status, 2009
Planned treatment, received Planned treatment, not received t-test
Variable Mean Std. Err. Mean. Std. Err. p-value
Aggregate score 36.269 17.542 43.746 24.258 0.000∗∗∗
French score 36.117 19.438 44.640 24.113 0.000∗∗∗
Math score 36.412 19.768 42.918 27.046 0.000∗∗∗
Repetition rate 6.718 7.752 3.965 4.390 0.000∗∗∗
Dropout rate 17.264 11.993 18.197 11.281 0.227
Promotion rate 76.360 12.554 77.836 11.209 0.066∗
Enrollment rate 17.264 11.993 18.197 11.281 0.227
Temporary shelters 1.921 1.383 1.294 0.957 0.000∗∗∗
Distance to school 0.822 0.382 0.897 0.304 0.002∗∗∗
School Manual 1.112 1.250 1.261 0.757 0.055∗
Household sizea 10.992 6.394 13.455 9.072 0.000∗∗∗
Teacher age 32.035 5.735 28.904 4.442 0.000∗∗∗
Pupil age 9.642 1.662 9.828 1.954 0.093∗
Primary school 1.257 0.526 1.235 0.424 0.515
Livestock 7.074 14.499 19.566 26.855 0.000∗∗∗
Note a:Household size per adult equivalent.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Regarding the academic performance of pupils, the group initially assigned to the program,
but that did not receive treatment has the highest scores with signiﬁcant diﬀerences. On internal
eﬃciency, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two groups of pupils for variables
dropout rate and enrollment rate. But for the repetition rate, the group of pupils that did
not receive treatment displayed the lowest rate, while the group that received the treatment as
planned displays the lowest promotion rate. So, the table shows that the partial adhesion did
not occurs randomly, which means that it is essential to correct this in order to obtain the eﬀect
of the program on those who actually received the treatment.
In summary, four regions in Senegal, namely, Fatick, Kolda, Diourbel and Se´dhiou were
chosen to host the experiment program. The intervention consisted of providing a hot lunch
through the implementation of a school canteen. The sampling strategy consisted ﬁrst to select
geographical locations, then to constitute a population of schools eligible to perform a random
selection of 120 schools to participate in the experiment. These schools were randomly divided
between a treatment group and a control group. In each school, 40 pupils were selected from
the grade of second year (CP) and fourth year (CE2) to participate in the experiment. It is
important to note that all pupils in treated school have beneﬁted from school feeding. The
variables available are of two types: i) outcome variables (pupils’ achievement and internal
eﬃciency of schools) and ii) control variables on schools and teachers characteristics, pupils’
characteristics and their households, as well as the environment in which they live. Before the
implementation of the program, the results of various test carried out at school level show that
there are no diﬀerences between the treatment group and the control.
We noted problem of non-compliance and non-response. In the literature, there are ways to
correct non-compliance and non-response separately. However, other approaches have been
developed to address the problems related to non-response and non-compliance simultaneously
(Horiuchi et al., 2007).
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4.4 Econometrics speciﬁcation
As described above, the experiment consists of a set of data concerning two periods. In this
section, we present an analytical framework of non-compliance and non-response (Section 4.4.1)
before presenting a model taking the two problems into account simultaneously (Section 4.4.2).
4.4.1 Partial adhesion and attrition: framework
As mentioned above, in this experiment non-compliance has occurred. Instrumental variables are
often used to correct the problem of non-compliance or partial adhesion; however, the method
becomes ineﬃcient in the presence of attrition (Horiuchi et al., 2007; Esterling et al., 2011).
As already mentioned in the descriptive statistics, from 4110 pupils, 1150 have not been tested
in the investigation of the second survey, while an attrition rate of 27.98% (26.53% in the control
group against 28.35% in the treatment group) is observed.
The removal of observations with non-response, as is often the case in experimental studies,
produces ineﬃcient results and may bias the results (Horiuchi et al., 2007). Even if non-response
occurs randomly, removing observations with non-response changes the target population for
which causal eﬀects are estimated. This is true even when the missing data is not aﬀected by
the assignment mechanism and the treatment, because non-attritors are generally systematically
diﬀerent from attritors. In addition to bias, ineﬃciency can come from the loss of information
due to the exclusion of certain observations in the analysis.
In the literature, several approaches have been developed to face the problems of attrition
and partial adhesion simultaneously (Imai, 2006; Horiuchi et al., 2007; Esterling et al., 2011;
Barnard et al., 2003).
From the Bayesian modeling framework of Imbens and Rubin (1997) that can process both
partial adherence and non-response problems, Horiuchi et al. (2007) developed a model to take
account of attrition and non-compliance problems. We use this framework to assess the impact
of school feeding program on academic performance in the presence of partial adherence and
attrition. Let us ﬁrst present, in the context of our study, the general statistical framework of
random experiments with partial adherence and attrition introduced by Angrist et al. (1996)
and generalized by Frangakis and Rubin (2002).
Partial adhesion
We begin by describing the statistical framework of Angrist et al. (1996) in the context of our
study which is on a school feeding program.
Let Zi be the status of initial treatment equal to 1 if it is anticipated that the pupil i re-
ceives a school canteen and 0 otherwise. Let Ti(z) be a potential treatment variable given
the assignment to treatment Zi = z. The real or eﬀective treatment that is equal to 1 if the
pupil has actually beneﬁted from a school canteen and 0 otherwise can be deﬁned as follows:
Ti ≡ ZiTi(1) + (1 − Zi)Ti(0). If it is anticipated that the pupil i receives access to a school
canteen (does not receives access) but it does not beneﬁt (it does beneﬁt) then Zi = 1 (Zi = 0)
and Ti(0) = 0 (Ti(0) = 1) then Ti = 0 (Ti = 1). In this experiment, 13% of pupils in the
treatment group do not beneﬁt from the program, while 21% of pupils in the control group does
ﬁnally beneﬁt from the program.
Given the assignment to treatment, the potential outcome variable is deﬁne as follows: Yi(z) ≡
Yi(Zi = z). The actual outcome variable is deﬁned as: Yi ≡ ZiYi(1)+(1−Zi)Yi(0). For example
in the group of treatment assignment, Y (1) is observed but Y (0) is not.
We also deﬁne two types of individuals, compliers and non-compliers. Compliers are pupils who
remain in their initial treatment status (Ti(1) = 1 and Ti(0) = 0) while non-compliers are those
who do not follow the instructions. That is to say, those who deviate from their initial treatment
assignment status. Let Ci be a variable of indicator of compliance that equal to 1 if the pupil i
is a complier and 0 otherwise.
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One can distinguish three types of non-compliers. The “always-taker” namely those who beneﬁt
from the canteen independently of whether they are assigned to the treatment group (Ti(1) =
Ti(0) = 1), the “never-taker” that is to say those who do not beneﬁt from the canteen inde-
pendently of whether they are assigned to the group of beneﬁciary (Ti(1) = Ti(0) = 0) and the
“deﬁers” namely those who beneﬁt from the canteen only when they are assigned to the control
group (Ti(1) = 0 et Ti(0) = 1).
Table 4.16: Complier versus Noncomplier
Planned Treatment
Zi = 1 Zi = 0
Treatment received Ti = 1 C:Yi(1) observed; Ci = 1 NC:Yi(0) observed; Ci = 0
Ti = 0 NC:Yi(1) observed; Ci = 0 C:Yi(0) observed; Ci = 1
C: Complier; NC: Noncomplier.
In our experiment, unlike Horiuchi et al. (2007), there are always-takers because we have
information on the status of adherence of pupils in the control group. Table 4.16 shows that from
the observed data, we have the adhesion status of pupils in the treatment and control groups. A
high proportion of compliers are paramount for a successful statistical analyzes of randomized
experiments. In this study, the proportion of complier is about 83%, which is superior to other
proportions found in the context of other randomized experiments. For example, the proportion
of compliers is about 70% in the study conducted by Horiuchi et al. (2007).
Attrition
In this experiment, despite eﬀorts, attrition has occurred because many pupils were absent on
the day of the test for second survey. At ﬁrst, one considers the approach of random attrition
-MAR-. Since attrition may be aﬀected by the assignment to treatment, it is important to
introduce a potential response which is an indicator variable, Ri(z) for z ∈ {0, 1}. For example,
Ri(1) = 1 and Ri(0) = 0 means that pupils i will be tested if assigned to the treatment group,
but will not be tested if assigned to the treatment group. The observed indicator variable is
given by Ri ≡ ZiR(1) + (1 − Zi)R(0), hence the formalization of the hypothesis of missing at
random (MAR):
P (Ri(z) = 1|Yi(z) = 1, Ti(z) = t, Zi = z,Xi = x) (1-1)
= P (Ri(z) = 1|Yi(z) = 0, Ti(z) = t, Zi = z,Xi = x),
for all t, z ∈ {0, 1}, where Xi represents a vector of pretreatment variables. This hypothesis
implies that after conditioning on planned and actual treatments, on variables as well as on
pretreatment covariates, the pattern of attrition is not systematically related to the outcome
variable.
Second, the latent ignorability approach is an alternative hypothesis (Barnard et al., 2003;
Frangakis and Rubin, 1999). This hypothesis can be formalized as follows:
P (Ri(z) = 1|Yi(z) = 1, Ci = c, Zi = z,Xi = x) (1-2)
= P (Ri(z) = 1|Yi(z) = 0, Ci = c, Zi = z,Xi = x),
for all c, z ∈ {0, 1}. This assumption conditions on covariate c rather than on the observed
treatment variable.
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The third hypothesis is the approach of non-ignorability-NI- (Imai, 2006). Contrary to MAR and
LI assumptions, NI assumption is appropriate if the missing data mechanism depends directly
on the values of the outcome variable itself (probably not observed). Formally we have:
P (Ri(1) = 1|Ti(1) = t, Yi(1) = y, Zi = 1, Xi = x) (1-3)
= P (Ri(0) = 1|Ti(0) = t, Yi(0) = y, Zi = 0, Xi = x)
for all t ∈ {0, 1}. This assumption means that the missing data mechanism does not depend on
the assignment to the treatment provided, once we condition on the outcome variable as well
as the actual treatment received and observed pretreatment variables. The relevance of each
assumption depends on the context of the experience, and sensitivity analysis which plays an
important role when considering the robustness in the resulting conclusions (Horiuchi et al.,
2007). However, the assumption is made regarding the missing data mechanism. A key point
has been to include signiﬁcant predictors of the outcome variable among the Xi. Such variables
also lead to an eﬀective estimation of causal eﬀects because they help to predict precisely the
missing values of the outcome variable. Finally, it is important to note that in our experiment,
there are no missing values on the outcome variables before the program. We observe missing
values only after the program.1
4.4.2 Partial adhesion and attrition: the model
The model consists of two parts Bayesian modeling: the ﬁrst describes the partial adhesion and
the second reﬂects on the outcome variable. For partial adhesion (non-compliance), a probit
model with linear predictors is deﬁned as follow:
P(Ci = 1|xi) = Φ(x′iα), (1-4)
where Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal, Xi represents the
control variables that may include dummies and α is the coeﬃcient vector to be estimated.
Given the status of adhesion Ci, the assignment to treatment Zi and observable variables Xi,
the outcome variable is modeled as a linear relation by the following equation:
Yi = θCiZi + βCi(1− Zi) + x′iγ + εi, (1-5)
where εi is an iid error term, θ and β are intercepts related to compliers of the treatment and
control groups respectively, and γ is the vector of parameters for the xi which includes an
intercept. Combining the two relations (1-4) and (1-5) we can write the likelihood function:
L =
N∏
i=1
[
Φ(x′iα)ϕ(Yi|Zi,xi)
]Ci[{
1− Φ(x′iα)
}
ϕ(Yi|Zi,xi)
]1−Ci
(1-6)
with ϕ(Yi|Zi,xi) = 1σε φ
(
Yi−θCiZi−βCi(1−Zi)−x′iγ
σε
)
where φ denotes the univariate standard nor-
mal density function. This likelihood function cannot be estimated directly because the value of
the outcome variable Yi is missing for some pupils due to attrition. We use the imputation based
method for missing data in which each iteration of the estimation procedure imputes missing
values of Yi using. This process is repeated until convergence holds, Horiuchi et al. (2007). In
the estimation procedure, independent prior distributions are assigned to θ, β and γ and the
joint posterior distribution is sampled using a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method.
1See Barnard et al. (2003) for the problem of missing data before and after the program.
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Treatment eﬀects
Two types of treatment eﬀects can be calculated, the intention to treat eﬀect (ITT) and the
complier average causal eﬀect (CACE).
The ITT is given by:
ITT =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[Yi(1)− Yi(0)] (1-7)
It represents the eﬀect of being assigned to the treatment group rather than the eﬀect of
actually beneﬁting from the school feeding program. Although the ITT does not represent the
eﬀect of treatment actually received, from the perspective of the decision maker who would
generalize the program, ITT can be of great interest. However, in the presence of attrition,
the estimated eﬀect of ITT is not simpler and requires making additional assumptions about
the missing data mechanism. In fact, this simple average diﬀerence estimator will be biased
(Frangakis and Rubin, 1999).
In addition, we may also be interested in estimating the eﬀect of a program on individuals
who actually received the treatment instead of estimating the ITT. Given the assumptions on
partial adherence and attrition, it is possible to identify the causal eﬀect on beneﬁciaries (Angrist
et al., 1996).
We focus on the causal eﬀect of treatment on participants. The complier average causal eﬀect
(CACE) is deﬁned as follows:
CACE =
∑N
i=1 Ci[Yi(1)− Yi(0)]∑N
i=1 Ci
(1-8)
In this experiment, CACE represents the causal eﬀect of the program on pupils who ben-
eﬁt from the program. It is important to note that this eﬀect is diﬀerent from the sample
average treatment eﬀect (ATE), which concerns the entire population. As the ITT eﬀect for
non-compliers is zero under the assumption that the assignment to treatment does not directly
aﬀect the outcome variable, the CACE will always be larger than the ITT eﬀect.
4.5 Findings
In this section, we present the ﬁndings of our analysis. We have two types of outcome variables
namely those on pupils performance (aggregate score, French score and math) and those on the
internal eﬃciency of schools (enrollment, promotion, repetition and dropout). It is important to
remember that we are in the presence of partial adherence and attrition problems. The presence
of partial adhesion led us to ﬁrst compute the intention to treat eﬀect (ITT) before calculating
the eﬀect of the program on those who actually received it (CACE). We used a model taking of
both the problems of attrition and partial adherence into account. For each outcome variable,
we performed the impact of the school feeding by grade and gender of the pupil.
Our inference is based on Monte Carlo samples from three independent Markov chains, each of
which has the length of 50,000 and is initiated at diﬀerent sets of starting values. We found
out that all parameters have the values of the Gelman-Rubin (GR) convergence statistic that
are less than 1.01 (meaning 1 < GR < 1.01). This statistic suggests that a satisfactory degree
of convergence has been achieved. We discard the ﬁrst 20,000 draws from each chain and re-
tain the last 30,000, thus, we based our inference on a combined total of 90,000 posterior draws.2
2Unlike to Chapters 2 and 3 where all computations are performed with STATA, in this Chapter 4, the R
software is used for estimations.
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In the following subsections, we ﬁrst present the impact of school feeding on pupils’ perfor-
mances before presenting its eﬀect on the internal eﬃciency of schools. In order to save space,
we summarize the diﬀerent eﬀects calculated without presenting the integrality of estimates.
4.5.1 Impact of school feeding on pupils’ performances
For all outcome variables related to pupils’ performances (aggregate score, French score and
math score) positive eﬀects are expected. Table 4.17 shows the means of the ITT eﬀect and the
CACE on scores. The table clearly shows that the school feeding program has a positive eﬀect
on pupils’ achievement. So, the results give us expected eﬀects. For the aggregate score, the
ITT is 4.318 points of percentage, while the CACE is 7.616 points of percentage with a standard
deviations of 0.726 and 1.267 for the ITT eﬀect and the CACE, respectively. The conﬁdence
intervals show that these eﬀects are signiﬁcant.
Table 4.17: Eﬀect of school feeding on pupils’ performance
Conﬁdence interval
Mean S.D 2.5% 97.5%
Aggregate score
Intention to treat eﬀect (ITT) 4.318 0.726 2.899 5.746
Complier average causal eﬀect (CACE) 7.616 1.267 5.133 10.109
French score
Intention to treat eﬀect (ITT) 3.769 0.817 2.180 5.377
Complier average causal eﬀect (CACE) 6.645 1.431 3.858 9.459
Math score
Intention to treat eﬀect (ITT) 4.740 0.804 3.171 6.311
Complier average causal eﬀect (CACE) 8.406 1.407 5.659 11.162
For the French score the ITT eﬀect is 3.767 points of percentage and the CACE is 6.645
points of percentage with a standard deviations of 0.817 and 1.431, respectively. For the Math
score, the ITT eﬀect is 4.740 points of percentage and the CACE is 8.406 points of percentage
with a standard deviations of 0.804 and 1.407, respectively. Therefore, the eﬀect on math score
is higher than that of the French. As expected, one also observes that for all scores, the CACE
is greater than the ITT eﬀect.
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Figures 4.1 and 4.2 represent histograms of the posterior distribution of the CACE and the
ITT eﬀect for the aggregate score, French and math scores, respectively.
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Figure 4.1: Histogram of posterior distribution for aggregate score: CACE and ITT eﬀect.
Figure 4.1 shows the histograms on the distribution of the CACE and the ITT eﬀect for the
aggregate score. One can sees that the CACE range between 4.5 and 10.5 points of percentage
and the ITT eﬀect varies between 2 and 6.5 points of percentage.
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Figure 4.2 shows the histograms on the distribution of the CACE and ITT eﬀect for French
and math scores. Here also, one can sees that the CACE ranges from 4.5 to 10.5 points of
percentage and from 4 to 12.5 points of percentage for French and math scores, respectively.
The ITT eﬀects which are smaller than the CACE range from 1 to 6 points of percentage and
from 2.5 to 7.5 point of percentages for French and math scores, respectively.
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Figure 4.2: Histogram of posterior distribution for French and math scores: CACE and ITT
eﬀect.[left]:French score [right]: Math score
For policy makers or NGO or donors, this ﬁnding is important because one can see that the
eﬀect of the canteen on pupils’ performances (scores) is positive everywhere. This means that
in average, the impact of the program is positive for all simulated parameters contrary to what
we will ﬁnd in what follows in other outcomes namely the promotion rate.
Impact heterogeneity
It is interesting to study the eﬀects of the school feeding program on some subgroups. This
exercise allows us to understand if the impact of the program is diﬀerent from one subgroup to
another. It is thought for example that the program’s impact might diﬀer according to gender
or according to the grade (class) of the pupil.
Impact of school feeding on pupils’ performance by gender
Table 4.18 gives the ITT eﬀect and the CACE for boys and girls. For aggregate and math
scores, the impact of the programme on girls is greater than boys, while in French the eﬀect of
the intervention is greater for boys as compared to girls. According to the conﬁdence intervals,
we see that all eﬀects are signiﬁcant. In fact, in the literature, sometimes results are mixed
about the relation between the gender of the pupil and performance (Ma, 2007).
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This result on the greater impact of the program on girls’ performances that we found could
be explained by the fact that the presence of a school canteen can ensure that girls do not come
to home to eat lunch, which means that they are exempt from chores they usually perform
during hours of the afternoon. Therefore, they are less distracted and can concentrate better on
studying.
Impact of school feeding on pupils’ performance by grade
We also examined whether the impact of the meal program varies by level of study of the
pupil. Table 4.19 shows positive eﬀects everywhere. It also appears that the impact of the
program on scores for pupils in grade CE2 is greater than those in grade CP but the diﬀerence
is small.
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4.5.2 Impact of canteens on internal eﬃciency of schools
The outcome variables related to internal eﬃciency of schools are enrollment rate, repetition
rate, promotion rate and dropout rate. For the enrollment and promotion rates, we expect
positive eﬀects, but for the repetition and dropout rates we expect a negative eﬀect. Remember
that negative treatment eﬀects on repetition and dropout rates mean that the meal program has
reduced the repetition and the dropout rates, so has positive eﬀect on these outcomes. Table
4.20 shows the impact of feeding on the internal eﬃciency of schools. It also appears that the
program lowers dropout rate and increases enrollment rate, which is as expected. However, the
program increases the repetition rate and decreases the promotion rate, which is unexpected.
This could be explained by the following situation. In order to ﬁght repetition, the Government
of Senegal has taken a number of measures that are administrative in nature, namely suppress-
ing repetition during the ﬁrst year of each step in the primary cycle, and cap at 5% the rate
of repetition at the end of each step. The ﬁrst years of each step in primary cycle are CI (ﬁrst
year of primary school), CE1 (third year of primary school) and CM1 (Fifth year of primary
school). The end of year in each step is CP (second year), CE2 (fourth year) and CM2 (sixth
year). Probably, if some schools in the control group apply the measure while some schools
in the treatment group did not respect the measure, this can explain the results that we have
obtained. However, the eﬀective application of the measure by schools remains to be veriﬁed.
Table 4.20: Eﬀect of school feeding on internal eﬃciency
Conﬁdence interval
Mean S.D 2.5% 97.5%
Enrollment rate
Intention to treat eﬀect (ITT) 12.807 4.344 3.725 21.028
Complier average causal eﬀect (CACE) 7.717 2.651 2.100 12.673
Repetition rate
Intention to treat eﬀect (ITT) 1.599 0.105 1.394 1.805
Complier average causal eﬀect (CACE) 2.712 0.173 2.373 3.049
Promotion rate
Intention to treat eﬀect (ITT) -0.186 0.334 -0.842 0.467
Complier average causal eﬀect (CACE) -0.301 0.541 -1.359 0.758
Dropout rate
Intention to treat eﬀect (ITT) -0.868 0.295 -1.446 -0.291
Complier average causal eﬀect (CACE) -1.423 0.479 -2.355 -0.480
About our results on dropout and enrollment rates, several authors have found the same re-
sult in the literature. In using experimental data, Kazianga et al. (2009) in Burkina Faso, found
that a school feeding program has a positive eﬀect on enrollment. In Peru, Cueto and Chinen
(2007) found that an experimental program of school breakfasts in primary schools lowered the
dropout rates of pupils beneﬁting from the program.
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For the enrollment and dropout rates, ﬁgure 4.3 shows the histograms of posterior distribu-
tion of the CACE and the ITT eﬀect.
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Figure 4.3: Histogram of posterior distribution for dropout and enrollment rates: CACE and
ITT eﬀect. [left]: Repetition rate [right]: Promotion rate
For the enrollment rate, one can see on the ﬁgure that the ITT eﬀect and the CACE are
positive everywhere. The ITT eﬀect ranges from 0 to 16 points of percentage while the CACE is
between 0 and 25 points of percentage. For the dropout rate, one can note that the ITT eﬀect
and the CACE are negative everywhere. Similarly, the ITT eﬀect is between -2 and 0 while the
CACE is between -3 and 0. These results indicate that the school feeding program lowers the
dropout rate and boots enrollment.
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Figure 4.4 shows that the histograms of posterior distribution of the ITT eﬀect and the
CACE for the repetition and promotion rates. For the repetition rate, one observes that the
ITT eﬀect and the CACE are everywhere positive. The ITT eﬀect also ranges from 1.2 to 2.0
points of percentages, while the CACE range from 2 and 3.3 points of percentage.
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Figure 4.4: Histogram of posterior distribution for repetition and promotion rates: CACE and
ITT eﬀect. [left]: Repetition rate [right]: Promotion rate
For the promotion rate, one observes that the ITT eﬀect and the CACE are not everywhere
negative. Indeed, the ITT eﬀect is between -1 and 1 points of percentage while the CACE ranges
from -2 and 1.9 points of percentage.
Impact heterogeneity
Here also, we tried to understand whether the impact of school feeding on internal eﬃciency
diﬀers according to gender or according to the grade (class) of the pupil.
Impact of school feeding on internal eﬃciency by gender
Table 4.21 gives the impact of the meal program on the internal eﬃciency of schools by gender.
It appears that the enrollment rate of boys is greater than that of girls. In contrast, the table
shows that girls dropout are lesser than boys in the presence of school canteens.
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Impact of school feeding on internal eﬃciency by grade
The impact of the meal program on internal eﬃciency by grade or class is given in Table
4.22. It appears that the program has a positive impact on the promotion rate of pupils in grade
CP. However the result is not signiﬁcant.
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In addition, the table shows that the impact of the program on the reduction of the dropout
rate is greater for the youngest pupils which are in class CP than for those in grade of CE2.
4.6 Policy analysis
An important political issue in the analysis of the impact of a program is whether other options
are more eﬀective or beneﬁcial than the evaluated program. In a context of scarce resources,
the eﬀectiveness of an educational policy to promote quality is determined by the eﬀects of the
program on educational outcomes and also the cost to achieve them. The cost-beneﬁt and cost-
eﬀective analysis allow for a prioritization of levers on which education policy can act to improve
on the quality of learning by taking into account resource constraints. The cost-eﬀectiveness
analysis is distinct from the cost-beneﬁt one, which assigns a monetary value to the measure of
the eﬀect before comparing it with the cost of the intervention. The cost-beneﬁt analysis shows
whether a program or policy is relevant, or to choose among several alternatives. It involves
comparing the total expected costs of each option to the total expected beneﬁts, to see whether
the beneﬁts outweigh the costs and by how much.
4.6.1 Cost-eﬀectiveness analysis
The relevance of educational policy options for improving school performance is determined not
only on the basis of their positive eﬀects but also their cost. Cost-eﬀectiveness analysis allows
one to relate the cost of the policies and their impact on school performance. It provides a
framework for reﬂection on investment options in the presence of resource constraints.
Based on experience in Cambodia, Cheung and Perrotta (2011) noted that there are few
studies that address the issue of cost-eﬀectiveness analysis in the assessment of the impact of
school feeding programs. The authors found out that school feeding is more proﬁtable than
the rations on improving enrollment and attendance. They also found that the combination
of school meals and rations with deworming is more proﬁtable due to the fact that the entire
package attracts many more pupils, and also drugs against parasites are not expensive. Miguel
and Kremer (2004) found that deworming is far more cost eﬀective than other options if the goal
is to increase school participation. In this subsection, we conduct a cost-eﬀectiveness analysis
of school feeding program compared to another option that is deworming. We will compare the
deworming and the canteen in terms of cost and eﬀectiveness in improving academic performance.
A similar analysis was previously conducted in Chapter 3, but the purpose of the exercise is to
determine whether the conclusion will be the same when the impact of the meal program is from
the experimental study.
To conduct the analysis, we need the cost of the meal program and the cost related to each
input. For the cost of the canteen, based on information from the ministry of education and the
WFP, the annual cost per pupil is approximately 14000 CFA. For the cost of the deworming,
based on information from the ministry of education, the annual cost per pupil is approximately
74 CFA.
Knowing the costs of diﬀerent interventions and the impact of each program on outcomes, we
can then combine the cost of each policy and its impact in calculating the cost-eﬀectiveness
ratio. By dividing the cost of each option by its eﬀect, we get the cost of producing one unit of
a given outcome, for example we will have, for each option, the cost of the improvement of the
academic achievement of 1 point. Once this is done, we can then deﬁne which program require
the lowest cost, for improving educational outcome of 1 point.
As we are not able to assess the impact of the deworming in this chapter, the percentage of
additional score for the deworming is taken from the Chapter 3. Dhaliwal et al. (2012) con-
ducted a comparative analysis on cost-eﬀectiveness of various programs implemented in diﬀerent
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countries but having the same goal. They used results from various analysis conducted in dif-
ferent countries to perform the cost-eﬀectiveness analysis. Their analysis included 11 programs
(deworming, free uniform program, iron fortiﬁcation and deworming, Camera Monitoring of
Teachers’ Attendance etc.) in six countries (Kenya, India, Nepal, Dominican Republic, Mada-
gascar, and Mexico). The authors pointed out that it is important to have a single year for
all programs in a given analysis. In addition, the outcome variable should be the same for all
interventions.
Table 4.23 presents the cost and impact of each intervention on the scores as well as the ratio
between the cost and percentage of additional scores for each intervention.
Table 4.23: Cost eﬀectiveness
Aggregate score French score Math score
Cost
Canteen 13100 13100 13100
Deworming 74 74 74
Percentage of additional score
Canteen 7.593 6.665 8.396
Deworming 17.295 2.002 48.124
Cost per percentage of additional score
Canteen 1725 1965 1560
Deworming 4 37 2
As in the previous chapter, this analysis shows that the deworming is by far the most cost-
eﬀective option in improving pupils’ performance. It is important to remember that school
feeding can have positive implications on the environment of the school, child health, poverty
and well-being of households. However, in a context of scarce resources, sustainability of school
feeding programs should depend largely on reducing their cost when the objective is to improve
scores.
4.6.2 Cost-beneﬁt analysis
In this subsection, we perform a cost-beneﬁt analysis to determine whether the gains from school
feeding program exceed the costs engaged. The gains were reduced to the additional incomes
generated by increasing the number of years of primary education obtained by the pupils that
are beneﬁciaries of the program. So we did not take into account other beneﬁts that would result
from the program like better health, or the welfare resulting from a change in the distribution
of income in favor of the poorest households that will generate the increase of their level of
primary education. To perform the cost-beneﬁt analysis, we successively estimated the number
of additional years of primary education, the additional incomes that are generated by the school
feeding program and the cost of the intervention for a pupil.
For the cost of the intervention, as mentioned earlier, based on information from WFP and
the Ministry of Education, the annual cost of the school feeding per pupil (cd) was calculated
by dividing the annual expenditure of the program by the number of pupils beneﬁting from the
canteen. The annual cost of the canteen per pupil is around 13100 CFA.
With no information allowing direct assessment of the increase in the number of years of educa-
tion resulting from a long participation in treatment, to calculate the number of additional years
of education, (the experiment lasted about 13 months), we simulated the eﬀects on the average
years of schooling that we would obtain if we had several years of experimentation. Using the
post program survey, a pseudo-cohort was constructed after the program implementation (2010).
More precisely, the transition rates by grade were calculated from the ﬁrst year of primary school
(CI) to the sixth and ﬁnal year of primary school (CM2). Their product gave us the expectation
of the number of years of schooling for a child who enters school in 2009. This calculation was
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done for the treatment group and the control group. The diﬀerence is 0.018 which is the number
of additional years of education gained from the treatment (as).
It is also possible to use Markov transition matrices to evaluate the treatment eﬀect in terms of
additional years of education (Behrman et al., 2005).
Moreover, the additional incomes were calculated over the entire period of active life of the
future adult with and without participation in the school feeding program. Based on the litera-
ture, we assumed that active life begins at age 15 and ends at age 65. The following approach
was used:
i) Using the equation of Mincer (1974) and data from the survey on follow-up of the poverty
in Senegal (ESPS) conducted in 2005 among Senegalese households, the performance of an
additional year of primary education in Senegal (tr) was estimated. This performance is 6378
CFA. To estimate the performance, we used as dependent variable the consumption per adult
equivalent, and as control variables, we used the highest grade completed by the individual,
marital status, age, gender, social class, professional experience, mode of principal activity’s
payment (variable that has as modalities, salary, payment in kind, payment to the task, payment
to the proﬁt) and the type of contract.
ii) The ESPS data were also used to estimate the average annual income of the pseudo-cohort
at age 15, 16 , ..., and 65.
iii) From the estimated annual average income, we computed the present value of the stream of
future incomes of a pupil in the control group using the following relation:
YT=0 =
65∑
i=15
Yi
(1 + r)i
, (1-9)
with Yi the annual income in millions of CFA francs corresponding to the year of active life i,
and r the real discount rate which is assumed equal to 3% and 5% as in Behrman et al. (2005).
iv) Then, the present value of the future incomes of a pupil in the treatment group was calculated
from the following relation:
YT=1 =
65∑
i=15
Yi(1 + tr ∗ as)
(1 + r)i
(1-10)
v) The economic gain or beneﬁt of the school feeding program was obtained by calculating
the diﬀerence between the discounted income of pupils who beneﬁt from the program and those
who do not beneﬁt from the program.
vi) Finally, the ratio between economic gain and the cost of the canteen provides a measure of
the rate of performance of the intervention. This is 3172 CFA (for a discount of 3% rate) and
2840 CFA (for a discount of 5%), hence come to the conclusion that the school feeding program is
a worthwhile investment because its economic beneﬁts exceed the costs involved. However, this
result underestimates the beneﬁts of the program because it does not account for the improved
health and social well-being due to program participation. We can thus say that the program is
justiﬁed in terms of economic gains.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, using experimental data, we have assessed the impact of a school feeding pro-
gram on school performances in the presence of attrition and partial adherence. The study used
a statistical method that can overcome the problems of partial adherence and attrition simulta-
neously. It covers four regions of Senegal namely Diourbel, Fatick, Se´dhiou and Kolda. We used
outcome variables related to the academic performance of pupils (aggregate score, French score
and Math score) and to internal eﬃciency of schools (enrollment rate, repetition rate, promotion
and dropout rates). We also conducted a cost-eﬀectiveness and cost-beneﬁt analysis.
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Baseline data were used to check the random assignment to the treatment. To this end,
several tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, Mann-Whitney and Student tests) were performed.
The results show that on average, the two groups are homogeneous when the tests are carried
out at the school level. However, when tests are performed at student level, the results show
that diﬀerences exist between the two groups.
The results that emerge from this study show that the school feeding program can signiﬁ-
cantly increase pupils’ performances and enrollment rate, while reducing the dropout rate. The
posterior distribution of the ITT eﬀect and the CACE shows that the impact of the program is
not homogeneous across outcomes. In fact the impact of the program is positive for all scores
(aggregate, French and math) and it is more important in math score compared to French score.
The impact is also greater for girls compared to boys in the math score, while in French score
the impact is greater for boys than girls. For policy analysis, results suggest that despite the
justiﬁcation of the meal program in terms of economic gains, the cost-eﬀectiveness analysis show
that the deworming program is more eﬀective.
In future research, it would be important to take two types of heterogeneity in measuring
the impact of the school feeding program into account. In the case study, schools do not prepare
meals every day of the week and the number of days per week they prepare meal varies from
one school to another (this number of days of preparation is between 2 and 5 days per week).
In addition, canteen meals are prepared and served at diﬀerent places and by diﬀerent people.
Pupils who share the meal cannot consume exactly the same amount of food per each meal
served; hence the need to take the heterogeneity of treatment into account (which is caused
by diﬀerences in treatment) in estimating the causal eﬀect of the program. Moreover, given
the same treatment, the magnitude of treatment eﬀects may vary from one unit treated to
another. Such heterogeneity is known as heterogeneity of treatment eﬀect. Thus, the magnitude
of treatment eﬀects may depend on the beneﬁciaries.
Another extension of this study would also be to study the long term impact of the school
feeding program by taking the impact of the program on health, nutrition and social welfare
into account.
CHAPTER 5
General Conclusion
Program evaluation is an important tool to inform policy makers about the eﬀectiveness of
programs and the eﬃcient allocation of resources. Several studies have examined the impact
of school feeding and deworming programs on school performances in developing countries.
However, conﬂicting evidence still exists regarding the eﬀects of these programs on school per-
formance. There is also little evidence on the cost eﬀectiveness of these programs.
In Senegal, although nutritional and health experiences have been developed in recent years,
no empirical study have been conducted to assess the impacts of meal and deworming programs
on school performances, and also address issues related to the complementarity or substitutabil-
ity of the two programs. This thesis aims at ﬁlling this gap. We use experimental and obser-
vational data and rely on both program evaluation and structural approaches to ﬁll the gap in
knowledge. The thesis is organized in 5 chapters.
Chapter 1 presents the motivation and objectives of the thesis, which also gives the history of
meal and deworming programs in Senegal. It also summarizes the debates between program eval-
uation approach and structural approaches recently raised by some authors before highlighting
the contributions and the organization of the thesis.
Chapter 2 uses a unique and recent data set from school feeding and deworming programs in
rural Senegal to assess their eﬀects on pupils’ achievement measured by test scores, while elabo-
rating on the determinants of test scores. We also used observational data on approximately 5000
pupils. The sample contains data on school and teacher characteristics, pupils’ achievements (ag-
gregate score, score in French and math score), pupils’ and household characteristics, community
characteristics, shocks variables, geographical location and treatment indicators. In this chapter,
we used both program evaluation (Propensity Score Matching) and structural approaches. For
the structural approaches, we used the dummy endogenous selection model originally developed
by Heckman (1979) and the Roy (1951) model. We used Full Information Maximum Likelihood
(FIML) and the Control Function (CF) approach as procedures of estimation. We computed
the average eﬀect of each intervention on all sample (ATE), on the treated (ATET) and on
the non-treated (ATENT) depending on the model used. In the dummy endogenous selection
model (Heckman selection framework), we identiﬁed only the ATE. In the PSM, we identiﬁed
the ATET; and in the Roy model in addition to the ATE and ATET, we also calculated the
ATENT. Regarding the ATENT, i.e, the average eﬀect on the group of pupils who do not receive
the meal program, the purpose is to inform policy makers on the rationale for extending the
programs to this subpopulation of pupils. In addition, in Chapter 2 we distinguished between
deworming at home and deworming in school.
Chapter 3 develops a model for two treatments to assess the impact of school feeding and
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deworming programs as a package on school performances, while elaborating on the determinants
of these performances. Using the same observational data as in Chapter 2, this chapter addresses
issues related to the impact of each program taken in isolation, but also the impact of the
combination of the two interventions and several kind of eﬀects (global eﬀects, exclusive eﬀects,
relative eﬀects, additional eﬀects, sequential and substitution eﬀects). In the chapter, we also
tested the complementarity versus substitutability of the two programs. In addition to the
outcome variables used in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 also assesses the impact of the two interventions
on internal eﬃciency of schools measured by enrollment, promotion and dropout rates. The
chapter proposes a structural framework for double-index selection where treatment variables are
endogenous. Firstly, we use a double endogenous selection model; and secondly use a generalized
Roy (1951) framework. For each speciﬁcation, we propose two estimation procedures, the Full
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) and the Control Function (two-step estimation) a` la
Heckman (1978, 1979).
Chapter 4 uses experimental data to assess the eﬀects of meal programs on school per-
formances in the presence of attrition and partial adherence. We used a statistical method
developed by Horiuchi et al. (2007). This method allows us to overcome the problems of par-
tial adherence and attrition simultaneously. In the presence of partial adherence, an intention
to-treat (ITT) eﬀect which is informative for policy makers gives a valid inference of the impact
of assignment on outcome, but it is also important to know the eﬀect of receiving the treatment
rather than the eﬀect of the assignment. That is why we calculate not only the ITT eﬀect,
but also the eﬀect of actually receiving the treatment, namely the Complier Average Causal
Eﬀect (CACE). The analysis in this chapter cover four regions of Senegal, two in the center
(Diourbel and Fatick) and two in the south of the country (Se´dhiou and Kolda). We used two
types of outcomes, namely those related to academic performance of pupils (aggregate score,
French score and Math score) and those related to internal eﬃciency of schools (enrollment rate,
repetition rate, promotion and dropout rates). It is important to remember that in this chapter,
it was not possible to address issues related to the impact of the deworming program on school
performances because as mentioned in Section 4.2, the deworming component was removed to
the experiment.
Chapter 5 summarizes the key ﬁndings from all chapters (Section 5.1), gives some policy
implications (Section 5.2), discusses the limitations of the thesis (Section 5.3) and presents the
need for some future research (5.4).
5.1 Summary of ﬁndings
Chapter 2 presents several sets of estimates on the determinants of pupils’ performances. The
results show that most of the control variables are of the expected sign and signiﬁcant. Some
others do not conform to intuition. However, they become highly interesting when put in the
speciﬁc rural Africa context.
For controls related to school characteristics, as expected, temporary shelters have negative
eﬀects on pupils’ performance (aggregate, French and math scores).
For control number of pupils per manual, results show that the number of pupils per manual
increases the scores until a point from which it has a negative eﬀect on performance. This
variable ranges between 0.2 to 7 pupils per manual. Our reading is that even if school manual
has a capacity to improve pupils’ competence, as the number of pupils per manual become
higher, this impact scores negatively because it decreases the learning time as the number of
pupils per manual increases.
For the control class size, the results show a U-shaped relation with aggregate and math scores.
The performance decreases with increasing class size which is consistent with some ﬁndings in
the literature on performance. However, starting from a certain threshold, the performance
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increases which is also consistent with other ﬁndings.
The teacher’s age also shows a similar U-shaped picture. The linear term is negative while
the square term is positive for scores. This means that the teacher’s age aﬀects the scores
negatively until a certain threshold at which additional age positively aﬀects the performances.
Control variable gender of teacher (male=1) has a negative eﬀect on scores as expected. However,
controls water point, professional qualiﬁcation and academic qualiﬁcation (High School Diploma
and more) have positive eﬀect on pupils’ performance. Regarding professional qualiﬁcation, the
results show that pupils supervised by a teacher with the vocational qualiﬁcation CAP and
CEAP perform better than those taught by a teacher with another vocational degree which
is the reference. The surprising result is that pupils taught by a teacher with no professional
diploma perform better than those supervised by a teacher with another vocational degree.
This result is consistent with a ﬁnding of CONFEMEN (2007) in Senegal. For the academic
qualiﬁcation of teachers, the results show that pupils supervised by a teacher with the “High
School Diploma and more” perform better in mathematics as compared to those supervised by
a teacher with the national certiﬁcate.
Regarding controls related to pupils’ characteristics, variable pupil’s age shows an inverted
U-shaped relation, meaning that, older pupils have a negative eﬀect on performance. Controls
related to gender of pupils, Koranic school, early childhood institution, pupils eat at ﬁll impact
performances positively. However, the pupil’s study level (class, grade; CE2=1) impact scores
negatively.
Regarding household characteristics, the results show that education expenditure and house-
hold size have a positive eﬀect on performances, as expected.
For community characteristics, to live in a community where some parents are not interested in
school has a negative eﬀect on scores, while to live in a village having a college shows a positive
one.
Regarding shocks variables, controls number of pregnancies registered in school, absenteeism
of teacher, disturbed courses and health expenditure impact scores negatively. Regarding re-
gions, results show that pupils living in Diourbel perform better than those in Fatick.
About the impact of the meal and deworming programs on pupils’ performances, the following
are the main results emerging from the Chapter 2. The meal program can increase pupils’ scores
signiﬁcantly. Also, the eﬀect of the meal program is more important for pupils who are in a
school with an association of mothers. Deworming in school has a positive eﬀect on pupils’
performance, while deworming at home has a negative impact on pupils’ scores. Our reading
is that, it is essential to assist rural households to deworm children at home. This will avoid
the use of traditional medicines for deworming children. In addition, the deworming program
signiﬁcantly increases the scores of pupils who are in a school with an association of pupils’
mothers or a school project.
In terms of policy analysis, the results show that the impact of programs varies depending
on pupils’ gender, the existence of an association around the school or the educational level of
the pupil. Also, the Local Average Treatment Eﬀect (LATE), reveals that in increasing scores,
the most cost-eﬀective way is to combine the canteen and the association of parents compared to
other options including management committee, school project, school cooperative and reduction
of teacher absence.
In Chapter 3, results on the determinants of scores are consistent with those in Chapter 2. In
addition, results show that control deworming at home impacts scores negatively, while existence
of latrine and existence of hand washing devices in school impact scores positively. About the
geographical area, pupils living in Diourbel perform better than those in Fatick. However, pupils
in Kolda and Se´dhiou perform less than those in Fatick.
In addition, temporary shelters, association of pupils’ parents, age of teacher, Koranic school,
snack, pupils who eat their ﬁll, and literacy of the household head have a positive eﬀect on
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enrollment rate.1 Another interesting and intuitive result is that having a literate household head
increases the enrollment rate. In contrast, the enrollment rate declines with school expenses.
This result is important for education policy in terms of reducing the illiteracy rate in rural
areas where the living standard is very low. Unquestionably, if policy makers want to encourage
families to send their children to school, it would be interesting to ensure that the cost of
schooling is not too high. Two other results are worth noting: having a male teacher and
holding arable land have negative eﬀects on enrollment.
Control variables temporary shelters, age of teacher, age of pupil, distance to school, association
of pupils’ parents, gender of the teacher, continuing training, Koranic school, early childhood
institution, pupils who eat their ﬁll and ownership of arable land have a positive eﬀect on the
promotion rate.
For the outcome of dropout rate, results show that the variables temporary shelters, class
size, age of pupil, distance to school, association of pupils’ parents, gender of teacher, vocational
training, Koranic school, early childhood institution, pupils who eat their ﬁll, ownership of
arable land and the existence of a college in the village have negative eﬀects on the outcome. In
contrast, controls health expenditure, number of head of cattle, disturbances that caused delay
in starting the courses, and the gender of household head have positive eﬀects on the dropout
rate. Remember that in the case of the dropout rate, negative indicator on a coeﬃcient is a
positive result as the objective is to reduce the dropout rate.
As a whole, our ﬁndings about the determinants of school performances conducted in Chapter
2 and Chapter 3 suggest that although temporary shelters allow to reduce dropout rate and to
increase enrollment and promotion rates, they have negative impact on pupils’ achievements
(scores). In addition, even if school manual can improve the competence of pupils, when the
number of pupils per manual become high (more than 4 pupils per manual) this eﬀect seems to
become negative.
In terms of the impacts of the interventions, the main results from Chapter 3 are the following.
For the score outcomes, the study shows a positive and signiﬁcant additional, exclusive and global
average treatment eﬀects (ATE). The impact of the meals program on the scores is greater than
that from the deworming program. The combination of the two programs (package) has greater
impacts than that for each program taken in isolation. This result indicates that, if the aim is
to increase the scores, the two programs should be complementary. Moreover, the relative eﬀect
of the package versus the deworming alone is greater than that the eﬀect of the canteen only.
For the average treatment eﬀects on the treated (ATET), the exclusive, global, and additional
eﬀects are all positive and signiﬁcant. It should be noted that the eﬀects on the treated are
larger than the ATE. For the treatment eﬀects on the untreated (ATENT), the results show
that the exclusive eﬀect of deworming is negative while the one on canteen is positive. The
combination of the two programs greatly increases the scores. The sequential eﬀects indicate
that for the pupils in the treated group, the impact of the package performs better if the school
meal is introduced before deworming. For pupils in the untreated group, the reverse sequence
is preferable.
For the internal eﬃciency of schools, results on the impact on enrollment rate show a negative
exclusive ATE eﬀect for the deworming program, a positive exclusive ATE for the meal program,
a negative overall eﬀect and a positive additional eﬀect. Moreover, when we set the target for
increasing enrollment, the implementation of the meal program alone is preferable to deworming
or the package. When the objective is to increase the promotion rate or reduce dropout, the
package is the best option.
Also, ﬁndings show that the meal and deworming programs are complementary in the goal of
increasing scores and promotion rates. On the contrary, the two programs are substitutes when
the aim is to reduce dropouts.
1Estimations related to internal eﬃciency of school in chapter 2 are not presented for issue of space. Findings
in Chapter 3 are consistent with those in Chapter 2 in terms of outcomes related to internal eﬃciency of schools.
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The cost-eﬀectiveness analysis conducted indicates that, regarding scores, deworming is far
cheaper than the meals program. It also shows that introducing the meals before deworming
is more cost-eﬀective than the reverse. For the promotion rate, the combination of the two
programs is more cost-eﬀective than the school feeding program only. For the dropout rate,
deworming is more cost-eﬀective than the canteen and the package. However, the package is
more cost-eﬀective than the single school feeding.
In Chapter 4, using baseline data, we checked the random assignment to the treatment by
performing several tests (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, Mann-Whitney and Student tests). The
test results show that on average, the two groups are relatively homogeneous when the tests are
carried out at school level. By contrast, when tests are performed at pupil level, we observe
some diﬀerences between the two groups. Our inference is based on Monte Carlo samples
from three independent Markov chains. Each of these samples has the length of 50,000 and is
initiated at diﬀerent sets of starting values. We found out that all parameters have values of the
Gelman-Rubin convergence statistic that are less than 1.01, meaning between 1 and 1.01. So, a
satisfactory degree of convergence has been achieved and we based our inference on a combined
total of 90,000 posterior draws.
The main results emerging from the chapter are as follows.
The school feeding program can signiﬁcantly increase pupils’ performances and enrollment
rate, while reducing the dropout rate. However, the program increases the repetition rate and
decreases the promotion rate, which is unexpected. This may follow from the measures taken
by the Government of Senegal consisting in suppressing repetition during the ﬁrst year of each
step in the primary cycle and capping at 5% the rate of repetition at the end of each step. This
also indicates that the eﬀect of the meal program is positive for all scores (aggregate, French
and math) and is greater in the math score than in the French score. One also noted that the
CACE is always greater than the ITT eﬀect. In addition, the eﬀect of the program is greater
for girls than for boys in the math score, while we observe the contrary for the French score.
In terms of promotion rate, the results show that the program do not increases except for the
promotion rate of girls and the pupils who are in the grade CP.
The cost-beneﬁt analysis conducted in this chapter shows that the meal program is justiﬁed in
terms of economic gains and the result of the cost-eﬀectiveness analysis, which is consistent with
the ﬁndings presented in Chapter 3.
Furthermore, the ﬁndings in Chapter 2 are consistent with those in Chapter 3 in terms of
the determinants of performances and treatment eﬀects. In both chapters, the results show that
the meal and deworming programs have positive eﬀects on performances. In addition, we do
not notice contradictory ﬁndings on the impact of the meal program on school performances in
Chapters 2, 3 and 4. One can take results in those chapters as complementary for the following
reasons. First, the experimental data used in Chapter 4 do not allow us to assess the impact of
the deworming program, because this program was removed from the experiment. Second, in
Chapter 4, we do not address several issues presented in Chapters 2 and 3 because of the data
and the method used.
From our analysis, it appears that using a structural approach allows to conduct a richer
analysis on the eﬀects calculation and policy analysis.
Overall, from this thesis, it appears that the meal and deworming programs have positive impact
on school performances. Therefore, these two interventions seem to be means of improving
pupils’ achievements and enrollment rates, while reducing the dropout rates.
5.2 Policy implications
The results of this thesis have some policy implications. The ﬁndings in terms of determinants
of performances suggest that despite the fact that temporary shelters allow to reduce dropout
rates, while having positive eﬀects on enrollment and promotion rates, they contribute towards
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reducing pupils’ achievement (scores). So, putting up temporary shelters owing to the lack
of classrooms appears to be a necessary evil. However, to ensure the quality of education to
improve pupils’ achievements, it is also important not to use temporary shelters for a long time.
Unfortunately, our research cannot give a clear idea about the optimal duration of temporary
shelters.
For control number of pupil per manual, results show that even if school manual has a capacity to
improve pupils’ competence, when the number of pupils per manual becomes higher than 4 pupils
per manual, this impacts scores negatively. Therefore, although the ideal is to ensure a manual
per pupil especially for key courses (namely French and math), our results suggest that reducing
the number of pupil per manual below four (4) pupils contribute towards improving student
achievement. Also, implementing a policy gearing towards reducing teachers’ absenteeism and
disturbances (strikes, deluge etc.), resulting to delays in the start of the courses will improve
educational quality.
Furthermore, it is important to promote more experienced teachers (from 33 years old) and
female teachers. Encouraging the construction of colleges in villages will also contribute to
improving pupils’ performances. In addition, encouraging parents to put their children in child-
hood institution or a Koranic school will contribute towards improving academic achievement,
enrollment and help reducing dropout rate.
Results also suggest, that improving the literacy rate for household heads in rural areas, re-
ducing the cost of schooling and encouraging the creation of associations of pupil’s parents can
contribute to increase the enrollment rate.
Finally, encouraging teachers to have professional qualiﬁcation CAP and CEAP, promoting
teachers with High school diploma and more as an academic qualiﬁcation, and increasing the
duration of continuing training for teachers are some ways of improving pupils’ achievement.
In terms of impact of the interventions, implementing meal and deworming programs in primary
schools seems to be an eﬀective means of improving school performances. For better success
of these programs, community involvement through associations of pupils’ mothers and parents
are more appropriate.
In addition, the combination of meal and deworming is more beneﬁcial in terms of increasing
pupils’s achievements. The sequence of implementation does matter. The two programs are
complementary in the goal of increasing scores and promotion rates. They are substitutes with
reducing dropouts. Also, our results suggest that it is essential to assist rural households in
deworming children at home, because this will avoid the use of traditional medicines.
Cost-eﬀectiveness analysis conducted in this thesis indicates that, regarding scores, deworm-
ing is far cheaper than the meals program. It also shows that introducing the meals before
deworming is more cost-eﬀective than the reverse. For the promotion rate, the combination of
the two programs is more cost-eﬀective than the school feeding program only. For the dropout
rate, deworming is more cost-eﬀective than the canteen or the package. However, the package is
more cost eﬀective than school feeding alone. Another interesting economic analysis performed
in this thesis is a cost-beneﬁt analysis. The results show that the meal program is justiﬁed in
terms of economic gains because costs engaged are less than the beneﬁts realized.
Furthermore, several school meal programs were initiated in developing countries. However,
their impact on educational outcomes is often contradictory. Over the last decade, a heated
debate has taken place over the quality of these programs to attract and retain pupils at school, as
well as increasing their performances. Therefore, doubts were expressed regarding the objectives
of these programs to improve school and academic performances of pupils. These critiques
point out that in the context of acute poverty; school feeding programs contribute more towards
reducing food poverty. Indeed, some parents send their children to schools where these programs
are implemented so that they can receive food rations. Another issue regarding the role of
school meals is their ability to reduce child labor. Child labor is widely practiced in rural
communities. This allows some families to generate additional income for the household. As food
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costs constitute a signiﬁcant share of household’s spending in rural areas, it is likely that some
parents send their children to school in the hope of thereby reducing their food expenditures.
However this thesis does not address the issues of poverty reduction and child labor.
Regarding deworwing programs, it is worthwhile noticing that the perception of families
about this intervention is mixed or even negative. Several families have serious reservations due
to side eﬀects of deworming drugs or to simple prejudices. It is therefore quite possible that the
result of this program is contrary to what is expected. Major eﬀort related to information sharing
and education must be conducted to convince families and children about the merits of such
interventions. These considerations should lead analysts to be cautious about the conclusions
of impact assessments.
In this thesis, one of the novelties of the interventions we evaluated has been to combine
them as a package. Intuitively, deworming and meals are complementary as both programs
could mutually reinforce each other. Moreover, the order or the sequence in which the programs
are administered makes sense and can play on the results. This thesis provided answers to these
questions.
5.3 Limitations of the thesis
This thesis has several limitations. Firstly, due to the lack of data on anthropometric measures,
it does not address the issue of the impact of meal and deworming programs on the nutritional
status of pupils. Also, it does not address issues about the impact of interventions on child
labor.
In addition, the thesis does not develop a structural model that overcomes attrition and partial
adhesion simultaneously in an experimental setting.
Another limitation is related to the deworming program in Chapter 2. As mentioned earlier
in the introduction of Chapter 2, the deworming program is not the sum of the deworming in
school and at home. Also, we do not take the combination of deworming in school and at home
into account. In addition, we distinguish between deworming at school and at home, but the
number of observations is so small that we have not been able to produce estimates using all
estimation methods.
Furthermore, the experimental data used in Chapter 4 does not allow us to assess the impact
of the deworming program in an experimental setting. Also, in Chapter 4, it would be important
to consider the two types of heterogeneity in measuring the impact of the school feeding program.
Another limitation is that the thesis does not address the issue related to the eﬀects of meal
and deworming programs on household consumption and welfare. Finally, the multilevel aspect
of the data (pupils, households, school and communities) was not taken into account for all
chapters.
5.4 Future research
The work done in this thesis has led to reﬂections that suggest several additional areas for
future research. A ﬁrst development is the multiple outcome framework. In this thesis, we have
considered the outcomes variables (aggregate, French and math scores; enrollment, promotion,
repetition and dropout rates) separately. It would be interesting to consider the improvement of
these outcomes jointly. Evidently, these outcomes are related. For example, in order to record
good scores, one needs to be enrolled and not to be a dropout. Moreover, being successful in
terms of academic achievements (via scores) may also imply a high probability to be promoted or
a low probability of repeating. Another area of research would be to use models with continuous
treatments (see Hirano and Imbens, 2004 and Florence et al., 2004 for analysis with continuous
treatment).
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In Chapter 3, a big challenge consists in extending the model developed for double treatment
to the case of M-treatment. This is not only a methodological challenge, but represents a real
empirical interest. As outlined by Lechner (2001), many evaluation problems (for example the
diﬀerent types of labor market policies in Europe) involve more than two treatments. However,
this is not without methodological diﬃculties. With regard to the ﬁrst model discussed in
the Chapter 3, we see the kernel K(yi,xi, ), which depends on the four regimes. This makes
the maximization procedure complex. As for the Roy model, the main diﬃculty is that the
procedure includes data consuming. All the parameters have to be estimated for each regime.
As a result, the problem related to parameter inﬂation is likely. For both models, our experience
is that the algorithms are very sensitive to the choice of initial values. In this regard, the
two-stage estimation provides a more manageable alternative. At the time of writing, none of
these issues have been addressed. We speculated that these could be a promising empirical
research avenue. Another future research would be to develop structural model that could
simultaneously overcome the attrition and partial adherence problems, and to test the method
using our experimental data (Lalonde, 1986).
Concerning Chapter 4, future research would be to take two types of heterogeneity in mea-
suring the impact of the school feeding program (Horiuchi et al., 2007) into account. Schools do
not prepare every day of the week, and as such, the number of days allocates to preparation of
meals per week varies from one school to another (this number of days of preparation is between
2 and 5 days per week). In addition, canteen meals are prepared and served at diﬀerent places
and by diﬀerent people. Pupils who share the meal cannot consume exactly the same amount
of food pert meal served; hence the need to take heterogeneity of treatment (which is caused
by diﬀerences in treatment) in estimating the causal eﬀect of the program into consideration.
Moreover, given the same treatment, the magnitude of treatment eﬀects may vary from one pupil
treated to another. Such heterogeneity is known as heterogeneity of treatment eﬀect. Therefore,
the magnitude of treatment eﬀects may depend on the beneﬁciaries.
Horiuchi et al. (2007) have modeled the treatment eﬀect as an unknown function of an observed
variable, regarded as Di heterogeneity variable. The main diﬀerence between the two sources
of heterogeneity is the nature of the heterogeneity variable Di . Treatment eﬀect heterogene-
ity Di can be regarded as an observed characteristic of pupils (for example gender). On the
other hand, a treatment heterogeneity Di measures the observed level of treatment or dose of
treatment. While the ﬁrst case Di was observed before assignment to treatment variable, in the
second case, Di describes the treatment itself and can be inﬂuenced by treatment allocation.
As future research, we also intend to use panel data in the case of multiple treatments.
In fact, the Ministry of Education runs an annual campaign to collect information from every
school. Some of the data include: the characteristics of schools, characteristics of teachers,
characteristics of students, school infrastructures (whether or not there is a school project,
school feeding, deworming program, iron supplementation etc.), dropout, repetition etc. The
Ministry, with support from WFP has set up a tool called ‘Balise’ (Base de donne´es Alimentation
Scolaire au Senegal). This project allows having semestrial data on school feeding in all schools
in Senegal. So from this information, we can construct panel data between ten year periods
(2003-2013). In addition to school feeding programs and deworming (intestinal parasite), the
impact of iron supplementation and vitamin A on educational outcomes will be measured.
Another future research line would be to study the long term impact of the school feeding and
deworming programs by taking into account the impact of the program on health, nutrition and
social welfare.
Overall, this thesis provides empirical evidence on the impact of meal and deworming pro-
grams on school performances using both experimental and non-experimental studies. To our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to reveal that the combination of meal and deworming programs
as package would be more eﬀective in terms of increasing school performances, while giving the
eﬀect of each intervention and several other eﬀects to inform policy makers.
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Appendix A.1 List and deﬁnition of variables
Table A.1: List and deﬁnition of variables
Variable name Deﬁnition Nature
Outcome variables
Aggregate score Aggregate test scores in French and Mathematics continuous
French score Test scores in French continuous
Math score Test scores in Mathematics continuous
Enrollment rate Enrollment rate of the school continuous
Repetition rate Repetition rate of the school continuous
Promotion rate Promotion rate of the school continuous
Dropout rate Dropout rate of the school continuous
Treatment indicators
Meal Meal program indicator binary (yes=1)
Deworming Deworming in school/ at home indicator binary (yes=1)
Deworming in school Deworming in school program indicator binary (yes=1)
Deworming at home Deworming at home program indicator binary (yes=1)
Schools and teachers characteristics
Temporary shelters Number of classes in temporary shelters continuous
School manual a Number of pupils per manual in the school continuous
Total pupils Total number of pupils per school continuous
Class size Number of pupils by class continuous
Teacher’s age Age of the teacher (in year) continuous
Number of pregnancies Number of pregnancies in the school during
the school year continuous
Number of marriages Number of marriages in the school during
the school year continuous
Distance to school Distance between school to pupils’s home (km) binary (0-1km=1)
Gender of teacher Gender of the teacher binary (male=1)
No professional qualif. Teachers without professional qualiﬁcation binary (yes=1)
Continued on next page. . .
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Table A.1 – continued
Variable name Deﬁnition Nature
Professional qualif. CAP Teachers with a ‘’Certiﬁcat d’Aptitude Pedagogique’‘
as professional qualiﬁcation binary (yes=1)
Professional qualif. CEAP Teachers with a ‘’Certiﬁcat Ele´mentaire d’Aptitude
Pe´dagogique‘’ as professional qualiﬁcation binary (yes=1)
Other professional qualif. Teachers with other professional qualiﬁcation binary (yes=1)
High school diploma & more Teachers having as academic qualiﬁcation:
baccalaureate or undergraduate or bachelor binary (yes=1)
National certiﬁcate Teachers having as academic qualiﬁcation:
national certiﬁcate ‘brevet’ binary (yes=1)
Continuing training Teachers have received continuing training binary (yes=1)
Absenteeism Indicates whether the teachers of the schools
are often absent or not binary (yes=1)
Playground Existence of a playground in the school binary (yes=1)
Medicine box Existence of a medicine box in the school binary (yes=1)
Toilets Existence of separate toilets in the school binary (yes=1)
Management committee Existence of a management committee in the school binary (yes=1)
School project Existence of a school project in the school binary (yes=1)
Cooperative school Existence of a cooperative school in the school binary (yes=1)
Association of parents Existence of a Association of pupil’s parents
in the school binary (yes=1)
Association of mothers Existence of a Association of pupil’s mothers
in the school binary (yes=1)
Rural council grant School receives a grant from the rural council binary (yes=1)
Water point Existence of a water point in the school binary (yes=1)
Disturbed courses Disturbances that caused delay of the start courses binary (yes=1)
Storage Existence of a storage -warehouse- in the school binary (yes=1)
Meals near school Opportunity of the pupils to have meal near school binary (yes=1)
Hands washing Existence of a hands washing device in the school binary (yes=1)
Pupils characteristics
Pupil’s age Age of the pupil (in year) continuous
Number of hours b The number of hours of work that the
child spends doing housework per day continuous
Gender of pupil Gender of the pupil binary (boy=1)
Grade Education level of the pupil binary (CE2=1)
Koranic school Pupils who attended a islamic school binary (yes=1)
Early childhood inst. Pupils who attended an early child institution binary (yes=1)
Sick last 3 months Pupils who have been sick in the last 3 months binary (yes=1)
Pupils eat ﬁll Pupils who eat to their ﬁll at home binary (yes=1)
Snack Child who brings a snack to school binary (yes=1)
Households characteristics
Food expenditure Monthly Food expenditure of household
per adult equivalent (in log, cfaa) continuous
Health expenditure Annual health expenditure of household (log, cfac) continuous
Education expenditure Annual education expenditure of household (log, cfac) continuous
Household size Household size per adult equivalent continuous
Livestock Number of head of livestock that the household owns continuous
Gender of household head Gender of the household head binary (male=1)
Lit. of household head Head of household is literate in French binary (yes=1)
Marital status Married people binary (yes=1)
Land Possession of cultivable land owned
by the household binary (yes=1)
Communities characteristics
Primary schools Number of primary schools in the community continuous
Continued on next page. . .
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Table A.1 – continued
Variable name Deﬁnition Nature
College Existence of a college in the school’s village binary (yes=1)
Parents school Child living in a community where parents
are not interested in school binary (yes=1)
Koranic school com. Child living in a community where attending Koranic
school prevent children from going to school binary (yes=1)
Geographical localization
Diourbel Region Diourbel binary (yes=1)
Fatick Region Fatick binary (yes=1)
Kolda Region Kolda binary (yes=1)
Se´dhiou Region Se´dhiou binary (yes=1)
Note a: This variable is created using total pupil and number of school manual; b: This variable is created by doing the report
between the total sum of hours spend in each housework by sevent (7); c: Currency of the French colonies in Africa.
Appendix A.2 Map of Senegal: geographical areas beneﬁting form the pro-
grams
The blue color indicates the geographical areas beneﬁting form the programs.
Figure A.1: Geographical areas covered by the meal and deworming programs
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Appendix A.3 Summary statistics
Table A.2: Summary statistics: Meal
Treatment group Control group t-test
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p > |t|
Aggregate score 42.445 18.883 37.587 19.458 0.000∗∗∗
French score 41.877 21.162 38.228 21.171 0.000∗∗∗
Math score 42.890 21.110 36.949 21.339 0.000∗∗∗
Temporary shelters 1.686 1.318 1.503 1.168 0.001∗∗∗
School manual 1.523 3.544 1.077 1.092 0.000∗∗∗
Total pupils 187.877 127.701 187.440 118.995 0.939
Class size 27.946 12.181 35.834 14.395 0.000∗∗∗
Number of pregnancies 0.257 0.516 0.089 0.331 0.000∗∗∗
Number of marriages 0.172 0.378 0.321 0.698 0.000∗∗∗
Teacher’s age 32.368 5.464 31.223 5.496 0.000∗∗∗
Pupil’s age 9.688 1.693 9.902 1.780 0.010∗∗
Number of hours 0.379 0.888 0.328 0.573 0.104
Food expenditurea 11.495 0.526 11.462 0.520 0.186
Education expenditurea 7.636 1.176 7.512 1.366 0.046∗∗
Health expenditurea 7.778 1.670 7.440 2.128 0.000∗∗∗
Household sizeb 10.930 6.260 11.451 6.924 0.101
Livestock 9.900 20.740 12.534 21.116 0.008∗∗∗
Distance to school 0.817 0.386 0.780 0.414 0.052∗
Playground 0.916 0.276 0.747 0.434 0.000∗∗∗
Management committee 0.629 0.483 0.530 0.499 0.000∗∗∗
School project 0.084 0.278 0.149 0.356 0.000∗∗∗
Cooperative school 0.699 0.458 0.682 0.465 0.434
Association of parents 0.983 0.126 0.961 0.192 0.007∗∗∗
Association of mothers 0.438 0.496 0.153 0.360 0.000∗∗∗
Rural council grant 0.924 0.263 0.618 0.485 0.000∗∗∗
Water point 0.438 0.496 0.395 0.489 0.062∗
Disturbed courses 0.902 0.297 0.713 0.452 0.000∗∗∗
Meals near school 0.319 0.466 0.285 0.451 0.107
Storage 0.440 0.496 0.183 0.387 0.000∗∗∗
Medicine box 0.060 0.238 0.133 0.339 0.000∗∗∗
Gender of teacher 0.794 0.404 0.840 0.366 0.009∗∗∗
No professional qualif.c 0.199 0.399 0.316 0.465 0.000∗∗∗
Professional qualif. CAP 0.145 0.352 0.162 0.369 0.302
Professional qualif. CEAP 0.349 0.477 0.188 0.391 0.000∗∗∗
Other professional qualif. 0.306 0.461 0.332 0.471 0.239
High school diploma & more 0.433 0.496 0.448 0.497 0.541
National certiﬁcate 0.566 0.496 0.551 0.497 0.541
Continuing training 0.450 0.497 0.654 0.475 0.000∗∗∗
Absenteeism 0.037 0.190 0.080 0.271 0.000∗∗∗
Gender of pupil 0.479 0.499 0.515 0.499 0.127
Grade 0.505 0.500 0.499 0.500 0.789
Koranic school 0.285 0.452 0.296 0.456 0.618
Early childhood inst. 0.037 0.190 0.067 0.250 0.007∗∗∗
Snack 0.050 0.219 0.099 0.299 0.000∗∗∗
Sick last 3 months 0.277 0.448 0.244 0.430 0.112
Pupils eat ﬁll 0.879 0.326 0.883 0.321 0.793
Gender of household head 0.923 0.266 0.895 0.306 0.043∗∗
Lit. of household head 0.158 0.365 0.157 0.364 0.950
Marital status 0.959 0.197 0.953 0.211 0.544
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Table A.2 – continued
Treatment group Control group t-test
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p > |t|
Land 0.946 0.225 0.947 0.224 0.934
Parents school 0.491 0.500 0.489 0.500 0.937
College 0.133 0.340 0.239 0.426 0.000∗∗∗
Diourbel 0 0 0.079 0.270 0.000∗∗∗
Fatick 0.672 0.469 0.425 0.494 0.000∗∗∗
Kolda 0.185 0.389 0.454 0.498 0.000∗∗∗
Se´dhiou 0.141 0.349 0.039 0.195 0.000∗∗∗
# Observations 613 1756
Note a: In log; b: Household size per adult equivalent; c: qualiﬁcation.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table A.3: Summary statistics: Deworming
Treatment group Control group t-test
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p > |t|
Aggregate score 37.495 18.480 37.587 19.458 0.913
French score 37.680 20.777 38.228 21.171 0.554
Math score 37.161 19.910 36.949 21.339 0.818
Temporary shelters 1.633 1.138 1.503 1.168 0.011∗∗
School manual 0.913 0.894 1.077 1.092 0.000∗∗∗
Total pupils 223.104 149.087 187.440 118.995 0.000∗∗∗
Class size 35.752 12.887 35.834 14.395 0.894
Number of pregnancies 0.147 0.402 0.089 0.331 0.000∗∗∗
Number of marriages 0.305 0.731 0.321 0.698 0.593
Teacher’s age 32.619 5.799 31.223 5.496 0.000∗∗∗
Pupil’s age 9.659 1.785 9.902 1.780 0.002∗∗∗
Number of hours 0.268 0.504 0.328 0.573 0.014∗∗
Food expenditurea 11.458 0.542 11.462 0.520 0.866
Education expenditurea 7.774 1.370 7.512 1.366 0.000∗∗∗
Health expenditurea 7.251 2.269 7.440 2.128 0.049∗∗
Household sizeb 11.429 6.413 11.451 6.924 0.941
Livestock 8.306 13.432 12.534 21.116 0.000∗∗∗
Distance to school 0.856 0.350 0.780 0.414 0.000∗∗∗
Playground 0.800 0.276 0.747 0.434 0.005∗∗∗
Management committee 0.673 0.469 0.530 0.499 0.000∗∗∗
School project 0.079 0.270 0.149 0.356 0.000∗∗∗
Cooperative school 0.729 0.444 0.682 0.465 0.022∗∗
Association of parents 0.983 0.127 0.961 0.192 0.004∗∗∗
Association of mothers 0.248 0.432 0.153 0.360 0.000∗∗∗
Rural council grant 0.656 0.475 0.618 0.485 0.072∗
Water point 0.526 0.499 0.395 0.489 0.000∗∗∗
Disturbed courses 0.659 0.474 0.713 0.452 0.007∗∗∗
Meals near school 0.265 0.441 0.285 0.451 0.313
Storage 0.264 0.441 0.183 0.387 0.000∗∗∗
Medicine box 0.119 0.324 0.133 0.339 0.335
Gender of teacher 0.823 0.381 0.840 0.366 0.297
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Table A.3 – continued
Treatment group Control group t-test
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. p > |t|
No professional qualif.c 0.216 0.411 0.316 0.465 0.000∗∗∗
Professional qualif. CAP 0.264 0.441 0.162 0.369 0.000∗∗∗
Professional qualif. CEAP 0.194 0.395 0.188 0.391 0.739
Other professional qualif. 0.325 0.468 0.332 0.471 0.736
High school diploma & more 0.519 0.499 0.448 0.497 0.001∗∗∗
National certiﬁcate 0.480 0.499 0.551 0.497 0.001∗∗∗
Continuing training 0.547 0.498 0.654 0.475 0.000∗∗∗
Absenteeism 0.114 0.319 0.080 0.271 0.006∗∗∗
Gender of pupil 0.493 0.500 0.515 0.499 0.328
Garde 0.473 0.499 0.499 0.500 0.236
Koranic school 0.276 0.447 0.296 0.456 0.322
Early childhood inst. 0.119 0.324 0.067 0.250 0.000∗∗∗
Snack 0.124 0.330 0.099 0.299 0.068∗
Sick last 3 months 0.402 0.490 0.244 0.430 0.000∗∗∗
Pupils eat ﬁll 0.922 0.268 0.883 0.321 0.004∗∗∗
Gender of household head 0.880 0.324 0.895 0.306 0.300
Lit. of household head 0.216 0.411 0.157 0.364 0.000∗∗∗
Marital status 0.956 0.204 0.953 0.211 0.751
Land 0.943 0.230 0.947 0.224 0.753
Parents school 0.536 0.499 0.489 0.500 0.032∗∗
College 0.202 0.402 0.239 0.426 0.047∗∗
Diourbel 0.020 0.141 0.079 0.270 0.000∗∗∗
Fatick 0.627 0.483 0.425 0.494 0.000∗∗∗
Kolda 0.310 0.463 0.454 0.498 0.000∗∗∗
Se´dhiou 0.041 0.198 0.039 0.195 0.892
# Observations 731 1756
Note a: In log; b: Household size per adult equivalent; c: qualiﬁcation.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Appendix A.4 Further estimation results
Table A.4: Propensity score estimation: Probit regression
Meal Deworming
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Total pupils 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0001
Distance to school 0.253∗∗∗ 0.055 - -
Management committee - - 0.206∗∗∗ 0.053
Association of mothers 0.470∗∗∗ 0.051 0.229∗∗∗ 0.060
Cooperative school - - 0.188∗∗∗ 0.052
Rural council grant 0.607∗∗∗ 0.053 0.055∗∗∗ 0.020
Water point 0.111∗∗ 0.052 0.140∗∗ 0.059
Disturbed courses 0.254∗∗∗ 0.051 - -
Storage 0.470∗∗∗ 0.054 - -
Gender of pupil -0.073∗ 0.043 -0.080∗ 0.047
Lit. of household head - - 0.158∗∗∗ 0.060
Intercept -1.673∗∗∗ 0.085 -1.121∗∗∗ 0.059
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Meal Deworming
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
LR test
χ2 (d.o.f) 156.94 (17) 248.51 (13)
P > χ2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.0714 0.0596
Log likelihood -1019.997 -1959.846
# Observations 3398 3625
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table A.5: Determinants of scores: Meal, HSFa regression (2-stepb)
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Performance Eq.
Temporary shelters -0.749∗∗ 0.345 -0.433 0.369 -1.151∗∗∗ 0.386
School manual 6.698∗∗∗ 1.107 6.779∗∗∗ 1.185 6.608∗∗∗ 1.240
School manual squared -0.613∗∗∗ 0.195 -0.939∗∗∗ 0.209 -0.287 0.219
Class size -0.237∗∗ 0.114 -0.076 0.122 -0.395∗∗∗ 0.128
Class size squared 0.001 0.001 -0.0002 0.001 0.004∗∗ 0.001
Number of pregnancies -3.586∗∗∗ 1.035 -3.757∗∗∗ 1.108 -3.303∗∗∗ 1.158
Number of marriages -0.494 0.736 -1.240 0.788 0.173 0.825
Teacher’s age -1.390∗∗ 0.657 -1.123 0.703 -1.533∗∗ 0.735
Teacher’s age square 0.023∗∗ 0.009 0.016 0.010 0.027∗∗ 0.011
Pupil’s age 7.113∗∗∗ 2.109 8.439∗∗∗ 2.257 5.914∗∗ 2.361
Pupil’s age square -0.284∗∗∗ 0.097 -0.348∗∗∗ 0.104 -0.228∗∗ 0.109
Number of hours -0.030 0.534 -0.114 0.572 0.050 0.596
Food expenditurec -0.749 0.767 -1.088 0.822 -0.537 0.859
Education expenditurec 0.937∗∗∗ 0.296 1.149∗∗∗ 0.317 0.747∗∗ 0.332
Health expenditurec -0.270 0.186 -0.189 0.199 -0.363∗ 0.208
Household size d 0.211∗∗∗ 0.065 0.215∗∗∗ 0.070 0.206∗∗∗ 0.073
Livestock 0.007 0.019 -0.004 0.020 0.020 0.021
Distance to school 1.366 0.939 1.425 0.997 1.316 1.062
Playground 0.400 1.060 0.085 1.134 0.651 1.187
Water point 2.424∗∗∗ 0.884 1.584∗ 0.940 3.270∗∗∗ 1.000
Disturbed courses -6.363∗∗∗ 1.170 -5.076∗∗∗ 1.244 -7.615∗∗∗ 1.321
Meals near school -0.120 0.912 -1.270 0.976 1.096 1.022
Gender of teacher -4.799∗∗∗ 1.144 -3.920∗∗∗ 1.225 -5.729∗∗∗ 1.280
No professional qualif.e 6.271∗∗∗ 1.043 5.056∗∗∗ 1.117 7.477∗∗∗ 1.167
Professional qualif. CAP 2.755∗ 1.413 3.088∗∗ 1.512 2.643∗ 1.582
Professional qualif. CEAP 4.483∗∗∗ 1.098 2.025∗ 1.175 6.807∗∗∗ 1.229
High school diploma & more 0.216 0.889 -1.237 0.952 1.646∗ 0.994
Continuing training -0.198 0.790 -0.370 0.845 -0.159 0.884
Absenteeism -1.174 1.600 -0.406 1.714 -1.939 1.789
Gender of pupil 1.422∗∗ 0.722 0.703 0.766 1.926∗∗ 0.818
Garde -12.658∗∗∗ 1.032 -19.557∗∗∗ 1.105 -5.707∗∗∗ 1.155
Koranic school 2.706∗∗∗ 0.812 2.630∗∗∗ 0.869 2.839∗∗∗ 0.909
Early childhood inst. 4.902∗∗∗ 1.563 5.811∗∗∗ 1.673 3.915∗∗ 1.751
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Table A.5 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Snack 1.472 1.315 1.477 1.408 1.686 1.471
Sick last 3 months 0.069 0.825 0.723 0.883 -0.495 0.922
Pupils eat ﬁll 2.899∗∗ 1.165 2.615∗∗ 1.248 3.125 1.303
Gender of household head -1.156∗ 1.366 -2.291 1.462 0.050 1.528
Lit. of household head -1.660 1.007 -1.170 1.078 -2.397∗∗ 1.127
Marital status 1.153 1.873 2.366 2.006 -0.0179 2.094
Land -2.319 1.670 -1.013 1.787 -3.377∗ 1.869
Parents school -3.075∗∗∗ 0.823 -3.940∗∗∗ 0.881 -2.066∗∗ 0.921
College 7.274∗∗∗ 1.110 6.668∗∗∗ 1.187 7.928∗∗∗ 1.244
Diourbel 6.731∗∗∗ 1.805 4.937∗∗ 1.930 8.595∗∗∗ 2.023
Kolda -0.725 1.298 -0.099 1.389 -1.209 1.454
Se´dhiou -0.887 1.909 -3.681∗ 2.045 1.773 2.134
Meal 3.055 2.137 4.873∗∗ 2.274 0.996 2.410
Intercept 26.737 17.820 21.579 19.074 30.573 19.948
Selection Eq.
Total pupils 0.0006∗ 0.0003 0.0006∗ 0.0003 0.0006∗ 0.0003
Distance to school 0.1276∗ 0.075 0.127∗ 0.075 0.127∗ 0.075
Management committee 0.089 0.070 0.089 0.0702 0.089 0.070
Association of mothers 0.707∗∗∗ 0.072 0.707∗∗∗ 0.072 0.707∗∗∗ 0.072
Cooperative school -0.012 0.068 -0.012 0.068 -0.012 0.068
Rural council grant 0.800 0.087 0.800 0.087 0.800 0.087
Water point -0.035 0.076 -0.035 0.076 -0.035 0.076
Disturbed courses 0.986∗∗∗ 0.096 0.986∗∗∗ 0.096 0.986∗∗∗ 0.096
Storage 0.841∗∗∗ 0.074 0.841∗∗∗ 0.074 0.841∗∗∗ 0.074
Gender of pupil -0.088 0.062 -0.088 0.062 -0.088 0.062
Intercept -2.701∗∗∗ 0.161 -2.701∗∗∗ 0.161 -2.701∗∗∗ 0.161
hasard λ 3.967∗∗∗ 1.365 1.653 1.455 6.401∗∗∗ 1.535
ρ 0.229 — 0.077 — 0.327 —
σ 17.271 — 18.313 — 19.562 —
λ 3.967 1.365 1.653 1.455 6.401 1.535
# Observations 2369 2369 2369
Wald χ2(50) 718.99 888.99 618.01
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes a: Heckman selection framework; b: Two step; c: In log; d: Household size per adult equivalent; e: qualiﬁcation.
Signiﬁcance levels (bootstrap): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table A.6: Determinants of scores: Deworming, HSFa regression
(2-stepb)
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Performance Eq.
Temporary shelters 0.452 0.390 0.228 0.412 0.663 0.440
School manual 1.335 1.097 2.479∗∗ 1.157 0.323 1.239
School manual squared 0.091 0.190 -0.304 0.201 0.472∗∗ 0.215
Class size -0.161 0.119 0.140 0.125 -0.469∗∗∗ 0.134
Class size squared 0.0007 0.001 -0.003∗∗ 0.001 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001
Number of pregnancies -6.593∗∗∗ 1.116 -8.530∗∗∗ 1.176 -4.600∗∗∗ 1.253
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Table A.6 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Number of marriages -0.056 0.677 0.192 0.714 -0.285 0.764
Teacher’s age -2.580∗∗∗ 0.629 -3.014∗∗∗ 0.663 -2.122∗∗∗ 0.709
Teacher’s age square 0.036∗∗∗ 0.009 0.040∗∗∗ 0.009 0.032∗∗∗ 0.010
Pupil’s age 6.947∗∗∗ 1.953 7.452∗∗∗ 2.058 6.325∗∗∗ 2.196
Pupil’s age square -0.276∗∗∗ 0.092 -0.301∗∗∗ 0.097 -0.245∗∗ 0.103
Number of hours -0.131 0.627 -0.143 0.661 -0.083 0.706
Food expenditurec 0.712 0.738 -0.015 0.778 1.359∗ 0.831
Education expenditurec 0.235 0.275 0.262 0.290 0.214 0.309
Health expenditurec 0.078 0.167 0.123 0.176 0.029 0.187
Household size d 0.266∗∗∗ 0.063 0.243∗∗∗ 0.067 0.288∗∗∗ 0.071
Livestock -0.0007 0.020 -0.020 0.021 0.020 0.023
Distance to school 1.083 0.909 1.450 0.959 0.640 1.024
Playground 1.741∗ 0.972 1.833∗ 1.024 1.903∗ 1.094
Water point -0.775 1.013 -2.553∗∗ 1.075 0.959 1.182
Disturbed courses -4.042∗∗∗ 0.998 -2.396∗∗ 1.052 -5.881∗∗∗ 1.121
Meals near school -0.553 0.907 -1.681∗ 0.957 0.568 1.025
Gender of teacher -3.710∗∗∗ 1.145 -2.301∗ 1.207 -5.178∗∗∗ 1.287
No professional qualif. e 0.224 1.040 -1.233 1.097 1.712 1.171
Professional qualif. CAP -1.063 1.262 -1.546 1.331 -0.456 1.420
Professional qualif. CEAP 4.493∗∗∗ 1.164 3.134∗∗ 1.229 5.465∗∗∗ 1.317
High school diploma & more 1.745∗∗ 0.882 0.950 0.930 2.323∗∗ 0.993
Continuing training -0.456 0.795 -0.367 0.839 -0.460 0.896
Absenteeism -4.931∗∗∗ 1.335 -3.156∗∗ 1.408 -6.734∗∗∗ 1.507
Gender of pupil 0.769 0.700 0.289 0.744 1.329 0.825
Grade -14.213∗∗∗ 0.984 -21.154∗∗∗ 1.037 -7.323∗∗∗ 1.107
Koranic school 3.562∗∗∗ 0.798 4.144∗∗∗ 0.841 3.206∗∗∗ 0.898
Early childhood inst. 2.105 1.319 2.900∗∗ 1.390 1.336 1.478
Snack -0.305 1.153 0.009 1.215 -0.583 1.294
Sick last 3 months -0.181 0.771 0.216 0.813 -0.717 0.866
Pupils eat ﬁll 0.429 1.192 1.004 1.257 -0.177 1.344
Gender of household head -0.667 1.266 -1.322 1.334 -0.173 1.422
Lit. of household head -0.129 1.027 0.125 1.091 -0.273 1.205
Marital status 2.816 1.795 2.399 1.891 3.209 2.016
Land -2.365 1.594 -2.270 1.679 -2.513 1.790
Parents school -3.040∗∗∗ 0.801 -2.808∗∗∗ 0.844 -3.413∗∗∗ 0.903
College 1.721∗ 1.026 0.821 1.082 2.747∗∗ 1.157
Diourbel 1.274 1.686 0.914 1.779 1.730 1.904
Kolda -9.912∗∗∗ 1.236 -10.037∗∗∗ 1.304 -9.766∗∗∗ 1.397
Se´dhiou -8.668∗∗∗ 2.268 -7.127∗∗∗ 2.391 -10.053∗∗∗ 2.553
Deworming -3.969 6.257 4.887 6.633 -13.797∗ 7.259
Intercept 45.704∗∗∗ 16.753 57.735∗∗∗ 17.664 35.401∗ 18.866
Selection Eq.
Total pupils 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002
Management committee 0.269∗∗∗ 0.058 0.269∗∗∗ 0.058 0.269∗∗∗ 0.058
Association of mothers 0.209∗∗∗ 0.071 0.209∗∗∗ 0.071 0.209∗∗∗ 0.071
Cooperative school 0.095 0.060 0.095 0.060 0.095 0.060
Water point 0.167∗∗∗ 0.065 0.167∗∗∗ 0.065 0.167∗∗∗ 0.065
Medicine box -0.154∗ 0.083 -0.154∗∗∗ 0.083 -0.154∗∗∗ 0.083
Gender of pupil -0.064 0.053 -0.064 0.053 -0.064 0.053
Lit. of household head 0.166∗∗ 0.069 0.166∗∗ 0.069 0.166∗∗ 0.069
Intercept -0.947∗∗∗ 0.071 -0.947∗∗∗ 0.071 -0.947∗∗∗ 0.071
hasard λ 2.045 3.779 -3.856 4.005 8.487∗ 4.381
ρ 0.120 — -0.214 — 0.424 —
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Table A.6 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
σ 16.935 — 18.010 — 19.997 —
λ 2.045 3.999 -3.856 4.005 8.487 4.381
# Observations 2487 2487 2487
Wald χ2(49) 738.60 1010.70 545.13
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes a: Heckman selection framework; b: Two step; c: In log; d: Household size per adult equivalent; e: qualiﬁcation.
Signiﬁcance levels (bootstrap): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table A.7: Determinants of scores: Meal, Roy regression (MLa)
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Selection Eq.
Total pupils 0.0005∗ 0.0003 0.0005∗ 0.0003 0.0006∗ 0.0003
Distance to school 0.148∗ 0.076 0.136∗ 0.076 0.154∗∗ 0.076
Management committee 0.041 0.069 0.060 0.070 0.0311 0.069
Association of mothers 0.699∗∗∗ 0.071 0.678∗∗∗ 0.073 0.738∗∗∗ 0.070
Cooperative school 0.016 0.069 -0.016 0.069 0.044 0.067
Rural council grant 0.846∗∗∗ 0.087 0.827∗∗∗ 0.088 0.847∗∗∗ 0.086
Water point -0.001 0.076 -0.011 0.077 -0.015 0.075
Disturbed courses 1.011∗∗∗ 0.096 1.005∗∗∗ 0.096 0.997∗∗∗ 0.096
Storage 0.859∗∗∗ 0.073 0.861∗∗∗ 0.074 0.845∗∗∗ 0.073
Gender of pupil -0.092 0.062 -0.091 0.062 -0.089 0.062
Intercept -2.773∗∗∗ 0.161 -2.727∗∗∗ 0.161 -2.791∗∗∗ 0.161
Performance Eq. Untreated
Temporary shelters -0.825∗ 0.454 -0.559 0.476 -1.071∗∗ 0.511
School manual 5.018∗∗∗ 1.292 5.175∗∗∗ 1.356 4.845∗∗∗ 1.458
School manual squared -0.313 0.217 -0.593∗∗∗ 0.227 -0.0268 0.245
Class size -0.125 0.136 0.194 0.142 -0.441∗∗∗ 0.153
Class size squared -0.0004 0.001 -0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003∗ 0.001
Number of pregnancies -8.933∗∗∗ 1.412 -10.085∗∗∗ 1.487 -7.827∗∗∗ 1.588
Number of marriages 0.038 0.787 -0.067 0.828 0.180 0.885
Teacher’s age -1.503∗∗ 0.731 -2.085∗∗∗ 0.768 -0.906 0.822
Teacher’s age square 0.022∗∗ 0.010 0.028∗∗ 0.011 0.016 0.012
Pupil’s age 6.751∗∗∗ 2.381 7.249∗∗∗ 2.500 6.275∗∗ 2.681
Pupil’s age square -0.253∗∗ 0.110 -0.275∗∗ 0.116 -0.232∗ 0.124
Number of hours 0.656 0.721 0.557 0.760 0.747 0.810
Food expenditureb 1.119 0.869 0.488 0.914 1.755∗ 0.978
Education expenditureb 0.447 0.329 0.527 0.346 0.386 0.369
Health expenditureb -0.057 0.204 -0.046 0.214 -0.074 0.230
Household size c 0.248∗∗∗ 0.074 0.248∗∗∗ 0.078 0.251∗∗∗ 0.084
Livestock 0.003 0.022 -0.015 0.023 0.021 0.025
Distance to school 1.615 1.056 1.818 1.095∗ 1.402 1.197
Playground -0.282 1.139 -0.226 1.201 -0.237 1.280
Water point -0.108 1.076 -1.454 1.125 1.209 1.217
Disturbed courses -4.781∗∗∗ 1.263 -3.663∗∗∗ 1.324 -5.995∗∗∗ 1.427
Meals near school -1.033 1.061 -2.152∗ 1.113 0.078 1.196
Gender of teacher -5.335∗∗∗ 1.400 -4.432∗∗∗ 1.466 -6.301∗∗∗ 1.578
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Table A.7 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
No professional qualif.d 3.906∗∗∗ 1.279 1.999 1.344 5.839∗∗∗ 1.440
Professional qualif. CAP 0.713 1.581 0.311 1.659 1.100 1.783
Professional qualif. CEAP 6.431∗∗∗ 1.400 5.279∗∗∗ 1.466 7.597∗∗∗ 1.577
High school diploma & more 2.276∗∗ 1.059 1.044 1.111 3.531∗∗∗ 1.194
Continuing training 0.538 0.940 -0.410 0.985 1.520 1.060
Absenteeism -1.710 1.670 -0.207 1.813 -3.443∗ 1.859
Gender of pupil 1.568∗ 0.833 1.231 0.864 1.928∗∗ 0.944
Grade -14.670∗∗∗ 1.180 -21.884∗∗∗ 1.241 -7.496∗∗∗ 1.327
Koranic school 3.969∗∗∗ 0.940 4.207∗∗∗ 0.988 3.762∗∗∗ 1.058
Early childhood inst. 4.946∗∗∗ 1.703 5.521∗∗∗ 1.787 4.389∗∗ 1.919
Snack 2.216 1.419 2.121 1.497 2.271 1.594
Sick last 3 months -0.823 0.952 -0.488 1.001 -1.160 1.071
Pupils eat ﬁll -0.005 1.355 0.006 1.426 0.014 1.523
Gender of household head -1.213 1.537 -2.224 1.614 -0.249 1.731
Lit. of household head -1.156 1.168 0.404 1.228 -2.665∗∗ 1.314
Marital 1.489 2.098 1.377 2.210 1.644 2.359
Land 0.543 1.918 1.144 2.017 -0.093 2.158
Parents school -3.825∗∗∗ 0.979 -4.634∗∗∗ 1.026 -3.105∗∗∗ 1.104
College 3.320∗∗∗ 1.240 2.699∗∗ 1.299 3.959∗∗∗ 1.397
Diourbel 3.442∗ 1.909 2.196 2.003 4.424∗∗ 2.144
Kolda -7.967∗∗∗ 1.499 -7.833∗∗∗ 1.574 -8.158∗∗∗ 1.689
Se´dhiou -1.768 2.777 -1.526 2.923 -1.987 3.126
Intercept 18.555 19.833 34.993∗ 20.826 1.463 22.328
Performance Eq. Treated
Temporary shelters -1.055 1.019 0.749 1.134 -2.686∗∗ 1.160
School manual 2.483 11.960 -9.088 13.346 5.472 13.560
School manual squared 5.274 5.111 7.731 5.699 6.540 5.802
Class size -0.951∗∗∗ 0.283 -1.201∗∗∗ 0.314 -0.708∗∗ 0.321
Class size squared 0.017∗∗∗ 0.004 0.020∗∗∗ 0.004 0.014∗∗∗ 0.004
Number of pregnancies -20.212∗∗∗ 3.352 -13.855∗∗∗ 3.732 -27.037∗∗∗ 3.814
Number of marriages -0.707 3.067 -0.445 3.415 -2.231 3.503
Teacher’s age -1.054 1.597 1.803 1.771 -2.508 1.821
Teacher’s age square 0.022 0.023 -0.021 0.026 0.045∗ 0.0271
Pupil’s age 4.883 3.739 7.664∗ 4.160 2.026 4.254
Pupil’s age square -0.152 0.172 -0.292 0.192 -0.0136 0.196
Number of hours 0.540 0.677 0.680 0.753 0.397 0.770
Total expenditureb -1.146 1.410 -1.495 1.568 -1.510 1.604
Education expenditureb 0.423 0.579 0.696 0.644 0.151 0.659
Health expenditureb -0.115 0.397 0.312 0.442 -0.590 0.452
Household size c 0.004 0.120 0.018 0.134 -0.038 0.137
Livestock -0.039 0.034 -0.035 0.038 -0.039 0.039
Distance to school 0.126 1.836 1.366 2.042 -1.422 2.091
Playground 7.048 6.225 3.688 6.958 15.423∗∗ 7.070
Water point 10.068∗∗∗ 1.927 8.927∗∗∗ 2.147 10.647∗∗∗ 2.190
Disturbed courses -2.427 3.879 6.796 4.288 -12.795∗∗∗ 4.456
Meals near school -3.308 2.584 -1.516 2.874 -6.047∗∗ 2.948
Gender of teacher -4.079∗ 2.458 -3.867 2.733 -3.103 2.797
No professional qualif.d 13.694∗∗∗ 2.416 19.318∗∗∗ 2.687 8.147∗∗∗ 2.748
Professional qualif. CAP 6.599∗ 3.347 8.402∗∗ 3.714 6.062 3.812
Professional qualif. CEAP -2.338 2.004 -6.714∗∗∗ 2.232 2.176 2.282
High school diploma & more -9.828∗∗∗ 1.968 -11.317∗∗∗ 2.182 -8.084∗∗∗ 2.246
Continuing training -1.149 1.582 2.596 1.758 -6.058∗∗∗ 1.810
Absenteeism -3.806 8.841 -5.349 9.849 3.304 10.043
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Table A.7 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Gender of pupil -0.268 1.188 -2.003 1.326 0.566 1.351
Garde -13.499∗∗∗ 1.979 -21.352∗∗∗ 2.202 -6.090∗∗∗ 2.252
Koranic school -2.054 1.429 -1.991 1.589 -1.905 1.626
Early childhood inst. 0.242 3.261 0.165 3.626 -0.003 3.710
Snack -1.195 2.787 -0.500 3.102 -0.342 3.172
Sick last 3 months 0.086 1.352 1.583 1.504 -1.161 1.538
Pupils eat ﬁll 5.596∗∗∗ 1.944 6.002∗∗∗ 2.162 4.629∗∗ 2.212
Gender of household head 0.813 2.538 -0.610 2.821 3.082 2.888
Lit. of household head 1.250 1.760 0.138 1.957 1.278 2.004
Marital status 0.511 3.363 4.874 3.740 -4.163 3.827
Land -5.607∗ 2.922 -2.767 3.253 -7.029∗∗ 3.323
Parents school 5.833∗∗ 2.382 0.955 2.652 11.709∗∗∗ 2.706
College 13.869∗∗∗ 3.544 10.073∗∗ 3.947 16.694∗∗∗ 4.027
Diourbel -5.84e-13 . -9.39e-15 . 4.89e-14 .
Kolda 23.015∗∗∗ 3.628 20.230∗∗∗ 4.039 24.933∗∗∗ 4.122
Se´dhiou 7.017∗∗ 3.395 2.207 3.776 10.196∗∗∗ 3.863
Intercept 33.819 36.477 -27.247 40.462 80.928∗ 41.571
ρ0 0.428∗∗∗ 0.076 0.253∗∗∗ 0.105 0.489∗∗∗ 0.066
ρ1 0.086 0.151 0.187 0.145 -0.068 0.154
Log likelihood -10987.795 -11141.915 -11271.584
# Observations 2369 2369 2369
Wald χ2(10) 483.74 468.09 494.95
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes a:Maximum Likelihood; b In log; c: Household size per adult equivalent; d: qualiﬁcation.
Signiﬁcance levels (bootstrap-100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table A.8: Determinants of scores: Deworming, Roy regression
(MLa)
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Selection Eq.
Total pupils 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0005∗∗ 0.0002 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0002
Management committee 0.063 0.050 0.085 0.055 0.077 0.049
Association of mothers 0.200∗∗∗ 0.058 0.190∗∗∗ 0.060 0.201∗∗∗ 0.059
Cooperative school 0.139∗∗∗ 0.051 0.124∗∗∗ 0.053 0.137∗∗∗ 0.051
Water point 0.161∗∗∗ 0.062 0.172∗∗∗ 0.063 0.155∗∗ 0.062
Medicine box -0.381∗∗∗ 0.074 -0.303∗∗∗ 0.080 -0.401∗∗∗ 0.070
Gender of pupil -0.035 0.053 -0.045 0.053 -0.031 0.053
Lit. of household head 0.164∗∗ 0.068 0.167∗∗ 0.068 0.158∗∗ 0.068
Intercept -0.873∗∗∗ 0.064 -0.871∗∗∗ 0.066 -0.889∗∗∗ 0.064
Performance Eq. Untreated
Temporary shelters -0.526 0.450 -0.380 0.472 -0.693 0.508
School manual 4.382∗∗∗ 1.290 4.801∗∗∗ 1.350 3.936∗∗∗ 1.456
School manual squared -0.250 0.217 -0.560∗∗ 0.227 0.068 0.245
Class size -0.073 0.135 0.234∗ 0.141 -0.378∗∗ 0.152
Class size squared -0.0008 0.001 -0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003∗ 0.001
Number pregnancies -8.949∗∗∗ 1.418 -10.086∗∗∗ 1.488 -7.826∗∗∗ 1.599
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Table A.8 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Number of marriages -0.193 0.795 -0.223 0.832 -0.136 0.896
Teacher’s age -1.550∗∗ 0.734 -2.134∗∗∗ 0.769 -0.959 0.827
Teacher’s age square 0.023∗∗ 0.011 0.029∗∗∗ 0.011 0.017 0.012
Pupil’s age 6.512∗∗∗ 2.387 7.111∗∗∗ 2.501 5.923∗∗ 2.690
Pupil’s age square -0.240∗∗ 0.111 -0.268∗∗ 0.116 -0.212∗ 0.125
Number of hours 0.583 0.726 0.523 0.761 0.656 0.818
Food expenditureb 1.105 0.874 0.469 0.915 1.716∗ 0.985
Education expenditureb 0.506 0.330 0.559 0.346 0.456 0.372
Health expenditureb -0.078 0.204 -0.056 0.214 -0.101 0.230
Household size c 0.260∗∗∗ 0.075 0.255∗∗∗ 0.078 0.265∗∗∗ 0.084
Livestock 0.008 0.022 -0.011 0.023 0.028 0.025
Distance to school 1.477 1.039 1.735 1.089 1.197 1.172
Playground 0.139 1.138 0.022 1.194 0.262 1.282
Water point -0.099 1.091 -1.344 1.158 1.160 1.230
Disturbed courses -6.153∗∗∗ 1.227 -4.521∗∗∗ 1.288 -7.792∗∗∗ 1.383
Meals near school -1.116 1.066 -2.219∗∗ 1.116 0.017 1.203
Gender of teacher -5.883 1.401 -4.723∗∗∗ 1.470 -7.055∗∗∗ 1.578
No professional qualif. d 3.897∗∗∗ 1.287 1.947 1.347 5.853∗∗∗ 1.452
Professional qualif. CAP 0.339 1.579 0.198 1.659 0.459 1.782
Professional qualif. CEAP 6.467∗∗∗ 1.403 5.349∗∗∗ 1.469 7.592∗∗∗ 1.584
High school diploma & more 2.366∗∗ 1.061 1.123 1.111 3.642∗∗∗ 1.197
Continuing training 0.480 0.942 -0.393 0.986 1.367 1.062
Absenteeism -4.140∗∗ 1.627 -1.642 1.704 -6.593∗∗∗ 1.834
Gender of pupil 1.715∗∗ 0.839 1.280 0.870 2.147∗∗ 0.950
Grade -14.930∗∗∗ 1.186 -22.015∗∗∗ 1.242 -7.848∗∗∗ 1.338
Koranic school 4.158∗∗∗ 0.942 4.334∗∗∗ 0.987 3.976∗∗∗ 1.062
Early childhood inst. 4.659∗∗∗ 1.701 5.411∗∗∗ 1.785 3.933∗∗ 1.917
Snack 1.765 1.425 1.877 1.495 1.673 1.607
Sick last 3 months -0.925 0.957 -0.543 1.003 -1.308 1.078
Pupils eat ﬁll 0.111 1.365 0.090 1.429 0.138 1.539
Gender of household head -1.393 1.538 -2.328 1.613 -0.464 1.733
Lit. of household head -0.335 1.213 1.006 1.276 -1.707 1.371
Marital status 1.970 2.105 1.661 2.208 2.263 2.372
Land 0.599 1.924 1.186 2.018 -0.028 2.167
Parents school -4.507∗∗∗ 0.969 -4.986∗∗∗ 1.015 -4.029∗∗∗ 1.093
College 3.601∗∗∗ 1.241 2.852∗∗ 1.299 4.360∗∗∗ 1.400
Diourbel 2.104 1.908 1.471 1.999 2.813 2.149
Kolda -8.038∗∗∗ 1.507 -7.896∗∗∗ 1.577 -8.222∗∗∗ 1.699
Se´dhiou -2.964 2.781 -2.280 2.916 -3.488 3.134
Intercept 21.546 19.914 37.381∗ 20.877 5.766 22.448
Performance Eq. Treated
Temporary shelters 3.279∗∗∗ 0.772 2.501∗∗∗ 0.859 4.208∗∗∗ 0.858
School manual -4.664∗∗ 2.167 -4.489∗ 2.447 -4.819∗∗ 2.435
School manual squared 0.655∗ 0.399 0.511 0.445 0.697 0.456
Class size -0.337 0.229 -0.029 0.256 -0.560∗∗ 0.259
Class size squared 0.004 0.002 0.0001 0.003 0.007∗∗ 0.003
Number of pregnancies -2.873 1.774 -4.489∗∗ 1.974 -1.541 1.968
Number of marriages 1.217 1.284 1.217 1.421 1.662 1.429
Teacher’s age -2.890∗∗ 1.144 -2.635∗∗ 1.295 -2.933∗∗ 1.256
Teacher’s age square 0.037∗∗ 0.016 0.030 0.018 0.040∗∗ 0.018
Pupil’s age 10.136∗∗∗ 3.249 11.109∗∗∗ 3.561 9.334∗∗ 3.648
Pupil’s age square -0.462∗∗∗ 0.157 -0.512∗∗∗ 0.172 -0.424∗∗ 0.177
Number of hours -1.535 1.145 -1.281 1.267 -2.080∗ 1.260
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Table A.8 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Food expenditureb 0.015 1.260 -0.973 1.403 0.352 1.393
Education expenditureb -0.158 0.456 -0.127 0.507 -0.265 0.492
Health expenditureb 0.509∗ 0.260 0.638∗∗ 0.288 0.318 0.288
Household size c 0.140 0.111 0.133 0.122 0.124 0.124
Livestock 0.018 0.044 -0.002 0.050 0.043 0.048
Distance to school -0.484 1.742 -0.944 1.906 -0.523 1.931
Playground 5.616∗∗∗ 1.791 5.818∗∗∗ 1.982 5.988∗∗∗ 2.009
Water point 1.292 2.057 0.850 2.290 1.565 2.271
Disturbed courses -4.707∗∗∗ 1.835 -3.655∗ 2.017 -6.336∗∗∗ 2.038
Meals near school -0.808 1.707 -1.551 1.873 0.296 1.883
Gender of teacher 0.596 1.874 0.545 2.063 1.133 2.108
No professional qualif. d -4.451∗∗ 1.762 -5.444∗∗∗ 1.959 -3.745∗ 1.956
Professional qualif. CAP -1.593 2.021 -2.382 2.243 -0.275 2.233
Professional qualif. CEAP -2.247 2.112 -3.985∗ 2.371 -2.523 2.354
High school diploma & more -1.812 1.624 -0.491 1.806 -4.206∗∗ 1.790
Continuing training -3.748∗∗ 1.450 -1.674 1.623 -5.348∗∗∗ 1.600
Absenteeism -0.234 2.418 1.140 2.668 -1.133 2.675
Gender of pupil -2.376 1.460 -3.495∗∗ 1.550 -0.877 1.656
Grade -10.886∗∗∗ 1.726 -18.956∗∗∗ 1.846 -2.913 1.978
Koranic school 2.183 1.405 3.767∗∗ 1.565 1.913 1.552
Early childhood inst. -0.595 1.955 -0.021 2.170 -1.804 2.158
Snack -1.994 1.819 -0.842 2.011 -3.093 2.025
Sick last 3 months -0.622 1.204 -0.145 1.336 -1.653 1.339
Pupils eat ﬁll -3.188 2.199 -0.608 2.471 -6.040∗∗ 2.434
Gender of household head -0.151 2.068 -0.757 2.284 -0.411 2.332
Lit. of household head 4.449∗∗ 1.897 4.498∗∗ 2.044 5.146∗∗ 2.146
Marital status 3.100 3.090 3.551 3.449 2.388 3.455
Land -6.599∗∗ 2.615 -9.738∗∗∗ 2.889 -4.846∗ 2.916
Parents school -0.189 1.468 0.667 1.634 -2.122 1.610
College -1.010 1.896 -2.987 2.100 1.648 2.113
Diourbel -9.725∗∗ 4.208 -6.473 4.653 -13.753∗∗∗ 4.751
Kolda -13.875∗∗∗ 2.220 -13.365∗∗∗ 2.458 -14.992∗∗∗ 2.489
Se´dhiou -20.292∗∗∗ 3.912 -14.785∗∗∗ 4.250 -25.096∗∗∗ 4.368
Intercept 31.901 28.981 36.269 32.504 30.293 32.372
ρ0 0.406∗∗∗ 0.097 0.289∗ 0.150 0.444∗∗∗ 0.088
ρ1 0.910∗∗∗ 0.025 0.878∗∗∗ 0.040 0.925∗∗∗ 0.024
Log likelihood -11933.474 -12084.921 -12222.351
# Observations 2487 2487 2487
Wald χ2(8) 96.91 82.40 106.23
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes a: Maximum Likelihood; b In log; c: Household size per adult equivalent; d: qualiﬁcation.
Signiﬁcance levels (bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table A.9: Determinants of scores: Meal, Roy regression (2-stepa)
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Selection Eq.
Continued on next page. . .
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Table A.9 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Total pupils 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0001
Distance to school 0.259∗∗∗ 0.056 0.259∗∗∗ 0.056 0.259∗∗∗ 0.056
Management committee -0.068 0.049 -0.068 0.049 -0.068 0.049
Association of mothers 0.507∗∗∗ 0.052 0.507∗∗∗ 0.052 0.507∗∗∗ 0.052
Cooperative school -0.171∗∗∗ 0.047 -0.171∗∗∗ 0.047 -0.171∗∗∗ 0.047
Rural council grant 0.607∗∗∗ 0.053 0.607∗∗∗ 0.053 0.607∗∗∗ 0.053
Water point 0.124∗∗ 0.053 0.124∗∗ 0.053 0.124∗∗ 0.053
Disturbed courses 0.270∗∗∗ 0.052 0.270∗∗∗ 0.052 0.270∗∗∗ 0.052
Storage 0.513∗∗∗ 0.055 0.513∗∗∗ 0.055 0.513∗∗∗ 0.055
Gender of pupil -0.077∗ 0.043 -0.077∗ 0.043 -0.077∗ 0.043
Intercept -1.579∗∗∗ 0.088 -1.579∗∗∗ 0.088 -1.579∗∗∗ 0.088
Performance Eq. Untreated
Temporary shelters -0.764 0.480 -0.475 0.490 -1.056∗ 0.535
School manual 4.960∗∗∗ 1.365∗∗∗ 5.049 1.248 4.867∗∗∗ 1.701
School manual squared -0.293 0.207 -0.576∗∗∗ 0.182 -0.010 0.275
Class size -0.110 0.121 0.217∗ 0.116 -0.439∗∗∗ 0.159
Class size squared -0.0006 0.001 -0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003∗ 0.002
Number of pregnancies -9.030∗∗∗ 1.811 -10.075∗∗∗ 1.664 -7.995∗∗∗ 2.145
Number of marriages 0.054 1.073 -0.117 1.089 0.226 1.163
Teacher’s age -1.484∗∗ 0.715 -2.119∗∗∗ 0.768 -0.849 0.797
Teacher’s age square 0.022∗∗ 0.010 0.029∗∗ 0.011 0.016 0.011
Pupil’s age 6.554∗∗∗ 2.226 7.105∗∗∗ 2.225 6.002∗∗ 2.643
Pupil’s age square -0.244∗∗ 0.101 -0.268∗∗∗ 0.103 -0.220∗ 0.118
Number of hours 0.623 0.796 0.547 0.797 0.702 0.917
Food expenditureb 1.169 1.010 0.489 1.034 1.842∗ 1.119
Education expenditureb 0.436 0.402 0.530 0.460 0.340 0.388
Health expenditureb -0.073 0.217 -0.051 0.227 -0.094 0.244
Household size c 0.248∗∗∗ 0.068 0.251∗∗∗ 0.070 0.245∗∗∗ 0.080
Livestock 0.003 0.025 -0.013 0.023 0.020 0.030
Distance to school 2.190∗∗ 1.109 2.022∗ 1.040 2.357∗ 1.313
Playground -0.478 1.153 -0.119 1.229 -0.830 1.314
Water point 0.692 1.134 -1.365 1.174 2.749∗∗ 1.341
Disturbed courses -6.121∗∗∗ 1.157 -4.432∗∗∗ 1.157 -7.815∗∗∗ 1.378
Meals near school -1.022 0.991 -2.148∗∗ 1.061 0.098 1.122
Gender of teacher -5.397∗∗∗ 1.385 -4.445∗∗∗ 1.421 -6.377∗∗∗ 1.564
No professional qualif. d 3.950∗∗∗ 1.465 1.969 1.601 5.930∗∗∗ 1.500
Professional qualif. CAP 0.208 1.654 -0.012 1.611 0.404 1.996
Professional qualif. CEAP 6.143∗∗∗ 1.565 5.196∗∗∗ 1.686 7.091∗∗∗ 1.727
High school diploma & more 2.388∗∗ 1.043 1.127 1.112 3.664∗∗∗ 1.258
Continuing training 0.537 0.967 -0.405 1.017 1.486 1.097
Absenteeism -2.067 1.477 -0.971 1.701 -3.184∗∗ 1.604
Gender of pupil 1.541∗ 0.790 1.291 0.870 1.790∗∗ 0.852
Grade -14.689∗∗∗ 1.272 -21.925∗∗∗ 1.225 -7.452∗∗∗ 1.547
Koranic school 3.995∗∗∗ 0.976 4.262∗∗∗ 1.029 3.726∗∗∗ 1.043
Early childhood inst. 4.765∗∗ 1.871 5.432∗∗∗ 1.951 4.098∗∗ 2.037
Snack 1.981 1.730 1.927 1.794 2.048 1.972
Sick last 3 months -0.867 1.005 -0.509 1.017 -1.225 1.112
Pupils eat ﬁll 0.028 1.442 0.069 1.532 -0.011 1.520
Gender of household head -1.311 1.516 -2.300 1.652 -0.328∗∗ 1.683
Lit. of household head -1.171 1.158 0.434 1.232 -2.771 1.355
Marital status 1.640 1.818 1.550 2.112 1.745 2.235
Land 0.466 1.884 1.135 2.077 -0.220 2.077
Parents school -3.983∗∗∗ 1.008 -4.771∗∗∗ 1.090 -3.213∗∗∗ 1.097
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Table A.9 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
College 3.443∗∗∗ 1.197 2.787∗∗ 1.309 4.110∗∗∗ 1.340
Diourbel 2.856 2.066 1.867 2.127 3.830 2.354
Kolda -7.741 1.494 -7.807 1.525 -7.668∗∗∗ 1.767
Se´dhiou -1.489∗∗∗ 3.074 -1.757 2.735 -1.211 3.755
lambda0 7.322∗∗∗ 2.279 2.655 2.413 11.936∗∗∗ 2.589
Intercept 19.949 20.432 35.802∗ 19.731 4.213 24.637
# Observations 1756 1756 1756
Adj R-squared 0.2367 0.2885 0.1988
Performance Eq. Treated
Temporary shelters -1.094 1.261 0.671 1.285 -2.664∗ 1.517
School manual 5.570 15.996 -3.133 15.367 4.800 19.815
School manual squared 4.114 6.384 5.507 6.328 6.752 7.866
Class size -0.918∗∗∗ 0.295 -1.132∗∗∗ 0.325 -0.716∗ 0.390
Class size squared 0.016∗∗∗ 0.004 0.019∗∗∗ 0.004 0.014∗∗ 0.005
Number of pregnancies -20.273∗∗∗ 3.309 -13.959∗∗∗ 3.684 -27.009∗∗∗ 3.710
Number of marriages -0.203 3.168 0.472 3.576 -2.199 3.741
Teacher’s age -0.936 2.227 2.065 2.233 -2.497 2.532
Teacher’s age square 0.020 0.034 -0.025 0.034 0.045 0.038
Pupil’s age 4.895 3.217 7.681∗∗ 3.724 2.009 3.986
Pupil’s age square -0.153 0.141 -0.294∗ 0.170 -0.012 0.173
Number of hours 0.542 0.652 0.683 0.784 0.403 0.724
Food expenditureb -1.181 1.452 -1.559 1.627 -1.515 1.675
Education expenditureb 0.413 0.616 0.672 0.897 0.155 0.618
Health expenditureb -0.094 0.452 0.352 0.465 -0.598 0.573
Household size c 0.004 0.124 0.018 0.152 -0.038 0.139
Livestock -0.040 0.034 -0.037 0.037 -0.038 0.041
Distance to school 0.869 2.083 2.920 2.293 -1.654 2.472
Playground 5.012 6.837 -0.169 7.645 15.656∗ 8.172
Water point 10.532∗∗∗ 1.911 9.904∗∗∗ 2.190 10.458∗∗∗ 2.326
Disturbed courses -2.587 3.428 6.291∗ 3.800 -12.346∗∗∗ 4.068
Meals near school -2.913 2.571 -0.778 2.882 -6.046∗∗ 2.868
Gender of teacher -4.078∗ 2.372 -3.868 2.627 -3.120 2.928
No professional qualif.d 13.836∗∗∗ 2.299 19.651∗∗∗ 2.587 8.094∗∗ 3.293
Professional qualif. CAP 7.396∗∗ 3.701 9.999∗∗∗ 3.820 5.917 4.795
Professional qualif. CEAP -2.227 1.797 -6.528∗∗∗ 2.112 2.186 2.421
High school diploma & more -10.023∗∗∗ 1.624 -11.728∗∗∗ 2.017 -8.082∗∗∗ 1.834
Continuing training -0.735 1.666 3.403∗ 2.004 -6.106∗∗∗ 1.900
Absenteeism -6.215 10.253 -10.161 10.563 3.956 12.433
Gender of pupil -0.408 1.123 -2.278∗ 1.389 0.595 1.236
Grade -13.611∗∗∗ 1.793 -21.590∗∗∗ 2.092 -6.060∗∗∗ 2.257
Koranic school -2.060 1.467 -2.005 1.533 -1.892 1.695
Early childhood inst. 0.330 4.368 0.342 4.526 -0.054 4.844
Snack -1.267 2.736 -0.655 2.517 -0.344 3.388
Sick last 3 months 0.090 1.560 1.591 1.647 -1.163 1.804
Pupils eat ﬁll 5.653∗∗∗ 1.734 6.114∗∗∗ 1.939 4.632∗∗ 1.987
Gender of household head 0.902 2.374 -0.435 2.884 3.030 2.813
Lit. of household head 1.375 1.822 0.382 1.871 1.277 2.068
Marital status 0.456 3.079 4.756 3.586 -4.126 4.080
Land -5.645∗ 3.016 -2.843 2.947 -7.017 3.633
Parents school 6.174∗∗ 2.889 1.614 3.117 11.598∗∗∗ 3.402
College 14.494∗∗∗ 3.328 11.325∗∗∗ 3.445 16.480∗∗∗ 4.278
Diourbel - - - - - -
Kolda 23.804∗∗∗ 4.279 21.846∗∗∗ 4.900 24.660∗∗∗ 4.713
Continued on next page. . .
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Table A.9 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Se´dhiou 7.671∗∗ 3.460 3.489 4.309 10.073∗∗ 3.905
lambda1 4.613 5.119 9.846∗ 5.779 -2.009 5.675
Intercept 28.076 43.501 -39.195 44.620 81.794 52.081
# Observations 613 613 613
Adj R-squared 0.3983 0.4099 0.3759
Notes a:Two step; b In log; c: Household size per adult equivalent; d: qualiﬁcation.
Signiﬁcance levels (bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table A.10: Determinants of scores: Deworming, Roy regression
(2-stepa)
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Selection Eq.
Total pupils 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0001
Management committee 0.225∗∗∗ 0.054 0.225∗∗∗ 0.054 0.225∗∗∗ 0.054
Association of mothers 0.214∗∗∗ 0.060 0.214∗∗∗ 0.060 0.214∗∗∗ 0.060
Cooperative school 0.200∗∗∗ 0.052 0.200∗∗∗ 0.052 0.200∗∗∗ 0.052
Water point 0.142∗∗ 0.059 0.142∗∗ 0.059 0.142∗∗ 0.059
Medicine box -0.132∗ 0.073 -0.132∗ 0.073 -0.132∗ 0.073
Gender of pupil -0.081 0.047 -0.081 0.047 -0.081 0.047
Lit. of household head 0.152∗∗ 0.060 0.152∗∗ 0.060 0.152∗∗ 0.060
Intercept -1.117∗∗∗ 0.059 -1.117∗∗∗ 0.059 -1.117∗∗∗ 0.059
Performance Eq. Untreated
Temporary shelters -0.643 0.468 -0.370 0.485 -0.920∗ 0.518
School manual 4.188∗∗∗ 1.323 4.973∗∗∗ 1.194 3.405∗∗ 1.675
School manual squared -0.224 0.203 -0.565∗∗∗ 0.180 0.115 0.269
Class size -0.039 0.120 0.216∗ 0.119 -0.296∗ 0.153
Class size squared -0.001 0.001 -0.004∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002 0.001
Number of pregnancies -9.322∗∗∗ 1.824 -9.851∗∗∗ 1.688 -8.802∗∗∗ 2.143
Number of marriages 0.032 1.093 -0.207 1.106 0.273 1.182
Teacher’s age -1.439∗ 0.735 -2.204∗∗∗ 0.772 -0.674 0.827
Teacher’s age square 0.021∗ 0.011 0.030∗∗∗ 0.011 0.012 0.012
Pupil’s age 6.554∗∗∗ 2.226 7.002∗∗∗ 2.215 6.107∗∗ 2.642
Pupil’s age square -0.243∗∗ 0.101 -0.263∗∗∗ 0.102 -0.223∗ 0.118
Number of hours 0.585 0.792 0.587 0.799 0.585 0.901
Food expenditureb 1.041 1.012 0.459 1.036 1.616 1.112
Education expenditureb 0.528 0.411 0.524 0.454 0.530 0.412
Health expenditureb -0.106 0.213 -0.035 0.225 -0.176 0.239
Household size c 0.267∗∗∗ 0.070 0.254∗∗∗ 0.070 0.279∗∗∗ 0.081
Livestock 0.007 0.025 -0.010 0.023 0.026 0.030
Distance to school 1.396 1.131 1.904∗ 1.059 0.890 1.339
Playground -0.072 1.168 0.391 1.267 -0.534 1.266
Water point 0.584 1.128 -2.628∗∗ 1.123 3.802∗∗∗ 1.409
Disturbed courses -6.391∗∗∗ 1.161 -4.139∗∗∗ 1.183 -8.648∗∗∗ 1.369
Meals near school -1.176 0.985 -2.080∗ 1.060 -0.277 1.119
Gender of teacher -6.541∗∗∗ 1.566 -4.020∗∗ 1.617 -9.084∗∗∗ 1.711
No professional qualif. d 3.808∗∗∗ 1.484 1.902 1.603 5.715∗∗∗ 1.523
Continued on next page. . .
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Table A.10 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Professional qualif. CAP 1.014 1.791 -0.725 1.796 2.728 2.094
Professional qualif. CEAP 6.774∗∗∗ 1.617 5.044∗∗∗ 1.730 8.503∗∗∗ 1.772
High school diploma & more 2.421∗∗ 1.055 1.076 1.104 3.7820∗∗∗ 1.284
Continuing training 0.753 0.966 -0.578 1.031 2.090∗ 1.078
Absenteeism -3.589∗∗ 1.395 -2.050 1.669 -5.137∗∗∗ 1.473
Gender of pupil 1.383∗ 0.827 1.640∗ 0.911 1.126 0.872
Grade -14.900∗∗∗ 1.262 -21.945∗∗∗ 1.227 -7.852∗∗∗ 1.509
Koranic school 4.239∗∗∗ 0.967 4.247∗∗∗ 1.026 4.228∗∗∗ 1.036
Early childhood inst. 4.903∗∗∗ 1.847 5.220∗∗∗ 1.940 4.587∗∗ 2.004
Snack 1.896 1.699 1.734 1.799 2.072 1.903
Sick last 3 months -0.884 1.012 -0.504 1.019 -1.264 1.128
Pupils eat ﬁll 0.231 1.461 0.119 1.535 0.342 1.565
Gender of household head -1.387 1.512 -2.321 1.646 -0.458 1.677
Lit. of household head 0.124 1.281 -0.146 1.287 0.397 1.529
Marital status 1.914 1.802 1.719 2.096 2.123 2.247
Land 0.485 1.902 1.142 2.060 -0.188 2.099
Parents school -4.805∗∗∗ 1.015 -4.746∗∗∗ 1.123 -4.877∗∗∗ 1.078
College 3.730∗∗∗ 1.199 2.708∗∗ 1.307 4.763∗∗∗ 1.336
Diourbel 2.260 2.030 1.971 2.135 2.539 2.312
Kolda -8.064∗∗∗ 1.501 -7.958∗∗∗ 1.508 -8.163∗∗∗ 1.783
Se´dhiou -1.915 3.095 -2.706 2.827 -1.109 3.702
Lambda0 13.151∗∗ 5.857 -6.592 6.067 32.851∗∗∗ 6.567
Intercept 22.951 20.950 33.533∗ 19.960 12.480 25.147
# Observations 1756 1756 1756
Adj R-squared 0.2342 0.2884 0.1995
Performance Eq. Treated
Temporary shelters 2.831∗∗∗ 0.896 1.610 1.009 4.058∗∗∗ 0.942
School manual -3.551 2.622 -2.703 2.788 -4.306 3.319
School manual squared 0.521 0.554 0.278 0.514 0.758 0.824
Class size -0.417 0.274 -0.037 0.260 -0.792∗∗ 0.358
Class size squared 0.005 0.003 -0.00005 0.003 0.010∗∗ 0.004
Number of pregnancies -2.888 1.875 -5.212∗∗∗ 1.731 -0.439 2.261
Number of marriages 2.091 1.536 2.121 1.660 2.039 1.613
Teacher’s age -4.290∗∗∗ 1.696 -3.892∗∗ 1.748 -4.683∗∗ 1.926
Teacher’s age square 0.058∗∗∗ 0.024 0.049∗ 0.025 0.066∗∗ 0.027
Pupil’s age 10.784∗∗∗ 3.250 11.405∗∗∗ 3.661 9.765∗∗∗ 3.654
Pupil’s age square -0.485∗∗∗ 0.154 -0.525∗∗∗ 0.171 -0.429∗∗ 0.176
Number of hours -2.386∗∗ 1.108 -1.933 1.281 -2.764∗∗ 1.160
Food expenditureb 0.172 1.293 -0.821 1.561 0.726 1.338
Education expenditureb -0.385 0.414 -0.238 0.477 -0.541 0.473
Health expenditureb 0.445 0.299 0.555∗ 0.330 0.353 0.319
Household size c 0.143 0.106 0.093 0.120 0.181 0.114
Livestock 0.010 0.048 -0.023 0.053 0.051 0.055
Distance to school -1.099 2.176 -0.773 2.216 -1.552 2.469
Playground 6.174∗∗∗ 2.036 5.795∗∗ 2.327 7.313∗∗∗ 2.206
Water point -1.961 2.057 -2.925 2.166 -1.093 2.255
Disturbed courses -4.382∗ 2.283 -2.627 2.351 -6.368∗∗ 2.541
Meals near school -0.819 1.807 -2.296 1.980 0.634 2.011
Gender of teacher 0.328 1.979 0.266 2.195 0.723 2.003
No professional qualif. d -3.837∗∗ 1.696 -4.734∗∗ 1.920 -3.094 1.901
Professional qualif. CAP -2.060 1.679 -3.030∗ 1.845 -0.845 1.958
Professional qualif. CEAP 0.859 2.338 -0.848 2.570 1.092 2.744
High school diploma & more -1.161 1.816 0.355 1.782 -3.431 2.131
Continued on next page. . .
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Table A.10 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Continuing training -3.335∗ 1.776 -1.061 1.801 -5.414∗∗∗ 2.069
Absenteeism -2.414 3.027 -0.972 3.302 -3.822 3.283
Gender of pupil -1.619 1.109 -2.731∗∗ 1.217 -0.178 1.242
Grade -13.284∗∗∗ 1.778 -20.143∗∗∗ 1.989 -6.536∗∗∗ 1.961
Koranic school 3.052∗ 1.739 4.369∗∗ 1.794 2.576 1.934
Early childhood inst. 0.547 2.205 1.074 2.339 -0.137 2.470
Snack -2.987 1.892 -2.018 2.057 -3.971∗ 2.070
Sick last 3 months 0.393 1.329 0.635 1.437 -0.306 1.486
Pupils eat ﬁll -1.378 1.866 1.357 2.195 -4.204∗∗ 1.961
Gender of household head -1.214 2.307 -1.007 2.574 -2.025 2.510
Lit. of household head 2.492 1.654 2.114 1.762 3.323∗ 1.815
Marital status 5.161∗ 3.035 4.698 3.599 5.672∗ 3.117
Land -8.462∗∗ 3.795 -10.113∗∗∗ 3.723 -6.994∗ 4.133
Parents school -0.420 1.807 1.086 1.935 -2.316 2.022
College -0.595 1.951 -2.542 1.988 1.687 2.300
Diourbel -8.254∗ 4.742 -5.898 4.115 -10.411 6.410
Kolda -13.948∗∗∗ 2.485 -14.005∗∗∗ 2.657 -13.959∗∗∗ 2.630
Se´dhiou -17.810∗∗∗ 3.855 -12.991∗∗∗ 3.826 -22.427∗∗∗ 4.384
lambda1 8.056 5.178 6.824 5.579 10.476∗ 5.736
Intercept 69.269∗∗ 34.146 71.107∗∗ 35.996 73.724∗ 39.091
# Observations 731 731 731
Adj R-squared 0.2499 0.2982 0.1933
Notes a:Two-step; b In log; c: Household size per adult equivalent; d: qualiﬁcation.
Signiﬁcance levels (bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table A.11: Matching test: Meal
Mean % bias t-test
Variable Sample Treated Control % bias reduction t P > |t|
Total pupils unmatched 232.81 192.25 25.4 7.90 0.000∗∗∗
matched 199.5 207.77 -5.2 79.6 -1.36 0.173
Distance to school unmatched 0.843 0.776 17.3 4.96 0.000
matched 0.830 0.824 1.6 90.6 0.41 0.683
Association of mothers unmatched 0.372 0.179 44.0 13.84 0.000∗∗∗
matched 0.313 0.338 -5.7 87.2 -1.27 0.203
Rural council grant unmatched 0.801 0.589 47.3 13.81 0.000∗∗∗
matched 0.823 0.802 4.7 90.1 1.30 0.193
Water point unmatched 0.540 0.433 21.6 6.51 0.000∗∗∗
matched 0.477 0.518 -8.2 61.9 -1.97 0.049
Disturbed courses unmatched 0.718 0.653 14.1 4.21 0.000∗∗∗
matched 0.727 0.690 7.9 43.7 1.95 0.051
Storage unmatched 0.330 0.143 44.9 14.27 0.000∗∗∗
matched 0.288 0.271 4.2 90.7 0.93 0.353
Gender of pupil unmatched 0.498 0.517 -3.7 -1.13 0.260
matched 0.497 0.492 0.9 75.7 0.22 0.827
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table A.13: Matching test: Deworming
Mean % bias t-test
Variable Sample Treated Control % bias reduction t P > |t|
Total pupils unmatched 241.65 192.25 31.5 8.58 0.000∗∗∗
matched 242.47 236.17 4.0 87.3 0.80 0.425
Management committee unmatched 0.695 0.531 34.2 8.80 0.000∗∗∗
matched 0.687 0.678 1.7 94.9 0.37 0.709
Association of mothers unmatched 0.244 0.179 15.9 4.29 0.000∗∗∗
matched 0.235 0.224 2.8 82.7 0.55 0.579
Cooperative school unmatched 0.728 0.601 27.1 6.95 0.000∗∗∗
matched 0.733 0.728 1.0 96.5 0.21 0.834
Water point unmatched 0.557 0.433 25.1 6.60 0.000∗∗∗
matched 0.554 0.550 0.7 97.2 0.15 0.882
Gender of pupil unmatched 0.493 0.517 -4.8 -1.27 0.205
matched 0.494 0.496 -0.5 90.6 -0.09 0.925
Lit. of household head unmatched 0.236 0.166 17.4 4.56 0.000∗∗∗
matched 0.234 0.230 0.9 95.0 0.17 0.866
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table A.15: Deworming in school: HSFa regression (FIMLb)
Aggregate score French score Math score
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Table A.15 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
No professional qualif. e 0.025 1.025 -1.768 1.084 1.848 1.155
Professional qualif. CAP -0.541 1.223 -0.476 1.294 -0.432 1.381
Professional qualif. CEAP 3.958∗∗∗ 1.164 2.561∗∗ 1.227 4.861∗∗∗ 1.313
High school diploma & more 1.672∗ 0.878 0.925 0.925 2.200∗∗ 0.989
Continuing training -0.575 0.810 -0.587 0.852 -0.482 0.913
Absenteeism -4.958∗∗∗ 1.277 -2.402∗ 1.343 -7.428∗∗∗ 1.438
Gender of pupil 0.531 0.728 -0.125 0.760 1.293 0.814
Grade -14.586∗∗∗ 0.986 -21.465∗∗∗ 1.040 -7.622∗∗∗ 1.107
Koranic school 3.366∗∗∗ 0.800 3.813∗∗∗ 0.843 3.185∗∗∗ 0.901
Early childhood inst. 1.633 1.286 2.513∗ 1.364 0.847 1.455
Snack -0.311 1.139 0.059 1.203 -0.544 1.284
Sick last 3 months -0.418 0.755 -0.268 0.798 -0.767 0.851
Pupils eat ﬁll -0.019 1.189 0.473 1.252 -0.507 1.342
Gender of household head -0.496 1.245 -1.134 1.317 -0.161 1.404
Lit. of household head -0.240 0.927 0.548 0.980 -0.988 1.046
Marital status 2.741 1.762 2.410 1.865 3.082 1.988
Land -2.194 1.577 -2.159 1.665 -2.383 1.779
Parents school -3.313∗∗∗ 0.795 -3.255∗∗∗ 0.838 -3.476∗∗∗ 0.897
College 2.025∗ 1.037 0.642 1.086 3.331∗∗∗ 1.170
Diourbel 1.109 1.712 0.228 1.800 2.108 1.923
Kolda -8.390∗∗∗ 1.251 -8.779∗∗∗ 1.316 -8.063∗∗∗ 1.408
Se´dhiou -9.785∗∗∗ 2.273 -8.342∗∗∗ 2.403 -10.888∗∗∗ 2.557
Deworming in school -20.104∗∗∗ 2.321 -21.916∗∗∗ 2.689 -18.968∗∗∗ 2.671
Intercept 46.775∗∗∗ 16.755 55.615∗∗∗ 17.634 38.458∗∗ 18.891
Selection Eq.
Total pupils -0.00006 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.00001 0.0003
Management committee 0.181∗∗ 0.078 0.228∗∗∗ 0.078 0.199∗∗ 0.079
Association of mothers 0.454∗∗∗ 0.0759 0.417∗∗∗ 0.0781 0.490∗∗∗ 0.077
Cooperative school 0.429∗∗∗ 0.081 0.377∗∗∗ 0.081 0.423∗∗∗ 0.081
Water point 0.505∗∗∗ 0.083 0.506∗∗∗ 0.083 0.496∗∗∗ 0.083
Medicine box -4.461 98.194 -5.440 2142.0 -5.973 16813.54
Gender of pupil -0.050 0.068 -0.056 0.069 -0.051 0.069
Intercept -1.865∗∗∗ 0.103 -1.817∗∗∗ 0.1027 -1.883∗∗∗ 0.102
atanh ρ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.089 0.648∗∗∗ 0.095 0.674 0.088
lnσ 2.886∗∗∗ 0.019 2.928∗∗∗ 0.019 2.997∗∗∗ 0.019
ρ 0.621 0.054 0.570 0.064 0.588 0.058
σ 17.931 0.350 18.697 0.369 20.039 0.387
λ 11.139 1.141 10.665 1.355 11.783 1.330
LR test (H0 : ρ = 0)
χ2 (1) 38.08 24.07 35.23
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.5725
Log likelihood -11306.085 -11442.162 -11601.186
# Observations 2487 2487 2487
Wald χ2(46) 795.27 1048.52 587.95
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes a: Heckman selection framework; b: Full Information Maximum Likelihood; c: In log; d: Household size per adult
equivalent; e: qualiﬁcation.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table A.16: Deworming in school: HSFa regression (2-stepb)
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Performance Eq.
Temporary shelters 0.603 0.395 0.452 0.417 0.761∗ 0.445
School manual 0.608 1.106 1.388 1.165 -0.059 1.245
School manual squared 0.158 0.193 -0.170 0.202 0.476∗∗ 0.217
Class size -0.188 0.119 0.131 0.125 -0.515∗∗∗ 0.134
Class size squared 0.001 0.001 -0.003∗∗ 0.001 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001
Number of pregnancies -6.298∗∗∗ 1.095 -8.309∗∗∗ 1.166 -4.229∗∗∗ 1.226
Number of marriages -0.539 0.692 -0.270 0.724 -0.783 0.781
Teacher’s age -2.308∗∗∗ 0.629 -2.552∗∗∗ 0.662 -2.035∗∗∗ 0.708
Teacher’s age square 0.032∗∗∗ 0.009 0.033∗∗∗ 0.009 0.031∗∗∗ 0.010
Pupil’s age 7.003∗∗∗ 1.947 7.358∗∗∗ 2.055 6.508∗∗∗ 2.188
Pupil’s age square -0.279∗∗∗ 0.091 -0.299∗∗∗ 0.096 -0.253∗∗ 0.103
Number of hours -0.114 0.628 -0.073 0.661 -0.114 0.707
Food expenditure c 0.675 0.739 -0.005 0.778 1.284 0.831
Education expenditure c 0.284 0.278 0.348 0.292 0.230 0.314
Health expenditurec 0.080 0.165 0.125 0.175 0.031 0.186
Household size d 0.273∗∗∗ 0.063 0.257∗∗∗ 0.066 0.289∗∗∗ 0.071
Livestock -0.003 0.020 -0.025 0.021 0.018 0.023
Distance to school 0.731 0.913 1.227 0.962 0.192 1.027
Playground 1.002 0.976 1.236 1.030 1.088 1.098
Water point 0.947 1.034 -0.411 1.066 2.216∗ 1.177
Disturbed courses -4.786∗∗∗ 1.005 -2.973∗∗∗ 1.062 -6.749∗∗∗ 1.129
Meals near school 0.081 0.926 -1.119 0.970 1.263 1.045
Gender of teacher -4.141∗∗∗ 1.121 -2.822∗∗ 1.188 -5.477∗∗∗ 1.257
No professional qualif. e 0.118 1.031 -1.588 1.088 1.849 1.158
Professional qualif. CAP -0.779 1.226 -0.736 1.305 -0.690 1.373
Professional qualif. CEAP 3.935∗∗∗ 1.178 2.602∗∗ 1.236 4.870∗∗∗ 1.328
High school diploma & more 1.904∗∗ 0.880 1.059 0.928 2.521∗∗ 0.990
Continuing training -0.429 0.811 -0.624 0.853 -0.196 0.913
Absenteeism -4.592∗∗∗ 1.287 -2.321∗ 1.351 -6.939∗∗∗ 1.451
Gender of pupil 0.565 0.730 -0.036 0.746 1.265 0.834
Grade -14.157∗∗∗ 0.983 -21.018∗∗∗ 1.036 -7.339∗∗∗ 1.106
Koranic school 3.483∗∗∗ 0.803 3.879∗∗∗ 0.846 3.287∗∗∗ 0.903
Early childhood inst. 2.003 1.299 2.864∗∗ 1.379 1.172 1.455
Snack -0.120 1.145 0.144 1.211 -0.364 1.286
Sick last 3 months -0.409 0.760 -0.192 0.801 -0.778 0.854
Pupils eat ﬁll 0.220 1.192 0.616 1.254 -0.213 1.343
Gender of household head -0.691 1.254 -1.305 1.328 -0.236 1.407
Lit. of household head -0.295 0.932 0.510 0.988 -1.051 1.046
Marital status 2.737 1.775 2.416 1.881 3.037 1.992
Land -2.645∗ 1.586 -2.378 1.677 -2.929∗ 1.781
Parents school -3.180∗∗∗ 0.800 -3.145∗∗∗ 0.841 -3.358∗∗∗ 0.901
College 1.424 1.034 0.390 1.086 2.556∗∗ 1.164
Diourbel 1.057 1.713 0.268 1.794 1.881 1.933
Kolda -8.399∗∗∗ 1.287 -9.026∗∗∗ 1.355 -7.789∗∗∗ 1.448
Se´dhiou -8.524∗∗∗ 2.277 -7.342∗∗∗ 2.401 -9.672∗∗∗ 2.562
Deworming in school -19.898∗∗∗ 4.653 -17.270∗∗∗ 4.808 -22.862∗∗∗ 5.288
Intercept 43.842∗∗∗ 16.777 55.165∗∗∗ 17.669 33.853∗ 18.881
Selection Eq.
Total pupils -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0003
Management committee 0.393∗∗∗ 0.080 0.393∗∗∗ 0.080 0.393∗∗∗ 0.080
Continued on next page. . .
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Table A.16 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Association of mothers 0.491∗∗∗ 0.083 0.491∗∗∗ 0.083 0.491∗∗∗ 0.083
Cooperative school 0.235∗∗∗ 0.083 0.235∗∗∗ 0.083 0.235∗∗∗ 0.083
Water point 0.517∗∗∗ 0.085 0.517∗∗∗ 0.085 0.517∗∗∗ 0.085
Medicine box -5.628 . -5.628 . -5.628 .
Gender of pupil -0.079 0.071 -0.079 0.071 -0.079 0.071
Intercept -1.770∗∗∗ 0.100 -1.770∗∗∗ 0.100 -1.770∗∗∗ 0.100
hasard λ 11.090∗∗∗ 2.605 8.029∗∗∗ 2.702 14.113∗∗∗ 2.955
ρ 0.619 — 0.438 — 0.689 —
σ 17.915 — 18.295 — 20.477 —
λ 11.090 3.999 8.029 2.702 14.113 2.955
# Observations 2487 2487 2487
Wald χ2(48) 778.56 1049.67 583.62
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes a: Heckman selection framework; b: Two step; c: In log; d: Household size per adult equivalent; e: qualiﬁcation.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table A.17: Deworming at home: HSFa regression (FIMLb)
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Performance Eq.
Temporary shelters 0.516 0.387 0.197 0.408 0.783∗ 0.436
School manual 1.264 1.082 2.269∗∗ 1.142 0.519 1.214
School manual squared 0.086 0.189 -0.291 0.199 0.433∗∗ 0.212
Class size -0.178 0.117 0.117 0.124 -0.483∗∗∗ 0.132
Class size squared 0.001 0.001 -0.002∗ 0.001 0.005∗∗∗ 0.001
Number of pregnancies -6.418∗∗∗ 1.099 -8.487∗∗∗ 1.161 -4.402∗∗∗ 1.239
Number of marriages -0.013 0.673 0.082 0.711 -0.073 0.758
Teacher’s age -2.576∗∗∗ 0.619 -2.881∗∗∗ 0.654 -2.283∗∗∗ 0.697
Teacher’s age square 0.036∗∗∗ 0.009 0.037∗∗∗ 0.009 0.034∗∗∗ 0.010
Pupil’s age 7.198∗∗∗ 1.945 7.511∗∗∗ 2.051 6.690∗∗∗ 2.195
Pupil’s age square -0.289∗∗∗ 0.091 -0.307∗∗∗ 0.096 -0.262∗∗∗ 0.103
Number of hours -0.288 0.633 -0.257 0.667 -0.273 0.713
Food expenditurec 1.099 0.798 0.381 0.840 1.771∗∗ 0.891
Education expenditurec 0.060 0.299 0.088 0.314 0.022 0.334
Health expenditurec 0.232 0.183 0.283 0.193 0.192 0.205
Household size d 0.260∗∗∗ 0.063 0.238∗∗∗ 0.066 0.280∗∗∗ 0.071
Livestock -0.001 0.020 -0.020 0.021 0.019 0.023
Distance to school 1.071 0.901 1.275 0.951 0.818 1.014
Playground 1.756∗ 0.944 1.529 0.997 2.253∗∗ 1.064
Water point -1.655∗ 0.941 -2.683∗∗∗ 0.990 -0.757 1.054
Disturbed courses -4.135∗∗∗ 0.981 -2.550∗∗ 1.035 -5.821∗∗∗ 1.108
Meals near school -0.512 0.899 -1.545 0.950 0.495 1.013
Gender of teacher -3.514∗∗∗ 1.115 -2.500∗∗ 1.176 -4.632∗∗∗ 1.259
No professional qualif. e 0.099 1.028 -1.329 1.083 1.681 1.159
Professional qualif. CAP -1.095 1.231 -1.342 1.299 -0.840 1.388
Professional qualif. CEAP 4.310∗∗∗ 1.166 2.964∗∗ 1.229 5.311∗∗∗ 1.313
Continued on next page. . .
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Table A.17 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
High school diploma & more 1.471∗ 0.881 0.908 0.925 1.922∗ 0.997
Continuing training -0.432 0.789 -0.297 0.834 -0.487 0.889
Absenteeism -4.980∗∗∗ 1.259 -2.722∗∗ 1.329 -7.376∗∗∗ 1.421
Gender of pupil 0.938 0.753 0.279 0.791 1.708∗∗ 0.839
Grade -13.985∗∗∗ 0.985 -20.816∗∗∗ 1.043 -7.195∗∗∗ 1.108
Koranic school 3.639∗∗∗ 0.792 4.230∗∗∗ 0.837 3.276∗∗∗ 0.893
Early childhood inst. 2.021 1.304 2.814∗∗ 1.376 1.274 1.470
Snack -0.467 1.140 -0.104 1.203 -0.791 1.286
Sick last 3 months -3.781∗∗∗ 0.996 -3.725∗∗∗ 1.081 -4.364∗∗∗ 1.135
Pupils eat ﬁll 0.595 1.191 0.954 1.258 0.131 1.340
Gender of household head -0.891 1.255 -1.444 1.326 -0.466∗∗ 1.416
Lit. of household head -1.459 1.042 -0.697 1.099 -2.291 1.164
Marital status 2.902 1.784 2.504 1.886 3.271 2.008
Land -2.817∗ 1.575 -2.740∗ 1.659 -2.779 1.778
Parents school -2.820∗∗∗ 0.7951 -2.773∗∗∗ 0.840 -3.071∗∗∗ 0.894
College 1.587 1.011 0.881 1.067 2.550∗∗ 1.139
Diourbel 1.311 1.676 1.119 1.767 1.626 1.887
Kolda -9.838∗∗∗ 1.224 -9.812∗∗∗ 1.291 -9.840∗∗∗ 1.381
Se´dhiou -9.195∗∗∗ 2.231 -6.891∗∗∗ 2.351 -11.118∗∗∗ 2.517
Deworming at home 19.156∗∗∗ 2.983 20.067∗∗∗ 3.460 20.339∗∗∗ 3.563
Intercept 37.668∗∗ 17.066 51.619∗∗∗ 17.985 25.231 19.201
Selection Eq.
Food expenditure -0.066 0.055 -0.072 0.055 -0.064 0.055
Education expenditure 0.018 0.020 0.022 0.020 0.017 0.021
Health expenditure -0.025∗∗ 0.013 -0.025∗∗ 0.013 -0.026∗∗ 0.013
Sick last 3 months 0.604∗∗∗ 0.060 0.608∗∗∗ 0.060 0.608∗∗∗ 0.060
Water point 0.105∗ 0.059 0.103∗ 0.059 0.105∗ 0.059
Gender of pupil -0.045 0.057 -0.050 0.057 -0.033 0.057
Lit. of household head 0.205∗∗∗ 0.074 0.203∗∗∗ 0.074 0.206∗∗∗ 0.074
Intercept -0.308 0.627 -0.263 0.632 -0.330 0.628
atanh ρ -0.712∗∗∗ 0.115 -0.691∗∗∗ 0.125 -0.667 0.120
lnσ 2.920∗∗∗ 0.029 2.969∗∗∗ 0.031 3.029∗∗∗ 0.030
ρ -0.612 0.072 -0.598 0.080 -0.583 0.079
σ 18.553 0.550 19.482 0.613 20.678 0.623
λ -11.361 1.641 -11.664 1.909 -12.060 1.969
LR test (H0 : ρ = 0)
χ2 (1) 7.09 5.38 6.24
P > χ2 0.007 0.020 0.012
Log likelihood -11725.921 -11859.491 -12020.072
# Observations 2487 2487 2487
Wald χ2(46) 780.21 1053.13 572.34
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes a: Heckman selection framework; b:Full Information Maximum Likelihood; c: In log; d: Household size per adult
equivalent; e: qualiﬁcation.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Table A.18: Deworming at home: HSFa regression (2-step)
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Performance Eq.
Temporary shelters 0.433 0.387 0.148 0.408 0.697 0.436
School manual 1.566 1.080 2.521∗∗ 1.138 0.788 1.216
School manual squared 0.056 0.189 -0.319 0.199 0.412∗ 0.213
Class size -0.170 0.118 0.136 0.125 -0.488∗∗∗ 0.133
Class size squared 0.0008 0.001 -0.003∗∗ 0.001 0.004∗∗∗ 0.001
Number of pregnancies -6.629∗∗∗ 1.110 -8.656∗∗∗ 1.174 -4.585∗∗∗ 1.248
Number of marriages -0.0217 0.675 0.112 0.712 -0.138 0.759
Teacher’s age -2.658∗∗∗ 0.623 -2.961∗∗∗ 0.657 -2.340∗∗∗ 0.701
Teacher’s age square 0.037∗∗∗ 0.009 0.039∗∗∗ 0.009 0.035∗∗∗ 0.010
Pupil’s age 6.989∗∗∗ 1.952 7.536∗∗∗ 2.059 6.323∗∗∗ 2.196
Pupil’s age square -0.277∗∗∗ 0.092 -0.305∗∗∗ 0.097 -0.244∗∗ 0.103
Number of hours -0.147 0.629 -0.124 0.663 -0.128 0.708
Food expenditureb 1.007 0.819 0.208 0.851 1.750∗ 0.929
Education expenditureb 0.114 0.303 0.161 0.315 0.061 0.345
Health expenditureb 0.189 0.201 0.216 0.210 0.168 0.229
Household size c 0.261∗∗∗ 0.063 0.238∗∗∗ 0.067 0.283∗∗∗ 0.071
Livestock 0.0008 0.020 -0.017 0.021 0.021 0.023
Distance to school 1.095 0.905 1.265 0.954 0.842 1.018
Playground 1.777∗ 0.951 1.516 1.003 2.324∗∗ 1.070
Water point -1.448 0.970 -2.425∗∗ 1.012 -0.609 1.100
Disturbed courses -4.016∗∗∗ 0.989 -2.539∗∗ 1.044 -5.648∗∗∗ 1.113
Meals near school -0.558 0.905 -1.598∗ 0.954 0.459 1.019
Gender of teacher -3.707∗∗∗ 1.127 -2.565∗∗ 1.190 -4.866∗∗∗ 1.267
No professional qualif. d 0.358 1.031 -1.166 1.088 1.959∗ 1.161
Professional qualif. CAP -1.263 1.238 -1.436 1.306 -0.998 1.393
Professional qualif. CEAP 4.581∗∗∗ 1.168 3.153∗∗∗ 1.231 5.611∗∗∗ 1.314
High school diploma & more 1.791∗∗ 0.883 1.029 0.931 2.330∗∗ 0.993
Continuing training -0.369 0.795 -0.222 0.838 -0.436 0.894
Absenteeism -5.165∗∗∗ 1.270 -2.892∗∗ 1.340 -7.558∗∗∗ 1.429
Gender of pupil 0.914 0.728 0.232 0.752 1.701∗∗ 0.830
Grade -14.239∗∗∗ 0.983 -21.143∗∗∗ 1.038 -7.373∗∗∗ 1.107
Koranic school 3.671∗∗∗ 0.800 4.223∗∗∗ 0.844 3.335∗∗∗ 0.900
Early childhood inst. 2.106 1.314 2.852∗∗ 1.388 1.361 1.477
Snack -0.272 1.148 0.076 1.214 -0.606 1.291
Sick last 3 months -2.906 2.632 -2.230 2.793 -3.972 2.951
Pupils eat ﬁll 0.420 1.195 0.807 1.260 -0.034 1.345
Gender of household head -0.669 1.264 -1.332 1.334 -0.177 1.422
Lit. of household head -1.187 1.251 -0.218 1.307 -2.178 1.415
Marital status 2.706 1.794 2.320 1.893 3.059 2.019
Land -2.347 1.587 -2.362 1.676 -2.365 1.784
Parents school -3.002∗∗∗ 0.797 -2.942∗∗∗ 0.841 -3.214∗∗∗ 0.897
College 1.808∗ 1.017 1.026 1.073 2.758∗∗ 1.144
Diourbel 1.429 1.675 1.223 1.765 1.792 1.885
Kolda -9.887∗∗∗ 1.232 -9.844∗∗∗ 1.299 -9.900∗∗∗ 1.386
Se´dhiou -8.540∗∗∗ 2.240 -6.525∗∗∗ 2.368 -10.402∗∗∗ 2.518
Deworming at home 14.368 13.612 11.905 14.484 18.158 15.239
Intercept 40.490∗∗ 17.595 54.649∗∗∗ 18.491 27.556 19.844
Selection Eq.
Food expenditure -0.069 0.056 -0.069 0.056 -0.069 0.056
Education expenditure 0.026 0.022 0.026 0.022 0.026 0.022
Continued on next page. . .
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Table A.18 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Health expenditure -0.027∗∗ 0.013 -0.027∗∗ 0.013 -0.027∗∗ 0.013
Sick last 3 months 0.623∗∗∗ 0.061 0.623∗∗∗ 0.061 0.623∗∗∗ 0.061
Water point 0.092 0.060 0.092 0.060 0.092 0.060
Gender of pupil -0.023 0.059 -0.023 0.059 -0.023 0.059
Lit. of household head 0.200∗∗∗ 0.075 0.200∗∗∗ 0.075 0.200∗∗∗ 0.075
Intercept -0.337 0.647 -0.337 0.647 -0.337 0.647
hasard λ -8.603 7.738 -6.997 8.235 -10.784 8.662
ρ -0.481 — -0.379 — -0.529 —
σ 17.853 — 18.417 — 20.349 —
λ -8.603 7.738 -6.997 8.235 -10.784 8.662
# Observations 2487 2487 2487
Wald χ2(53) 841.71 1112.84 648.79
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes a: Heckman selection framework; b: In log; c: Household size per adult equivalent; d: qualiﬁcation.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Appendix B.1 Computation of outcome variables related to internal eﬃciency
For the internal eﬃciency of schools, we used the enrollment, promotion and dropout rates that
we calculated for year 2009.
For enrollment rate, we took the diﬀerence between the new enrolled in the ﬁrst year of primary
school (CI) of 2009 ‘newenrollment09’ and those of 2008 ‘newenrollment08’ that we divided
by the new enrolled in 2008 ‘newenrollment08’ and multiplied by 100. We used the following
relationship:
Enrollmentrate = newenrollment09−newenrollment08newenrollment08 ∗ 100.
To calculate the promotion rate, we made the connection between the total promoted in 2009
‘Promoted09’ and the total number of pupils in the school for the same year and multiplied by
100. To compute the total promoted ‘Promoted09’ we used the following equation:
Promoted09 = Pupils10 − newenrollment10 − totalrepeaters10 + examadmitted09
where ‘Pupils10’ is the total number of pupils within each school in 2010, ‘newenrollment10’
refers to pupils who have enrolled for the introductory course -ﬁrst year of primary school- (CI) in
2010, ‘totalrepeaters10’ is the total number of repeaters recorded in 2010, and ‘examadmitted09’
is the number of pupils admitted to the secondary school entrance examination in 2009. It is
important to note that we do not have any information on transfers between schools, that is
why they do not appear in the calculation of the total promoted. So, the promotion rate for
2009 is obtained from the following relation:
Promotionrate = Promoted09Pupils09 ∗ 100
To compute the dropout rate, we used the following relation:
Dropoutrate = 100− (Repetiotionrate09 + Promotionrate09);
To compute the repetition rate we made the ratio between the sum of repeaters of 2009
reported in 2010 and the total number of pupils ‘(Pupils)’ in the school for 2009.
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Repetitionrate09 =
∑
repeaters(CI,CP,CE1,CE2,CM1,CM2)10∑
Pupils(CI,CP,CE1,CE2,CM1,CM2)09
∗ 100
Appendix B.2 General framework for mean of trivariate truncated normal
distributions
Let x, y and z denote three random variables following a trivariate normal distribution with
mean μ and covariance matrix Σ, i.e.,
(x, y, z) ∼ N
⎡⎣⎛⎝ μxμy
μz
⎞⎠ ,
⎛⎝ σ2xρxyσxσy σ2y
ρxzσxσz ρyzσyσz σ
2
z
⎞⎠⎤⎦ .
In this appendix we establish various neat relations regarding the mean of trivariate truncated
normal distribution. These relations are used in the estimation strategies of this chapter 3 and
also proved useful in deriving treatment eﬀects. The formulas we get also have the advantage
of being easy to write in terms of code for most statistical and econometric software. Before
proceeding, let’s brieﬂy recall the well-known formulae for the mean of univariate and bivariate
truncation.
Univariate truncation
The conditional expectation E(x | x > a) involving the univariate truncated normal distribu-
tion is given by
E(x | x > a) = μx + σxλxa
[(
a− μx
σx
)]
(B-1)
where λxa denotes the inverse Mill’s ratio and equals
φ1
(
a−μx
σx
)
1− Φ1
(
a−μx
σx
) with φ1 and Φ1 denoting
respectively the probability distribution function (pdf) and the cumulative distribution function
(cdf) of the univariate standard normal distribution. Similarly, the conditional expectation
involving the univariate truncated (from above) normal distribution is given by
E(x | x ≤ b) = μx − σxλxb
[(
b− μx
σx
)]
(B-2)
where λxb equals
φ1
(
b−μx
σx
)
1− Φ1
(
b−μx
σx
) .
Bivariate truncation
The conditional expectation E(x|y > a) involving the bivariate truncated (from below) normal
distribution is written as
E(x|y > a) = μx + cov(x, y)
σy
λya
= μx +
ρxyσxσy
σy
λya (B-3)
= μx + ρxyσxλya ,
APPENDIX B. APPENDIX CHAPTER 3 175
where cov(x, y) = ρxyσxσy and λya =
φ1
(
a−μy
σy
)
1− Φ1
(
a−μy
σy
) .
Similarly, we can show that
E(x|y ≤ b) = μx − cov(x, y)
σy
λyb , (B-4)
where λyb =
φ1
(
b−μy
σy
)
1− Φ1
(
b−μy
σy
) .
In what follow, we establish the analogue formulae for the case of trivariate truncation
Trivariate truncation
Now, we are interested in the expressions of E(x|y > a, z > b), E(x|y ≤ a, z ≤ b), E(x|y > a, z ≤
b) and E(x|y ≤ a, z > b)
These conditional expectations involve the trivariate truncated normal distribution. More
speciﬁcally, we make use of the conditional distribution of x|y, z. The mean of that distribution
is given by
E(x|y, z) = μx + σxρxy.z
σy
(y − μy) + σxρxz.y
σz
(z − μz), (B-5)
where ρxy.z and ρxz.y are derived from and related to the partial correlations, and are given
by
ρxy.z =
ρxy − ρxzρyz
1− ρ2yz
; ρxz.y =
ρxz − ρxyρyz
1− ρ2yz
. (B-6)
Expression of E(x|y > a, z > b)
We can derive E(x|y > a, z > b) by using equation (B). Hence,
E(x|y > a, z > b) = μx + σxρxy.z
σy
E(y − μy|y > a, z > b) + σxρxz.y
σz
E(z − μz|y > a, z > b)
= μx +
σxρxy.z
σy
[E(y|y > a, z > b)− μy] + σxρxz.y
σz
[E(z|y > a, z > b)− μz] .
(B-7)
Thus, we need to derive the expressions of E(y|y > a, z > b) and E(z|y > a, z > b).
i) Computation of E(y|y > a, z > b)
Since
f1(y|y > a, z > b) = f2(y, z)
P [y > a, z > b]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ Γ
, 1 (B-8)
the conditional expectation can be written as
E(y|y > a, z > b) = E(yz0|y > a, z > b)
= Γ−1
∫ ∞
a
∫ ∞
b
yf(y, z)dydz. (B-9)
1The subscripts 1 and 2 denote respectively the univariate and the bivariate pdf of cdf of the normal or standard
normal distribution.
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By making the variable changes Y = y−μyσy and Z =
z−μz
σz
so that dy = σydY and dz =
σzdZ, the expectation can be written as
E(y|y > a, z > b) = Φ−12
[
μy − a
σy
,
μz − b
σz
, ρyz
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ Φ−12
∫ ∞
a−μy
σy
∫ ∞
b−μz
σz
(σyY + μy)
φ2(Y, Z)
σyσz
σyσzdY dZ
= σyΦ−12
∫ ∞
a−μy
σy
∫ ∞
b−μz
σz
Y φ2(Y, Z)dY dZ + μyΦ−12
∫ ∞
a−μy
σy
∫ ∞
b−μz
σz
φ2(Y, Z)dY dZ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ Φ2
(B-10)
= σy Φ−12
∫ ∞
a−μy
σy
∫ ∞
b−μz
σz
Y φ2(Y, Z)dY dZ︸ ︷︷ ︸
E
(
Y |Y >a−μy
σy
,Z> b−μz
σz
)
+ μy.
Since Y and Z have a bivariate standard normal distribution, we can use the result of
Rosenbaum (1961) or, more generally, moment generating function of Muthe´n (1990) to
show that
E
(
Y |Y > a− μy
σy
, Z >
b− μz
σz
)
= Φ−12
⎡⎣φ1(a− μy
σy
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρyz a−μyσy − b−μzσz√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠
+ ρyzφ1
(
b− μz
σz
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρyz b−μzσz − a−μyσy√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠⎤⎦ . (B-11)
Hence,
E(y|y > a, z > b) = σyΦ−12
⎡⎣φ1(a− μy
σy
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρyz a−μyσy − b−μzσz√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠
+ ρyzφ1
(
b− μz
σz
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρyz b−μzσz − a−μyσy√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠⎤⎦+ μy. (B-12)
ii) Computation of E(z|y > a, z > b)
Similarly, we can derive E(z|y > a, z > b) as
E(z|y > a, z > b) = σzΦ−12
⎡⎣φ1(b− μz
σz
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρyz b−μzσz − a−μyσy√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠
+ ρyzφ1
(
a− μy
σy
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρyz a−μyσy − b−μzσz√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠⎤⎦+ μz. (B-13)
For notational convenience, let us deﬁne Λ1 and Λ2 as
Λ1 ≡ φ1
(
a− μy
σy
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρyz a−μyσy − b−μzσz√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠ (B-14a)
Λ2 ≡ φ1
(
b− μz
σz
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρyz b−μzσz − a−μyσy√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠ . (B-14b)
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Hence, E(x|y > a, z > b) can be written as
E(x|y > a, z > b) = μx + σxρxy.z
σy
[
σyΦ−12 (Λ1 + ρyzΛ2) + μy − μy
]
+
σxρxz.y
σz
[
σzΦ−12 (Λ2 + ρyzΛ1) + μz − μz
]
. (B-15)
Replacing ρxy.z and ρxz.y by their expressions, and simplifying the previous expression
yield
E(x|y > a, z > b) = μx + σx (ρxy − ρxzρyz)1− ρ2yz
Φ−12 (Λ1 + ρyzΛ2)
+
σx (ρxz − ρxyρyz)
1− ρ2yz
Φ−12 (Λ2 + ρyzΛ1) . (B-16)
Factorizing yields
E(x|y > a, z > b) = μx + σxΦ
−1
2
1− ρ2yz
Λ1
[
ρxy − ρxzρyz + ρxzρyz − ρxyρ2yz
]
+
σxΦ−12
1− ρ2yz
Λ2
[
ρxz − ρxyρyz + ρxyρyz − ρxzρ2yz
]
(B-17)
which can also be written as
E(x|y > a, z > b) = μx + σxΦ
−1
2
1− ρ2yz
Λ1ρxy(1− ρ2yz) +
σxΦ−12
1− ρ2yz
Λ2ρxz(1− ρ2yz)
= μx + σxΦ−12 Λ1ρxy + σxΦ
−1
2 Λ2ρxz. (B-18)
The ﬁnal expression of E(x|y > a, z > b) is given by
E(x|y > a, z > b) = μx +
σxρxyφ1
(
a−μy
σy
)
Φ2
[
μy−a
σy
, μz−bσz , ρyz
]Φ1
⎛⎝ρyz a−μyσy − b−μzσz√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠
+
σxρxzφ1
(
b−μz
σz
)
Φ2
[
μy−a
σy
, μz−bσz , ρyz
]Φ1
⎛⎝ρyz b−μzσz − a−μyσy√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠ . (B-19)
Expression of E(x|y ≤ a, z ≤ b)
In this case, E(y|y > a, z > b) and E(z|y > a, z > b) are replaced by E(y|y ≤ a, z ≤ b)
and E(z|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) in equation (B-7). Hence, we need to derive E(y|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) and
E(z|y ≤ a, z ≤ b). Equation (B-8) is now written as
f1(y|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) = f2(y, z)
P[y ≤ a, z ≤ b] . (B-20)
Using similar derivations as previously and results from Muthe´n (1990), E(y|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) is
given by
E(y|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) = σyΦ−12
[
a− μy
σy
,
b− μz
σz
, ρyz
]⎡⎣−φ1(a− μy
σy
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ b−μzσz − ρyz a−μyσy√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠
−ρyzφ1
(
b− μz
σz
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ a−μyσy − ρyz b−μzσz√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠⎤⎦+ μy. (B-21)
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Similarly, E(z|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) is derived as
E(z|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) = σzΦ−12
[
a− μy
σy
,
b− μz
σz
, ρyz
]⎡⎣−φ1(b− μz
σz
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ a−μyσy − ρyz b−μzσz√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠
−ρyzφ1
(
a− μy
σy
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ b−μzσz − ρyz a−μyσy√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠⎤⎦+ μz. (B-22)
Using similar calculations as previously, E(x|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) is derived as
E(x|y ≤ a, z ≤ b) = μx −
σxρxyφ1
(
a−μy
σy
)
Φ2
[
a−μy
σy
, b−μzσz , ρyz
]Φ1
⎛⎝ b−μzσz − ρyz a−μyσy√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠
−
σxρxzφ1
(
b−μz
σz
)
Φ2
[
a−μy
σy
, b−μzσz , ρyz
]Φ1
⎛⎝ a−μyσy − ρyz b−μzσz√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠ . (B-23)
Expression of E(x|y > a, z ≤ b)
The calculation of E(x|y > a, z ≤ b) involves E(y|y > a, z ≤ b) and E(z|y > a, z ≤ b) in
equation (B-7). The latter two expectations are given by
E(y|y > a, z ≤ b) = σyΦ−12
[
μy − a
σy
,
b− μz
σz
,−ρyz
]⎡⎣φ1(a− μy
σy
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ b−μzσz − ρyz a−μyσy√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠
−ρyzφ1
(
b− μz
σz
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρyz b−μzσz − a−μyσy√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠⎤⎦+ μy (B-24)
and
E(z|y > a, z ≤ b) = σzΦ−12
[
μy − a
σy
,
b− μz
σz
,−ρyz
]⎡⎣−φ1(b− μz
σz
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρyz b−μzσz − a−μyσy√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠
+ ρyzφ1
(
a− μy
σy
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ b−μzσz − ρyz a−μyσy√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠⎤⎦+ μz. (B-25)
Hence, E(x|y > a, z ≤ b) is given by
E(x|y > a, z ≤ b) = μx +
σxρxyφ1
(
a−μy
σy
)
Φ2
[
μy−a
σy
, b−μzσz ,−ρyz
]Φ1
⎛⎝ b−μzσz − ρyz a−μyσy√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠
−
σxρxzφ1
(
b−μz
σz
)
Φ2
[
μy−a
σy
, b−μzσz ,−ρyz
]Φ1
⎛⎝ρyz b−μzσz − a−μyσy√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠ . (B-26)
Expression of E(x|y ≤ a, z > b)
Finally, the calculation of E(x|y ≤ a, z > b) involves E(y|y ≤ a, z > b) and E(z|y ≤ a, z > b)
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in equation (B-7), the expressions of which are given by
E(y|y ≤ a, z > b) = σyΦ−12
[
a− μy
σy
,
μz − b
σz
,−ρyz
]⎡⎣−φ1(a− μy
σy
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρyz a−μyσy − b−μzσz√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠
+ρyzφ1
(
b− μz
σz
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ a−μyσy − ρyz b−μzσz√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠⎤⎦+ μy (B-27)
and
E(z|y ≤ a, z > b) = σzΦ−12
[
a− μy
σy
,
μz − b
σz
,−ρyz
]⎡⎣φ1(b− μz
σz
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ a−μyσy − ρyz b−μzσz√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠
− ρyzφ1
(
a− μy
σy
)
Φ1
⎛⎝ρyz a−μyσy − b−μzσz√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠⎤⎦+ μz. (B-28)
Hence, E(x|y ≤ a, z > b) is given by
E(x|y ≤ a, z > b) = μx −
σxρxyφ1
(
a−μy
σy
)
Φ2
[
a−μy
σy
, μz−bσz ,−ρyz
]Φ1
⎛⎝ρyz a−μyσy − b−μzσz√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠
+
σxρxzφ1
(
b−μz
σz
)
Φ2
[
a−μy
σy
, μz−bσz ,−ρyz
]Φ1
⎛⎝ a−μyσy − ρyz b−μzσz√
1− ρ2yz
⎞⎠ . (B-29)
Appendix B.3 Descriptive statistics and further estimations results
Descriptive statistics
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Further estimation results
Table B.2: Determinants of scores: DISMa model, FIMLb
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Selection Eq. Deworming
Total pupils 0.0005∗ 0.0002 0.0004∗∗ 0.0002 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0002
Management committee 0.014 0.059 0.010 0.060 -0.026 0.060
Medicine box -0.414∗∗∗ 0.090 -0.360∗∗∗ 0.091 -0.400∗∗∗ 0.092
Association of mothers 0.386∗∗∗ 0.059 0.363∗∗∗ 0.060 0.406∗∗∗ 0.060
Cooperative school 0.331∗∗∗ 0.068 0.296∗∗∗ 0.069 0.317∗∗∗ 0.069
Water point 0.441∗∗∗ 0.066 0.460∗∗∗ 0.067 0.439∗∗∗ 0.067
Gender of pupil -0.043 0.055 -0.047 0.056 -0.048 0.056
Intercept -1.823∗∗∗ 0.079 -1.792∗∗∗ 0.080 -1.812∗∗∗ 0.079
Selection Eq. Meal
Total pupils 0.0004∗ 0.0002 0.0004∗∗ 0.0002 0.0004∗∗ 0.0002
Distance to school 0.022 0.061 0.028 0.062 0.021 0.061
Management committee -0.041 0.055 -0.047 0.055 -0.044 0.054
Association of mothers 0.631∗∗∗ 0.057 0.646∗∗∗ 0.058 0.631∗∗∗ 0.057
Cooperative school 0.080 0.055 0.077 0.056 0.085 0.055
Rural council grant 0.717∗∗∗ 0.068 0.691∗∗∗ 0.068 0.738∗∗∗ 0.068
Water point -0.009 0.062 0.003 0.062 -0.020 0.062
Disturbed courses 0.911∗∗∗ 0.072 0.917∗∗∗ 0.072 0.909∗∗∗ 0.072
Storage 0.831∗∗∗ 0.058 0.834∗∗∗ 0.058 0.817∗∗∗ 0.058
Gender of pupil -0.060 0.050 -0.060 0.050 -0.061 0.049
Intercept -2.435∗∗∗ 0.119 -2.430∗∗∗ 0.119 -2.436∗∗∗ 0.119
Performance Eq.
Temporary shelters 0.342 0.316 0.367 0.338 0.189 0.355
School manual 3.150∗∗∗ 0.915 3.576∗∗∗ 0.979 2.944∗∗∗ 1.021
School manual squared -0.096 0.159 -0.450∗∗∗ 0.170 0.240 0.177
Class size -0.013 0.024 -0.025 0.026 -0.007 0.027
Teacher’s age -3.102∗∗∗ 0.528 -1.974∗∗∗ 0.562 -3.976∗∗∗ 0.588
Teacher’s age square 0.048∗∗∗ 0.007 0.028∗∗∗ 0.008 0.064∗∗∗ 0.008
Pupil’s age 0.833∗∗∗ 0.226 0.831∗∗∗ 0.244 0.811∗∗∗ 0.253
Education expenditurec 0.507∗∗ 0.244 0.729∗∗∗ 0.263 0.320 0.273
Health expenditurec -0.052 0.150 0.029 0.162 -0.165 0.168
Livestock -0.007 0.010 -0.011 0.011 -0.0004 0.011
Disturbed courses -4.963∗∗∗ 0.918 -4.177∗∗∗ 0.988 -6.080∗∗∗ 1.020
Meals near school 0.124 0.727 -0.554 0.783 0.727 0.814
Toilets 2.787∗∗ 0.762 1.626∗∗ 0.820 3.791∗∗∗ 0.850
Hands washing 3.078∗∗ 1.219 4.058∗∗∗ 1.303 2.401∗ 1.358
Gender of teacher -4.555∗∗∗ 0.913 -4.118∗∗∗ 0.986 -5.147∗∗∗ 1.023
No professional qualif.d 3.274∗∗∗ 0.870 2.400∗∗ 0.934 4.399∗∗∗ 0.971
Professional qualif. CAP -0.167 1.060 0.782 1.150 -0.819 1.186
Professional diploma CEAP 3.081∗∗∗ 0.919 1.265 0.990 4.594∗∗∗ 1.027
High school diploma & more 0.661 0.721 -0.653 0.773 1.638∗∗ 0.803
Continuing training -0.701 0.672 0.107 0.722 -1.643∗∗ 0.750
Absenteeism -4.025∗∗∗ 1.135 -1.667 1.226 -6.371∗∗∗ 1.269
Gender of pupil 0.670 0.627 -0.291 0.662 1.543∗∗ 0.699
Grade -11.209∗∗∗ 0.815 -17.697∗∗∗ 0.876 -4.605∗∗∗ 0.912
Deworming at home -1.595∗∗ 0.749 -1.650∗∗ 0.807 -1.324 0.838
Islamic school 2.669∗∗∗ 0.676 2.561∗∗∗ 0.727 2.927∗∗∗ 0.756
Early childhood inst. 1.920 1.197 2.712∗∗ 1.295 1.207 1.344
Snack -1.104 1.015 -1.094 1.094 -0.750 1.137
Continued on next page. . .
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Table B.2 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Sick last 3 months 0.005 0.655 0.251 0.705 -0.293 0.732
Pupils eat ﬁll 1.956∗∗ 0.990 1.944∗ 1.063 1.922∗ 1.107
Gender of household head 0.130 1.103 -0.486 1.190 0.581 1.235
Lit. of household head -0.116 0.799 -0.080 0.861 -0.353 0.895
Married 1.654 1.568 2.753 1.691 0.588 1.754
Land -1.949 1.358 -1.299 1.465 -2.417 1.519
Parents school -2.047∗∗ 0.654 -2.802∗∗∗ 0.697 -1.221∗ 0.728
College 6.235∗∗∗ 0.905 4.496∗∗∗ 0.971 8.050∗∗∗ 1.016
Diourbel 4.484∗∗∗ 1.639 2.531 1.751 6.590∗∗∗ 1.828
Kolda -3.818∗∗∗ 0.952 -4.474∗∗∗ 1.025 -2.870∗∗∗ 1.063
Sedhiou -4.194∗ 1.530 -5.255∗∗∗ 1.633 -2.783 1.713
Deworming (T1) -17.155∗∗∗ 2.516 -18.719∗∗∗ 3.008 -15.190∗∗∗ 2.816
Meal (T2) 3.488∗ 1.948 4.147∗∗ 2.076 2.966 2.048
T1T2 3.600∗ 2.097 5.868∗∗ 2.268 2.216 2.342
Intercept 82.369∗∗∗ 9.427 69.068∗∗∗ 10.037 92.011∗∗∗ 10.520
ρ12 -0.071∗ 0.039 -0.066∗ 0.039 -0.067∗ 0.039
ρ13 0.567∗∗∗ 0.058 0.494∗∗∗ 0.070 0.528∗∗∗ 0.060
ρ23 0.098 0.068 -0.010 0.068 0.181∗∗∗ 0.063
se3 18.383∗∗∗ 0.335 19.414∗∗∗ 0.358 20.500∗∗∗ 0.360
Log likelihood -17710.647 -17970.804 -18098.279
# Observations 3487 3487 3487
Wald χ2(7) 210.25 191.39 209.36
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes a: Double-Index Selection Model; b: Full Information Maximum Likelihood; c: In log; d: qualiﬁcation.
Signiﬁcance levels (bootstrap): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table B.3: Determinants of scores: DISMa model, 2-stepb
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Selection Eq. Deworming
Total pupils 0.0003∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗ 0.0001
Management committee 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056
Medicine box -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089 -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089 -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089
Association of mothers 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052
Cooperative school 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055
Water point 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059
Gender of pupil -0.029 0.047 -0.029 0.047 -0.029 0.047
Intercept -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067 -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067 -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067
Selection Eq. Meal
Total pupils 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001
Distance to school 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048
Management committee -0.045 0.042 -0.0456 0.042 -0.045 0.042
Association of mothers 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043
Cooperative school -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041
Rural council grant 0.569∗∗∗ 0.045 0.569∗∗∗ 0.045 0.569∗∗∗ 0.0457
Water point 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046
Disturbed courses 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044
Continued on next page. . .
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Table B.3 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Storage 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044
Gender of pupil -0.041 0.037 -0.041 0.037 -0.041 0.037
Intercept -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075 -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075 -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075
Performance Eq.
Temporary shelters 0.374 0.306 0.369 0.343 0.297 0.358
School manual 3.273∗∗∗ 0.966 3.611∗∗∗ 1.011 2.939∗∗ 1.188
School manual squared -0.096 0.156 -0.450∗∗∗ 0.148 0.257 0.223
Class size -0.015 0.024 -0.027 0.024 -0.025 0.031
Teacher’s age -2.979∗∗∗ 0.493 -1.912∗∗∗ 0.534 -3.935∗∗∗ 0.548
Teacher’s age square 0.046∗∗∗ 0.007 0.027∗∗∗ 0.008 0.063∗∗∗ 0.008
Pupil’s age 0.867∗∗∗ 0.240 0.836∗∗∗ 0.260 0.870∗∗∗ 0.269
Education expenditurec 0.544∗∗ 0.240 0.762∗∗ 0.298 0.348 0.257
Health expenditurec -0.082 0.158 0.008 0.158 -0.182 0.186
Livestock -0.001 0.015 -0.007 0.015 0.004 0.017
Disturbed courses -5.787∗∗∗ 0.664 -4.392∗∗∗ 0.732 -7.295∗∗∗ 0.792
Meals near school -0.049 0.791 -0.653 0.850 0.564 0.853
Toilets 2.984∗∗∗ 0.725 1.733∗∗ 0.773 4.147∗∗∗ 0.831
Hands washing 3.459∗∗∗ 1.172 4.337∗∗∗ 1.314 2.663∗∗ 1.244
Gender of teacher -4.751∗∗∗ 0.936 -4.263∗∗∗ 1.028 -5.389∗∗∗ 1.021
No professional qualif.d 3.652∗∗∗ 0.837 2.565∗∗∗ 0.935 4.839∗∗∗ 0.911
Professional qualif. CAP -0.148 1.207 0.672 1.301 -0.664 1.254
Professional qualif. CEAP 3.134∗∗∗ 1.023 1.269 1.145 4.762∗∗∗ 1.093
High school diploma & more 0.616 0.693 -0.618 0.743 1.673∗∗ 0.850
Continuing training -0.829 0.722 -0.015 0.754 -1.683∗∗ 0.836
Absenteeism -4.13∗∗∗ 1.114 -1.989 1.239 -6.209∗∗∗ 1.132
Gender of pupil 0.809 0.578 -0.154 0.592 1.672∗∗ 0.688
Grade -11.063∗∗∗ 0.806 -17.586∗∗∗ 0.913 -4.501∗∗∗ 0.874
Deworming at home -1.564∗ 0.809 -1.626∗ 0.839 -1.348 0.918
Islamic school 2.799∗∗∗ 0.707 2.652∗∗∗ 0.702 3.103∗∗∗ 0.841
Early childhood inst. 2.172∗∗ 1.038 2.898∗∗ 1.125 1.432 1.206
Snack -1.017 0.966 -1.029 0.994 -0.722 1.131
Sick last 3 months 0.053 0.672 0.287 0.746 -0.246 0.732
Pupils eat ﬁll 2.010∗ 1.052 1.947∗ 1.057 1.964 1.224
Gender of household head 0.042 0.941 -0.547 1.145 0.558 1.036
Lit. of household head -0.143 0.823 -0.060 0.875 -0.383 0.936
Married 1.612 1.452 2.697 1.695 0.570 1.589
Land -1.995 1.491 -1.330 1.600 -2.450 1.626
Parents school -1.927∗∗∗ 0.621 -2.770∗∗∗ 0.724 -1.086 0.669
College 6.251∗∗∗ 1.039 4.575∗∗∗ 1.038 8.048∗∗∗ 1.188
Diourbel 4.561∗∗∗ 1.359 2.652∗ 1.571 6.481∗∗∗ 1.538
Kolda -3.836∗∗∗ 0.959 -4.400∗∗∗ 0.975 -3.142∗∗∗ 1.152
Sedhiou -4.149∗∗∗ 1.471 -5.324∗∗∗ 1.575 -2.825∗ 1.726
Deworming (T1) -18.845∗∗∗ 5.258 -19.479∗∗∗ 5.427 -19.717∗∗∗ 5.851
Meal (T2) 4.266∗ 2.520 5.064∗ 2.635 3.397 2.903
T1T2 4.066∗ 2.087 6.098∗∗∗ 2.326 2.442 2.338
h1(T1, T2) 11.161∗∗∗ 2.713 9.772∗∗∗ 2.855 13.181∗∗∗ 3.054
h2(T1, T2) 1.418 1.622 -0.701 1.718 3.577∗ 1.861
Intercept 80.332∗∗∗ 8.341 67.714∗∗∗ 9.065 91.690∗∗∗ 9.416
# Observations 3487 3487 3487
Wald χ2(43) 1395.70 1866.94 1243.89
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.166 0.203 0.145
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Table B.3 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Notes a: Double-Index Selection Model; b: Two step; c: In log; d: qualiﬁcation.
Signiﬁcance levels (bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table B.4: Determinants of scores: Generalized Roy’s model, 2-
stepa
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Selection Eq. Deworming
Total pupils 0.0003∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗ 0.0001
Management committee 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056
Medicine box -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089 -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089 -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089
Association of mothers 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052
Cooperative school 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055
Water point 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059
Gender of pupil -0.029 0.047 -0.029 0.047 -0.029 0.047
Intercept -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067 -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067 -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067
Selection Eq. Meal
Total pupils 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001
Distance to school 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048
Management committee -0.045 0.042 -0.0456 0.042 -0.045 0.042
Association of mothers 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043
Cooperative school -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041
Rural council grant 0.569∗∗∗ 0.045 0.569∗∗∗ 0.045 0.569∗∗∗ 0.0457
Water point 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046
Disturbed courses 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044
Storage 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044
Gender of pupil -0.041 0.037 -0.041 0.037 -0.041 0.037
Intercept -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075 -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075 -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075
Performance Eq. Deworming
Temporary shelters -3.374∗∗ 1.479 -3.232∗ 1.917 -4.523∗∗∗ 1.741
Class size -0.321∗∗ 0.154 -0.495∗∗∗ 0.167 -0.195 0.161
Teacher’s age -8.972∗∗∗ 2.039 -10.737∗∗∗ 2.416 -7.080∗∗∗ 2.427
Teacher’s age square 0.125∗∗∗ 0.029 0.141∗∗∗ 0.035 0.106∗∗∗ 0.033
Pupil’s age 1.594∗∗ 0.602 2.361∗∗∗ 0.705 0.733 0.637
High school diploma & more 8.193∗∗∗ 2.615 10.269∗∗∗ 2.958 7.295∗∗ 2.839
Absenteeism 4.796 5.956 3.182 6.778 11.155∗ 5.952
Gender of pupil -0.917 1.439 -0.884 1.706 0.101 1.824
Grade -16.738∗∗∗ 2.343 -25.852∗∗∗ 2.818 -7.910∗∗∗ 2.528
Deworming at home -3.087 2.211 -0.425 2.626 -2.631 3.083
Islamic school -0.064 2.038 1.593 2.701 0.418 2.508
Early childhood inst. -2.572 2.821 -2.322 2.786 -4.188 3.342
Snack -3.450 3.166 -1.729 3.580 -2.574 3.731
Pupils eat ﬁll 6.722∗∗∗ 2.498 9.624∗∗∗ 2.834 3.494 3.008
Gender of household head 2.225 2.829 0.573 3.116 2.107 3.688
Lit. of household head 1.075 1.999 1.938 2.011 1.396 2.369
Married 2.795 4.993 0.393 5.960 2.584 6.012
λ+−1 24.389
∗ 13.036 18.653 15.745 38.823∗∗∗ 13.657
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Table B.4 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
λ+−2 4.648 6.433 7.436 7.489 5.561 6.661
Intercept 146.152∗∗∗ 49.514 195.332∗∗∗ 60.408 86.224∗∗ 54.921
# Observations 320 320 320
Wald χ2(19) 244.51 298.29 135.96
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.356 0.401 0.227
Performance Eq. Meal
Temporary shelters -0.576 0.579 -0.333 0.573 -0.953 0.661
Class size 0.377∗∗∗ 0.043 0.368∗∗∗ 0.051 0.405∗∗∗ 0.051
Teacher’s age 1.068 1.347 1.315 1.467 1.180 1.362
Teacher’s age square -0.005 0.020 -0.010 0.022 -0.005 0.021
Pupil’s age -0.256 0.431 -0.453 0.501 -0.152 0.455
High school diploma & more -2.768∗∗ 1.289 -3.568∗∗∗ 1.335 -1.976 1.434
Absenteeism 5.027∗ 3.058 -0.043 3.140 10.013∗∗∗ 3.261
Gender of pupil 1.396 1.238 -0.710 1.324 2.866∗∗ 1.391
Grade -4.917∗∗∗ 1.454 -9.533∗∗∗ 1.660 -0.122 1.614
Deworming at home -3.531∗∗ 1.717 -4.292∗∗ 1.813 -2.743 1.886
Islamic school -6.009∗∗∗ 1.181 -7.180∗∗∗ 1.321 -4.715∗∗∗ 1.413
Early childhood inst. 4.712 3.445 5.665 4.023 3.260 3.616
Snack -4.253∗ 2.277 -2.717 2.635 -4.379∗ 2.618
Pupils eat ﬁll 7.617∗∗∗ 1.568 7.492∗∗∗ 1.667 7.586∗∗∗ 1.854
Gender of household head 1.271 2.524 -1.371 3.162 4.352∗ 2.550
Lit. of household head 0.031 1.772 -1.396 1.901 0.884 1.981
Married -2.955 2.871 2.301 3.371 -8.175∗∗ 3.684
λ−+1 15.248
∗∗∗ 5.588 16.141∗∗∗ 5.917 13.537∗∗ 6.754
λ−+2 5.570
∗∗ 2.265 5.468∗∗ 2.449 5.903∗∗ 2.700
Intercept -1.559 21.626 -1.500 24.074 -7.209 21.917
# Observations 915 915 915
Wald χ2(19) 326.95 277.05 291.21
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.170 0.168 0.153
Performance Eq. Package
Temporary shelters 5.109∗∗∗ 1.588 4.772∗∗∗ 1.809 5.447∗∗∗ 1.925
Class size 1.094∗∗∗ 0.167 0.918∗∗∗ 0.184 1.270∗∗∗ 0.189
Teacher’s age -45.806∗∗∗ 7.100 -41.943∗∗∗ 8.370 -49.670∗∗∗ 8.188
Teacher’s age square 0.662∗∗∗ 0.099 0.605∗∗∗ 0.120 0.718∗∗∗ 0.114
Pupil’s age -2.376∗ 1.239 -2.580∗ 1.390 -2.171 1.334
High school diploma & more -18.169∗∗∗ 4.026 -21.428∗∗∗ 4.280 -14.911∗∗∗ 4.606
Absenteeism -28.398∗∗∗ 9.427 -18.943∗ 10.260 -37.853∗∗∗ 11.122
Gender of pupil -1.522 2.410 -2.182 2.674 -0.862 2.848
Grade -4.743 5.163 -8.657 5.915 -0.830 5.300
Deworming at home -5.012∗ 2.752 -4.619 3.328 -5.405 3.366
Islamic school 1.816 3.682 1.069 3.938 2.563 4.386
Early childhood inst. -14.486∗∗ 6.811 -10.298 6.825 -18.675∗∗ 9.133
Snack 1.302 5.644 1.527 5.840 1.077 7.072
Pupils eat ﬁll -0.029 4.594 1.950 4.358 -2.009 6.155
Gender of household head -2.709 4.383 -2.363 4.686 -3.054 4.773
Lit. of household head -3.546 3.994 -5.005 3.866 -2.087 4.795
Married -4.312 6.624 -4.114 7.045 -4.510 6.797
λ++1 80.384
∗∗∗ 18.355 68.143∗∗∗ 20.381 92.624∗∗∗ 22.789
λ++2 -47.396
∗ 27.553 -49.361 31.404 -45.432 32.294
Intercept 731.730∗∗∗ 105.850 695.734∗∗∗ 127.702 767.727∗∗∗ 123.242
# Observations 168 168 168
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Table B.4 – continued
Aggregate score French score Math score
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Wald χ2(19) 299.54 410.47 219.96
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.476 0.507 0.373
Performance Eq. Untreated
Temporary shelters -0.601∗ 0.313 -0.571∗ 0.319 -0.636∗ 0.356
Class size -0.036 0.026 -0.080∗∗∗ 0.026 0.007 0.031
Teacher’s age -0.471 0.526 -0.555 0.511 -0.384 0.620
Teacher’s age square 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.009
Pupil’s age 0.656∗∗ 0.298 0.522∗ 0.311 0.789∗∗ 0.322
High school diploma & more 0.874 0.694 0.128 0.695 1.627∗ 0.819
Absenteeism -3.556∗∗∗ 1.261 -0.128 1.353 -7.001∗∗∗ 1.353
Gender of pupil 1.130 0.728 0.254 0.705 2.003∗∗ 0.855
Grade -13.060∗∗∗ 0.959 -18.900∗∗∗ 1.012 -7.215∗∗∗ 1.113
Deworming at home -1.965∗ 1.022 -1.535 1.063 -2.389∗∗ 1.098
Islamic school 2.252∗∗∗ 0.780 1.864∗∗ 0.810 2.640∗∗ 0.909
Early childhood inst. 5.931∗∗∗ 1.531 6.724∗∗∗ 1.568 5.154∗∗∗ 1.729
Snack -2.311∗ 1.258 -1.879 1.411 -2.728∗∗ 1.335
Pupils eat ﬁll 4.699∗∗∗ 1.309 3.382∗∗ 1.339 6.016∗∗∗ 1.418
Gender of household head -3.243∗∗ 1.373 -3.234∗∗ 1.384 -3.261∗∗ 1.646
Lit. of household head 2.260∗∗ 1.030 3.086∗∗∗ 1.031 1.440 1.168
Married 0.879 1.813 1.202 1.769 0.570 2.187
λ−−1 14.650
∗∗∗ 3.452 15.842∗∗∗ 3.285 13.511∗∗∗ 4.162
λ−−2 -5.559
∗∗∗ 1.936 -4.644∗∗ 2.101 -6.439∗∗∗ 2.111
Intercept 46.542∗∗∗ 9.254 55.706∗∗∗ 9.063 37.308∗∗∗ 10.935
# Observations 2572 2572 2572
Wald χ2(19) 518.10 872.91 232.47
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.114 0.192 0.051
Notes a: Two-step; b: In log.
Signiﬁcance levels (bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table B.5: Determinants of rates: Generalized Roy’s model, (2-
stepa)
Enrollment rate Promotion rate Dropout rate
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Selection Eq. Deworming
Total pupils 0.0003∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗ 0.0001
Management committee 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056
Medicine box -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089 -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089 -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089
Association of mothers 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052
Cooperative school 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055
Water point 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059
Gender of pupil -0.029 0.047 -0.029 0.047 -0.029 0.047
Intercept -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067 -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067 -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067
Selection Eq. Meal
Total pupils 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001
Distance to school 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048
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Table B.5 – continued
Enrollment rate Promotion rate Dropout rate
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Management committee -0.045 0.042 -0.0456 0.042 -0.045 0.042
Association of mothers 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043
Cooperative school -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041
Rural council grant 0.569∗∗∗ 0.045 0.569∗∗∗ 0.045 0.569∗∗∗ 0.0457
Water point 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046
Disturbed courses 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044
Storage 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044
Gender of pupil -0.041 0.037 -0.041 0.037 -0.041 0.037
Intercept -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075 -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075 -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075
Performance Eq. Deworming
Temporary shelters -17.718∗∗∗ 1.372 -4.563∗∗∗ 0.832 3.877∗∗∗ 0.560
Class size -1.833∗∗∗ 0.180 -0.191 0.120 0.375∗∗∗ 0.078
Pupil’s age -0.802 0.562 -0.471 0.361 0.507∗∗ 0.239
Education expenditureb 6.397∗∗∗ 1.258 3.490∗∗∗ 0.941 -2.114∗∗∗ 0.619
Health expenditureb -0.322 0.328 -0.201 0.237 0.178 0.159
Livestock -0.129∗ 0.077 -0.038 0.069 0.044 0.049
Distance to school 14.758∗∗∗ 2.762 5.703∗∗∗ 2.191 -1.429 1.410
Gender of teacher 21.138∗∗∗ 3.323 11.811∗∗∗ 1.792 -11.421∗∗∗ 1.419
Continuing training - - -3.469∗∗ 1.620 - -
Gender of pupil 2.710 2.052 1.385 1.296 -1.721∗∗ 0.858
Islamic school 6.191∗∗∗ 2.337 4.217∗∗ 1.651 -2.940∗∗ 1.139
Early childhood inst. 1.763 2.816 -2.447 1.688 1.849∗ 1.122
Snack 5.863∗ 3.286 3.731∗ 2.002 -2.670∗∗ 1.273
Sick last 3 months - - -0.805 1.075 0.277 0.725
Pupils eat ﬁll 28.923∗∗∗ 3.800 15.421∗∗∗ 2.141 -10.674∗∗∗ 1.595
Gender of household head 2.794 3.136 2.558 1.988 -1.799 1.376
Lit. of household head 3.206 2.482 1.500 1.773 -0.470 1.275
Married -4.358 5.155 -1.001 3.477 0.673 2.356
Land -4.573 3.032 -4.560∗∗ 1.837 2.547∗ 1.464
λ+−1 -65.351
∗∗∗ 8.487 -3.835 6.480 23.827∗∗∗ 4.441
λ+−2 -38.792
∗∗∗ 4.391 8.434∗∗∗ 2.998 -3.129 2.201
Intercept 95.461∗∗∗ 27.436 40.598∗ 21.126 -9.200 14.720
# Observations 288 286 286
Wald χ2(d.o.f) 2276.27 (19) 1213.66(21) 2028.79(20)
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.790 0.528 0.696
Performance Eq. Meal
Temporary shelters 5.558∗∗∗ 0.577 2.835∗∗∗ 0.321 -0.994∗∗∗ 0.259
Class size -0.773∗∗∗ 0.100 0.143∗∗∗ 0.026 -0.242∗∗∗ 0.027
Pupil’s age 0.193 0.762 -0.173 0.220 -0.236 0.164
Education expenditureb -2.202∗ 1.152 -0.033 0.370 -0.056 0.305
Health expenditureb -0.351 0.565 -0.733∗∗∗ 0.219 0.498∗∗∗ 0.178
Livestock -0.101 0.087 -0.012 0.016 -0.024 0.023
Distance to school -4.514 3.076 2.597∗∗ 1.077 -0.873 1.049
Gender of teacher -34.665∗∗∗ 4.519 6.140∗∗∗ 1.028 -1.204 0.782
Continuing training - - -1.240 0.940 - -
Gender of pupil 1.057 1.926 -0.492 0.700 0.556 0.582
Islamic school 3.015 2.301 1.302 0.827 0.765 0.726
Early childhood inst. -14.563∗∗∗ 4.928 2.457 2.100 -4.149∗∗∗ 1.562
Snack -14.347∗∗∗ 3.786 -2.507∗ 1.318 1.587 1.175
Sick last 3 months - - -0.930 0.848 0.948 0.673
Pupils eat ﬁll 2.785 3.002 -2.704∗∗ 1.207 0.653 0.885
Gender of household head 13.535∗ 6.919 0.829 1.775 1.815 1.179
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Table B.5 – continued
Enrollment rate Promotion rate Dropout rate
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Lit. of household head 14.765∗∗∗ 3.149 2.875∗∗∗ 0.831 -0.282 0.736
Married -0.469 6.573 -1.701 1.784 -1.243 1.878
Land -3.955 5.090 1.093 1.395 1.562 1.186
λ−+1 42.324
∗∗∗ 7.314 -11.011∗∗∗ 2.738 7.086∗∗∗ 2.395
λ−+2 -25.219
∗∗∗ 4.571 15.937∗∗∗ 1.547 -9.221∗∗∗ 1.220
Intercept 70.729∗∗∗ 16.113 60.811∗∗∗ 5.263 27.725∗∗∗ 4.447
# Observations 827 822 822
Wald χ2(d.o.f) 379.93 (19) 273.15(21) 212.57 (20)
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.271 0.222 0.172
Performance Eq. Package
Temporary shelters -13.834∗∗∗ 0.584 5.512∗∗∗ 0.182 -0.868∗∗∗ 0.014
Class size -0.013 0.024 0.004 0.007 -0.0004 0.0006
Pupil’s age -0.047 0.040 0.032∗∗ 0.015 -0.001 0.001
Education expenditureb 0.001 0.068 0.003 0.023 -0.0004 0.001
Health expenditureb 0.021 0.063 -0.011 0.022 0.0009 0.001
Livestock 0.0006∗∗ 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0001 0.00002 0.00001
Distance to school 9.046∗∗∗ 0.340 -2.847∗∗∗ 0.106 0.237∗∗∗ 0.008
Gender of teacher 0.554∗ 0.335 -0.232∗ 0.118 0.015 0.008
Continuing training - - -0.123 0.085 - -
Gender of pupil 1.784∗∗∗ 0.094 0.700∗∗∗ 0.031 -0.079∗∗∗ 0.002
Islamic school -0.502∗∗∗ 0.149 0.158∗∗∗ 0.048 -0.012∗∗∗ 0.004
Early childhood inst. -0.387 0.255 0.106 0.074 -0.010∗ 0.006
Snack -0.226 0.200 0.068 0.052 -0.006 0.004
Sick last 3 months - - 0.017 0.025 -0.0005 0.002
Pupils eat ﬁll 0.340 0.250 -0.107 0.094 0.006 0.007
Gender of household head -0.209 0.142 0.061 0.048 -0.005 0.004
Lit. of household head -0.053 0.140 0.020 0.046 -0.002 0.003
Married 0.117 0.186 -0.054 0.062 0.004 0.005
Land -0.187 0.292 0.042 0.083 -0.006 0.007
λ++1 -167.168
∗∗∗ 0.797 -1.094 0.264 0.989∗∗∗ 0.021
λ++2 72.112
∗∗∗ 2.696 -23.553∗∗∗ 0.827 1.983∗∗∗ 0.069
Intercept 191.992∗∗∗ 1.855 101.787∗∗∗ 0.540 7.386∗∗∗ 0.047
# Observations 135 135 135
Wald χ2(d.o.f) 3.66e+06 (19) 327065.53 1.09e+06(20)
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99
Performance Eq. Untreated
Temporary shelters 2.571∗∗∗ 0.843 0.599∗∗∗ 0.194 -0.828∗∗∗ 0.171
Class size -0.449∗∗∗ 0.070 -0.027∗ 0.015 0.014 0.015
Pupil’s age -0.899 0.594 0.133 0.140 -0.233∗ 0.134
Education expenditureb 4.867∗∗∗ 0.917 0.067 0.173 -0.131 0.177
Health expenditureb -3.649∗∗∗ 0.585 -0.367∗∗∗ 0.105 0.346∗∗∗ 0.102
Livestock -0.413∗∗∗ 0.044 -0.074∗∗∗ 0.010 0.089∗∗∗ 0.010
Distance to school -12.540∗∗∗ 3.487 4.037∗∗∗ 0.629 -4.219∗∗∗ 0.608
Gender of teacher -20.712∗∗∗ 2.761 1.542∗∗ 0.684 0.722 0.665
Continuing training - - 2.225∗∗∗ 0.549 - -
Gender of pupil 0.149 2.072 0.733 0.539 -0.741 0.528
Islamic school 0.865 2.351 1.985∗∗∗ 0.474 -1.364∗∗∗ 0.447
Early childhood inst. 4.222 3.705 2.277∗∗∗ 0.708 -2.908∗∗∗ 0.624
Snack 1.371 3.371 -0.387 0.829 -0.380 0.899
Sick last 3 months - - 0.332 0.517 -0.222 0.496
Pupils eat ﬁll 31.105∗∗∗ 2.854 4.286∗∗∗ 0.966 -6.112∗∗∗ 1.044
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Table B.5 – continued
Enrollment rate Promotion rate Dropout rate
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Gender of household head -20.150∗∗∗ 4.069 1.075 0.866 0.434 0.696
Lit. of household head 17.791∗∗∗ 3.112 -0.466 0.659 -0.081 0.652
Married -4.055 7.092 -1.591 1.104 1.900∗ 1.039
Land -7.900∗∗ 3.738 3.034∗∗∗ 1.068 -3.034∗∗∗ 1.076
λ−−1 107.293
∗∗∗ 10.615 20.796∗∗∗ 2.161 -22.859∗∗∗ 2.143
λ−−2 23.885
∗∗∗ 6.695 -20.390∗∗∗ 1.233 19.688∗∗∗ 1.195
Intercept -19.412 13.954 73.448∗∗∗ 2.788 22.035∗∗∗ 2.870
# Observations 2312 2299 2299
Wald χ2(d.o.f) 1727.77(19) 812.10(21) 1033.09(20)
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.283 0.154 0.184
Notes a: Two-step; b: In log.
Signiﬁcance levels (bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table B.6: Determinants of rates: DISMa model, (2-stepb)
Enrollment rate Promotion rate Dropout rate
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Selection Eq. Deworming
Total pupils 0.0003∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗ 0.0001 0.0003∗ 0.0001
Management committee 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056 0.221∗∗∗ 0.056
Medicine box -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089 -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089 -0.496∗∗∗ 0.089
Association of mothers 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052 0.207∗∗∗ 0.052
Cooperative school 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055 0.262∗∗∗ 0.055
Water point 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059 0.582∗∗∗ 0.059
Gender of pupil -0.029 0.047 -0.029 0.047 -0.029 0.047
Intercept -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067 -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067 -1.942∗∗∗ 0.067
Selection Eq. Meal
Total pupils 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.0001
Distance to school 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048 0.193∗∗∗ 0.048
Management committee -0.045 0.042 -0.0456 0.042 -0.045 0.042
Association of mothers 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043 0.472∗∗∗ 0.043
Cooperative school -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.041
Rural council grant 0.569∗∗∗ 0.045 0.569∗∗∗ 0.045 0.569∗∗∗ 0.0457
Water point 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046 0.156∗∗∗ 0.046
Disturbed courses 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044 0.291∗∗∗ 0.044
Storage 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044 0.390∗∗∗ 0.044
Gender of pupil -0.041 0.037 -0.041 0.037 -0.041 0.037
Intercept -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075 -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075 -1.482∗∗∗ 0.075
Performance Eq.
Temporary shelters 6.700∗∗∗ 0.669 1.041∗∗∗ 0.161 -0.928∗∗∗ 0.158
Class size -0.451∗∗∗ 0.050 0.015 0.013 -0.021∗ 0.013
Teacher’s age -3.893∗∗∗ 1.056 -1.341∗∗∗ 0.343 0.354 0.314
Teacher’s age square 0.061∗∗∗ 0.015 0.017∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.005 0.004
Pupil’s age 0.268 0.342 0.202∗ 0.119 -0.207∗∗ 0.103
Education expenditurec -0.109 0.556 0.016 0.142 0.147 0.119
Health expenditurec -1.165∗∗∗ 0.333 -0.213∗∗ 0.087 0.144∗ 0.075
Livestock -0.019 0.022 -0.019∗∗∗ 0.006 0.011∗ 0.006
Continued on next page. . .
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Table B.6 – continued
Enrollment rate Promotion rate Dropout rate
Variable Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Primary schools 0.241 0.982 - - - -
Distance to school -7.556∗∗∗ 2.038 3.995∗∗∗ 0.477 -2.959∗∗∗ 0.470
Association of parents 10.440∗∗∗ 2.377 6.021∗∗∗ 0.787 -3.703∗∗∗ 0.468
Disturbed courses -4.018∗∗ 1.630 -4.573∗∗∗ 0.485 5.258∗∗∗ 0.411
Meals near school 1.121 1.325 -0.598 0.385 -0.529 0.406
Gender of teacher -6.145∗∗∗ 2.114 3.749∗∗∗ 0.495 -1.203∗∗∗ 0.453
Continuing training - - 1.315∗∗∗ 0.459 -1.090∗∗ 0.423
Absenteeism -0.113 3.067 -1.761∗∗∗ 0.578 -0.155 0.606
Gender of pupil 1.159 1.144 0.416 0.403 -0.535 0.356
Islamic school 2.991∗∗ 1.251 1.405∗∗∗ 0.394 -0.983∗∗ 0.394
Early childhood inst. -3.321 2.120 1.913∗∗∗ 0.696 -2.313∗∗∗ 0.609
Snack 4.155∗∗ 1.843 0.277 0.683 -0.143 0.715
Sick last 3 months - - -0.525 0.378 0.416 0.374
Pupils eat ﬁll 5.852∗∗∗ 2.042 2.307∗∗∗ 0.799 -3.261∗∗∗ 0.788
Gender of household head -3.988 2.741 0.790 0.657 0.884∗ 0.499
Lit. of household head 10.834∗∗∗ 1.614 -0.524 0.497 1.009∗∗ 0.453
Married -0.213 3.435 -0.627 0.870 -0.243 0.823
Land -4.760∗ 2.424 1.643∗∗ 0.744 -1.459∗ 0.797
School cost -3.771∗∗ 1.462
Islamic school com. 1.030 1.432 - - 1.167∗∗∗ 0.431
College - - -0.260 0.623 -1.213∗∗ 0.586
Diourbel 13.551∗∗∗ 3.995 5.728∗∗∗ 0.890 -4.680∗∗∗ 0.858
Kolda -76.376∗∗∗ 1.858 -5.258∗∗∗ 0.509 5.558∗∗∗ 0.534
Sedhiou -18.183∗∗∗ 2.721 9.914∗∗∗ 0.740 -6.079∗∗∗ 0.815
Deworming (T1) -8.007 10.196 7.548∗∗ 2.917 -9.645∗∗∗ 2.887
Meal (T2) 58.966∗∗∗ 5.924 -18.048∗∗∗ 1.646 13.065∗∗∗ 1.608
T1T2 1.623 3.601 9.494∗∗∗ 1.339 -2.799∗∗∗ 1.001
h1(T1, T2) -9.007∗ 5.140 -6.171∗∗∗ 1.486 3.943∗∗∗ 1.438
h2(T1, T2) -28.215∗∗∗ 3.804 12.224∗∗∗ 1.059 -10.518∗∗∗ 1.009
Intercept 65.993∗∗∗ 20.599 93.063∗∗∗ 5.516 14.921∗∗∗ 5.268
# Observations 3428 3487 3487
Wald χ2(d.o.f) 19968.66 (34) 2534.05(34) 3453.24 (35)
P > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adj R-squared 0.602 0.250 0.249
Notes a: Double-Index Selection Model; b: Two step; c: In log.
Signiﬁcance levels (bootstrap -100 replications-): ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Appendix B.4 Figures on the treatment eﬀect heterogeneity
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Figure B.1: Distribution of treatment eﬀects for aggregate score. [Top]: Average Treatment
Eﬀect (ATE) [Bottom-left]: Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Treated (ATET). [Bottom-right]:
Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Nontreated (ATENT)
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Figure B.2: Distribution of treatment eﬀects for French score. [Top]: Average Treatment Ef-
fect (ATE) [Bottom-left]: Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Treated (ATET). [Bottom-right]:
Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Nontreated (ATENT)
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Figure B.3: Distribution of treatment eﬀects for math score. [Top]: Average Treatment Eﬀect
(ATE)[Bottom-left]: Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Treated (ATET). [Bottom-right]: Average
Treatment Eﬀect on the Nontreated (ATENT)
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Figure B.4: Distribution of sequential and substitution eﬀects on the treated. [Top]: Aggregate
score [Bottom-left]: French score. [Bottom-right]: Math score
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Figure B.5: Distribution of sequential and substitution eﬀects on the nontreated. [Top]: Aggre-
gate score [Bottom-left]: French score. [Bottom-right]: Math score
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Figure B.6: Distribution of treatment eﬀects for enrollment rate. [Top]: Average Treatment
Eﬀect (ATE) [Bottom-left]: Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Treated (ATET). [Bottom-right]:
Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Nontreated (ATENT)
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Figure B.7: Distribution of treatment eﬀects for promotion rate. [Top]: Average Treatment
Eﬀect (ATE) [Bottom-left]: Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Treated (ATET). [Bottom-right]:
Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Nontreated (ATENT)
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Figure B.8: Distribution of treatment eﬀects for dropout rate. [Top]: Average Treatment Ef-
fect (ATE) [Bottom-left]: Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Treated (ATET). [Bottom-right]:
Average Treatment Eﬀect on the Nontreated (ATENT)
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Figure B.9: Distribution of sequential and substitution eﬀects on the treated. [Top]: Enrollment
rate [Bottom-left]: Promotion rate. [Bottom-right]: Dropout rate
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Figure B.10: Distribution of sequential and substitution eﬀects on the nontreated. [Top]: En-
rollment rate [Bottom-left]: Promotion rate. [Bottom-right]: Dropout rate
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Appendix C.2 Comparison of attritors and non attritors
Table C.3: Descriptive statistics on the attrition status, 2009
Attritors Non attritors t-test
Variable Mean St.Dev. # Obs. Mean St.Dev. # Obs. p > |t|
All sample
Aggregate score 36.082 19.332 924 40.516 19.856 2610 0.000∗∗∗
French score 35.929 20.896 924 40.370 21.669 2610 0.000∗∗∗
Math score 36.193 21.338 924 40.663 21.736 2610 0.000∗∗∗
Repetition rate 6.435 7.560 896 5.373 5.908 2522 0.000∗∗∗
Promotion rate 80.739 12.563 896 82.882 11.944 2522 0.000∗∗∗
Dropout rate 16.865 11.810 896 14.721 11.412 2522 0.000∗∗∗
Temporary Shelters 1.793 1.289 925 1.678 1.413 2610 0.029∗∗
Number of hours 0.205 0.508 925 0.167 0.528 2610 0.053∗
Distance to school 0.741 0.437 925 0.827 0.378 2610 0.000∗∗∗
School manual 1.251 1.264 925 1.113 1.121 2610 0.003∗∗∗
Household sizea 9.616 5.820 925 9.719 5.724 2610 0.638
Pupil age 9.864 1.882 925 9.605 1.701 2610 0.000∗∗∗
Primary schools 1.436 0.990 896 1.446 1.059 2522 0.803
Livestock 10.027 19.668 925 12.065 29.532 2610 0.051∗∗∗
Lit. of household head 0.161 0.367 925 0.192 0.394 2610 0.035∗∗
Land 0.915 0.278 925 0.939 0.239 2610 0.014∗∗
Koranic school com. 0.489 0.500 896 0.452 0.497 2522 0.052∗
Treated
Aggregate score 33.172 18.195 516 38.659 18.702 1370 0.000∗∗∗
French score 33.459 19.804 516 38.465 20.369 1370 0.000∗∗∗
Math score 32.811 20.187 516 38.856 21.003 1370 0.000∗∗∗
Repetition rate 7.156 8.081 516 5.263 6.081 1370 0.000∗∗∗
Promotion rate 79.324 13.177 516 81.113 12.394 1370 0.006∗∗∗
Dropout rate 18.965 12.372 516 17.339 11.754 1370 0.008∗∗∗
Temporary shelters 2.017 1.242 516 1.655 1.350 1370 0.000∗∗∗
Number of hours 0.220 0.560 516 0.194 0.657 1370 0.425
Distance to school 0.792 0.405 516 0.837 0.369 1370 0.023∗∗
School manual 1.321 1.386 516 1.066 1.062 1370 0.000∗∗∗
Household sizea 9.289 5.592 516 9.615 5.745 1370 0.269
Pupil age 9.868 1.824 516 9.493 1.614 1370 0.000∗∗∗
Primary schools 1.312 0.565 516 1.229 0.495 1370 0.001∗∗∗
Livestock 7.868 16.387 516 9.561 18.183 1370 0.064∗∗∗
Lit. of household head 0.180 0.384 516 0.192 0.394 1370 0.538
Land 0.891 0.311 516 0.937 0.241 1370 0.000∗∗∗
Koranic school com. 0.577 0.494 516 0.567 0.495 1370 0.685
Control
Aggregate score 39.762 20.108 408 42.566 20.874 1240 0.017∗∗
French score 39.053 21.828 408 42.474 22.845 1240 0.008∗∗∗
Math score 40.471 22.002 408 42.659 22.357 1240 0.085∗∗∗
Repetition rate 5.457 6.657 380 5.503 5.695 1152 0.895
Promotion rate 82.659 11.418 380 84.985 11.028 1152 0.000∗∗∗
Dropout rate 14.013 10.354 380 11.607 10.152 1152 0.000∗∗∗
Temporary shelters 1.511 1.293 409 1.703 1.480 1240 0.019∗∗
Number of hours 0.186 0.435 409 0.136 0.328 1240 0.013∗∗
Distance to school 0.677 0.468 409 0.816 0.387 1240 0.000∗∗∗
School manual 1.162 1.087 409 1.164 1.182 1240 0.975
Household sizea 10.028 6.078 409 9.835 5.700 1240 0.558
Pupil age 9.733 1.947 409 9.729 1.785 1240 0.972
Primary schools 1.605 1.353 380 1.704 1.429 1152 0.233
Livestock 12.750 22.886 409 14.832 38.166 1240 0.297
Lit. of household head 0.136 0.344 409 0.191 0.393 1240 0.011∗∗
Land 0.946 0.225 409 0.940 0.236 1240 0.659
Koranic school com. 0.371 0.483 380 0.315 0.465 1152 0.047∗∗
Continued on next page. . .
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Table C.3 – continued
Attritors Non attritors t-test
Variable Mean St.Dev. # Obs. Mean. St.Dev. # Obs. p > |t|
Note a: Household size per adult equivalent.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Table C.4: Descriptive statistics of attritors by group, 2009
Attritors of control Attritors of treatment t-test
Variable Mean St.Dev. # Obs. Mean St.Dev. # Obs. p > |t|
Aggregate score 39.762 20.108 408 33.172 18.195 516 0.000∗∗∗
French score 39.053 21.828 408 33.459 19.804 516 0.000∗∗∗
Math score 40.471 22.002 408 32.811 20.187 516 0.000∗∗∗
Repetition rate 5.457 6.676 380 7.156 8.081 516 0.000∗∗∗
Promotion 82.659 11.418 380 79.324 13.177 516 0.000∗∗∗
Dropout rate 14.013 10.354 380 18.965 12.372 516 0.000∗∗∗
Temporary shelters 1.511 1.293 409 2.017 1.242 516 0.000∗∗∗
Distance to school 0.677 0.468 409 0.792 0.405 516 0.000∗∗∗
Number of hours 0.186 0.435 409 0.220 0.560 516 0.312
School manual 1.162 1.087 409 1.321 1.386 516 0.057∗∗
Household sizea 10.028 6.078 409 9.289 5.592 516 0.055∗∗
Pupil age 9.733 1.947 409 9.968 1.824 516 0.058∗∗
Primary schools 1.605 1.353 380 1.312 0.565 516 0.000∗∗∗
Livestock 12.750 22.886 409 7.868 16.387 516 0.000∗∗∗
Lit. of household head 0.136 0.344 409 0.180 0.384 516 0.075∗∗
Land 0.946 0.225 409 0.891 0.311 516 0.002∗∗∗
Koranic school com. 0.371 0.483 380 0.577 0.494 516 0.000∗∗∗
Note a: Household size per adult equivalent.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Appendix C.3 Descriptive statistics after program
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Summary in Dutch
Programmabeoordeling is een belangrijk instrument om beleidsmakers te informeren over de
doeltreﬀendheid van programma’s en de doeltreﬀende toewijzing van hulpmiddelen. In verschil-
lende studies werd de impact onderzocht van schoolmaaltijd- en ontwormingsprogramma’s op de
onderwijsresultaten in ontwikkelingslanden. Er bestaan echter nog altijd tegenstrijdige bewijzen
over de doeltreﬀendheid van die programma’s met betrekking tot de schoolresultaten. Er zijn
ook weinig bewijzen van de kosteneﬃcie¨ntie van die programma’s. Hoewel er in de laatste jaren
in Senegal voedings-en gezondheidservaring ontwikkeld is, is er geen empirisch onderzoek voor
de beoordeling van de impact van schoolmaaltijd- en ontwormingsprogramma’s op de schoolre-
sultaten dat ook thema’s behandelt met betrekking tot de complementariteit of vervangbaarheid
van de twee programma’s.
In deze scriptie wordt ernaar gestreefd dit hiaat op te vullen. We maken gebruik van experi-
mentele en observationele gegevens en vertrouwen op zowel programmabeoordeling als op een
structurele aanpak. De scriptie is opgedeeld in 5 hoofdstukken. Na een introductie in hoofd-
stuk 1 wordt er in hoofdstuk 2 gebruik gemaakt van observationele gegevens om de impact van
maaltijden en ontworming als aparte programma’s te beoordelen. We bestuderen de impact van
deze programma’s op de schoolprestaties gemeten door proefresultaten, terwijl er verder wordt
gegaan op de factoren die de proefresultaten bepalen. Dit verklaart dat de maaltijd- en ontworm-
ingsprogramma’s de resultaten van leerlingen kunnen verhogen. De impact van elk programma
is belangrijker voor leerlingen die op school zitten in samenhang met hun moeders. Ontwormen
op school heeft een positief eﬀect op de prestaties van de leerlingen, terwijl de ontworming thuis
een negatieve impact heeft op hun resultaten. Daarnaast verhoogt het ontwormingsprogramma
de resultaten aanzienlijk van leerlingen die op school zitten in associateie met hun moeders of
schoolproject. Onder de determinanten van de proefresultaten hebben de onderwijsuitgaven, de
grootte van het huishouden, de Koranschool, de instelling voor de vroege kinderjaren en het
bestaan van een school in het dorp een positief eﬀect op de prestaties van de leerlingen, terwijl
controles zoals verstoorde cursussen, tijdelijke onderkomens, het geslacht en lerarenafwezigheid
een negatieve invloed op hun cijfers. Op het gebied van de beleidsanalyse toont het Plaatselijke
Gemiddelde Behandelingseﬀect (Local Average Treatment Eﬀect, LATE) dat wanneer het doel
is om de resultaten te verhogen het de meest kosteneﬃcie¨nte manier is om de kantine en de
oudervereniging te combineren in vergelijking met andere opties waaronder het beheercomite´,
het schoolproject, de schoolcoo¨peratie en de vermindering van de lerarenafwezigheid.
In hoofdstuk 3 worden de waarnemingsgegevens gebruikt om de voedings- en ontwormingspro-
gramma’s van de school te beoordelen als een pakket voor de schoolprestaties (totaalscore, score
voor Frans, score voor wiskunde, inschrijving, percentage zittenblijvers en vroegtijdige schoolver-
laters), terwijl er verder wordt ingegaan op de determinanten van die prestaties. In dit hoofdstuk
wordt een model ontwikkeld voor twee behandelingen, wat het mogelijk maakt verschillende be-
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handelingseﬀecten in te schatten, terwijl ook onderwerpen in verband met de complementariteit
of vervangbaarheid van de programma’s worden behandeld. Er is gebleken dat zowel maaltijd-
als ontwormingsprogramma’s de behaalde cijfers verhogen, maar de combinatie van de twee pro-
gramma’s is nuttiger voor de verhoging van de prestaties van de leerlingen. De volgorde van de
uitvoering speelt geen rol. De twee programma’s zijn complementair om de cijfers en slaagper-
centages te verhogen. Zij zijn echter substituten om het aantal vroegtijdige schoolverlaters te
verminderen. Uit de kosten-batenanalyse blijkt dat ontworming veruit goedkoper is dan school-
maaltijden. De uitvoering van maaltijdprogramma’s vo´o´r ontworming is echter kosteneﬃcie¨nter
dan omgekeerd.
Op het vlak van de bepalende factoren van de cijfers komen de in dit hoofdstuk vastgestelde
resultaten overeen met die in hoofdstuk 2. Bovendien heeft ontworming thuis een negatieve in-
vloed op de cijfers, terwijl het bestaan van latrines en van een apparaat om de handen te wassen
op school een positief eﬀect heeft op de cijfers.
Een interessant en intu¨ıtief resultaat is dat het hebben van een geletterd gezinshoofd het in-
schrijvingspercentage verhoogt. Het inschrijvingspercentage daalt daarentegen samen met de
schoolkosten. Dit resultaat is belangrijk voor het onderwijsbeleid met het oog op de vermin-
dering van de analfabetiseringsgraad in landelijke gebieden waar de levensstandaard zeer laag
is. Als beleidsmakers gezinnen inderdaad willen aanmoedigen om hun kinderen naar school te
sturen, zou het interessant zijn om ervoor te zorgen dat de onderwijskosten niet te hoog zijn. Er
zijn nog twee vermeldenswaardige resultaten: het hebben van een mannelijke leraar en bezitten
van bouwland hebben een negatieve invloed op de inschrijvingscijfers.
Samengevat suggereren de bevindingen uit het oogpunt van de bepalende factoren van de school-
resultaten in hoofdstuk 2 en 3 dat hoewel opvangcentra het percentage van vroegtijdige schoolver-
laters verminderen en een positieve invloed hebben op de inschrijvings- en slaagpercentages, ze
ook bijdragen tot de vermindering van de prestaties (cijfers) van de leerlingen. Als schoolboeken
bovendien de competentie van de leerlingen kunnen verbeteren, lijkt het eﬀect op de scores
negatief te zijn, wanneer het aantal leerlingen per handboek hoger wordt (meer dan 4 leerlin-
gen per handboek). Het doorvoeren van een beleid om de lerarenafwezigheid en storingen te
verminderen zal de kwaliteit van het onderwijs verbeteren. Het lijkt ook belangrijk om meer
ervaren leerkrachten (vanaf 33 jaar oud) en vrouwelijke leraren te bevorderen. Ten slotte kunnen
de prestaties van de leerlingen onder andere verbeterd worden door de leraren aan te moedigen
om de beroepskwaliﬁcaties CAP en CEAP te halen, leraren met een diploma van de middelbare
school en meer als academische kwaliﬁcatie te ondersteunen en de duur van de voortgezette
lerarenopleiding te verhogen.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt gebruik gemaakt van experimentele gegevens om de impact van het
maaltijdprogramma op de schoolresultaten te beoordelen in de aanwezigheid van afbouwing en
gedeeltelijke naleving. De schattingsresultaten tonen aan dat het schoolmaaltijdprogramma de
prestaties van de leerlingen en het inschrijvingspercentage aanzienlijk verhoogt en het percentage
van vroegtijdige schoolverlaters vermindert. Het programma verhoogt daarentegen het percent-
age zittenblijvers en vermindert het slaagpercentage, wat onverwacht is. Dit kan voortvloeien
uit de door de Senegalese regering genomen maatregelen die eruit bestaan het zittenblijven te
elimineren tijdens het eerste jaar van elke stap in de lagere schoolcyclus en wordt beperkt tot
5% van het maximaal percentage zittenblijvers op het einde van elke stap.
Er is ook vastgesteld dat het maaltijdprogramma een groter eﬀect heeft voor meisjes ten opzichte
van jongens in het geval van de wiskundescore, terwijl jongens beter presteren dan de meisjes
voor Frans.
Uit de kosten-batenanalyse in dit hoofdstuk blijkt dat het maaltijdprogramma gerechtvaardigd is
uit het oogpunt van de economische voordelen, terwijl het resultaat van de kosten-batenanalyse
overeenkomt met de bevindingen in hoofdstuk 3.
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt een overzicht gegeven van de belangrijkste bevindingen van alle hoofd-
stukken plus enkele beleidsimplicaties. Er wordt ook ingegaan op de beperkingen van de scriptie
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en de noodzaak van toekomstige onderzoeksprojecten wordt gerechtvaardigd.
Over het algemeen worden er in deze scriptie empirische bewijzen verstrekt van de impact van
maaltijd- en ontwormingsprogramma’s op de schoolresultaten door middel van zowel experi-
mentele als niet-experimentele onderzoeken. Voor zover we weten, is dit het eerste onderzoek
dat aantoont dat de combinatie van maaltijd- en ontwormingsprogramma als pakket doeltref-
fender zou zijn om de schoolresultaten te verhogen, terwijl het eﬀect van elke tussenkomst en
diverse andere eﬀecten gegeven worden om de beleidsmakers te informeren.
Short biography of the author
Fatoumata Lamarana Diallo Sow was born and grew up in Labe´, Guinea on July 31, 1980.
She completed her high school education in Mathematical Science at Labe´ in 1999. In 2004,
Mrs. Sow holds a master degree in Economics from Gamal Abdel Nasser University in Conakry,
Guinea after one year spent at the ‘Centre Pre´paratoire Commun (CPC)’ of the Polytechnic
Institute at the same university where she successfully completed the year. In 2006, she received
her Post-graduate diploma in International Economics from the University Cheikh Anta Diop
(UCAD) in Dakar thanks to a scholarship from the ‘Programme de Troisie`me Cycle Inter-
universitaire (PTCI)’. To obtain her post-graduate diploma, she wrote on the topic ‘Analyzing
multidimensional poverty in Guinea using the fuzzy set approach’ for which she got a research
grant from the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) based in Nairobi. Since 2008,
she has been following the ‘Nouveau Programme de Troisie`me Cycle Inter-universitaire (NPTCI)’
in Africa as a PhD fellow. She also completed specialization courses in Economics of Human
Resources in the PhD program. In 2010, and 2011 Mrs. Sow has been a visiting PhD fellow at
the United Nations University-Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation
and Technology (UNU-MERIT) in Maastricht, Netherlands. Parallel to her PhD research, Mrs.
Sow is a teaching assistant at the faculty of Economics at UCAD. She is also a research assistant
at the ‘Consortium pour la Recherche Economique et Sociale (CRES)’, where she participates
actively in the research activities of the institute since 2007. In addition, since 2012, Mrs. Sow is
a member of the Knowledge Platform Development Policies created by the Ministry of Foreign
Aﬀairs in the Netherlands.
During the research for her PhD, Mrs. Sow attended several conferences and seminars including
the African Econometric Society (AES) Conference on ‘Econometric Modelling in Africa’, at
the Kenya School of Monetary Studies, July, 2011, Nairobi, Kenya; the Center for the Study
of African Economies (CSAE) Conference 2010 ‘Economic Development in Africa’ University of
Oxford, March, 2010 Oxford, United Kingdom and the Africa Research Workshop, October, 2011
at UNU-MERIT. In addition, she is a member of the African Economic Research Consortium
(AERC) network and the Partnership for Economic Policy (PEP) network, and has received
fellowships and grants from NPTCI, AERC, UNU-MERIT and the ‘Ministe`re de l’Enseignement
Supe´rieur et de la Recherche’ of Senegal.
 2014 
83. Fatoumata Lamarana Diallo 
Evaluation of Meal and Deworming Programs for 
Primary Schools in Rural Senegal 
 
2013 
82. Anant Kamath 
Information Sharing through Informal Interaction in 
Low-Tech Clusters 
 
81. Flavia Pereira de Carvalho 
What we talk about when we talk about Brazilian 
Mulitantionals: an investigation on Brazilian FDI, 
economic structure, innovation and the relationship 
between them 
 
80. Jun Hou 
Complementarity in Innovation and Development: A 
Cross-country Comparison 
 
79. Rufin Baghana 
Impacts of Government Incentives to R&D, 
Innovation and Productivity:  
A Microeconometric Analysis of the Québec Case 
 
78. Lilia I. Stubrin 
High-Tech Activities in Emerging Countries: A 
Network perspective on the Argentinean biotech 
activity 
2012 
77. Abdul Waheed 
Innovation Determinants 
and Innovation as a Determinant:  
Evidence from Developing Countries 
76. Bilal Mirza 
Energy Poverty and Rural Energy Markets in 
Pakistan 
75. Benjamin Engelstätter 
Enterprise Software and Video Games: An Empirical 
Analysis 
Fulvia Farinelli 
Natural Resources, Innovation and Export Growth: 
The Wine Industry in Chili and Argentina 
Rodolfo Lauterbach 
Innovation in Manufacturing: From Product Variety 
and Labor Productivity Growth to Economic 
Development in Chile 
74. Kirsten Wiebe 
Quantitative Assessment of Sustainable 
Development and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
73. Julio Miguel Rosa 
Organizational Strategies, Firms' Performance and 
Spatial Spillovers. The Canadian Case in Research 
and Development. 
Johannes Wilhelmus Marie Boels 
Joseph Schumpeter, honderd jaar economische 
ontwikkeling. Een historisch-theoretische 
beschouwing.  
2011 
72. Daniel Vertesy 
Interrupted Innovation: Emerging economies in the 
structure of the global aerospace industry.  
71. Tina Saebi 
Successfully managing alliance portfolios: an 
alliance capability view.  
70. Nora Engel 
Tuberculosis in India - A case of innovation and 
control.  
69. Evans Mupela 
Connectivity and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: The 
role of communication satellites 
68. Nantawan Kwanjai  
Cross cultural intelligence amid intricate cultural 
webs – A tale of the UnDutchables in the land of 
1002 smiles 
67. Lina Sonne 
Innovation in Finance to Finance Innovation: 
Supporting pro-poor entrepreneur-based 
innovation 
2010 
66. Fernando Santiago 
Human Resources Management Practices and 
Learning for Innovation in Developing Countries: 
Pharmaceutical Firms in Mexico 
65. Zakaria Babutsidze 
Essays on Economies with Heterogenous Interacting 
Consumers 
64. Bertha Vallejo 
Learning and Innovation Under Changing Market 
Conditions: The Auto Parts Industry in Mexico 
63. Donatus Ayitey 
Technical Change, Competitiveness and Poverty 
Reduction: A Study of the Ghanaian Apparel 
Industry 
62. Sergey Fillipov 
Multinational Subsidiary Evolution: Corporate 
Change in New EU Member States 
61. Asel Doranova 
Technology Transfer and Learning under the Kyoto 
regime; Exploring the Technological Impact of CDM 
projects in developing countries 
2009 
60. Alexis Habiyaremye 
From Primary Commodity Dependence to 
Diversification and Growth”. “Absorptive Capacity 
and Technological Catch Up in Botswana and 
Mauritius”. 
59. Yoseph Getachew 
The Role of Public Capital in Economic Development 
58. Sandra Leitner 
Embodied Technological Change and Patterns of 
Investment in Austrian Manufacturing 
57. Semih Akçomak 
The Impact of Social Capital on Economic and Social 
Outcomes 
56. Abraham Garcia 
The Role of Demand in Technical Change 
55. Saurabh Arora 
Coherence in socio-technical systems: a network 
perspective on the innovation process 
2008 
54. Rutger Daems 
Medicines for the developing world 
53. Johannes Hanel 
Assessing Induced Technology - Sombart's 
Understanding of Technical Change in the History of 
Economics 
52. Rifka Weehuizen 
Mental Capital: the economic significance of mental 
health 
51. Danielle Cloodt 
The relationship between R&D partnership 
formation, social embeddedness and innovative 
performance 
50. Sabine Fuss 
Sustainable Energy Development under Uncertainty 
2007 
49. Tobias Kronenberg 
Reconciling Environmental Conservation with 
Economic Prosperity: The Feasibility of Double 
Dividends in the Short and Long Run 
48. Viktoria Kravtsova 
Assessing the Impact of Foreign Direct Investment 
in Transition Economies 
47. Suhail Sultan 
The Competitive Advantage of Small and Medium 
Sized Enterprises: The Case of Jordan's Natural 
Stone Industry 
2006 
46. Bulat Sanditov 
Essays on Social Learning and Imitation 
45. Mamata Parhi 
Dynamics of New Technology Diffusion: A Study of 
the Indian Automotive Industry 
44. Andreas Reinstaller 
Social structures and the innovation process: Their 
role in the demand of firms and consumers 
43. Rose Kiggundu 
Innovation systems and development : the journey 
of a Beleaguered Nile Perch Fishery in Uganda 
42. Thomas Pogue 
The Evolution of Research Collaboration in South 
African Gold Mining: 1886-1933 
41. Geoffrey Gachino 
Foreign Direct Investment, Spillovers and 
Innovation: The Case of Kenyan Manufacturing 
Industry 
40. Önder Nomaler 
Technological Change, International Trade and 
Growth - An Evolutionary, Multi-Agents-Based 
Modeling Approach 
2005 
39. Samia Satti Osman Mohamed-Nour 
Change and Skill Development in the Arab Gulf 
Countries 
38. Elad Harison 
Intellectual Property Rights: Economics and Policy 
Analysis 
37. Daniel Dalohoun 
The relationship between R&D partnership 
formation, social embeddedness and innovative 
performance: a multi-level approach of social 
embeddedness 
36. Müge Ozman 
Networks, Organizations and Knowledge 
35. Bas Straathof 
Product variety and economic growth - The 
counteracting effects of scale and idiosyncrasy 
34. Wilfred Schoenmakers 
Knowledge Flows between Multinational 
Companies: A Patent Data Analysis 
33. Myriam Cloodt 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) in High-Tech 
Industries: Measuring the Post-M&A Innovative 
Performance of Companies 
2004 
32. Paola Criscuolo 
R&D Internationalisation and Knowledge Transfer. 
Impact on MNEs and their Home Countries 
31. Maarten Verkerk 
Trust and Power on the Shop Floor 
30. Gottfried Leibbrandt 
Adoption, harmonization and succession of network 
technologies across countries 
29. Mark Sanders 
Skill Biased Technical change - Its Origins, the 
Interaction with the Labour Market and Policy 
Implications 
2003 
28. Nadine Roijakkers 
Inter-firm cooperation in high-tech industries: a 
study of R&D partnerships in pharmaceutical 
biotechnology 
27. Viki Sonntag 
Speed, Scale and Sustainability 
26. Masaru Yarime 
From End-of-Pipe Technology to Clean Technology 
25. Stéphane Malo 
The combinatorial Chemistry Revolution - 
Sustaining a Superior Performance Position through 
Technological Learning 
2002 
24. Annelies Hogenbirk 
Determinants of Inward Foreign Direct Investment: 
the Case of the Netherlands 
2001 
23. John Adeoti 
Technology Investment in Pollution Control in Sub-
Saharan Africa: The Case of the Nigerian 
Manufacturing Industry 
22. Edward Huizenga 
Innovation Management: How Frontrunners Stay 
Ahead. An Empirical Study on Key Success Factors in 
the ICT sector 
2000 
21. Machiel van Dijk 
Technological Change and the Dynamics of 
Industries. Theoretical Issues and Empirical 
evidence from Dutch Manufacturing 
1999 
20. Jan Cobbenhagen 
Managing Innovation at the Company Level: A Study 
on Non-Sector-Specific Success Factors 
19. Marjolein Caniëls 
Regional Growth Differentials: The Impact of Locally 
Bounded Knowledge Spillovers 
1998 
18. Aldo Geuna 
Resource allocation and knowledge production: 
Studies in the economics of university research 
1996 
17. Reinoud Joosten 
Dynamics, Equilibria, and Values 
16. Hugo Kruiniger 
Investment, R&D, and the Financing Decisions of 
the Firm 
1995 
15. Hans van Meijl 
Endogenous Technological Change: The Case of 
Information Technology. Theoretical Considerations 
and Empirical Results 
14. René Kemp 
Environmental Policy and Technical Change. A 
Comparison of the Technological Impact of Policy 
Instruments 
13. Rohini Acharya 
The Impact of New Technologies on Economic 
Growth and Trade. A Case Study of Biotechnology 
12. Geert Duysters 
The Evolution of Complex Industrial Systems. The 
Dynamics of Major IT Sectors 
11. Marjan Groen 
Technology, Work and Organisation, A Study of the 
Nursing Process in Intensive Care Units 
1994 
10. Huub Meijers 
On the Diffusion of Technologies in a Vintage 
Framework; Theoretical Considerations and 
Empirical Results 
9. Theon van Dijk 
The Limits of Patent Protection. Essays on the 
Economics of Intellectual Property Rights 
8. Hans Voordijk 
Naar Integrale Logistiek in Bedrijfsketens, 
Ontwikkelingen in de Bouw 
1993 
7. Paul Diederen 
Technological Progress in Enterprises and Diffusion 
of Innovations. Theoretical Reflections and 
Empirical Evidence. 
6. Ben Dankbaar 
Economic Crisis and Institutional Change. The crisis 
of Fordism from the perspective of the automobile 
industry 
5. Hanno Roberts 
Accountability and Responsibility: The Influence of 
Organisation Design on Management Accounting 
1992 
4. Bart Verspagen 
Uneven Growth Between Interdependent 
Economies. An Evolutionary View on Technology 
Gaps, Trade and Growth 
3. Sjoerd Romme 
A Self-organization Perspective on Strategy 
Formation 
1989 
2. John Spangenberg 
Economies of Scale, and Atmosphere in Research 
Organisations 
1988 
1. John Hagedoorn 
Evolutionary and heterodox innovation analysis : a 
study of industrial and technological development 
in process control and information technology 
 
 
